招標(biāo)文件外文翻譯-- 激勵機(jī)制和獎勵辦法競爭性招標(biāo)在采購與談判

1、<p><b>　　外文原文1：</b></p><p>　　Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement</p><p>　　Steven Tadelis Patrick

2、 Bajari</p><p>　　University of California Berkeley University of Michigan</p><p>　　Haas School of Business Department of Economics</p><p>　　Janua

3、ry, 2006</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we a f

4、ramework that ?rst describes the buyer’s choice of contracts, and then links this choice to the selection of competitive tendering or negotiations. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of com

5、petitive tendering. These may perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders.</p><p>　　1 Introduction</p><p>　　Manufactured goods,

6、 such as computers, TVs and automobiles are mass produced, have standardized characteristics and are typically purchased at list price. Other goods, such as new buildings, fighter jets, custom software or consulting serv

7、ices are tailored to?t a procurer’s specific and often unique needs. To procure these customized goods,the procurer hires a contractor who supplies the good according to a set of desired specifications. We call this the

8、procurement problem.</p><p>　　The procurement problem has attracted much attention both in policy and in academic circles. The main focus of academic economists has been on procurement by the public sector,

9、in part because of its sheer importance to the economy.For example,procurement by federal, state and local government accounts for more than 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product in the United States. Many private sector

10、transactions are also governed by procurement contracts. Prominent examples include electronics compone</p><p>　　When considering the procurement of goods and services, the procurer is faced with many challe

11、nges. First, she has to choose what exactly should be procured, and how to transmit her needs to the potential suppliers. Second, a contract must be laid out that includes contractual obligations and methods of compensat

12、ion. Third, the procurer needs to decide how to award the procurement contract between the potential suppliers.Finally, the award mechanism should result in the selection of a quali?ed a</p><p>　　Following u

13、p on these last two points, competitive tendering is widely recognized asan attractive procurement mechanism and is commonly advocated for several reasons.Most notably it is viewed as a procedure that stimulates and prom

14、otes competition.By its nature, open competitive tendering invites potential suppliers from many venues.Furthermore, in the face of competition from many potential suppliers each one has strong incentives not to in?ate h

15、is price. Indeed, fair market price discovery is </p><p>　　Interestingly, there is widespread use of both competitive tendering and negotiations in the private sector. For example, from 1995 to 2000, forty-f

16、our percent of private sector non-residential building construction projects in Northern California were procured using negotiations, while only eighteen percent were procured using open competitive tendering. The use of

17、 negotiations with single source suppliers is also common in high tech and software, and used for defence procurement as well. This </p><p>　　To put this Chapter in perspective it is worth observing that mos

18、t of the economic analysis describes the procurement problem as follows. The supplier has information about production costs that the procurer does not have. The procurer then has to consider clever ways to infer the sup

19、pliers costs, such as ering the supplier many potential projects to choose from, and having the supplier select the one that will be produced.</p><p>　　In contrast, scholars and practitioners of engineering

20、and construction management argue that the central problem in procurement is not that suppliers know so much more than procurers at the onset of the project, but that instead both procurers and suppliers share uncertaint

21、y about many important design changes that occur after the contract is signed and production begins. These changes are usually a consequence of design failures, unanticipated conditions, and changes in regulatory require

22、ments</p><p>　　An illustrative example of the signi?cance of ex post adaptation is the building of the Getty Center Art Museum in Los An geles, which is a 24 acre, $1 billion dollar facility that took over 8

23、 years to construct (see Engineering New-Record 1994, 1997). The project design had to be changed due to site conditions that were hard to anticipate. The geology of the project included canyons, slide planes and earthqu

24、ake fault lines, which posed numerous challenges for the team of architects and contract</p><p>　　These observations suggest that the procurement problem may indeed be primarily one of smoothing out or circu

25、mventing adaptations after the project begins rather than information revelation by the supplier before the project is selected. In this Chapter we argue that the form of contracts and award mechanisms can be tailored in

