外文翻譯--合并政策和稅收競爭（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3200字,2000單詞，10500英文字符</p><p>　　出處： Haufler A, Schulte C. Merger Policy and Tax Competition[J]. Discussion Papers in Economics, 2007, volume 18(12):121-145(25).</p><p><b>　　原文

2、：</b></p><p>　　Merger Policy and Tax Competition</p><p>　　A Haufler，C Schulte</p><p>　　In many situations governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their

3、 disposal to influence the market outcome after a national or an international merger has taken place. We find that whether national or international mergers are more likely to be enacted in the presence of nationally op

4、timal tax policies depends crucially on the ownership structure of firms. When all firms are owned domestically in the premerger situation, non-cooperative tax policies are more efficient in t</p><p>　　Merge

5、rs have played a prominent role over the past decade, and international merger activity has grown particularly fast. During the period 1981-1998 the annual number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has increased more

6、than fivefold and the share of cross-border mergers has reached more than one quarter of the total by the end of this period. This increase in merger activity has led to situations where a national or an international me

7、rger have been in direct competition with each other. A rec</p><p>　　A different approach has been taken by the British government, which has fully liberalized its electricity market in the early 1990s. In t

8、his process, foreign electricity providers (among them E.ON ) took over a large part of the British electricity industry. The British government responded to high profits in this and other privatized industries by imposi

9、ng a one-time, sector-specific ‘windfall profit tax’ in 1997. Since then, a renewed imposition of this tax has been repeatedly discussed as a </p><p>　　The last example shows clearly that national government

10、s dispose over additional policy instruments in an industry where a merger or a foreign acquisition has taken place. Price regulation in privatized `network industries' is one important way to increase domestic consu

11、mer surplus at the expense of corporate profits, which often accrue, at least in part, to foreign shareholders. Sector-specific profit taxes have very similar effects, if their proceeds are redistributed to consumers in

12、compensat</p><p>　　we argue that the possibility to levy industry-specific taxes or subsidies in a nationally optimal way has important repercussions on the position that national regulation authorities take

13、 vis-µa-vis a national or an international merger proposal. At the same time, merging firms will incorporate a possible change in policy when deciding about a merger in a particular country. To analyze this interact

14、ion between tax and merger policies we set up a model where both firms and merger regulation auth</p><p>　　Our analysis shows that the relative attractiveness of a national versus an international merger dep

15、ends critically on the degree of foreign firm ownership. When all firms are nationally owned prior to the merger, then a national merger will lead to more efficient tax policies as compared to the international merger. I

16、n contrast, when the level of foreign firm ownership is high initially, then non-cooperative tax policies in the host countries will be more efficient under the international merge</p><p>　　Our analysis rela

17、tes to two strands in the literature. First, there is a growing recent literature on merger policies in open economies. This literature, however, typically regards merger control as an isolated policy problem for nationa

18、l or international regulators. The literature that analyses the interaction of merger control with other policy instruments is scarce, and it almost exclusively focuses on international trade policies as the additional p

19、olicy variable (Richardson, 1999; Horn and </p><p>　　The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework for our analysis. Section 3 presents the benchmark case of double duopoly, wh

20、ere two firms are located in each country and all four firms compete in both markets. Section 4 analyzes the changes in tax policies and welfare when a national merger occurs in one of the countries. Section 5 carries ou

21、t the same analysis for an international merger. Section 6 introduces synergy effects associated with a national and an intern</p><p>　　In practice a core motivation for firms to undertake mergers, and an im

22、portant reason for regulation authorities to permit them, is that mergers can create synergy effects. We analyze how large the cost savings must be for a national or an international merger in order to be in the interest

23、 of both the merging firms and the regulation authority of the host country. We deal again with different ownership structures of firms. Due to the complexity of the resulting expressions, we confine the discu</p>

24、<p>　　We should observe a positive and systematic relationship between the foreign ownership share and the share of cross-border mergers in a particular industry. There is indeed some first, suggestive evidence in

25、favour of this proposition. In the OECD countries the share of cross-border mergers in the total number of M&A cases differs widely across different economic sectors and is highest in manufacturing. At the same time,

26、 manufacturing is also one of the most internationalized sectors with respec</p><p>　　In many industries governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market

27、 outcome after a change in market structure has occurred. In this paper we have set up a simple model to analyze how nationally optimal tax rates will be adjusted in response to a national merger on the one hand and an i

28、nternational merger on the other. Extending the analysis to incorporate synergy effects of mergers, we have then studied how these changes in tax policy feed b</p><p>　　Our analysis shows that a national and

29、 an international merger lead to different incentives for national tax policy. On the one hand an international merger increases the 24 incentives for non-cooperative tax policy to tax foreign firm owners in excess of th

30、e efficient levels. On the other hand, an international merger leads to a larger share of consumption in each country being served by local producers and thus increases the incentive for each country to grant Pareto effi

31、cient subsidies. Which</p><p>　　One implication of our model is that a rise in international portfolio diversification will favour cross-border mergers, other things being equal. When, as it is often argued,

