外文翻譯--合并政策和稅收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3200字,2000單詞，10500英文字符</p><p>　　出處： Haufler A, Schulte C. Merger Policy and Tax Competition[J]. Discussion Papers in Economics, 2007, volume 18(12):121-145(25).</p><p><b>　　原文

2、：</b></p><p>　　Merger Policy and Tax Competition</p><p>　　A Haufler，C Schulte</p><p>　　In many situations governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their

3、 disposal to influence the market outcome after a national or an international merger has taken place. We find that whether national or international mergers are more likely to be enacted in the presence of nationally op

4、timal tax policies depends crucially on the ownership structure of firms. When all firms are owned domestically in the premerger situation, non-cooperative tax policies are more efficient in t</p><p>　　Merge

5、rs have played a prominent role over the past decade, and international merger activity has grown particularly fast. During the period 1981-1998 the annual number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has increased more

6、than fivefold and the share of cross-border mergers has reached more than one quarter of the total by the end of this period. This increase in merger activity has led to situations where a national or an international me

7、rger have been in direct competition with each other. A rec</p><p>　　A different approach has been taken by the British government, which has fully liberalized its electricity market in the early 1990s. In t

8、his process, foreign electricity providers (among them E.ON ) took over a large part of the British electricity industry. The British government responded to high profits in this and other privatized industries by imposi

9、ng a one-time, sector-specific ‘windfall profit tax’ in 1997. Since then, a renewed imposition of this tax has been repeatedly discussed as a </p><p>　　The last example shows clearly that national government

10、s dispose over additional policy instruments in an industry where a merger or a foreign acquisition has taken place. Price regulation in privatized `network industries' is one important way to increase domestic consu

11、mer surplus at the expense of corporate profits, which often accrue, at least in part, to foreign shareholders. Sector-specific profit taxes have very similar effects, if their proceeds are redistributed to consumers in

12、compensat</p><p>　　we argue that the possibility to levy industry-specific taxes or subsidies in a nationally optimal way has important repercussions on the position that national regulation authorities take

13、 vis-µa-vis a national or an international merger proposal. At the same time, merging firms will incorporate a possible change in policy when deciding about a merger in a particular country. To analyze this interact

14、ion between tax and merger policies we set up a model where both firms and merger regulation auth</p><p>　　Our analysis shows that the relative attractiveness of a national versus an international merger dep

15、ends critically on the degree of foreign firm ownership. When all firms are nationally owned prior to the merger, then a national merger will lead to more efficient tax policies as compared to the international merger. I

16、n contrast, when the level of foreign firm ownership is high initially, then non-cooperative tax policies in the host countries will be more efficient under the international merge</p><p>　　Our analysis rela

17、tes to two strands in the literature. First, there is a growing recent literature on merger policies in open economies. This literature, however, typically regards merger control as an isolated policy problem for nationa

18、l or international regulators. The literature that analyses the interaction of merger control with other policy instruments is scarce, and it almost exclusively focuses on international trade policies as the additional p

19、olicy variable (Richardson, 1999; Horn and </p><p>　　The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework for our analysis. Section 3 presents the benchmark case of double duopoly, wh

20、ere two firms are located in each country and all four firms compete in both markets. Section 4 analyzes the changes in tax policies and welfare when a national merger occurs in one of the countries. Section 5 carries ou

21、t the same analysis for an international merger. Section 6 introduces synergy effects associated with a national and an intern</p><p>　　In practice a core motivation for firms to undertake mergers, and an im

22、portant reason for regulation authorities to permit them, is that mergers can create synergy effects. We analyze how large the cost savings must be for a national or an international merger in order to be in the interest

23、 of both the merging firms and the regulation authority of the host country. We deal again with different ownership structures of firms. Due to the complexity of the resulting expressions, we confine the discu</p>

24、<p>　　We should observe a positive and systematic relationship between the foreign ownership share and the share of cross-border mergers in a particular industry. There is indeed some first, suggestive evidence in

25、favour of this proposition. In the OECD countries the share of cross-border mergers in the total number of M&A cases differs widely across different economic sectors and is highest in manufacturing. At the same time,

26、 manufacturing is also one of the most internationalized sectors with respec</p><p>　　In many industries governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market

27、 outcome after a change in market structure has occurred. In this paper we have set up a simple model to analyze how nationally optimal tax rates will be adjusted in response to a national merger on the one hand and an i

28、nternational merger on the other. Extending the analysis to incorporate synergy effects of mergers, we have then studied how these changes in tax policy feed b</p><p>　　Our analysis shows that a national and

29、 an international merger lead to different incentives for national tax policy. On the one hand an international merger increases the 24 incentives for non-cooperative tax policy to tax foreign firm owners in excess of th

30、e efficient levels. On the other hand, an international merger leads to a larger share of consumption in each country being served by local producers and thus increases the incentive for each country to grant Pareto effi