26、 a way to help mitigate this procurement problem. In particular, a trade between incentives to reduce cost and incentives to facilitate changes and share information will </p><p>　　We argue that simple proje

27、cts, which we de?ne as easy to design with little uncertainty about what needs to be produced, ought to be procured using ?xed-price contracts,should be accompanied by high levels of design completeness (to prevent the n

28、eed for adaptations), and are best awarded through competitive tendering. In contrast, complex projects, which we de?ne as hard to design with large scope for surprises in the final configuration ought to be procured usi

29、ng cost-plus contracts, should be </p><p>　　The intuition for our prescriptions stems from a tension between providing incentives to lower costs and avoiding costly and wasteful renegotiation that follows re

30、quests for changes. The strong incentives to reduce costs that are oered by ?xed-price tendered contracts will lead the parties to the transaction to dissipate valuable surplus when changes need to be renegotiated. This

31、eciency loss will often be due to haggling over prices when there is true lock-in of the current supplier who wishes </p><p>　　We continue to argue that the choice of payment procedures, such as ?xed price a

32、nd cost plus contracts, is tied in with the follow-up decision that a procurer faces: whether to award a procurement contract by competitive tendering or by negotiating with a potential supplier</p><p>　　Whi

33、le our research has been motivated by practices in the private sector, it oers implications for the public sector as well. In the U.S. the public sector statutes that govern procurement, typically based on FARs, strongly

34、 favor the use of competitive bidding. For example, from 1995 to 2000, ninety-seven percent of public sector building construction projects in Northern California were procured using competitive bidding.While competitive

35、 bidding does have the advantage of unbiased awarding of </p><p>　　We begin our analysis in the next section with a simple framework to describe the procurer’s choice of devising a contract that will govern

36、the procurement relationship with a selected supplier. We then continue to describe how the contracts chosen will dictate the use of award mechanisms. We conclude with a discussion of implications for business strategy a

37、nd public procurement.</p><p><b>　　中文翻譯1：</b></p><p>　　激勵機(jī)制和獎勵辦法：競爭性招標(biāo)在采購與談判</p><p>　　史蒂芬Tadelis 帕特里克Bajari 密歇根大學(xué)

38、 加州大學(xué)伯克利分校 經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系 哈斯商學(xué)院 2006年1月 </p><p><b>　　摘要 </b></p><p>　　買方會使用一個定制好的競爭性招標(biāo)

39、或談判選擇承包商嗎？為了關(guān)注這個問題，我們提供了一個框架，首先介紹合同買方的選擇，然后將這個選擇與競爭性招標(biāo)或談判相聯(lián)系。分析表明對于使用競爭性招標(biāo)有大量可能性的限制。當(dāng)項目是復(fù)雜的時候，這些可能會執(zhí)行不佳，合同的設(shè)計也不完整，很少有可用的競投者。此外，競爭性招標(biāo)，可能會扼殺買家和賣家的交流，防止利用承包商的專業(yè)買家當(dāng)設(shè)計項目。這些結(jié)果在采購的啟示私營和公共部門進(jìn)行了討論。 </p><p><b>

40、　　1 引言</b></p><p>　　制成品，如電腦，電視和汽車的大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)，他們有標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的特點，通常按價格表購買。其他商品，比如新的建筑，戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)，定制軟件或咨詢服務(wù)定制是針對采購人的具體要求購買，他們通常有特殊的需要。獲取這些定制產(chǎn)品，采購人雇用了一個能根據(jù)一套理想的規(guī)格提供物品的承包商。我們稱這種為采購問題</p><p>　　采購問題已經(jīng)引起了政治界和學(xué)術(shù)界的廣泛關(guān)注

41、。專業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的主要焦點已經(jīng)在公共部門的采購，部分是由于它對于經(jīng)濟(jì)有純粹的重要性。1例如，在美國，聯(lián)邦，州和當(dāng)?shù)卣牟少徴紘鴥?nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分之十幾。許多私營部門交易也是需要用采購合同。突出的例子包括電子元器件，定制軟件，汽車生產(chǎn)和建筑施工。</p><p>　　當(dāng)考慮采購的貨物和服務(wù)時,采購者面臨許多挑戰(zhàn)。首先,她必須選擇究竟什么應(yīng)該被采購，怎樣傳遞需要到潛在的新供應(yīng)商。第二,一個合同必須設(shè)置合同義務(wù)和補(bǔ)償方法

