環(huán)境規(guī)制與國(guó)際貿(mào)易外文翻譯

1、<p>　　1914單詞，11000英文字符,3600漢字</p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目：Environmental regulation and international trade </p><p>　　出 處：Journal of Regulatory Economics Volume 8,

2、 Number 1,61-72,DOI:10.1007/BF01066600 </p><p>　　作 者：Eftichios Sophocles Sartzetakis and Christos Constantatos </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Environme

3、ntal regulation and international trade </p><p>　　Abstract ：In this paper, we investigate how a country's choice of environmental policy instrument affects the international competitiveness of its firms

4、. We show that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the total marke share of firms regulated through tradeable emission permits increases relative to that of the firms operating under command and control due to better alloca

5、tion of total abatement among the firms in the country. Our work suggests that free trade situations should not only result in</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　In recent years, increased aware

6、ness of environmental issues has made pollution control, notably the control of emissions, an important topic in public policy discussions. A commonly raised objection against emissions control is that this may impair t

7、he competitiveness of the domestic industry in international markets. In particular, it has been argued that firms operating in countries with low environmental standards will acquire substantial cost advantages over int

8、ernational competitors opera</p><p>　　Substantial literature has been devoted to the impact of environmental policy on trade patterns. The link between trade and the environment is rooted in policy rigiditie

9、s that prevent authorities from achieving first best optimality. In the absence of any restrictions on the use of environmental and trade policies, any impact the former might have on a country's terms of trade coul

10、d easily be offset by the appropriate choice of tariffs. International agreements as well as the action of domesti</p><p>　　Kennedy (1994) also considers environmental policy as the only instrument in the p

11、resence of transboundary pollution within an imperfectly competitive global environment. Rather than looking at the optimal tax level, he determines the Nash equilibrium pollution taxes and shows that strategic interacti

12、on between countries results to equilibrium taxes that are lower than what is globally efficient. Finally, Copeland (1994) recognizes the possibility of restrictions on the use of both environmental</p><p>　

13、　In this paper, we deal with the impact of environmental policy on trade patterns. Our work differs from the aforementioned papers in that, instead of focusing on the level of environmental standards, we concentrate on

14、the impact of the type of regulatory regime on a country's international competitiveness. This particular focus is motivated by the following observations. First, the fact that some countries have already adopted &qu

15、ot;incentive based" regulatory policy instruments--namely taxes and tr</p><p>　　Even in a context of differing environmental standards, the impact of differing regimes on international competitiveness s

16、hould not be neglected. As we show, for large differences in abatement technology, a more efficient regulatory regime may yield an advantage substantial enough to outweigh any trade disadvantage stemming from a more stri

17、ngent environmental regulation. Thus, the country with the more efficient regulatory regime can either increase its international market share or afford a be</p><p>　　Among the various regulatory instrument

18、s, Pigouvian taxes, tradeable emission permits (TEP), and command and control (CAC) are the most commonly used. The equivalence of emission taxes and permits, when there are no transaction costs or imperfections in the p

19、ermit market and the regulator has full information, is well established in the literature. While Pigouvian taxes are used mainly in Europe, there is an increasing interest in North America in the use of tradeable permit

20、s as an alternative t</p><p>　　In this paper, we consider two countries imposing the same environmental standards through different regulatory regimes and examine the potential effects of this asymmetry on t

21、rade patterns. More specifically, we are interested in finding whether the adoption of any specific regime might help a country's industry to increase its share in international markets. </p><p>　　The p

22、aper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the main model in the absence of regulation; sections 3 and 4 derive the reaction functions of the firms under a CAC and a TEP regulation, respectively; and section 5 ana

23、lyses the free-trade equilibrium under the simultaneous presence of both regulatory regimes. Section 6 contains the concluding remarks. Most proofs have been abbreviated with more details provided in the corresponding a

24、ppendices.</p><p>　　6. Conclusions</p><p>　　We investigate how a country's choice of environmental policy instrument affects the international competitiveness of firms in that country. We s

25、how that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the total market share of firms regulated through a TEP system increases relative to that of the firms operating under a CAC system. This is due to the fact that a TEP system bette

26、r allocates total abatement among the firms in the country. The advantage of a TEP system becomes more pronounced as the diversity of</p><p>　　The advantage of TEP regulations must be qualified for the comp

27、etitive emission permit market assumption. Hanh (1984) has shown that in autarky, when the industry is competitive, a non-competitive permit market result in efficiency losses, but remains more efficien than a CAC system