31、cient subsidies. Which</p><p>　　One implication of our model is that a rise in international portfolio diversification will favour cross-border mergers, other things being equal. When, as it is often argued,

32、 a rise in foreign asset holdings is one of the consequences of economic integration, then our analysis provides an explanation for the rising share of cross-border mergers. In principle our argument is complementary to

33、other reasons for cross-border mergers found in the literature, in particular the argument that they allo</p><p>　　Our analysis could be extended in several directions. One possibility would be to indigenize

34、 the share of foreign firm ownership, and relate this share explicitly to the forces of economic integration. In such a setting international portfolio diversification would lead to gains in the form of higher returns or

35、 lower aggregate risk, but it would also cause higher information or transaction costs. If economic integration reduces the latter, the link between globalization and the rise of cross-bor</p><p><b>　　

36、譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　合并政策和稅收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)</b></p><p>　　通常政府有特定部門(mén)的稅收和管理政策來(lái)處理國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)或者跨國(guó)并購(gòu)中產(chǎn)生的市場(chǎng)問(wèn)題。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)或跨國(guó)并購(gòu)是否為國(guó)內(nèi)最佳稅收政策所觸發(fā)，主要取決于公司的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。當(dāng)企業(yè)在合并中為純粹國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)時(shí)，非合作稅收政策在國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)合并中就更有效，同時(shí)協(xié)同效應(yīng)很少。當(dāng)在合并前企業(yè)

37、的外資股份很高時(shí)，結(jié)果正好相反。</p><p>　　在過(guò)去的十年當(dāng)中，合并的作用十分顯著，跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的發(fā)展也很快。在1981-1998年期間，年均企業(yè)并購(gòu)的數(shù)量增加了5倍以上，跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的份額已達(dá)到總數(shù)的四分之一。企業(yè)并購(gòu)數(shù)量的增加導(dǎo)致了國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)和跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。最新的例子就是西班牙頭號(hào)電力供應(yīng)商恩德薩公司招標(biāo)時(shí)，德國(guó)意昂集團(tuán)和西班牙天然氣之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。西班牙當(dāng)局與國(guó)際并購(gòu)相比，更偏向于國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)，于是從中作梗，阻

38、止德國(guó)意昂集團(tuán)的接手，這是意昂集團(tuán)最終退出招標(biāo)的原因之一。</p><p>　　英國(guó)政府采取了新的措施，使電力市場(chǎng)在20世紀(jì)90年代早期得到了充分自由化發(fā)展。在這個(gè)過(guò)程當(dāng)中，外國(guó)電力供應(yīng)商（其中也包括意昂集團(tuán)）收購(gòu)了很大一部分英國(guó)電力企業(yè)。英國(guó)政府從中得到了高額的利潤(rùn)，其他的企業(yè)則在1997年專業(yè)部門(mén)提出暴利稅后一次性將利潤(rùn)劃歸私人所有。從此，作為完善價(jià)格管理制度的籌碼，價(jià)格權(quán)威部門(mén)(天然氣部門(mén)和電力市場(chǎng))不斷地

39、提出新的稅收政策</p><p>　　從上面的例子中，我們可以清楚地看到，政府是如何處理國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)或者跨國(guó)并購(gòu)時(shí)產(chǎn)生的附加政策的。價(jià)格規(guī)則在私有的網(wǎng)絡(luò)產(chǎn)業(yè)中是一個(gè)以共同利益為代價(jià)增加消費(fèi)者盈余的重要方法，它至少會(huì)增加外國(guó)股東的利潤(rùn)。如果管理利潤(rùn)稅的部門(mén)以他們的收入為賠償金再重新分配給消費(fèi)者來(lái)提高價(jià)格，這個(gè)作用是微乎其微的。另一方面，也有很多企業(yè)為了提高產(chǎn)品的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力而給專門(mén)的部門(mén)直接發(fā)放補(bǔ)貼。這里有一系列的例子，比如

40、說(shuō)礦業(yè)、造船業(yè)、煉鋼業(yè)或飛機(jī)制造業(yè)。此外，一些其他的部門(mén)（如航空運(yùn)輸），通過(guò)消費(fèi)稅的折合率給予直接的補(bǔ)貼，尤其在電力稅方面。從該意義上來(lái)講，這些生態(tài)稅收就相當(dāng)于皮古稅，使公司通過(guò)稅收減少他們產(chǎn)品所消耗的社會(huì)成本。這樣的減免稅主要體現(xiàn)在電力和能源部門(mén)上。在這些例子當(dāng)中可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，無(wú)論是特定部門(mén)的稅收還是補(bǔ)貼政策，都可以通過(guò)調(diào)整國(guó)家政策的方式來(lái)適應(yīng)并購(gòu)所帶來(lái)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的變化。</p><p>　　通過(guò)我們論證得出，國(guó)家