42、。第三,采購者需要決定如何獎勵潛在供應(yīng)商之間的采購合同。最后,這個獎項機(jī)制會導(dǎo)致一個合格的選擇和理想供應(yīng)商和在實施一個有效的最終產(chǎn)品。</p><p>　　隨后這兩場分,競爭投標(biāo)是被廣泛認(rèn)可一個有吸引力的采購機(jī)制和普遍提倡這有幾個原因。最明顯的是被看作是一個過程,激發(fā)和促進(jìn)競爭。由其自身的性質(zhì)決定,開放的競爭投標(biāo)邀請來自許多潛在的供應(yīng)商場所。此外,面對競爭的每個人都有許多潛在的供應(yīng)商他不充氣的強(qiáng)烈沖動的價格。事實

43、上,公平市場價格發(fā)現(xiàn)是經(jīng)常吹捧為一種有益的由于這樣的招標(biāo)。開放的競爭機(jī)制以他們的透明度,使它更容易防止腐敗公眾。無論是在在采購經(jīng)理和私營部門可能鼓勵鉆機(jī)系統(tǒng)以換取賄賂和其它好處。這些特點,以及贊成平等機(jī)會,提供正當(dāng)?shù)穆衫缏?lián)邦的習(xí)得條例》(美國聯(lián)邦航空局法規(guī)),強(qiáng)烈支持使用在美國的競爭投標(biāo)公共部門.</p><p>　　有趣的是,有普遍使用的兩個競爭投標(biāo)和談判在私營部門。舉例來說,從1995年到2000年,百分之

44、四十四的私人建筑施工項目的棚舍在加利福尼亞州北部被發(fā)現(xiàn)利用談判,而只有百分之十八的人收購利用開放的競爭招標(biāo)。使用單一的供應(yīng)商的談判中也常見高技術(shù)和軟件,并用于國防采購。本章提供了一個框架比較競爭投標(biāo)的談判并將這些獎付款程序機(jī)制的選擇,在合同。特別是,它試圖當(dāng)競爭投標(biāo)揭示與固定造價合同將被優(yōu)先考慮談判成本加成合同,什么時候不該吃。</p><p>　　把這一章,是值得觀察角度,大部分的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析采購問題描述如下。供應(yīng)

45、商已經(jīng)信息對生產(chǎn)成本并不存在。這然后不得不聰明的方法來推導(dǎo)出考慮供應(yīng)商費用,如提供供應(yīng)商很多潛在項目的選擇,并且在選擇一個供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)生.</p><p>　　相反,學(xué)者和教育工作者的工程施工管理認(rèn)為的中心問題,供貨商采購是不知道的比較多在分娩比項目,但這兩不是和供應(yīng)商分享的不確定性對變化,許多重要的設(shè)計后的合同簽署、生產(chǎn)開始。這些改變通常是由于設(shè)計失敗、不可預(yù)見的條件,和改變監(jiān)管要求。</p><

46、;p>　　一個數(shù)值例子的意義是事后適應(yīng)的建筑蓋蒂中心在洛杉磯藝術(shù)博物館,這是一個24畝,設(shè)施,10億美元接管了8年的構(gòu)裝體(請參閱《工程技術(shù)New-Record 1994、1997、)。這個項目設(shè)計必須改變由于現(xiàn)場條件使人難以預(yù)料。這地質(zhì)的項目包括峽谷、飛機(jī)和地震的斷層滑動,哪一個為球隊帶來諸多挑戰(zhàn)建筑師與承包商。例如，承包商“刺痛了一個滑”,竟然搬到75000立方公尺的地球。更多的嚴(yán)重的,在1994年一場地震。鋼焊縫裂紋的這個建

