會(huì)計(jì)外文翻譯--轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)中的研發(fā)和企業(yè)績(jī)效

1、<p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Financial Management of R&D</p><p>　　Financial thinking about R&D has evolved well beyond basic discounted cash flow models. Better tools have b

2、een developed to value intellectual capital, including the quantitative assessment of the value added by R&D. The dissection of the elements of risk and the application of real options theory are new features of the

3、R&D landscape. Financing vehicles have also changed with an enormous surge of venture capital and private equity funds. The analyst’s toolbox has been enhanced by electronic spr</p><p>　　Industrial R&

4、;D is characteristically a high-risk investment with a deferred payoff. Its importance to industrial societies, and to individual firms within these economies, is paramount；Lau has estimated that more than 50% of the wea

5、lth creation in developed countries originates from technology, which is typically a product of R&D. However, R&D comes at a cost, and it is as capable of destroying value as creating it. Knowing the difference i

6、s crucial; the penalties for underinvestment can be a de</p><p>　　But measuring the difference between value creation and value destruction is not easy. One source of confusion is that accounting conventions

7、 treat R&D as an expense, not an investment. An even more fundamental issue is that past performance is not a reliable guide to future performance.</p><p>　　Faced by a measurement problem that is both di

8、fficult and important, the business financial and academic communities have continued improving their tools. As a result, R&D analysis and management has evolved dramatically in the past fifty years (3), and that evo

9、lution is far from over.</p><p>　　In its first postwar phase, industrial R&D was viewed as a creative enterprise and</p><p>　　Its’ management was left to the R&D directors. Their main fi

10、nancial metric was an annual budget (a tool basically inadequate to evaluate an investment). The budget was in part determined by industry benchmarks, such as R&D expense as a percentage of revenues. Accordingly, the

11、 financial skills of R&D executives were largely focused on cost accounting and cost control (4).In many companies, top management(often lacking personal experience in R&D)didn’t have a clue about the relationshi

12、p of value t</p><p>　　The second phase, in the 1970s, was the introduction of increasingly powerful tools for evaluating investments under risk being adopted by financial analysts to R&D, leading to a ci

13、rcumstance I would describe as “the apparent triumph of DCF (Discounted Cash Flow).”The use of DCF in evaluating investments was an important step forward in that it introduced the discipline of business plans, factored

14、in the concept of risk, and helped bridge the communications gap between technical and non-technica</p><p>　　The word value has become a fixture of the business lexicon during the past two decades. Unfortuna

15、tely, this omnipresent word is being used in two very different contexts: economic value and market value. The two forms of value are not at all the same. The distinction is profound for R&D, because innovation initi

16、ally comes at a cost ion economic value, but is equally often a driver for market value!</p><p>　　Economic Value</p><p>　　The term Economic Value is invoked in much current business jargon, expl

17、icitly</p><p>　　In such concepts as Economic Value Added (EVA), and implicitly in discussions of “value chains,” and “value propositions.” The economic value of an enterprise is determined by the projected s

18、um of its free cash flows, discounted by its cost of capital.</p><p>　　The EVA concept, although traceable to Albert P. Sloan, the legendary CEO of General Motors, was reintroduced to the corporate community

19、 by the firm Stern Stewart in the 1990s, with considerable impact. EVA is defined as net operating profit minus an appropriate charge for the opportunity cost of all capital invested in the</p><p>　　Enterpri

20、se. (The relationship between EVA and Economic Value is simple: Economic</p><p>　　Value is just the sum of the EVA’s added by the enterprise in each successive year.)</p><p>　　EVA is an estimate

21、 of true “economic profit,” or the amount by which earnings exceed or fall short of the required minimum rate of return that shareholders and lenders might earn by investing in alternative securities of comparable risk.&

22、lt;/p><p>　　The Crisis in Valuation; When Market Value Didn’t Track</p><p>　　Market Value</p><p>　　For professional investors in securities, the bottom line is not economic return, it

