人民幣國際化相關外文文獻翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3350字，2200單詞，1.2萬英文字符</p><p>　　文獻出處：Eichengreen B, Kawai M. Issues for Renminbi Internationalization: An Overview[J]. 2014.1-7</p><p>　　http://www.wenku1.com/news/3ABCCE1CB3041C0C.h

2、tml</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Issues for Renminbi Internationalization: An Overview</p><p>　　Barry Eichengreen; Masahiro Kawai</p><p><b>　　Abstract&

3、lt;/b></p><p>　　This paper provides an overview of the potential international role of the renminbi (RMB). Reviewing the current state, the paper finds that much progress has been made on RMB settlements

4、for trade involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and on RMB-denominated bond issuance in Hong Kong, China, but that RMB internationalization is still limited due to capital account controls. It argues that a high

5、 degree of RMB internationalization requires significant capital account liberalization, whi</p><p>　　Keywords: renminbi, yuan, international monetary policy, currency internationalization, foreign exchange,

6、 capital account liberalization, financial market</p><p>　　1. INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　人民幣國際化 Internationalization of the renminbi (RMB) is one of the more contentious and widely debated aspect

7、s of economic reform in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Wider use of the RMB in international transactions, both commercial and financial transactions and those undertaken by central banks and other official instit

8、utions, can be understood as a natural response to the growing weight of PRC trade and investment flows in the world economy. At the same time, top PRC officials have dec</p><p>　　So too is the role of RMB i

9、nternationalization in the process of the PRC’s economic growth and development. Some will say that the cause of RMB internationalization is being advanced mainly in the interest of financial institutions, which see scop

10、e for doing international business in the currency as a lucrative source of potential income. Others argue that currency internationalization is supported by PRC firms that see the ability to do cross-border business in

11、their own currency as a useful wa</p><p>　　Similarly, it is argued in some circles that RMB internationalization is a natural corollary of the process of financial development and deepening currently under w

12、ay in the PRC. As financial markets gain depth, width, and liquidity and are progressively opened to foreign investors, greater international use of the currency will come naturally. The counterpoint is that currency int

13、ernationalization and the capital account liberalization required to advance it can be or are being used to ratchet </p><p>　　Equally contentious is how quickly international use of the RMB is likely to expa

14、nd. The PRC is already the world’s largest exporter and will soon be the world’s largest economy as measured by gross domestic product (GDP)—previous studies like Chinn and Frankel (2007) suggesting that economic size is

15、 an important determinant of the extent of international use of a national currency create a presumption that there should be momentum for more widespread use of the RMB on this ground alone. Other s</p><p>

16、　　These are among the issues we seek to address in this paper. This overview is first concerned with establishing the facts. Most fundamentally, what is happening in terms of RMB internationalization? How, where, and why

17、 is the currency being adopted as an international unit of account, means of payment, and store of value? We are also interested in the economics and political economy of RMB internationalization. How does currency inter

18、nationalization fit into the larger process of the PRC’s econo</p><p>　　The PRC is not like other countries. This makes it important to ask, critically, how much can be learned about the prospects and pitfal

19、ls of RMB internationalization from the experience of other countries. In particular, the PRC has a much more extensively controlled capital account of the balance of payments, and a more heavily controlled financial sys

20、tem and economy generally, than any other country that has previously aspired to elevate its national unit to international currency status. Thus</p><p>　　We also inquire into the implications of RMB interna

21、tionalization not just for the PRC but for other countries and, more broadly, for the international monetary and financial system. The effects of economic policies and conditions in the PRC will be stronger on countries

22、that come to rely extensively on the RMB in their international transactions. Their commercial banks will come to rely more heavily on RMB funding. Their central banks are likely to place a heavier weight on the RMB when

23、 managin</p><p>　　This brings us, in turn, to the implications of RMB internationalization for the structure of the international monetary system. Does the emergence of the RMB imply a world of competing int

24、ernational currencies or a system of overlapping regional currency blocs? Is a system in which both the US dollar and the RMB play major global roles likely to display better or worse stability properties than our curren

25、t</p><p>　　dollar-based system? Will it make for the smoother and more stable provision of global liquidity over time? Will it make for more disciplined policies on the part of the reserve-currency countries

26、, since none of them will possess a monopoly of safe-haven status? Will it make for more volatile exchange rates between the major currencies, as investors making use of liquid markets in both currencies shift erraticall

27、y between the dollar and the RMB?</p><p>　　2. THE STATE OF PLAY</p><p>　　In line with its traditional approach to economic and financial reform, the PRC has pursued a strategy of gradualism in s

28、eeking to internationalize the RMB. In the first stage, it has encouraged cross-border use of the currency for trade settlement. As firms exporting to the PRC have acquired RMB receipts, they were allowed to maintain tho