47、筑物的框架承包商重新引起的充分性和耐震設(shè)計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的內(nèi)容被使用。工程設(shè)計必須改變也由于法規(guī)環(huán)境- 107項目被放置于建筑物使用執(zhí)照的條件。這些問題很難預(yù)測,都procurer和承包商。然而,似乎合理的,一旦問題的出現(xiàn),承包商具有優(yōu)良的相關(guān)信息成本和實施辦法的變化。最近的一種和更多的爭議例子就是“大挖"在波士頓,在那里12000改變超過150設(shè)計和建造合同已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致16億美元的成本超支,其中大部分即可追溯到設(shè)計和現(xiàn)場條件不與期望。&l

48、t;/p><p>　　這些觀察建議,問題可能確實是采購為主理順或偽裝的適應(yīng),而不是項目后開始信息披露前由供應(yīng)商提供項目選擇。在這一章我們認(rèn)為合同的形式和獎勵機(jī)制可以剪裁的幫助緩解這個采購問題。特別是,一個激勵之間的協(xié)調(diào)為了降低成本和鼓勵促進(jìn)變化和分享信息將鑰匙部隊在爭論合同的選擇。我們認(rèn)為,簡單的職業(yè)活動,我們定義為易于設(shè)計和小的不確定性對生產(chǎn)所需要的,應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得使用固定價格合同,應(yīng)伴有高水平的設(shè)計完整性(防止需要嗎適

49、應(yīng)),所以最好是通過競爭獲得招標(biāo)。相反,復(fù)雜項目,我們定義為大范圍很難設(shè)計驚喜的決賽配置,應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得成本加成合同使用,必須有人陪同低含量的完整性(意味著設(shè)計高機(jī)會,適應(yīng)了合同將需要),應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得通過談判和水平的和合格供應(yīng)商。</p><p>　　為我們的直覺處方源于緊張關(guān)系提供獎勵降低成本,避免昂貴和浪費,暨南請求之后變化。強(qiáng)烈的刺激,以降低成本提供固定轉(zhuǎn)化合同將導(dǎo)致雙方交易的時候再剩余價值要改審議。這種效率損失,常

50、常會由于磋商價格有真的鎖定現(xiàn)有供應(yīng)商的希望使用需要改變自己的優(yōu)勢。成本加成合同,相反,阻止節(jié)約的努力但談判過程中變化減緩和適應(yīng)合同正本要求。</p><p>　　我們繼續(xù)認(rèn)為付款程序的選擇,如固定價格成本加成合同,是與后續(xù)的決定綁在一個procurer面:不管授予競爭性招標(biāo)采購合同或通過談判的潛在的供應(yīng)商。而我們的研究實踐的對話已經(jīng)激發(fā)了私營機(jī)構(gòu),它提供了公共部門的意義。在美國公共部門的律例管理采購,通常是基于美

51、國聯(lián)邦航空局法規(guī),大力支持使用具有競爭力招標(biāo)。舉例來說,從1995年到2000年,百分之九十七的公共部門的建筑在加利福尼亞北部,是建設(shè)項目使用競價收購。在招標(biāo)的優(yōu)點是無偏見的獎勵的計劃,它沒有反映優(yōu)化,事后的適應(yīng)。這表明公共采購復(fù)雜的項目是遭受效率損失我們開始我們的分析在下一節(jié)里與一個簡單的框架來描述采購者選擇設(shè)計,采購合同管理的關(guān)系用選定的供應(yīng)商。然后我們繼續(xù)描述如何選擇合同決定使用獎勵機(jī)制。我們的結(jié)論的影響進(jìn)行了討論經(jīng)營策略及公共采

52、購.</p><p><b>　　外文原文2： </b></p><p>　　Subcontracting and Competitive Bidding on </p><p>　　Incomplete Procurement Contracts</p><p>　　Daniel P. Miller

53、 </p><p>　　University of Minnesota</p><p>　　Job Market Paper</p><p>　　November 12, 2008</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　This paper invest