32、 a rise in foreign asset holdings is one of the consequences of economic integration, then our analysis provides an explanation for the rising share of cross-border mergers. In principle our argument is complementary to

33、other reasons for cross-border mergers found in the literature, in particular the argument that they allo</p><p>　　Our analysis could be extended in several directions. One possibility would be to indigenize

34、 the share of foreign firm ownership, and relate this share explicitly to the forces of economic integration. In such a setting international portfolio diversification would lead to gains in the form of higher returns or

35、 lower aggregate risk, but it would also cause higher information or transaction costs. If economic integration reduces the latter, the link between globalization and the rise of cross-bor</p><p><b>　　

36、譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　合并政策和稅收競爭</b></p><p>　　通常政府有特定部門的稅收和管理政策來處理國內并購或者跨國并購中產生的市場問題。我們發(fā)現國內并購或跨國并購是否為國內最佳稅收政策所觸發(fā)，主要取決于公司的所有權結構。當企業(yè)在合并中為純粹國內企業(yè)時，非合作稅收政策在國內企業(yè)合并中就更有效，同時協同效應很少。當在合并前企業(yè)

37、的外資股份很高時，結果正好相反。</p><p>　　在過去的十年當中，合并的作用十分顯著，跨國并購的發(fā)展也很快。在1981-1998年期間，年均企業(yè)并購的數量增加了5倍以上，跨國并購的份額已達到總數的四分之一。企業(yè)并購數量的增加導致了國內并購和跨國并購的直接競爭。最新的例子就是西班牙頭號電力供應商恩德薩公司招標時，德國意昂集團和西班牙天然氣之間的競爭。西班牙當局與國際并購相比，更偏向于國內并購，于是從中作梗，阻

38、止德國意昂集團的接手，這是意昂集團最終退出招標的原因之一。</p><p>　　英國政府采取了新的措施，使電力市場在20世紀90年代早期得到了充分自由化發(fā)展。在這個過程當中，外國電力供應商（其中也包括意昂集團）收購了很大一部分英國電力企業(yè)。英國政府從中得到了高額的利潤，其他的企業(yè)則在1997年專業(yè)部門提出暴利稅后一次性將利潤劃歸私人所有。從此，作為完善價格管理制度的籌碼，價格權威部門(天然氣部門和電力市場)不斷地

39、提出新的稅收政策</p><p>　　從上面的例子中，我們可以清楚地看到，政府是如何處理國內并購或者跨國并購時產生的附加政策的。價格規(guī)則在私有的網絡產業(yè)中是一個以共同利益為代價增加消費者盈余的重要方法，它至少會增加外國股東的利潤。如果管理利潤稅的部門以他們的收入為賠償金再重新分配給消費者來提高價格，這個作用是微乎其微的。另一方面，也有很多企業(yè)為了提高產品的競爭力而給專門的部門直接發(fā)放補貼。這里有一系列的例子，比如

40、說礦業(yè)、造船業(yè)、煉鋼業(yè)或飛機制造業(yè)。此外，一些其他的部門（如航空運輸），通過消費稅的折合率給予直接的補貼，尤其在電力稅方面。從該意義上來講，這些生態(tài)稅收就相當于皮古稅，使公司通過稅收減少他們產品所消耗的社會成本。這樣的減免稅主要體現在電力和能源部門上。在這些例子當中可以發(fā)現，無論是特定部門的稅收還是補貼政策，都可以通過調整國家政策的方式來適應并購所帶來的市場結構的變化。</p><p>　　通過我們論證得出，國家

41、法規(guī)當局用一個全國性的最佳方式來征收行業(yè)標準稅或津貼，對實行國內并購或跨國并購有著重要的影響。同時，當決定在一個特定的國家進行企業(yè)并購時，該合并企業(yè)可能需要適應一個新的政策。為了分析稅收和企業(yè)并購之間的相互作用，我們建立了一個模型。在該模型內，企業(yè)和國家法規(guī)當局期望在實現企業(yè)合并后，東道主國家的稅收會得到最佳的調整。更具體的說，我們要研究生產性企業(yè)之間的產量競爭情況，這四個企業(yè)兩兩分布于實力均衡的國家中。重要的是，這些企業(yè)都可能有外資股

42、份，因此，這也激發(fā)了政府利用那一部分被輸出給國外投資者的利潤稅。從雙寡頭壟斷市場的市場結構入手，我們著眼于比較國內合并和跨國并購。</p><p>　　我們的分析表明，一個國家對國際并購的相對吸引力，關鍵取決于外國企業(yè)所有權的程度。當所有的企業(yè)在合并前為純粹國內企業(yè)時，那么合并后與跨國并購相比將導致更有效的稅收優(yōu)惠。對比之下，當企業(yè)的外資股份初始水平很高時，東道國的非合作稅收政策在國內企業(yè)合并中將更加有效。將該模

43、型允許企業(yè)并購的協同作用進行擴展，我們不難發(fā)現，當企業(yè)的外資股份程度較高時，跨國并購將更容易提出和采用一些福利政策。這些結果意味著，一個所有權結構越分散的企業(yè)和非合作選擇的國家稅收政策相結合，可能為近期跨國并購活動激增提供了一個解釋。</p><p>　　我們的分析涉及文獻中的兩個方面。一方面，在最近的文獻中有越來越多關于對開放經濟中的合并政策的理解。然而，這類文獻通常把控制跨國并購作為一個政策問題，還分析出合并

