外文翻譯---在分稅制度股利政策與資本結(jié)構(gòu)下的決策

1、<p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The interaction of corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions under differential tax regimes</p><p>　　1、The interaction of capital struc

2、ture and dividend policy</p><p>　　Firm values are normalized with respect to the firm with zero debt and zero dividend payout. The panels in the figure indicate that the combined net impact of corporate divi

3、dend and capital structure policies on firm value is directly affected by the pertinent tax rates at the time.</p><p>　　We next discuss the implications of the model for dividend and capital structure polici

4、es under several historical tax regimes. Three representative tax regimes (1979–1981, 1988–1990, 1993–2002) were chosen for analysis out of the ten that were in existence at some time during the three decades since 1979.

5、 The three representative tax regimes exhibit distinctly different set of tax rates both in terms of absolute values and relative to each other. For this reason, these three contrasting regimes</p><p>　　2、Ye

6、ars 1979–1981</p><p>　　The application of the model using the tax rates from the period 1979–1981 reveals a subtle effect. The table and the figure depict normalized firm value, VD,Π/V0,0, as a function of t

7、he leverage D and the dividend payout π. The gain from leverage is positive only when the firm is at a relatively high payout ratio (above approximately 40%), with the maximum gain occurring at full (100%) payout. Intere

8、stingly, at a dividend payout level lower than 40%, increasing leverage lowers firm value.</p><p>　　The reversal of the leverage effect at lower payout ratios is driven by the relative levels of tax rates. D

9、uring the years 1979–1981, the top marginal tax rate for personal income was very high in comparison to the tax rate for corporate income (70% and 46% respectively). In a tax rate environment such as this, high taxes pai

10、d by the bondholders for their interest income proceeds exceed the benefit from the tax deductibility of interest payments at the firm level. Since debt financing can be ass</p><p>　　Another noteworthy obser

11、vation about the 1979–1981 tax rate environment is the steep loss in firm value at very low debt levels in response to increasing dividend payout. According to our model, it was possible for an all-equity firm to experie

12、nce losses in value up to 58%. The firm could mitigate this loss by maintaining a higher debt level.</p><p>　　The tax regime that made the interesting features discussed above possible is not a short-term an

13、omaly confined to the years 1979–1981. Indeed, the entire period between the Great Depression and the late 1970s was characterized by a similar tax rate environment. Our model indicates that optimal policies to maximize

14、firm value under such tax regimes required zero debt and zero dividend payout. This prescription interestingly comports with the observed leverage policies of the time, when numerous </p><p>　　3、Years 1988–1

15、990 (and 1991–1992)</p><p>　　The situation during the years 1988–1990 is unique because during that time the top marginal tax rates on ordinary income (thus on dividend and interest income) were nominally th

16、e same as the tax rate on capital gains at 28%. In the following 2 years (1991–1992), the two tax rates remained very close (at 31.0% and 28.9% respectively). The result of the convergence in tax rates is visible in Fig.

17、 2 for the1988–1990 and 1991–1992 panels. There is little if any moderating influence of the dividend </p><p>　　4、Years 1993–2002</p><p>　　In contrast to the reversal effect observed under the t

18、ax regime during 1979–1981, and similar to the situation during 1988–1992, the gain from leverage is always positive under the 1993–2002 tax regimes. The details of the gain from leverage relation and the effect of the d

19、ividend payout for the years 1993–1994 and the year 2002 are available. As a departure from the previous tax regimes discussed above, throughout this decade-long time interval, the gain from leverage is significantly mor

20、e pro</p><p>　　In contrast to the maximum potential gain from leverage during 1988–1992 that reached up to 50%, the tax rate changes throughout the 1990s significantly reduced the maximum potential gain. the

21、 maximum potential gain was near 30% in 1993, and by 1998, approximately 20%,remaining at that level through 2002. </p><p>　　5、Summary and empirical implications </p><p>　　The nature of the comb

22、ined impact of financial leverage and dividend policy on firm value over the years 1979–2002 is found to be wide ranging as a direct result of the tax rate changes. We discussed above three distinct tax regime environmen

23、ts in detail. In the first interval 1979–1981, low leverage and low dividend payout leads to higher firm value. However, given a high dividend payout, the firm is better off by carrying a high debt level. That suggests a

24、 simultaneous increase or decrease in </p><p>　　The same logic applies throughout the years following the 1979–1981 time interval up to 1987 and again after 1992. During the years 1979–1987, the tax rate wer