54、igates the cost implications of contractual incompleteness and itse ect on subcontracting decisions in the bridge construction industry. Construction contracts are incomplete because the original blueprints and specicati

55、ons may require modications during construction. According to the transactions cost theory of the rm|Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)|such contract revisions can lead to signicant bargaining and renegotiation costs. Furth

56、ermore, theory predicts these costs are lar</p><p>　　1 Introduction</p><p>　　Subcontractors play a vital role in the construction industry. They perform 50% of the work on civil projects and 75%

57、 to 100% on a typical private construction project.1But, the contractualhazards of subcontracting plague the industry. Sweet (2004), an expert on the legal aspects of construction contracting, expresses this sentiment by

58、 titling his chapter on subcontracting The Achilles Heel of Construction Management." The hazards he refers to usually involve contract changes, and the costs mani</p><p>　　Construction projects begin w

59、ith the preparation of plans, specications, and blueprints. For reasons largely unpredictable and out of the control of both buyers and contractors, modications and revisions will be made.3Such changes require contractor

60、s and their subcontractors to adapt the construction process without direction from a prior written contract. This is the sense in which construction contracts are incomplete. According to incomplete contracting theories

61、 of therm(Coase, 1937; Williams</p><p>　　pricing; bids submitted ex-ante, not costs incurred ex-post, establish the terms of compensation. Primary contractors, who submit bids, and the subcontractors they hi

62、re are liable for all costs. Consequently, forward looking, rational contractors will assess the likelihood that design changes will occur and incorporate anticipated adaptation costs into their bids.</p><p>

63、;　　I develop a model representation of the design-bid-build process and propose a measure of con-tractual incompleteness to address four quantitative questions. What is the eect of incompleteness on cost if a subcontract

64、or performs work? What is the e ect if a primary contractor performs work?Do these eects dier? Finally, what are the dollar-valued magnitudes? The baseline prediction is that cost increases in the degree of incompletenes

65、s under both arrangements, but with a larger marginal eect for </p><p>　　A vast body of empirical work qualitatively analyzes how rms are organized. These traditional studies, lacking cost measures, only add

66、ress the third question listed above: does incompleteness(or some other parameter) a ect the probability of subcontracting? There is very little quantitativeevidence about the impact of rm boundaries on economic outcomes

67、 such as cost. This has been a major critique in this literature (Hubbard, 2008; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007; Klein, 2005). This paper o ers one of</p><p>　　The unit of analysis is at a detailed level. The en

68、gineer's speci cations list construction work items and corresponding quantities. On bridge contracts, tasks range from heavy engineering jobs such as installing structural concrete, steel, asphalt, and drilling to a

69、ncillary tasks such as trac striping, fencing, and landscaping. For each task, bidders decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor. They also submit a unit price bid expressed as dollars per unit of

70、 quantity. Un</p><p>　　Incompleteness is inherently a di cult concept to measure. A measurement should capture contractors' beliefs about the non-contracted contingencies that might occur during the ex-p

71、ost build phase. Many contingencies alter blueprints, which, in turn, requires an adjustment in quan-tities actually installed. I propose a measure based on quantity changes. Specically, the dierence between the work ite

72、m quantity in the original blueprints and the quantity actually installed af-ter blueprint revisions</p><p>　　Bidding and subcontracting decisions depend on incompleteness. I do not explicitly model the mech

73、anics of the ex-post bargaining process; nor do I model any other ex-ante actions taken in anticipation of bargaining. Instead, I treat the predictions of theory in a reduced form manner and use the model to show why the

74、 incompleteness proxy a ects forecasted unit costs and thesubsequent subcontracting decision.In a subgame, </p><p>　　I model subcontract formation.I model the strategic aspects of bidding which also depend o

75、n quantity changes. These are scoring auctions. The total bid is calculated by multiplying unit price bids with original quantities,then summing those values across tasks. For each task, the winner is paid its unit price

76、 bid times the quantity actually installed. Di erences in original and nal quantities induce strategic bidding behavior. The basic intuition described by Athey and Levin (2001) shows that bi</p><p>　　The mod