23、is total shareholder return (TSR), defined as the appreciation of the stock price plus dividend payments. This is “cash is king” reasoning, since liquid securities and cash dividends mean cash to an investor. To money ma

24、nagers, total return is also their report card. In such a world, the Market Value of a stock is the final metric, and Economic Value is but one component of it. Investors also gauge each firm’s s</p><p>　　Ec

25、onomic Value </p><p>　　A part of the crisis in valuation arose from the growing differences between market value and the accountant’s perspective of valuation based on historical cost. While this circumstan

26、ce could, in principle, have resulted from smart management delivering superior cash flows, this explanation did not hold up when the actual cash flow projections of the companies were considered. </p><p>　　

27、Young is based on cash flow anticipated in the next five years-the outer limit of the proverbial “short-term”. Thus, more than 75 percent of the valuation of the total stock market must be related to something other than

28、 short-term economic value. In this scenario, as long as perceptions of opportunity grew faster than economic capital, the growth sector would outperform the “value” sector, and hence would attract more investment. This

29、cascade effect would result in higher price-earnings ratios,</p><p>　　During the 1990s, as the valuation gap was growing, a host of articles began to extend the venerable concept of intellectual property to

30、the concept of intellectual or</p><p>　　Knowledge capital, which added an important new dimension to intangible assets. Some writers even choose to define intellectual capital as the difference between marke

31、t value and the value of the tangible assets. This approach is exemplified by this quotation: The greatest challenge facing any organization today is in understanding the huge differential between its balance sheet and m

32、arket valuation. This gap represents the core value of the company – its Intellectual Capital.</p><p>　　From this traditional base, the concept was now extended to include the knowledge of the organization a

33、nd its employees, and its ability to learn. It thus went far beyond the more limited concepts of know-how and trade secrets. Most importantly, there was recognition that intellectual and human capital could far outweigh

34、tangible capital for valuation purposes.</p><p>　　This insight was important, but yet not very definitive." But the idea of intellectual capital is a new one,” wrote P.H. Sullivan ,”it brings to the for

35、eground the brainpower assets of the organization, recognizing them as having a degree of importance comparable to the traditional land, labor, and tangible assets. If a survey were conducted, there would be agreement th

36、at many modern companies are filled with intellectual capital: law firms, consulting firms, software companies, computer compani</p><p>　　Technology appraisal</p><p>　　A practical application of

37、 the economic value approach to intellectual property developed considerably during the 1990s.It has been termed technology appraisal. The approach is basically a DCF valuation of a pro forma business plan incorporating

38、the technology being appraised .Technology appraisal has been used primarily for tax purposes: for example, the valuation of patents donated to universities by companies such as Dow Chemical or the valuation of in-proces

39、s R&D in mergers and acquisitions.</p><p>　　New trends in corporate finance, and a new toolkit, are naturally to be expected to cause structural changes in industrial R&D. In fact, the changes that h

40、ave taken place in the past two decades have been remarkably far-reaching.</p><p>　　The Impact of Leveraged Buyouts (LBO’s)</p><p>　　The 1980s marked the advent of the leveraged buyout era and i

41、ts sibling, the high- yield or “junk” bond. The era culminated spectacularly in the RJR bidding war, depicted in the book and subsequent movie, Barbarians at The Gate (38), the book, The Predator’s Ball (39), and the imp

42、risonment of prominent participants for insider trading and securities violations. About $400 billion of LBO’ s were financed in the decade of the 1980s.Excessive bids, such as for RJR, caused a broad collapse of the fi&

43、lt;/p><p>　　LBO’ s were generally financed with 10 percent or less equity put up by limited partners and 90 percent by bank loans and subordinated debt, typically in the form of</p><p>　　High yield

44、 bonds floated by Drexel Burnham Lambert and others. An LBO becomes a</p><p>　　Possibility when the share price of the target company has fallen to a level where the required debt to purchase the company can

45、 be paid down quickly by a combination of</p><p>　　asset sales and cash flow from operations. Ideally, the company is purchased with its own assets, leaving the investors with a large profit after the debt b