25、e such that at low debt levels, firm value declined with increasing dividend payout ratios. Similarly, from 1993 until 2002, firms would suffer losses in value if they chose to increase dividend payout while maintaining

26、low debt levels. In contrast, during the 1988–1992 time interval, there was no penalty for having a high dividend payout </p><p>　　The breakdown in the interaction of dividend payout and capital structure du

27、ring the 1988–1992 time period as implied by our model provides an opportunity to test the model empirically. If our model is a reasonable representation of the dividend payout-capital structure interaction under varying

28、 tax rate environments, we would expect a positive association between dividend payout and debt levels during the years 1979–1987 and 1993–2002 During the years 1988–1992, the association between dividend</p><

29、p>　　It is worth noting that, to the extent firms have shifted their distributions to their shareholders from dividends to stock repurchases over time, our empirical analysis, which only uses dividend payout data, wil

30、l not be able to pick up this trend. Indeed, during the three decades under study there was a shift in firms’ attitudes toward share repurchases vis-à-vis dividend payout. We do not pursue stock repurchases empirica

31、lly in this study due to data limitations. However, note that the model </p><p>　　In this paper we develop a valuation model that ties together capital structure and dividend payout polices while incorporati

32、ng differential tax rates on dividend distributions and capital gains. As such it is an extension of the original Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend policy model and of the Miller (1977) model. We numerically and grap

33、hically demonstrate the implications of this new model under ten different tax regimes in effect since 1979 and derive the implications of the model for fi</p><p>　　Our analysis indicates a wide range of fir

34、m values depending on the particular set of tax rates applicable at the time. In the first interval, 1979–1981, when the tax regime featured a high rate on dividend income in comparison to the rates on corporate income a

35、nd personal capital gains, increasing financial leverage would lead to losses in firm value, if the dividend payout was relatively small. At dividend payout ratios below 40%, the loss in firm value in response to increas

36、ed debt ratio coul</p><p>　　Using the analysis of the valuation model under a diverse set of tax regimes, we develop several predictions for empirical testing. The results of the empirical tests are strongly

37、 supportive of the basic predictions of our analysis in a static setting. The interaction between dividend policy and financial leverage decisions is significantly influenced by the prevailing tax rates. The more dynamic

38、 predictions of the model remain for subsequent examination.</p><p>　　By design, our tax-based model abstracts from the well-known and important contributions of previous studies on bankruptcy/financial dist

39、ress costs, agency considerations, and signaling theories. However, the insights gained from our extended tax-based model could contribute in a significant way to the understanding of corporate financial policy in both r

40、esearch and policy dimensions. It is a well established notion within the trade-off theory of corporate capital structure that a range of debt </p><p>　　In the near future, another major change in the U.S. t

41、ax environment is possible, especially if the JGTRRA is allowed to expire by the Congress. The ability of the model in this paper to easily incorporate the new levels of marginal tax rates on four types of income makes i

42、t a useful tool for corporate decision makers in analyzing dividend and debt decisions. For purposes of research, the model can be used to gain insights into the evolution of dividend policy over the past three decades.&

43、lt;/p><p>　　Source: Ufuk Ince and James E. Owers. 2003 “The interaction of corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions under differential tax regimes”. Journal of Economics and Finance, August, pp

44、. 29-32.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　在分稅制度股利政策與資本結(jié)構(gòu)下的決策</p><p>　　1、互動(dòng)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策 </p><p>　　公司價(jià)值方面進(jìn)行歸一零債務(wù)和零股利支出?；诠緝r(jià)值上的公司股利和資本結(jié)構(gòu)政策所帶來(lái)的公司合并凈影響是直接與當(dāng)時(shí)的相關(guān)稅率掛鉤。

45、</p><p>　　我們接下來(lái)討論在不同歷史稅制下的股利和資本政策模型所帶來(lái)的影響。三個(gè)有代表性的稅收制度（1979-1981年，1988-1990年，1993-2002年）被選定為用于分析出自從1979年開(kāi)始三十年期間存在的十個(gè)。三個(gè)有代表性的稅收制度無(wú)論從絕對(duì)價(jià)值還是彼此間的相對(duì)價(jià)值來(lái)看都體現(xiàn)出截然不同的稅率組合。出于這個(gè)原因，這三個(gè)截然不同的制度提供了一個(gè)合適的設(shè)置來(lái)測(cè)試我們的模型的價(jià)值含義。如果我們的模