41、法規(guī)當(dāng)局用一個(gè)全國(guó)性的最佳方式來(lái)征收行業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)稅或津貼，對(duì)實(shí)行國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)或跨國(guó)并購(gòu)有著重要的影響。同時(shí)，當(dāng)決定在一個(gè)特定的國(guó)家進(jìn)行企業(yè)并購(gòu)時(shí)，該合并企業(yè)可能需要適應(yīng)一個(gè)新的政策。為了分析稅收和企業(yè)并購(gòu)之間的相互作用，我們建立了一個(gè)模型。在該模型內(nèi)，企業(yè)和國(guó)家法規(guī)當(dāng)局期望在實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)合并后，東道主國(guó)家的稅收會(huì)得到最佳的調(diào)整。更具體的說(shuō)，我們要研究生產(chǎn)性企業(yè)之間的產(chǎn)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情況，這四個(gè)企業(yè)兩兩分布于實(shí)力均衡的國(guó)家中。重要的是，這些企業(yè)都可能有外資股

42、份，因此，這也激發(fā)了政府利用那一部分被輸出給國(guó)外投資者的利潤(rùn)稅。從雙寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)入手，我們著眼于比較國(guó)內(nèi)合并和跨國(guó)并購(gòu)。</p><p>　　我們的分析表明，一個(gè)國(guó)家對(duì)國(guó)際并購(gòu)的相對(duì)吸引力，關(guān)鍵取決于外國(guó)企業(yè)所有權(quán)的程度。當(dāng)所有的企業(yè)在合并前為純粹國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)時(shí)，那么合并后與跨國(guó)并購(gòu)相比將導(dǎo)致更有效的稅收優(yōu)惠。對(duì)比之下，當(dāng)企業(yè)的外資股份初始水平很高時(shí)，東道國(guó)的非合作稅收政策在國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)合并中將更加有效。將該模

43、型允許企業(yè)并購(gòu)的協(xié)同作用進(jìn)行擴(kuò)展，我們不難發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)企業(yè)的外資股份程度較高時(shí)，跨國(guó)并購(gòu)將更容易提出和采用一些福利政策。這些結(jié)果意味著，一個(gè)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)越分散的企業(yè)和非合作選擇的國(guó)家稅收政策相結(jié)合，可能為近期跨國(guó)并購(gòu)活動(dòng)激增提供了一個(gè)解釋。</p><p>　　我們的分析涉及文獻(xiàn)中的兩個(gè)方面。一方面，在最近的文獻(xiàn)中有越來(lái)越多關(guān)于對(duì)開(kāi)放經(jīng)濟(jì)中的合并政策的理解。然而，這類(lèi)文獻(xiàn)通常把控制跨國(guó)并購(gòu)作為一個(gè)政策問(wèn)題，還分析出合并

44、控制和其他政策手段之間的相互作用是很少的，它幾乎只關(guān)注額外政策變量的國(guó)際貿(mào)易政策(理查森，1999；哈恩和萊文索恩，2001；哈克和康拉德，2004；薩基和伊麗斯，2006)。相反，到目前為止，這種文獻(xiàn)尚未提及合并政策與國(guó)家稅收政策的內(nèi)容。另一方面，第二種文獻(xiàn)使得我們的論文建立在寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)中的最優(yōu)商品稅分析上（基恩和拉希麗，1998；洛克伍德，2001；基恩等，2002；哈夫等2005；哈希姆扎德等，2005）。然而，這種文獻(xiàn)主要集中

45、在商品統(tǒng)一稅收和外部給定的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下商品稅制度選擇的問(wèn)題上。作為并購(gòu)的結(jié)果，它并沒(méi)有遵從潛在市場(chǎng)環(huán)境的變化來(lái)處理稅收政策的影響。</p><p>　　本文安排如下。第2節(jié)描述我們分析的基本框架。第3節(jié)介紹雙寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)。第4節(jié)分析了稅收政策和福利的變化時(shí)，國(guó)內(nèi)發(fā)生的跨國(guó)并購(gòu)。第5節(jié)進(jìn)行了一個(gè)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)案例的分析。第6節(jié)是從跨國(guó)并購(gòu)引出了協(xié)同效應(yīng)，比較了下一個(gè)或其他類(lèi)型的并購(gòu)提議，并通過(guò)收購(gòu)當(dāng)局的條件進(jìn)行兼并。第7節(jié)