46、urden is eliminated.</p><p>　　The LBO strategy is not one of maximizing value; it is one of maximizing cash flow. The target company may be substantially depleted of physical and intellectual capital at the

47、 end of the game. Ironically, however, an LBO comes into play when management’s efforts to enhance value have either failed, or are perceived by the marketplace to be failing.</p><p>　　There were lasting eff

48、ects from this traumatic period, some beneficial and some less so. Managements rapidly became more disciplined about value creation when it became apparent that they were vulnerable to a raid, or were missing opportuniti

49、es to</p><p>　　enhance shareholder value. The notion was that if shareholders could benefit from streamlining, downsizing, etc. management would do it before the raiders arrived to do it for them. Corporatio

50、ns shed expensive frills, such as costly headquarters, unprofitable divisions, and pet projects, to focus on core operations, and to scrutinize new acquisitions and capital investments from an economic value viewpoint. T

51、he well-publicized reign of Jack Welch at General Electric symbolized many of the elemen</p><p>　　The effects on R&D finance were significant: long-term R&D, and R&D not targeted to existing busi

52、nesses, was often curtailed to shore up short-term cash flow. This process took place not only within companies that were in LBO mode, but also in companies that considered themselves LBO targets. Many large central rese

53、arch centers were downsized or eliminated, and those that remained were tied directly to strategic business units (Sub’s), which had now become the focus of value creation. In additio</p><p>　　Source: F. Pet

54、er Boer .Financial Management of R&D. Research Technology Management，2002, pp1-28</p><p><b>　　譯文:</b></p><p><b>　　研發(fā)財(cái)務(wù)管理</b></p><p>　　研發(fā)財(cái)務(wù)管理的思想演變發(fā)展遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過基本

55、的現(xiàn)金貼現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流模型，財(cái)務(wù)的研發(fā)工具中已經(jīng)發(fā)展到了智力資本的價(jià)值，其中包括定量?jī)r(jià)值的評(píng)估。解剖風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要素和實(shí)物期權(quán)理論的應(yīng)用是財(cái)務(wù)研發(fā)新的特點(diǎn)，同時(shí)融資工具也在發(fā)生變化，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本和私人股本資金大量激增。分析師的工具箱已經(jīng)被提高到了電子表格，網(wǎng)上數(shù)據(jù)庫，蒙特卡羅軟件，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)，以及無處不在的個(gè)人電腦。</p><p>　　工業(yè)研發(fā)是典型的遞延收益與高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的項(xiàng)目，這個(gè)對(duì)工業(yè)社會(huì)的公司尤其至關(guān)重要，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家50%的財(cái)富

56、來自產(chǎn)品技術(shù)創(chuàng)造的研發(fā)。但是衡量?jī)r(jià)值創(chuàng)造和價(jià)值之間的差異是不容易區(qū)別的，其混亂的原因是在會(huì)計(jì)慣例中把這項(xiàng)財(cái)務(wù)費(fèi)用當(dāng)作一項(xiàng)開支，而不是一項(xiàng)投資，不把它作為一個(gè)基本的研發(fā)問題，也不把過去業(yè)績(jī)作為未來指標(biāo)。在過去的十五年，商業(yè)、金融和學(xué)術(shù)界在面對(duì)困難的測(cè)量問題面前，不斷地改善和發(fā)展研發(fā)分析和管理的測(cè)量問題，</p><p>　　在戰(zhàn)后的第一階段，產(chǎn)業(yè)研發(fā)被認(rèn)為是一項(xiàng)具有研發(fā)創(chuàng)造性的管理事業(yè)。其中主要財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)是年度預(yù)算（