46、型提供了公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和股利政策決定合理的表述，那么這三種截然不同的稅制將會(huì)成為在模型預(yù)測(cè)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)性觀察中尋找合適點(diǎn)的理想環(huán)境。</p><p>　　2、1979-1981年</p><p>　　運(yùn)用從1979年和1981年期間稅率的模型的應(yīng)用揭示了一個(gè)微妙的影響，表和圖描繪了代表杠桿和股利支出功能的規(guī)格化公司價(jià)值，VD，Π/V0,0。杠桿收益只有當(dāng)公司處在一個(gè)相對(duì)高的派息率（約40％以上）

47、，并且伴有在全額支出（100%）下的最大增益的情況下才為正。有趣的是，在分紅水平低于40％的情況下，提升了的杠桿效應(yīng)卻降低了公司價(jià)值。杠桿效應(yīng)的支付率較低狀況的逆轉(zhuǎn)是由稅率的相對(duì)水平所驅(qū)使造成的。</p><p>　　1979-1981年期間，個(gè)人所得稅的最高邊際稅率相比較于企業(yè)所得稅率已經(jīng)是相當(dāng)高的了（70%和46%），在這樣的稅率環(huán)境，為他們所得的利息收入債券持有人支付高額稅收超過(guò)從在企業(yè)層面的利息減稅好處。

48、因?yàn)閭鶆?wù)融資可以被假定為具有零凈現(xiàn)值，這個(gè)額外的負(fù)擔(dān)是由股東承擔(dān)。在派息水平高，另一方面，對(duì)股息收入征稅，使派息相比更加不利支付利息。換言之，現(xiàn)在它會(huì)更利于公司的借款并支付利息，而不是分紅。從利息稅扣除收獲傾斜的好處在債務(wù)融資支持的平衡，使得利用更具吸引力。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)關(guān)于1979-1981年稅率環(huán)境值得注意的現(xiàn)象是在回應(yīng)增加派息以非常低的債務(wù)水平，公司價(jià)值大幅虧損。根據(jù)我們的模型，它是一個(gè)全公司

49、股權(quán)價(jià)值可能遇到的損失高達(dá)58％（即，VD，Π/V0，0值范圍從1.00至表2A中的第一列0.42）。該公司可以減輕維持較高的債務(wù)水平這一損失。稅收制度，使得上述可能討論的不是一個(gè)有趣的特點(diǎn)是短期異常僅限于1979-1981年。事實(shí)上，兩者的大蕭條和70年代末整個(gè)時(shí)期的特點(diǎn)是一個(gè)類(lèi)似的稅率環(huán)境。我們的模型表明，最優(yōu)的政策，以最大限度地提高企業(yè)在這樣的債務(wù)和所需的稅收零零分紅制度的價(jià)值。有趣的是此方與當(dāng)前關(guān)注的杠桿政策相一致，當(dāng)諸如IBM

50、和可口可樂(lè)公司在眾多著名的20世紀(jì)80年代之前，幾乎沒(méi)有，債務(wù)杠桿觀察政策。但是，如果一個(gè)企業(yè)將需要維持高派息率的水平，這將是更好地執(zhí)行在同一時(shí)間相對(duì)較高的債務(wù)水平了。傳統(tǒng)的電力公司的例子，似乎是符合這個(gè)模具。</p><p>　　3、1988-1990年（和1991-1992年）</p><p>　　1988-1990年期間的情況是獨(dú)一無(wú)二的，因?yàn)樵谶@段時(shí)間里最普通的收入（從而對(duì)股利和利

51、息收入）的邊際稅率名義上與28％的資本利得稅稅率相同。在隨后的2年（1991-1992年），兩稅稅率仍保持十分密切（在31.0％和28.9％）。在公司杠桿價(jià)值關(guān)系上的股利分紅基本上是沒(méi)有緩和影響的趨勢(shì)。無(wú)論派息水平，從理論上的最大杠桿收益接近50％。我們的預(yù)期比較靜態(tài)模型，該派息率的影響消失是由于在1988-1992年期間的近零稅率差（τpd？τpg）。</p><p>　　4、1993-2002年</p&

