報(bào)告的盈余管理，以避免政治上的成本沙特阿拉伯公司的研究【外文翻譯】

1、外文翻譯原文：TheManagementofReptedEarningstoAvoidPoliticalCosts:AStudyofSaudiArabianFirmsIntroductionAfterthe2006accountingrelatedscalsinSaudiArabia(e.g.AnaamInternationalHoldingGroupBishahAgricultureDevelopmentCompany)boththe

2、financialpressaccountingregulat(SaudiganizationfCertifedPublicAccountantshereafterSOCPA)haveexpressedconcernaboutthepervasivenessofearningsmanagementtheoverallintegrityoffinancialreptinginSaudiArabia.Theaccountingempiric

3、alliteratureinSaudiArabiaindicatesthatearningsmanagementbehaviourdoesexistamongSaudilistedcompanies.Almoghaiwli(2001)focusedonasingleaccountingpolicynamelytheZakatpolicyprovidedempiricalevidenceontherelationshipbetweenth

4、eaccountingtreatmentofZakatby48Saudilistedcompaniesin1995incentivesfearningsmanagement.Alsehali(2006)testedtherelationshipbetweenaggregateaccrualsincentivesfearningsmanagement.Hefoundthatduringtheperiod20012004managersof

5、40Saudicompaniesmanipulateaccrualsindertoreachspecificbenchmarksinthelevelofreptedearningsunderstateanyrealunfavourableearnings(e.g.earningslossesearningsdecreases).ThisstudyissomewhatsimilartothestudiesofAlmoghaiwli(200

6、1)Alsehali(2006)inthatitsaimistoempiricallyinvestigatethefactsthatmayexplainthepresenceofearningsmanagementinSaudiArabia.HoweverourstudydiffersfromthetwoSaudistudiesinthatitdevelopsanexplicitlinkbetweenthepoliticalproces

7、sinSaudiArabiaitseffectonconductingearningsmanagementbehaviour.MespecificallythecurrentstudypredictsthatmanagersofSaudilistedcompaniesmanagereptedearningssoastoavoidthepotentialpoliticalcostsofthegoalsofthe20052009Saudid

8、evelopmentplanincluding“privatisationofgovernmentownedmanagementshareholderswherebymanagersmaytakedecisionsthatmaximisetheirownexpectedutilitywealthratherthantheshareholders’expectedutilitywealththeconflictbetweenshareho

9、ldersdebtholderswherebyshareholdersmaytakedecisionsthatarenotinthebestinterestsofdebtholders.Thebonusplanmotivationisanexampleontheconflictofinterestbetweenafirm’smanagersshareholders.Thismotivation(GuidryLeoneRock1999Ga

10、verGaverAustin1995McNicholsWilson1988Healy1985)suggeststhatmanagersmayengageinearningsmanagementindertomaximisecompensation.Thishappenswhencompensationisatleastpartiallyrelatedtoprofitabilityresults.Thebasicfmulationofth

11、ebonusplanhypothesis(Healy1985)statesthatmanagerstendtoreduceearningsiftheyareeitherabovetheupperbelowthelowerbonusplanlimitwhiletheytendtoincreaseearningswhentheyareinbetweenthetwolimits.Theconflictofinterestbetweenshar

12、eholdersdebtholdersgivesrisetotheagencycostsofdebt.Theseagencycostsarebnebyshareholdersifnoactionistakentoreducethembymonitingbondingdevices.Therefeitisassumedthatshareholdershaveincentivestoenterintomonitingbondingcontr

13、actswhichusuallyincludecovenantsrestrictingtheirabilitytoengageinopptunisticbehaviour.Theearningsmanagementliterature(e.g.RishardsonTunaWu2002Sweeney1994PressWeintrop1990)maintainsthatmanagershavetheincentivetomanageearn

14、ingstoavoidviolatingcovenantsindebtcontracts.Mespecificallytheliteraturesuggeststhatmanagerstendtoincreaseearningswhentheyareclosetotheviolationofcovenantsbasedonprofitabilityindertoavoidtheriskofcancellationrenegotiatio

15、nofdebt.IntheiraggregatedearningsmanagementstudyHealyWahlen(1999)alsostatedthatearningsmanagementincludethealteringofreptedfinancialinfmationbymanagerstomisleadsomeoutsidersabouttheunderlyingeconomicperfmanceofthecompany