57、一個(gè)工具基本上不足以評(píng)估一個(gè)投資）。預(yù)算是按行業(yè)基準(zhǔn)確定的，比如研發(fā)作為費(fèi)用占收入的比例來確定一部分的。因此研發(fā)人員的財(cái)務(wù)技能主要集中在成本會(huì)計(jì)和成本控制。在許多公司，高層管理人員（通常是缺乏研發(fā)人員的經(jīng)驗(yàn)）沒有對(duì)價(jià)值關(guān)系到成本進(jìn)行探索，并試圖以管理一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)潔描述為“管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)出來功能”的管理。換言之，窮人的研發(fā)返回被看做比對(duì)一個(gè)公司的戰(zhàn)略，這個(gè)解決方案導(dǎo)致的后果是產(chǎn)品的管理不善，更是經(jīng)常被形容為一個(gè)新聘請(qǐng)來的男孩。</p>

58、<p>　　第二階段，在20世紀(jì)70年代，越來越多的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估被金融分析師引入研發(fā)，可以形容為“明顯的勝利DCF法(貼現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流)。DCF法在評(píng)估投資的使用是一個(gè)重要的步驟，因?yàn)樗肓松虡I(yè)計(jì)劃紀(jì)律中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素的概念，并幫助協(xié)調(diào)了技術(shù)和非技術(shù)人員的溝通分歧。工具包中包含凈現(xiàn)金流量折現(xiàn)現(xiàn)值（NPV）的回報(bào)率（內(nèi)部收益率）和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加權(quán)資本成本內(nèi)部收益率。但它是在實(shí)踐過程中過度使用貼現(xiàn)率，以及過度和保守終值相結(jié)合，譴責(zé)任何長(zhǎng)期研發(fā)的項(xiàng)

59、目。結(jié)果是違背了行業(yè)中認(rèn)為創(chuàng)新是長(zhǎng)期醞釀的最賺錢的這一共同經(jīng)驗(yàn)。</p><p>　　在過去二十年，這個(gè)詞的價(jià)值已成為固定的業(yè)務(wù)詞匯。不幸的是，這倆個(gè)無所不在的詞語有很不同的背景：經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值和市場(chǎng)價(jià)值。這倆種價(jià)值形式并不是完全相同的，這種區(qū)別是深刻的研發(fā)因?yàn)樽畛跏强扑雇?chuàng)新的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值，但它往往也是市場(chǎng)價(jià)值驅(qū)動(dòng)。</p><p><b>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值</b></p&

60、gt;<p>　　明確經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值這一詞的概念，調(diào)用商業(yè)行話，是作為經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值（EVA），并含蓄地對(duì)“價(jià)值鏈”和價(jià)值命題的討論。一個(gè)企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值是取決于它的自由現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)總結(jié)其資本成本貼現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　EVA的概念，雖然可以追溯到斯隆，通用汽車公司的傳奇總裁，但重新被引入到企業(yè)是在20世紀(jì)90年代的戴爾公司，具有相當(dāng)?shù)挠绊?。EVA是指凈營(yíng)業(yè)利潤(rùn)對(duì)在企業(yè)全部資本投資的機(jī)會(huì)成本的適當(dāng)收取。（E

61、VA與經(jīng)濟(jì)之間的價(jià)值關(guān)系很簡(jiǎn)單：經(jīng)濟(jì)僅僅是價(jià)值的EVA的款項(xiàng)，則每連續(xù)三年在企業(yè)相加。）EVA是一個(gè)真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤(rùn)，或者死收入數(shù)額超過投資所要求的最低回報(bào)率，且與其他證券的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相比，股東和貸款人的收入周期比較短。</p><p><b>　　市場(chǎng)價(jià)值</b></p><p>　　對(duì)于證券專業(yè)投資者來說，底線不是經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)，而是股東回報(bào)（TSR），即股價(jià)加分紅。這是“

62、現(xiàn)金為王”的推理，因?yàn)橐后w證劵和現(xiàn)金股利平均現(xiàn)金的總回報(bào)是基金經(jīng)理的成績(jī)單。在這樣的一個(gè)世界，股票的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值作為它的組成部分是最后的度量和經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。投資者同時(shí)還衡量每個(gè)企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略地位，以及在加上其他因素造成的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值，如投資者情緒和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢(shì)。股東價(jià)值在很大程度上與當(dāng)前的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值型股票價(jià)格是同義詞，無論是行政人員還是董事，誰無視這個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)都有相當(dāng)大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p><b>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值</