44、控制和其他政策手段之間的相互作用是很少的，它幾乎只關注額外政策變量的國際貿易政策(理查森，1999；哈恩和萊文索恩，2001；哈克和康拉德，2004；薩基和伊麗斯，2006)。相反，到目前為止，這種文獻尚未提及合并政策與國家稅收政策的內容。另一方面，第二種文獻使得我們的論文建立在寡頭壟斷市場中的最優(yōu)商品稅分析上（基恩和拉希麗，1998；洛克伍德，2001；基恩等，2002；哈夫等2005；哈希姆扎德等，2005）。然而，這種文獻主要集中

45、在商品統一稅收和外部給定的市場結構下商品稅制度選擇的問題上。作為并購的結果，它并沒有遵從潛在市場環(huán)境的變化來處理稅收政策的影響。</p><p>　　本文安排如下。第2節(jié)描述我們分析的基本框架。第3節(jié)介紹雙寡頭壟斷市場。第4節(jié)分析了稅收政策和福利的變化時，國內發(fā)生的跨國并購。第5節(jié)進行了一個跨國并購案例的分析。第6節(jié)是從跨國并購引出了協同效應，比較了下一個或其他類型的并購提議，并通過收購當局的條件進行兼并。第7節(jié)

46、則是結論。</p><p>　　在實踐中得出，能夠創(chuàng)造協同效應是企業(yè)進行并購的核心動力，也是一國當局允許并購的重要原因。我們分析了作為國內或者跨國并購，為了合并企業(yè)雙方的利益，怎樣去節(jié)約大量的成本。同樣的，我們又對不同所有權結構下的國家進行了分析。由于所產生的表達式的復雜性，我們在主文本中只討論國家所有權和完整的國際所有權的多樣化。</p><p>　　我們應該注意到，在一個特定行業(yè)中，資

47、源共享和跨國并購的份額之間有著積極和系統的聯系。這確實有一些基本的提示性強的理論在支持這個觀點。在經濟合作與發(fā)展組織成員國中，總的企業(yè)并購量中的跨國并購份額在不同的經濟部門有著很大的不同，最高的是制造業(yè)。與此同時，至少在歐洲國家，制造業(yè)也是一個對待企業(yè)的外資股份最國際化的部門之一。同樣的，企業(yè)外資股份較低的部門，如建筑行業(yè)中跨國并購量占并購案例總量的比例就很低。一個詳細的實證研究需要嚴格的論證，比如企業(yè)的外資股份和跨國并購份額間擁有的普

48、遍性是否是一種正相關，它是否能被聯系到全國最佳的互動稅收政策和合并控制中去。</p><p>　　在市場結構出現變化之后，在許多行業(yè)，政府都有特定部門的稅收和管理政策來處理它們對市場產出造成的影響。本文列舉一個簡單的例子來解釋國家是如何通過調整最佳稅率來適應國內并購和跨國并購的。再將這個分析延伸到并購的協同作用上。我們還研究了這些稅收政策的變化是如何激勵公司合并，同時也讓合并管理的權威部門收購它。</p&g

49、t;<p>　　分析結果表明，國內并購和跨國并購對國家的稅收政策產生了不同的刺激。一方面，跨國并購使得非合作性稅收政策可以向外國企業(yè)征收超過它生產能力部分的稅收。另一方面，跨國并購導致了本國產品自產自銷，從而促進了各國對有效補貼政策的收購。這兩種不同的影響關鍵取決于在合并之前企業(yè)的外資股份的多少。如果公司在合并之前為純粹國內企業(yè)，那么國內合并就占了主導地位，也就是說它在提出合并和被管理機構解除時需要比較少的成本。相反的，如

50、果企業(yè)外資的股權份額較大，那么在提出或者取消跨國并購的時候成本的范圍更廣一些。</p><p>　　我們認為，國際投資組合不斷的多樣化有助于跨國并購和促進公平。就如通常說的那樣，外國資產的增長是全球經濟一體化的結果。我們的調查結果為跨國并購的不斷增多提供了進一步的分析解釋。大體上，我們的調查與文獻上的跨國并購，尤其是關于允許節(jié)約運輸成本的調查是相輔相成的。值得一提的是，這個論點并不能說明跨國并購份額一直是不斷上升

51、的。隨著時間的推移，當經濟一體化不斷發(fā)展，運輸成本不斷下降的時候，它也將變的無足輕重了。</p><p>　　我們的分析可以延伸到多個方面。一種可能性是將外國公司的市場份額本土化，并且明確地將市場份額與經濟一體化的力量聯系起來。這種國際證券組合多樣化的環(huán)境將會導致以更高的回報或更低的總風險形式來獲得收益。但是，它也可能會產生更高的信息獲取和交易成本。如果經濟一體化縮減了后者，那么全球化和跨國并購之間有了更好的聯系