29、se receipts in the form of RMB bank deposits in Hong Kong, China and, subsequently, other offshore financial centers. The banks and firms acquiring those balan</p><p>　　2.1 Renminbi Trade Settlement</p>

30、;<p>　　In the first step in the process of RMB internationalization, the PRC focused on promoting use of the currency for trade-related purposes. In July 2009, the PRC launched a pilot scheme that allowed use of t

31、he RMB in settlement of trade with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states as well as Hong Kong, China and Macau, China in five mainland PRC cities: Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Zhuha

32、i. In mid-2010, coverage of the scheme was expanded to 20 provinces, permi</p><p>　　Initially, RMB trade settlement was skewed toward import settlement as opposed to settlement of PRC exports. At the end of

33、2010, for instance, the ratio of RMB receipts and payments was 1:5.5 (People’s Bank of China 2012). One interpretation of this bias is that it likely reflected the lack of availability of RMB abroad and the incentive to

34、hold RMB offshore in anticipation of the currency’s appreciation. In other words, it reflected speculative motives rather than the convenience of invoicing a</p><p>　　More recently, however, the ratio has na

35、rrowed. From 1:1.7 in 2011, it fell to 1:1.3 in the first half of 2013 (People’s Bank of China 2013). This trend is in line with the turnaround in expectations of a RMB appreciation since the latter part of 2011. Such co

36、nsistent expansion in the utilization of RMB in trade settlement, despite diminished expectations of RMB appreciation in recent years, suggests that RMB internationalization is now being driven by fundamental changes rat

37、her than just by spe</p><p>　　Together with the expansion in RMB trade settlement, RMB deposits in Hong Kong, China have risen dramatically. While banks in Hong Kong, China were allowed to open RMB accounts

38、as early as 2004, it was only in mid-2010, when the RMB settlement scheme was introduced, that RMB deposits in Hong Kong, China took off. Since then, the RMB has been allowed to flow back and forth between Hong Kong, Chi

39、na and the PRC for purposes related to trade settlement, as noted above. From about $9.2 billion at the</p><p>　　2.2 Renminbi-Denominated Investment</p><p>　　Although the PRC authorities have co

40、ntinued to control inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI), the controls in question have been relaxed in recent years. In addition, both the approval process in the use of the RMB for outward FDI by PRC enter

41、prises and the actual use of the RMB for inward FDI in the PRC have been streamlined with the announcement of the Renminbi Outward Direct Investment scheme in January 2011 and the creation of the Renminbi FDI scheme in O

42、ctober of the same year.</p><p>　　While the strictest controls are on portfolio investment flows, these controls have also been relaxed in recent years to expand the range of investors and the type of financ

43、ial assets that are permitted to engage in cross-border transactions using the RMB. Since April 2006, preapproved institutional investors from the PRC have been allowed to invest in RMB-denominated financial instruments

44、offshore, such as in Hong Kong, China. In August 2010, foreign central banks and certain types of foreign f</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　人民幣國際化問題：一個概述</p><p>　　巴里.艾肯格林;濱崎

45、雅宏.卡瓦依</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　本文概述了人民幣(RMB)的潛在國際角色。回顧現(xiàn)行狀態(tài),本文發(fā)現(xiàn),人民幣貿(mào)易結算上已經(jīng)取得了很大進展,包括中華人民共和國(PRC)和在中國香港發(fā)行以人民幣計價的債券,但由于資本賬戶管制，人民幣國際化程度仍然有限。本文強調(diào),高度的人民幣國際化需要重要資本賬戶的自由化,從而倡導提高匯率的靈活性來使

46、中央銀行貨幣政策可以享受自治權。然而,這將成為中國當局面臨的一個挑戰(zhàn)，草率的資本賬戶自由化可能暴露其金融市場危機的風險。本文還強調(diào)為了使人民幣成為一個真正的國際儲備貨幣，制度改革很重要。</p><p>　　關鍵詞:人民幣，元，國際貨幣政策，貨幣國際化，外匯，資本賬戶自由化，金融市場</p><p><b>　　1.引言</b></p><p>

47、;　　人民幣（RMB）的國際化，其中一個具有爭議性和廣泛討論的方面是中華人民共和國(PRC)的經(jīng)濟改革。人民幣在國際交易中的廣泛使用, 由中央銀行和其他官方機構從事的商業(yè)和金融交易,可以被理解為中國在世界經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易和投資流動日益增長的一個自然反應。與此同時,中國高層官員多次宣布貨幣國際化的政策目標,而中國人民銀行和其他政府機構追求各種各樣的舉措以鼓勵貨幣的廣泛使用。因此,是否擴大人民幣在國際上的應用是一個自發(fā)的市場反應，也體現(xiàn)了中華人民共