63、b></p><p>　　價(jià)值危機(jī)的一部分源于歷史成本為基礎(chǔ)的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值與會(huì)計(jì)的估值角度日益增大的差別。從提供卓越的智能管理來看，在這種情況下有可能產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流量，但這種解釋并不能成立，需要公司對(duì)實(shí)際現(xiàn)金流量進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè)和審議。</p><p>　　年輕，是基于在未來5年中的眾所周知的“短期”，一次，超過75%的股票市值總額比其他外部界限預(yù)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)金流價(jià)值要短。在這種情況下，只要認(rèn)識(shí)的機(jī)會(huì)

64、增長(zhǎng)速度快于經(jīng)濟(jì)資本，“成長(zhǎng)部門”將跑贏“價(jià)值”產(chǎn)業(yè)，從而吸引更多的投資。這種連帶效應(yīng)將導(dǎo)致較高的市盈率，因?yàn)閮r(jià)格的市盈率指標(biāo)是聯(lián)系在一起的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，這就是發(fā)生在上世紀(jì)90年代的十年間的市場(chǎng)。實(shí)際上，投資者等同于“價(jià)值”的股票投資，在有限的機(jī)會(huì)內(nèi)進(jìn)行股票投資并主張“增長(zhǎng)”部門。</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)90年代，隨著估值差距越來越大，主流文章開始擴(kuò)大古老的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)理念，增加了智力和知識(shí)資本這一重要的新層面，

65、無形資產(chǎn)的概念。有些學(xué)者甚至選擇市場(chǎng)價(jià)值與有形資產(chǎn)的智力資本價(jià)值的差額作為定義。這種方法是報(bào)價(jià)來例證的：任何組織在今天面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)是了解資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表之間的估值和市場(chǎng)的巨大差別，這個(gè)差別代表了公司的核心價(jià)值-智力資本。從這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)基礎(chǔ)上，現(xiàn)在這一概念已經(jīng)擴(kuò)大到了包括員工的組織能力和學(xué)習(xí)知識(shí)的能力。因此它遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過了技術(shù)訣竅和商業(yè)秘密這比較有限的概念。最重要的是，人們認(rèn)識(shí)到致死與人力資本可能遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過對(duì)有形資本估價(jià)的目的。</p>

66、<p>　　這一見解是重要的，但不是很明確?！暗侵橇Y本是個(gè)新的想法，”沙利文說，它帶來的前景是承認(rèn)組織的智力資產(chǎn)比傳統(tǒng)的土地、勞動(dòng)力、有形資產(chǎn)重要。如果進(jìn)行一項(xiàng)調(diào)查，一致認(rèn)為會(huì)有許多現(xiàn)代公司與智力資本填補(bǔ)，比如律師事務(wù)所、咨詢公司、軟件公司，一些的電腦公司等。但是如果接著調(diào)查什么是知識(shí)資本的定義時(shí)，將會(huì)有廣泛的答案。這些答案不會(huì)收斂到一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的智力資本的定義，但存在著許多的比較。對(duì)于描述和界定智力資本方面數(shù)量存在著不同的意

67、見且比較廣泛，沒有一個(gè)明確的重點(diǎn)，所以常常令人困惑……</p><p><b>　　技術(shù)鑒定</b></p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)90年代，一種有關(guān)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的實(shí)際應(yīng)用的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值方法得到了很大的發(fā)展。它被稱為技術(shù)鑒定，這種方法在備考業(yè)務(wù)計(jì)劃中被評(píng)為DCF估值。技術(shù)鑒定被用于稅收的主要目的有：專利估價(jià)捐贈(zèng)，兼并和收購(gòu)公司的研發(fā)估值。杜邦詳細(xì)描述了與先鋒海蘭國(guó)際公司的收購(gòu)