77、el collapses to a linear econometric specication. A unit price bid is the dependent vari-able and the proxy for incompleteness is the key explanatory variable. There are two potentially confounding factors: bid skewing a

78、nd the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. Bid-skewing terms derived from the auction model enter linearly. To account for the endogeneity of subcon- tracting decisions, I use a xed eect method which exploits the un

79、ique panel data structure. I see multiple observation</p><p>　　Finally, I add exibility by making a distinction between heavy construction tasks and ancillary tasks. The predominant view in the industry is t

80、hat prime contractors lack core competencies and a minimum e cient scale on ancillary tasks. I will argue that it is ambiguous whether the e ect of incompleteness on subcontracting costs should be hypothesized to be grea

81、ter than that for prime-contracting. (I invent the word primecontracting" for a dichotomy with the term subcontracting. Primecontracting</p><p>　　1.1 Contribution to Existing Literature</p><p

82、>　　This study joins an emerging literature that quantities the impact of rm boundaries on economic outcomes. Recent examples include Gil (2008) (industry: cinemas and performance outcome: movie run length), Ciliberto

83、(2006) (hospitals and capital investments), Forbes and Lederman (2007)(airlines and ight delays), and Novak and Stern (2008) (automobiles and consumer quality ratings).Others Baker and Hubbard (2004) (trucking and fuel e

84、conomy) and Levin and Tadelis (2008)(municipal services and city e</p><p>　　I adopt a more structural approach than most work in this literature by analyzing an auction setting. The timing of bid submissions

85、 provides a crisp division between ex-ante contract formation(design and bid) and ex-post contract execution (build). This means bids capture all costs of both ex-anted incentive distortions and ex-post bargaining. Where

86、as many of the previous studies consider intermediate outcomes that partially related to the pro tability objectives of rms, bids fully encapsulate c</p><p>　　This study of contractual incompleteness falls i

87、nto the class of empirical work that considers uncertainty and complexity of a transaction. Seminal contributions include Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten (1984) and Masten et al. (1991). They nd a higher degree of co

88、mplexity is asso-ciated with a lower probability of subcontracting. Recent work by Gil (2007) (movies), Acemoglu,Aghion, Grith, and Zilibotti (2007) (R&D intesity), Forbes and Lederman (2006) (airlines) Levinand Tade

89、lis (2008) (muni</p><p>　　Besides providing evidence about theory, this study has practical signicance. Public procure-ment agencies emphasize the competitive aspects of contracting. They </p><p&g

90、t;　　try to promote competition with the goal of reducing bidder markups. Markup estimates are small, around 4%.9This suggeststhere are negligible gains available from promoting further competition. Instead, eorts to writ

91、e more complete construction plans could generate signi cant cost savings|up to 17% for the trans-actions most sensitive to incompleteness. Moreover, the civil engineering industry is important to study given the urgency

92、 to replace and repair \structurally de cient" public infrastruc</p><p>　　This work is related to the empirical auctions literature. There is an especially large body of work on highway procurement auct

93、ions including the contributions of Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Krasnokutskaya (2004), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2007), Marion (2008), De Silva et al. (2008), an

94、d Bajari and Lewis (2008). This is the rst study to use work items as the unit of observation within the context of a structural auction model.10</p><p>　　Previous empirical work on bid skewing (Athey and Le

95、vin, 2001; Bajari et al., 2007) restricted attention to just one dimension of skewing. I model the bid skewing decision as a portfolio choice problem. That is, the correlation structure in quantity change risk across all

96、 tasks determines the optimal skew on any given task. The proposed empirical technique recovers the correlation structure of risk. Risk aversion in auctions has attracted attention in both the empirical auctions and expe

97、rimental</p><p>　　In summary, this study o ers four contributions. First, I quantity, rather than qualitatively assess, the e ects of incompleteness and integration decisions on cost. The second contribution

98、 regards the quality of the data. I perform analysis at the detailed level of a work item. The sample includes over 12,000 individual transactions. I propose a well de ned notion of incompleteness,and the unique panel da