28、. Further, Sartzetakis (1993) fias shown that a CAC regulation may be welfare superior to a non-competitive permits market when the industry is also non-competitive. These results indicate that the advantage of a TEP <

29、;/p><p>　　Background：State Environmentalism</p><p>　　Among other things the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and related national environmental legislation were born out of the concern that the

30、patchwork of diverse state environmental standards evolving in the early 1970s would wreak havoc on interstate commerce and create competitive disadvantages for states striving to improve environmental quality. National

31、environmental legislation was expected to level the playing field.</p><p>　　Although national environmental policies have certainly raised the minimum level of environmental standards, three decades later ve

32、ry important differences in state environmental policies remain, as anyone who works in business or industry can attest. Federal laws notwithstanding, state regulations governing hazardous waste disposal, wetlands fillin

33、g, air and water pollution, and wildlife protection vary considerably between Louisiana and Massachusetts, Mississippi and New Jersey, and Idaho and </p><p>　　Some of these differences can be explained in te

34、rms of “need.” The more heavily industrialized and urbanized states have more serious environmental problems and hence require more stringent controls. Other differences can be attributed to variations in state politic

35、al cultures. Sagebrush states, for example, tend to reflect the “l(fā)eave people be” attitude of their residents.</p><p>　　Regardless of what may explain these differences tabulating and comparing the characte

36、ristics of environmental policies among the states produces an interesting snapshot of the relative degree of “environmentalism” among the states. TABLE 1 lists the states in order, starting with those with the weakest e

37、nvironmental policies and moving down to the strongest, for 1982 and 1990. A detailed description of the precise method for deriving the scores underlying these listings is not important for our</p><p>　　Wha

38、t is important is that the listings are intuitive: the states that most of us would guess as having the most stringent environmental regulations appear near the bottom of the list. Those that we would imagine to have le

39、ss rigorous standards are found near the top. This is essential for the analysis to be credible. Environmentalists, politicians, business and industry must "feel" comfortable that the correct comparisons are b

40、eing made. If, for example, New Jersey were scored as have weak en</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p><b>　　環(huán)境規(guī)制與國(guó)際貿(mào)易</b></p><p>　　摘要：從本文中，我們得知一個(gè)國(guó)家的環(huán)境政策工具會(huì)影響該國(guó)公司的

41、國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。我們使用古諾—納什均衡分析表明，在市場(chǎng)調(diào)節(jié)下公司通過(guò)分享排放許可能夠減少溫室氣體排放總量，這歸功于公司的優(yōu)秀的經(jīng)營(yíng)和指導(dǎo)。我們的研究還表明在自由貿(mào)易狀況下，不僅會(huì)產(chǎn)生相類(lèi)似的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，而且還會(huì)有類(lèi)似的監(jiān)督管理體制變化。而在加拿大的環(huán)保部門(mén)正在考慮緊跟美國(guó)的腳步而提起一項(xiàng)貿(mào)易排放許可機(jī)制的行為就不足為奇了。</p><p><b>　　一、說(shuō)明</b></p><

42、;p>　　近年來(lái)，隨著民眾環(huán)境保護(hù)意識(shí)的加強(qiáng)，污染控制問(wèn)題，特別是控制排放的問(wèn)題，已成為一個(gè)公共政策討論的重要課題。一個(gè)大家普遍對(duì)排放控制這一有好處的政策提出的不同看法就是不得損害國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)上的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。特別是對(duì)，在國(guó)家環(huán)保標(biāo)準(zhǔn)較低的國(guó)家運(yùn)行與利用巨大的成本優(yōu)勢(shì)在國(guó)家環(huán)保標(biāo)準(zhǔn)更高的國(guó)家的運(yùn)行的公司而言。甚至已經(jīng)有些學(xué)者表示，有些國(guó)家可能成為“污染天堂”以犧牲環(huán)境為代價(jià)來(lái)吸引那些低環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的企業(yè)，比如，Markusen 等（1

43、993）。但是早在Leonard(1988)和Tobey(1989,1990)的實(shí)證研究就認(rèn)為環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上的差異其實(shí)并沒(méi)有顯著的影響貿(mào)易的格局；而最近Lucas等(1992)的研究表明，本文所提出的環(huán)境規(guī)制對(duì)于國(guó)際貿(mào)易的影響可能是起關(guān)鍵作用的。 </p><p>　　一些實(shí)際應(yīng)用型的文獻(xiàn)一直致力于尋找環(huán)境政策影響貿(mào)易模式之間的關(guān)系，貿(mào)易和環(huán)境關(guān)系主要取決于政策，這也是當(dāng)局的最優(yōu)預(yù)防污染方法。在缺乏相關(guān)的限制而使用環(huán)