68、連接時(shí)的典型技術(shù)鑒定方法。</p><p>　　在過去二十年里，企業(yè)融資工具發(fā)生了深遠(yuǎn)的變化，可以預(yù)期導(dǎo)致工業(yè)研發(fā)結(jié)構(gòu)性變化這意義趨勢(shì)。</p><p>　　杠桿收購(gòu)的影響（LBO）</p><p>　　20世紀(jì)80年代標(biāo)志著杠桿收購(gòu)時(shí)代，高收益或“垃圾債券”的到來。尤其以雷諾競(jìng)購(gòu)戰(zhàn)這個(gè)案例，正如書籍和電影所描述的由于證劵內(nèi)幕交易這一違法行為產(chǎn)生的影響尤為突出。雷諾

69、在80年代投標(biāo)了約400億美元的杠桿收購(gòu)，雖然這十年的資助引起了廣泛的第一個(gè)垃圾債券市場(chǎng)的崩潰，但是這一杠桿收購(gòu)技術(shù)還活著，在一個(gè)更復(fù)雜的杠桿收購(gòu)企業(yè)的收購(gòu)資金支持下，產(chǎn)生了工業(yè)市場(chǎng)的新收購(gòu)機(jī)會(huì)。</p><p>　　杠桿收購(gòu)的資金一般是通過百分之十或更少的股票賣給有限合伙，另外90%是銀行貸款及百分之次級(jí)貸款，通常的形式是高收益?zhèn)?。成為一個(gè)杠桿收購(gòu)的可能性時(shí)，目標(biāo)公司的股價(jià)下降到需要購(gòu)回本公司的債務(wù)來支付銷售

70、下跌帶來的資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)所需的現(xiàn)金流量的支持的水平。</p><p>　　杠桿收購(gòu)不是價(jià)值最大化的問題，而是現(xiàn)金流量最大化。目標(biāo)公司可能耗費(fèi)了體力和智力在資本上，但是當(dāng)一個(gè)杠桿收購(gòu)進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)時(shí)，管理層努力提升價(jià)值可能會(huì)失敗或被市場(chǎng)視為失敗，這樣可能會(huì)對(duì)公司產(chǎn)生重創(chuàng)。因此，這個(gè)持久的效果可能會(huì)使管理層錯(cuò)過創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，提高股東價(jià)值的機(jī)會(huì)。這一概念是，如果股東能夠受益于精簡(jiǎn)，管理人員可能早就做了裁員之類的事情。企業(yè)擺脫昂貴的

71、裝飾，如昂貴的總部，無利可圖的項(xiàng)目，專注于核心業(yè)務(wù)，并審查經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值觀的新收購(gòu)和資本投資。</p><p>　　財(cái)務(wù)管理研發(fā)對(duì)資金的影響比較顯著：長(zhǎng)期研發(fā)，往往是縮減現(xiàn)有的業(yè)務(wù)，以支撐短期的現(xiàn)金流量。這一過程不僅發(fā)生在有杠桿收購(gòu)模式的公司內(nèi)部，也在債務(wù)杠桿收購(gòu)的公司。中央研究中心表示，縮減或淘汰規(guī)模來創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，已經(jīng)被直接運(yùn)用連接到那些戰(zhàn)略業(yè)務(wù)單位。此外，一個(gè)企業(yè)受到外部威脅典型的反應(yīng)是與行業(yè)的其他人合并，并消除重復(fù)

72、創(chuàng)建總部帶來的資本消耗，提高銷售組織和研發(fā)業(yè)務(wù)的價(jià)值。這些費(fèi)用明顯消除了產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值，成為了戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值的一個(gè)很大的成本問題。</p><p>　　出處：彼得波爾，2002《財(cái)務(wù)管理的研發(fā)》.研究技術(shù)管理，《研究技術(shù)管理》，</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　R&D and Firm Performance

73、in a Transition Economy</p><p>　　INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　According to international comparative statistics the Eastern European countries show much less innovative activity than e.g. the EU averag

74、e This might be good or bad. If the firms are not capable enough to handle R&D processes it is good that they recognize this. During a country’s transformation process to a market economy, adoption of established pro