52、gt;<p>　　在1979-81和1988-1992年期間與此相反的逆轉(zhuǎn)作用下觀察到的稅制，類(lèi)似的情況，從利用增益總是在1993-2002年的稅收制度中顯陽(yáng)性。在1993年到1994年以及2002年相關(guān)的杠桿關(guān)系增益和股利分紅影響的詳細(xì)狀況可以看到。從與上一個(gè)間隔10年之久的稅收制度的角度來(lái)講，杠桿收益對(duì)于高派息率公司來(lái)說(shuō)顯得更加明顯和重要。雖然負(fù)債水平低或零增長(zhǎng)的派息降低公司價(jià)值，但是對(duì)派息的負(fù)面影響減弱了債務(wù)水平上升

53、。這種效果是明顯的。</p><p>　　在1988-1992年期間相比，最大限度的利用潛力增益可達(dá)50％，在整個(gè)20世紀(jì)90年代顯著降低稅率變化的最大潛在收益。在1993年，最大的潛在收益接近30％，到1998年，約20％，其余維持這一水平一直到2002年。</p><p>　　對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)杠桿和股利政策對(duì)公司價(jià)值的綜合影響的性質(zhì)，多年來(lái)79年至02年被發(fā)現(xiàn)有廣泛變化作為稅率變化的直接結(jié)果。我

54、們討論了上述三種不同的稅收制度，詳細(xì)的環(huán)境。在第一區(qū)間1979-1981，低杠桿和低派息導(dǎo)致較高的公司價(jià)值。然而，由于高派息率，該公司正在通過(guò)實(shí)施更好的高債務(wù)水平了。這表明了同步增長(zhǎng)的杠桿或減少對(duì)企業(yè)支出。這是不太可能找到與低杠桿和高派息（這在公司的價(jià)值最小可能的結(jié)果）公司的。在1979-1981年的時(shí)間間隔為模型的實(shí)證含義是一個(gè)杠桿和支出之間的正相關(guān)。</p><p>　　同樣的邏輯也適用于整個(gè)1979-198

55、1年之后的幾年時(shí)間間隔直到1987年和1992年。1979-1987年期間，稅率在低負(fù)債水平上，公司價(jià)值增加派息比率下降。同樣，從1993年到2002年，公司將蒙受損失的價(jià)值，如果他們選擇增加派息，同時(shí)保持較低的負(fù)債水平。相比之下，在1988-1992年的時(shí)間間隔，較低的負(fù)債水平而高股利分紅的公司并沒(méi)有受到派息處罰。派息確實(shí)無(wú)關(guān)緊要，在這段時(shí)間內(nèi)不會(huì)改變預(yù)期，有系統(tǒng)地進(jìn)行企業(yè)間的不同層次的債務(wù)。</p><p>

56、　　5、總結(jié)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)的影響</p><p>　　1979-2002年期間財(cái)務(wù)杠桿和股利政策對(duì)公司價(jià)值的綜合影響，被發(fā)現(xiàn)是作為一種廣泛的稅率變化的直接結(jié)果。我們?cè)敿?xì)地討論了上述三種不同的稅收制度環(huán)境。在1979-1981年期間，低杠桿和低派息導(dǎo)致較高的公司價(jià)值。然而，由于高派息率，該公司正在通過(guò)實(shí)施更好的高債務(wù)水平了。這表明了在杠桿效應(yīng)和企業(yè)支出上同步的增長(zhǎng)或減少。這是不太可能找到低杠桿和高派息（導(dǎo)致公司價(jià)值值最小的

57、結(jié)果）的公司。在1979-1981年的時(shí)間間隔為模型的實(shí)證含義是一個(gè)杠桿和支出之間的正相關(guān)。</p><p>　　在1988-1992年期間支付的股息和資本結(jié)構(gòu)的相互作用，我們的模型所隱含的故障提供了一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)檢驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｐ偷膶?shí)證。如果我們的模型在浮動(dòng)稅率環(huán)境下能作為股利分紅和資本結(jié)構(gòu)互動(dòng)的一個(gè)合理代表的話，</p><p>　　我們將期待在1979-1987年和1993-2002年期間的股利分

58、紅和債務(wù)水平將呈現(xiàn)正相關(guān)。在1988-1992年期間，派息與杠桿效應(yīng)間的聯(lián)系預(yù)計(jì)將減弱。我們?cè)诘?節(jié)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)，研究這些預(yù)測(cè)的有效性。值得一提的是，企業(yè)的范圍內(nèi)，隨著時(shí)間的推移已經(jīng)從向股東分配股利轉(zhuǎn)移到股票的回購(gòu)，我們的實(shí)證分析，只使用派息數(shù)據(jù)，將不能夠延續(xù)這一趨勢(shì)。事實(shí)上，相對(duì)于派息而言，在所研究的三十年有一個(gè)公司更加傾向于股票回購(gòu)。由于數(shù)據(jù)的限制，我們不追求股票回購(gòu)的實(shí)證研究。但是，請(qǐng)注意，本文得出的模型是通過(guò)捕捉隱含的資本利得的