46、則是結(jié)論。</p><p>　　在實(shí)踐中得出，能夠創(chuàng)造協(xié)同效應(yīng)是企業(yè)進(jìn)行并購(gòu)的核心動(dòng)力，也是一國(guó)當(dāng)局允許并購(gòu)的重要原因。我們分析了作為國(guó)內(nèi)或者跨國(guó)并購(gòu)，為了合并企業(yè)雙方的利益，怎樣去節(jié)約大量的成本。同樣的，我們又對(duì)不同所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下的國(guó)家進(jìn)行了分析。由于所產(chǎn)生的表達(dá)式的復(fù)雜性，我們?cè)谥魑谋局兄挥懻搰?guó)家所有權(quán)和完整的國(guó)際所有權(quán)的多樣化。</p><p>　　我們應(yīng)該注意到，在一個(gè)特定行業(yè)中，資

47、源共享和跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的份額之間有著積極和系統(tǒng)的聯(lián)系。這確實(shí)有一些基本的提示性強(qiáng)的理論在支持這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)。在經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織成員國(guó)中，總的企業(yè)并購(gòu)量中的跨國(guó)并購(gòu)份額在不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)部門(mén)有著很大的不同，最高的是制造業(yè)。與此同時(shí)，至少在歐洲國(guó)家，制造業(yè)也是一個(gè)對(duì)待企業(yè)的外資股份最國(guó)際化的部門(mén)之一。同樣的，企業(yè)外資股份較低的部門(mén)，如建筑行業(yè)中跨國(guó)并購(gòu)量占并購(gòu)案例總量的比例就很低。一個(gè)詳細(xì)的實(shí)證研究需要嚴(yán)格的論證，比如企業(yè)的外資股份和跨國(guó)并購(gòu)份額間擁有的普

48、遍性是否是一種正相關(guān)，它是否能被聯(lián)系到全國(guó)最佳的互動(dòng)稅收政策和合并控制中去。</p><p>　　在市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)出現(xiàn)變化之后，在許多行業(yè)，政府都有特定部門(mén)的稅收和管理政策來(lái)處理它們對(duì)市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)出造成的影響。本文列舉一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的例子來(lái)解釋國(guó)家是如何通過(guò)調(diào)整最佳稅率來(lái)適應(yīng)國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)和跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的。再將這個(gè)分析延伸到并購(gòu)的協(xié)同作用上。我們還研究了這些稅收政策的變化是如何激勵(lì)公司合并，同時(shí)也讓合并管理的權(quán)威部門(mén)收購(gòu)它。</p&g

49、t;<p>　　分析結(jié)果表明，國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)和跨國(guó)并購(gòu)對(duì)國(guó)家的稅收政策產(chǎn)生了不同的刺激。一方面，跨國(guó)并購(gòu)使得非合作性稅收政策可以向外國(guó)企業(yè)征收超過(guò)它生產(chǎn)能力部分的稅收。另一方面，跨國(guó)并購(gòu)導(dǎo)致了本國(guó)產(chǎn)品自產(chǎn)自銷(xiāo)，從而促進(jìn)了各國(guó)對(duì)有效補(bǔ)貼政策的收購(gòu)。這兩種不同的影響關(guān)鍵取決于在合并之前企業(yè)的外資股份的多少。如果公司在合并之前為純粹國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)，那么國(guó)內(nèi)合并就占了主導(dǎo)地位，也就是說(shuō)它在提出合并和被管理機(jī)構(gòu)解除時(shí)需要比較少的成本。相反的，如

50、果企業(yè)外資的股權(quán)份額較大，那么在提出或者取消跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的時(shí)候成本的范圍更廣一些。</p><p>　　我們認(rèn)為，國(guó)際投資組合不斷的多樣化有助于跨國(guó)并購(gòu)和促進(jìn)公平。就如通常說(shuō)的那樣，外國(guó)資產(chǎn)的增長(zhǎng)是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的結(jié)果。我們的調(diào)查結(jié)果為跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的不斷增多提供了進(jìn)一步的分析解釋。大體上，我們的調(diào)查與文獻(xiàn)上的跨國(guó)并購(gòu)，尤其是關(guān)于允許節(jié)約運(yùn)輸成本的調(diào)查是相輔相成的。值得一提的是，這個(gè)論點(diǎn)并不能說(shuō)明跨國(guó)并購(gòu)份額一直是不斷上升

51、的。隨著時(shí)間的推移，當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化不斷發(fā)展，運(yùn)輸成本不斷下降的時(shí)候，它也將變的無(wú)足輕重了。</p><p>　　我們的分析可以延伸到多個(gè)方面。一種可能性是將外國(guó)公司的市場(chǎng)份額本土化，并且明確地將市場(chǎng)份額與經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的力量聯(lián)系起來(lái)。這種國(guó)際證券組合多樣化的環(huán)境將會(huì)導(dǎo)致以更高的回報(bào)或更低的總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)形式來(lái)獲得收益。但是，它也可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生更高的信息獲取和交易成本。如果經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化縮減了后者，那么全球化和跨國(guó)并購(gòu)之間有了更好的聯(lián)系