48、和國日益增長的能力，以及影響全球經(jīng)濟結構的意愿。</p><p>　　人民幣國際化的作用同樣體現(xiàn)在中國的經(jīng)濟增長和發(fā)展的過程中。一些人認為,人民幣國際化的原因主要在于金融機構的利益,意識到貨幣國際業(yè)務是一個潛在的有利可圖的收入來源。但也有人認為，貨幣國際化的支持來自中國公司，他們將貨幣跨境業(yè)務的能力作為一個節(jié)省成本、保持競爭優(yōu)勢的方式。這些公司沒有認識到為什么他們應該繼續(xù)承擔在美國(US)美元開展此類業(yè)務的額外成

49、本和對沖產(chǎn)生的風險。</p><p>　　同樣,在學術界存在這樣一種爭論,人民幣國際化是目前金融發(fā)展和深化的一個自然推論的過程。隨著金融市場深度、寬度、和流動性的增加,并逐步向外國投資者開放,人民幣的國際化發(fā)展就是理所當然的。貨幣國際化和資本賬戶自由化被用于加大中國監(jiān)管機構的壓力,加快國內(nèi)金融改革,加快金融發(fā)展和開放的過程。</p><p>　　同樣有爭議的是人民幣國際化的速度很可能會擴大

50、。中國已經(jīng)是世界上最大的出口國,并且很快將成為世界最大的經(jīng)濟體——琴恩和弗蘭克爾(2007)先前研究表明貨幣國家化程度的一個重要的決定因素是經(jīng)濟規(guī)模。其他學者強調(diào),發(fā)行國的市場流動性、金融穩(wěn)定、國際貨幣地位和政治結構決定因素說明了必要的調(diào)整可能需要相當長的時間。樂觀主義者指出,中國現(xiàn)在的國際貿(mào)易以人民幣結算的比例高達17%,人民幣銀行存款以及在香港發(fā)行人民幣債券的快速增長。悲觀主義者回應,大部分貿(mào)易來自于中國和香港，而在香港人民幣存款的

51、增長,反映了中國貨幣升值的預期可能不會持續(xù)下去。樂觀主義者指出,過去貨幣提升國際地位,美元在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)之后,能夠很快創(chuàng)建一個獨立的中央銀行來增強市場流動性,并進行了相關的制度改革。悲觀主義者則認為,美元在1930年代的金融危機期間失去了許多國際收益。他們認為應當優(yōu)先考慮貨幣國際化和資本賬戶自由化對國內(nèi)金融發(fā)展和改革的影響。他們擔心允許資本賬戶自由化領先于國內(nèi)金融改革，這樣可能增加危機的風險。</p><p>

52、　　這些都是我們尋求解決的問題。本文首先關注的是確立事實。最根本的是,就人民幣國際化而言發(fā)生了什么?如何、在哪里以及為什么人民幣被作為國際貨幣單位賬戶,付款方式和存儲價值?我們同樣感興趣的是人民幣國際化的經(jīng)濟和政治經(jīng)濟。貨幣國際化如何適應中國的經(jīng)濟改革?它如何適應中國的政治經(jīng)濟?例如,誰游說和反對?這對國際貨幣體系來說意味著什么?</p><p>　　中國不像其他國家。這使得詢問變得很重要，根據(jù)別國的經(jīng)驗，我們了

53、解多少關于人民幣國際化的前景和陷阱。特別是,中國需要更廣泛的控制資本賬戶收支平衡,也需要更多的控制金融體系和經(jīng)濟,相比其他任何國家,中國更加希望提高人民幣的國際貨幣地位。因此,之前關于資本賬戶自由化和相關的金融風險的經(jīng)驗,不僅存在于早期的儲備貨幣國家也存在于新興市場。</p><p>　　人民幣國際化的含義，對中國和其他國家,更廣泛地說,對于國際貨幣和金融體系都是非常重要的。他們的商業(yè)銀行將更多地依賴人民幣資金。

54、他們的中央銀行將更重視人民幣匯率和外匯儲備管理。我們主要討論亞洲國家,在此種情況下,人民幣可能會發(fā)展成全球貨幣嗎?</p><p>　　反過來,我們探討人民幣國際化對國際貨幣體系結構的影響。人民幣的崛起意味著一個世界國際貨幣的競爭或一個系統(tǒng)的區(qū)域貨幣集團嗎?美元和人民幣扮演的全球角色會比當前以美元為基礎的體系穩(wěn)定屬性嗎?它會使全球流動性更流暢和穩(wěn)定嗎? 由于沒有人會擁有壟斷的避險地位，它會使國家儲備貨幣的政策更加