59、長(zhǎng)期回購(gòu)的估值效應(yīng)。</p><p>　　這篇文章我們完善了相對(duì)公司在不同稅率股利分配和資本增長(zhǎng)下聯(lián)系資本結(jié)構(gòu)與股利支付政策的股價(jià)模型。因此它是擴(kuò)展的原來(lái)的米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961)的股利政策模型及米勒 (1977年)模型。我們用數(shù)值和圖形證明這個(gè)自1979年以來(lái)的新模型含義在實(shí)際10種不同的稅收制度,派生出該模型內(nèi)涵對(duì)于企業(yè)價(jià)值根據(jù)股利支付率和負(fù)債比率的計(jì)算。</p><p>　　我們

60、的分析表明大范圍的公司價(jià)值計(jì)算依靠當(dāng)時(shí)特定設(shè)立的稅率。在第一個(gè)區(qū)間,1979-1981,當(dāng)時(shí)稅收制度上的一個(gè)特點(diǎn)在股利收入高稅率相比與企業(yè)所得稅和個(gè)人資本所得, 如果派利支付是相對(duì)較小,增加財(cái)政杠桿會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)價(jià)值損失。在股利支付率低于40%，企業(yè)價(jià)值的損失作為對(duì)響應(yīng)增加負(fù)債比率可能達(dá)到23%。在同一時(shí)期,如果公司保持著股利支付率超過(guò)40%,如果一個(gè)股份公司決定擔(dān)負(fù)債務(wù),公司價(jià)值可以將近一半。在1988 - 1990時(shí)期,當(dāng)稅率在股利收入

61、和資本收益上都是28%,一個(gè)獨(dú)資股權(quán)公司（沒(méi)有關(guān)于它的股利支付水平）可能提高價(jià)值通過(guò)差不多2倍的負(fù)債。在1998年之后盛行的稅收制度,最大限度的潛在獲利通過(guò)不支付股利股權(quán)公司大約20%,然而一個(gè)高股利支付率公司可能價(jià)值漲一倍如果增加其債務(wù)融資。</p><p>　　在不同的稅收制度利用股價(jià)分析模式,我們建立幾個(gè)預(yù)言來(lái)實(shí)證。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果強(qiáng)烈支持我們分析的基本預(yù)測(cè)在一個(gè)靜態(tài)環(huán)境。摘要在股利政策和財(cái)務(wù)杠桿決策之間的相互

62、作用顯著影響通過(guò)現(xiàn)行稅率。更多模型的動(dòng)態(tài)預(yù)測(cè)在后來(lái)實(shí)驗(yàn)中保持。</p><p>　　從構(gòu)想來(lái)說(shuō)，稅務(wù)基礎(chǔ)模式是從早期的銀行破產(chǎn)，金融危機(jī)成本，機(jī)構(gòu)分析，和相關(guān)理論中反映出來(lái)的。然而，其延伸出的稅務(wù)基礎(chǔ)模式可以通過(guò)其研究和政策規(guī)模合理的了解公司金融政策。公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)中已經(jīng)存在的債務(wù)水平在其權(quán)衡交易定論里面得到一個(gè)合理的建立。合理的債務(wù)性融資可以對(duì)該公司起到一個(gè)正面的影響力。概括這些，我們所提及的模式可以潛在性為資本

63、結(jié)構(gòu)中所涉及到的股息配股方面提供一個(gè)有價(jià)值的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　在不久的將來(lái)，關(guān)于美國(guó)現(xiàn)有稅務(wù)環(huán)境的變化都是可能的，特別是如果美國(guó)現(xiàn)有公民關(guān)于其工作，稅收增長(zhǎng)中進(jìn)行的減免政策是被允許使用到國(guó)會(huì)到期。這章中涉及到現(xiàn)有模式的優(yōu)點(diǎn)是可以更方便融入邊際稅率中所關(guān)于收入這一塊，它可以更有效的去讓一個(gè)公司的決策者更好的去分析公司的股權(quán)和債務(wù)。研究調(diào)查的目的是希望能從過(guò)去的三十年相關(guān)的政策中獲得有效的改變。</p