44、境和貿(mào)易的政策，任何的一個(gè)影響都有可能使某個(gè)國(guó)家的貿(mào)易條件有選擇性的抵消稅收。國(guó)際協(xié)議以及國(guó)內(nèi)游說(shuō)組織的作用，也在事實(shí)上成為了限制貿(mào)易/環(huán)保政策關(guān)系的工具。Baumol 和Oates(1988)還有Markusen(1975)考慮在行使環(huán)境政策或者是檢查必要關(guān)稅后所產(chǎn)生的環(huán)境問(wèn)題。Krutilla（1991）和Markusen(1975)則認(rèn)為在國(guó)際貿(mào)易協(xié)議中限制使用關(guān)稅以進(jìn)行環(huán)境監(jiān)管的條例中，唯一可行的措施就是來(lái)自外國(guó)。在考慮這些所有

45、情況的條件下，發(fā)現(xiàn)這些關(guān)稅或者是綠色稅收可能會(huì)高于或比最高的水平略低。</p><p>　　Kennedy(1994)也認(rèn)為環(huán)境政策在一個(gè)在不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的全球環(huán)境下比調(diào)查跨國(guó)界污染更能夠評(píng)測(cè)也更適合政府的支出水平，它決定于納什均衡曲線，調(diào)查表明了，污染稅在國(guó)與國(guó)之間的相互作用，平衡稅款對(duì)于全球環(huán)境多是有效的。最后，Copelan(1994)承認(rèn)使用限制于環(huán)境和貿(mào)易政策這些條件工具對(duì)于政策的逐漸改革是一種實(shí)質(zhì)上的進(jìn)步

46、。他的作用強(qiáng)調(diào)的是協(xié)調(diào)貿(mào)易與污染政策，以避免進(jìn)一步打破政策改革可能更加容易分配污染排放配額，但明顯不是稅收制度起的作用。他也發(fā)現(xiàn)，國(guó)際因素的流動(dòng)性其實(shí)主要得益于污染政策的改革。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們主要處理的是環(huán)境規(guī)制對(duì)于各國(guó)貿(mào)易政策模式的影響。我們的工作與上述文件是不盡相同的，我們并不專(zhuān)注于環(huán)保的水平而是重點(diǎn)在環(huán)保的要求上，以及對(duì)一個(gè)國(guó)家的國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力還有對(duì)其監(jiān)管體制的類(lèi)型影響。這些特別關(guān)注主要來(lái)源

47、于以下的觀察。首先，這一事實(shí)，有些國(guó)家已經(jīng)批準(zhǔn)了“以激勵(lì)為基礎(chǔ)的”政策監(jiān)管工具——也就是說(shuō)稅收與排放許可應(yīng)具有可交易性——顯然別人也是在這個(gè)方向上進(jìn)行相關(guān)工作的，以期能指揮與控制收益水平大小。第二，環(huán)保標(biāo)準(zhǔn)發(fā)展中國(guó)家往往與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家并不是明顯不同的，看Cropper和Oates(1992)，由于類(lèi)似的環(huán)境偏好保護(hù)或國(guó)際協(xié)議就形成了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的相似性。關(guān)于后者，有人說(shuō)是因?yàn)榄h(huán)境保護(hù)意識(shí)的增強(qiáng)與國(guó)家更加嚴(yán)格的規(guī)定，自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定將不再是可以做到忽視環(huán)

48、境問(wèn)題的程度了，需要對(duì)寬松的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)加強(qiáng)管制以代替國(guó)際協(xié)議中合同仲裁法規(guī)。因此，在當(dāng)前趨勢(shì)下，有些國(guó)家在面對(duì)嚴(yán)格的污染標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時(shí)有可能出現(xiàn)貿(mào)易自由化的副作用。不過(guò)，沒(méi)有明顯的理由去評(píng)價(jià)國(guó)際協(xié)議為什么應(yīng)當(dāng)加強(qiáng)參與國(guó)的任何特定監(jiān)管制度。</p><p>　　甚至在同一個(gè)國(guó)家也有不同的環(huán)保要求，對(duì)不同的政權(quán)影響國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力是不可忽視的影響。如上面所說(shuō)，因?yàn)闇p少溫室氣體排放技術(shù)的國(guó)與國(guó)，地區(qū)與地區(qū)之間的巨大差異，更有效的監(jiān)管體