75、cesses and products in connection with product variation and competitive production possibilities are an attractive alternative to innovation. Ho</p><p>　　Those policy interventions are not only subject of t

76、heoretical discussions. Subsidies granted by the European Commission in member countries, like the sixth framework program, are also relevant for the accession countries of the European Union. Perhaps R&D subsidies a

77、re partly wasted if granted in an early stage of the transformation process and could be used in a more productive way. It might be the case that instead of conducting research and development firms in these areas are be

78、tter off by </p><p>　　The purpose of our article is to compare the success of innovative activity in Eastern and Western Germany in order to investigate whether there are differences with respect to R&D

79、performance between the two parts of reunified Germany. Eastern Germany is a very special example of a transition economy. The movement from the former German Democratic Republic to states of the German Federal Republic

80、was accompanied by the introduction of a well established currency, a stable and reliable legal fra</p><p>　　R&D conducted by East-German firms is heavily subsidized as the policy decision makers regard

81、it as being very important that the competitiveness of these companies is improved by technological leadership. It remains to be shown that these subsidies are not wasted. We intend to answer this question by comparing t

82、he performance of Eastern and Western German enterprises. Innovation in a transition economy like Eastern Germany might suffer from lacking experience with both the current technological</p><p>　　The purpose

83、 of this paper has two dimensions: On one hand, we compare Western and Eastern German manufacturing firms by relating a credit rating index as measure of performance to R&D spending and other firm characteristics. On

84、 the other hand, we extend the rating model by a second equation dealing with financial distress and bankruptcy. This is particularly interesting because Eastern German manufacturing is predominantly composed of small an

85、d medium-sized enterprises that were newly founded af</p><p>　　Our study is an extension of the (few) existing studies on the effects of innovations in transition economies. Aghi on et al. (2002) as well as

86、Carlin et al.(2004) investigate the effect of innovations on growth of a sample of 2,245 respectively 3,288 firms from 24 Eastern European countries and they find that some competitive pressure is good for innovativeness

87、, but too much can be counterproductive (Carlin et al. 2004).Innovativeness has a positive impact on growth. However, it is not tested w</p><p>　　CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</p><p>　　Firm performance w

88、ith respect to R&D has been measured by a variety of indicators such as productivity, profitability, and firm’s stock market valuations .In this paper we employ a broad measure encompassing productivity, profitabilit

89、y and stock market value. We approximate the overall firm value by firms credit ratings. The firm value is expected to reflect the value of both tangible assets and intangible assets, in particular knowledge capital, the

90、 intangible assets created by R&D activity. It</p><p>　　The statement that innovative activity is a risky undertaking is close to triviality. Risk is expected to affect firm value negatively, as the prob

91、ability of a bankruptcy or at least payment delays will increase. However, due to the fact that innovation is a driving force for economic success, a trade-off between risk and future success exists. There might well be

92、an internal optimum which means that ‘some’ R&D is useful, whilst too much R&D does not maximize the present firm value. Thus a ‘mode</p><p>　　Aside of the general relevance of evaluating the effect

93、of R&D activity on firm value, it is of specific interest in the case of Eastern Germany. We are able to compare the market economy of Western Germany with an economy in transition where both have the same currency u

94、nit, the same legal system, the same economic system and all other important contributions to the business environment. It should be noted, though, that in Eastern Germany a much smaller share of all workers is covered b

95、y collec</p><p>　　After the German reunification in 1990, the East German industrial sector more or less collapsed. The existing larger firms were sold to new owners and a restructuring process took place. A

96、mong introductions of other policy measures, R&D has been heavily subsidized in order to speed up the convergence process. Fostering innovation is clearly intended to improve the competitiveness of the companies in q

97、uestion and this was highly needed for the former producers in a centrally governed planning so</p><p>　　As said above we use credit ratings as the variable reflecting economic performance of a firm. In a se

98、cond step of our analysis we investigate whether the results we find with respect to the rating are also reflected in other performance indicators. Since Eastern German firms are, on average, much younger and smaller tha