55、嚴格嗎? 由于投資者在流動市場美元和人民幣之間的轉(zhuǎn)變不規(guī)律，它會使貨幣之間的匯率波動更加不穩(wěn)定嗎?</p><p><b>　　2.當前情況</b></p><p>　　與經(jīng)濟和金融改革的傳統(tǒng)方法一致,中國在尋求人民幣國際化的過程中奉行循序漸進的策略。在第一階段,它鼓勵貿(mào)易結算中人民幣的跨境使用。由于公司出口中國可獲得人民幣收入,在香港，中國和其他金融中心，他們被允許

56、以人民幣銀行存款的方式去維護那些收入。銀行和公司為了維持收支平衡，允許他們逐漸擴大在中國的投資范圍。與此同時,中國人民銀行與外國央行談判雙邊貨幣互換協(xié)議,為提高人民幣流動性，進一步鼓勵外國當局允許他們的銀行和企業(yè)在中國經(jīng)商。最近,中國當局宣布打算在一個有限地理領域嘗試更全面的資本賬戶自由化,通過創(chuàng)建上海自由貿(mào)易區(qū),很大程度上打開與世界其他地區(qū)的金融交易。</p><p>　　2.1人民幣貿(mào)易結算</p>

57、;<p>　　在人民幣國際化過程的第一步，中國專注于推廣使用人民幣進行貿(mào)易。2009年7月,中國推出了一個試點計劃,允許使用人民幣與東南亞國家聯(lián)盟(ASEAN)成員國以及香港、澳門、中國大陸的五個城市:上海、廣州、深圳、東莞、珠海等進行結算貿(mào)易。2010年中期,覆蓋的計劃已擴大到20個省,允許公司在這些省份的貿(mào)易以人民幣結算。從那時起,授權以人民幣進行貿(mào)易結算的范圍已經(jīng)擴大到全國。</p><p>

58、　　最初,人民幣貿(mào)易結算是傾向于進口結算而不是出口結算。例如,2010年底人民幣收支比率是1:5.5(中國人民銀行2012年)。對于這種偏見的一個解釋是,這可能反映了人民幣在海外缺乏有效性，以及持有人民幣偏離了人民幣升值的預期。換句話說,它反映了投機動機而不是中國貨幣計價和結算的便利貿(mào)易。</p><p>　　然而, 最近這一比率已經(jīng)縮小。從2011年的1:1.7,到2013年上半年跌至1:1.3(中國人民銀行2

59、013年)。這種趨勢符合人民幣升值的預期。利用人民幣進行貿(mào)易結算的擴大,盡管近年來減少了人民幣升值的預期,它同樣表明人民幣國際化正在發(fā)生根本性的變化,而不是僅僅通過投機動機。</p><p>　　隨著人民幣貿(mào)易結算的擴大,中國香港人民幣存款大幅增加。雖然香港的銀行,中國允許在2004年初開設人民幣賬戶,但僅在2010年年中,當人民幣結算方案出臺時,在香港人民幣存款就開始了。如上所述,人民幣被允許在香港和中華人民共

60、和國之間來回流動,用于貿(mào)易結算。截至2009年底約9.2美元(占中國香港全部存款的1.1% ) ；截至2010年底,人民幣存款激增至47.3美元(占存款總額的5.4% ) ,截至2011年底達到93美元( 9.5% ) ,到2012年底達到96美元(約9.0 )。2012年加息有所放緩,但這可能不反映人民幣對香港吸引力的任何削弱,中國從人民幣存款轉(zhuǎn)向其他人民幣計價的金融資產(chǎn)。根據(jù)這一解釋,中國香港人民幣存款的價值隨后繼續(xù)上升,截至201

61、3年10月底達到124.6美元,占存款總額的10.8%。</p><p>　　2.2人民幣計價的投資</p><p>　　盡管中國政府繼續(xù)控制內(nèi)外直接投資(FDI),但今年來的控制已變得松弛。此外,中國企業(yè)的對外直接投資中使用人民幣的審批流程，以及對外直接投資流入中國的人民幣實際使用被簡化,2011年1月宣布人民幣對外直接投資計劃和在同年10月建立人民幣外商直接投資計劃。從2012年初至今

62、的數(shù)據(jù)有效,以人民幣計價和結算的外國直接投資約占三分之一。</p><p>　　雖然嚴格控制組合投資流動,近年來這些控制也有所放松，以擴大投資者范圍和金融資產(chǎn)的類型，允許使用人民幣進行跨境交易。自2006年4月以來,中國預先批準的機構投資者被允許以人民幣計價的金融工具進行投資,如在香港。2010年8月,外國中央銀行和某些類型的外國金融機構獲準在中國境內(nèi)銀行間債券市場投資。之后,2011年12月,人民幣合格境外機構