49、制所帶來(lái)的優(yōu)勢(shì)會(huì)給貿(mào)易帶來(lái)更大的收益。因此，更加有效的國(guó)家監(jiān)管制度可以使你占有更多國(guó)家市場(chǎng)份額或者至少使沒(méi)有一家公司因?yàn)榄h(huán)保問(wèn)題而在國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中處于劣勢(shì)。</p><p>　　在眾多的監(jiān)督管理工具中，皮古稅收、可交易排放許可（TEP），監(jiān)管與控制系統(tǒng)（CAC）三者是最常用的。在沒(méi)有交易成本或者是不完善的許可證市場(chǎng)里，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)有著的相似的允許排放稅率，這些都是建立在數(shù)據(jù)之上的。在皮古稅應(yīng)用于歐洲時(shí)，人們卻越來(lái)越關(guān)注北

50、美使用許可證替代越來(lái)越廣泛的CAC規(guī)定。本文摘要政府鼓勵(lì)使用排放許可證作為具有代表性的基礎(chǔ)工具。許多研究試圖在一個(gè)封閉的經(jīng)濟(jì)中評(píng)估福利系統(tǒng)的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)來(lái)進(jìn)行比較靜力學(xué)研究，比如Malueg（1990），Copeland(1990),Sartzetakis(1993)都是這種想法。然而，沒(méi)有什么工具能夠完全檢測(cè)同時(shí)使用不同類(lèi)型的國(guó)際貿(mào)易環(huán)境規(guī)制。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們通過(guò)不同的管理制度，相對(duì)兩國(guó)相同的管理

51、制度來(lái)考慮，還能檢查非對(duì)稱(chēng)貿(mào)易模式下二者的潛在影響。更確切的說(shuō)，我們對(duì)于一些具體采用這些措施的政權(quán)是否有助于一個(gè)國(guó)家的工業(yè)，增加其在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)的份額。</p><p>　　本文摘要組織如下：第二節(jié)描述了缺乏調(diào)節(jié)的主要模式；第三和第四節(jié)則反映了在模型狀態(tài)下的公司和TEP的規(guī)定，并進(jìn)行分析；第五節(jié)是自由貿(mào)易平衡下兩種管理制度同時(shí)存在。第六部分作為結(jié)束語(yǔ)。大多數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)被縮寫(xiě)以提供更多的細(xì)節(jié)都在附錄之中。</p>

52、<p><b>　　六、總結(jié)</b></p><p>　　我們研究一個(gè)國(guó)家環(huán)境政策工具對(duì)于該國(guó)的國(guó)際企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的影響。分析表明，在古諾—納什均衡中，占總的市場(chǎng)份額的公司通過(guò)TEP調(diào)節(jié)系統(tǒng)相對(duì)于增加公司的CAC系統(tǒng)的運(yùn)行更有效。由于這些事實(shí)，分配系統(tǒng)應(yīng)將具有良好基礎(chǔ)的TEP總減排企業(yè)放置在欠發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。但是由于國(guó)家內(nèi)部多種多樣的減少溫室氣體排放的技術(shù)TEP的系統(tǒng)優(yōu)勢(shì)會(huì)變得更加明顯，

53、這些實(shí)現(xiàn)了CAC規(guī)定的增長(zhǎng)。對(duì)大型公司不同的差異減排成本，已經(jīng)確定了那些環(huán)境法規(guī)帶來(lái)增量的國(guó)家，當(dāng)然這是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)相對(duì)于私人規(guī)制的TEP情況而言的。研究顯示，自由貿(mào)易情況不僅會(huì)產(chǎn)生相似的環(huán)保標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，還能出現(xiàn)相類(lèi)似的監(jiān)督管理體制的變化。針對(duì)上述結(jié)果，導(dǎo)致加拿大環(huán)保部門(mén)認(rèn)真考慮并隨著美國(guó)提出的環(huán)境規(guī)制的排污系統(tǒng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的這一現(xiàn)象是一致的。</p><p>　　市場(chǎng)假設(shè)TEP的規(guī)范優(yōu)勢(shì)必然能夠勝過(guò)排放許可證的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。Ha

54、nh(1984)已經(jīng)表明，在自給自足的市場(chǎng)中，這個(gè)行業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，允許非競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)的效率損失，但仍然會(huì)比CAC系統(tǒng)更有效率。此外，Sartzetakis(1993)還大膽的表示CAC 法規(guī)的福利是因?yàn)樵诜歉?jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)允許中，工業(yè)也變得毫無(wú)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力。這些結(jié)論表示，作為T(mén)EP系統(tǒng)是可以有效增加在更多政策存在不完善地方的市場(chǎng)上的優(yōu)勢(shì)的。</p><p><b>　　背景：國(guó)家環(huán)保主義</b></

55、p><p>　　除了上述原因之外，空氣清潔法案、潔凈水資源法案，以及其他相關(guān)國(guó)家環(huán)境立法的出現(xiàn)是由于擔(dān)心于二十世紀(jì)七十年代早期那個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單將不同國(guó)家環(huán)境規(guī)制法案修改、拼湊在一起的環(huán)境法案會(huì)對(duì)各個(gè)州之間的商貿(mào)往來(lái)還有各州的環(huán)境質(zhì)量造成破壞。并且國(guó)家環(huán)境立法還是為了對(duì)各州競(jìng)賽的水平進(jìn)行合理評(píng)價(jià)。</p><p>　　盡管?chē)?guó)家環(huán)境政策的確提高了環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的最低限度，就像那些在工商業(yè)或者制造業(yè)中的工作人員能

56、夠證明的一樣，三十年后作用最為明顯的區(qū)別主要原因還是在于對(duì)于國(guó)家環(huán)境政策是否能夠堅(jiān)持。雖然在聯(lián)邦法律之中，國(guó)家對(duì)于危險(xiǎn)物品的處置、濕地的利用、空氣污染與水體污染、野生動(dòng)植物保護(hù)有嚴(yán)格規(guī)定，但是實(shí)際上這些法規(guī)在路易斯安那州、馬薩諸塞州、密西西比州還有新澤西州愛(ài)荷達(dá)州、加利福尼亞州執(zhí)行的力度相差比較大。</p><p>　　這些差異的有些事可以解釋為“所必須需要的”。州的工業(yè)化和城市化程度越高那么環(huán)境問(wèn)題越嚴(yán)重，所以

57、這是需要嚴(yán)格控制的。差別其實(shí)主要可以歸結(jié)在國(guó)家政治文化上。比如在Sagebrush州，人們就對(duì)“遠(yuǎn)離大都市”有著不同的態(tài)度。</p><p>　　任何東西都可以解釋這些比較指標(biāo)還有各州環(huán)境政策之間的差異與特點(diǎn)，那樣的話，無(wú)論對(duì)“環(huán)保主義”與各州之間的關(guān)聯(lián)度都是個(gè)有趣的反映。下表1列出了以各州為基礎(chǔ)的數(shù)據(jù)，將從1982年到1990年之間的最嚴(yán)格的環(huán)境政策到執(zhí)行力度最差的環(huán)境政策的所有州做了一個(gè)排名。對(duì)于我們的目標(biāo)而

58、言，詳盡準(zhǔn)確描述的方法從而產(chǎn)生衍生分?jǐn)?shù)的潛力排名是不重要的。從數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)源上來(lái)說(shuō)，每個(gè)州的得分大約來(lái)自于二十項(xiàng)環(huán)境政策指標(biāo)的收集，例如：濕地政策、危險(xiǎn)品處理蒸菜，還有非點(diǎn)源性環(huán)境污染政策。我們是對(duì)每一個(gè)領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行評(píng)分，然后最終總結(jié)得到最終成績(jī)。因?yàn)閺?982年到1990年的排名是因?yàn)樵诿總€(gè)制表者是利用各自不同的統(tǒng)計(jì)方法還有統(tǒng)計(jì)范圍進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)的，所以我們減去了相關(guān)系列的均值并除以標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差，從而進(jìn)行更有意義的分?jǐn)?shù)比較。因此，在變化中的環(huán)境評(píng)分單位代表

59、了各州在前十名左右的近似排名（由弱到強(qiáng)的環(huán)境政策執(zhí)行力），是以“均值”狀態(tài)（即州排名到25為止）。另一個(gè)單元在環(huán)境評(píng)分中上升，將土地歸國(guó)家排名那將到約四十位。所以，對(duì)環(huán)境的差異分別是兩個(gè)單位的距離，并且是從排名前十的州中尋找到執(zhí)行力最強(qiáng)的環(huán)境政策的州還有最弱的州。</p><p>　　重要的是，這些表格上所列出的是符合事實(shí)情況的，我們當(dāng)中的絕大多數(shù)人都想會(huì)有最嚴(yán)格的環(huán)境法規(guī)那樣就會(huì)使他們出現(xiàn)在列表的底部。那些我們