外文翻譯--從管理角度反思股利政策(節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3800字，2100單詞，12500英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Baker H K, Powell G E, Veit E T. Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy[J]. Journal of Economics & Finance, 2002, 26(3):267-283.</p>

2、<p><b>　　原文 </b></p><p>　　Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy</p><p>　　Author: H. Kent Baker, Gary E. Powell, Theodore Veit</p><p>　　One of the mo

3、re puzzling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a compelling and widely accepted argument for dividend irrelevance in a world with perfect capital markets. Many years late

4、r, Miller (1986) recognized that the observed preference for cash dividends is one of the "soft spots in the current body of theory." So why do corporations pay dividends, and why do investors care? Black (1976

5、) once described this issue as a dividend "puzzle" with "</p><p>　　To help explain this puzzle, financial economists developed various theories--signaling, tax- preference, agency costs, and b

6、ird-in-the-hand explanations. The profusion of theories led Ang(1987) to observe, 'Thus, we have moved from a position of not enough good reasons to explain why dividends are paid to one of too many." Advocates

7、of behavioral finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984), introduced concepts such as prospect theory and mental accounting to explain why investors like dividends</p><p>　　One way to enhance our understand

8、ing of why corporations pay dividends is to examine the views of managers who are responsible for making such decisions. Past fieldwork and surveys have provided important insights into how managers determine their firm&

9、#39;s dividend payouts and their views about various dividend policy issues. For example, Lintner(1956) conducted the seminal field study about the determination of dividend policy. Other researchers including Baker, Far

10、relly, and Edelman(1985) and Po</p><p>　　Our study examines how managers view dividend policy but uses a different data set to extend and refine the scope of previous survey research. Specifically, we survey

11、 corporate managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy, the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for paying dividen

12、ds--signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand arguments. Our motivation for conducting this st</p><p>　　In this study, we do not focus on the views about dividend policy of managers from

13、the "typical" Nasdaq firm because most Nasdaq firms either pay no dividends or pay dividends on an irregular basis. Instead, we investigate the views of a subset of Nasdaq firms, namely, those that consistently

14、 pay cash dividends. The fact that most Nasdaq firms do not pay dividends is not surprising given their characteristics. As Damodaran(1999) notes, a firm's dividend policy tends to follow the firm's life cyc</

15、p><p>　　Our study differs from previous research on dividend policy in several ways. First, unlike prior fieldwork and surveys that focus only on NYSE-listed firms from a few industries, we study managers from

16、dividend-paying Nasdaq firms from numerous industries. Michel (1979) and Baker (1988) present evidence that dividend policies vary across industries. Our rationale for examining Nasdaq firms rests on the belief that the

17、views of Nasdaq managers may differ from those of NYSE-listed firms because of</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. The next section provides a brief review of the relevant dividend li

18、terature. The third section presents our research questions and empirical predictions followed by discussion of methodology and limitations in the fourth section .The fifth section presents our survey results ,and the fi

19、nal section provides a summary and conclusions. </p><p>　　Previous Research</p><p>　　In this section, we present three basic areas of dividend research. First, we discuss Lintner’s(1956)classic

20、study that investigates how corporate managers determine their firm’s dividend policies. We also review some of the subsequent research related to Lintner’s findings. Second, we review studies that examine whether divide

21、nd policy affects firm value. Third; we present major research findings related to four common explanations for paying dividends--signaling, tax- preference, agency costs,</p><p>　　Determining a Firm’s Divid

22、end</p><p>　　In his classic study, Lintner (1956) reports that firms have long-run target dividend payout ratios and place their attention more on dividend changes than on absolute dividend levels. He also f

23、inds that dividend changes follow shifts in long-run sustainable earnings (managers smooth earnings) and managers are hesitant to make dividend changes that may later need to be reversed. Managers also try to stabilize d

24、ividends and avoid dividend cuts. Lintner developed a partial- adjustment model to des</p><p>　　Dividend Policy and Value</p><p>　　Much empirical research exists investigating whether dividend p

25、olicy affects firm value. Graham and Dodd (1951) and Gordon (1959) argue that an increase in the dividend payout increases stock price (value) and lowers the cost of equity, but empirical support for this position is wea

26、k. Others such as Litzenberger (1979) and Ramaswamy (1982),Blume(1980),and Ang and Peterson(1985) take the opposite position. Their studies report that stocks with high dividend payout rations have higher required ret<

27、;/p><p>　　Explanations for Paying Dividends</p><p>　　The finance literature contains four standard explanations for paying dividends--signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand.

28、The signaling, or asymmetric information, models for paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya(1979),John and Williams(1985),and Miller and Rock(1985),suggest that managers as insiders choose dividend payment levels an

29、d dividend increases to signal private information to investor. Managers have an incentive to signal this private information to the inv</p><p>　　A second explanation for paying dividends is tax-preference t

30、heory. Favorable tax treatment on capital gains (lower capital gains tax rate and deferral of capital gains tax) should cause investors to prefer no dividend-paying stocks. Tests of this tax-preference explanation for pa

31、ying or not paying dividends take two forms. According to Brennan's (1970) version of the capital asset pricing model, dividend-paying stocks must offer higher pre-tax returns than no dividend- paying stocks, all els

32、e e</p><p>　　Other studies examine the ex-dividend date price drop. Favorable capital gains tax treatment could cause the price drop to be less than the dividend payment and cause investors to prefer no divi

33、dend-paying stocks. Empirical evidence on this matter is also inconclusive. For example, Elton and Gruber (1970) find an ex-dividend date price drop that is less than the dividend amount, but Michaely (I991) finds an ex-

34、dividend date price drop equal to the dividend payment. </p><p>　　Another explanation for why firms might pay dividends is based on agency relationships between various claimholders of the firm. Easterbrook

35、(1984) argues that firm’s pay dividends to help reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. By paying dividends, managers must raise funds more frequently in the capital markets where

36、 they are subjected to scrutiny and the disciplining effects of investment professionals. Jensen (1986) makes a similar agency-theory argum</p><p>　　Finally, the bird-in-the-hand explanation asserts that pay

37、ing higher dividends increases firm value because dividends represent a "sure thing" while future share price appreciation is uncertain. Miller and Modigliani (1961) refer to this as the bird-in-the-hand fallac

38、y. Bhattacharya (1979) correctly argues that the riskiness of a project's cash flows determines a firm’s risk and an increase in dividend payout today will simply result in an equivalent drop in the stock's ex-di

39、vidend price. Thus, </p><p>　　Research Questions and Empirical Predictions</p><p>　　We address three major research questions in this study. First, what views do Nasdaq managers from dividend-pa

40、ying firms have on the dividend-setting process? We expect that out survey respondents strongly agree with statements involving Lintner’s(1956)model on dividend policy. Lintner’s famous investigation of dividend policy s

41、tresses that firms only increase dividends when management believes that earnings have permanently increased. As previously discussed, much support exist for Lintner’s de</p><p>　　Second, do corporate manage

42、rs of dividend-paying Nasdaq firms believe a firm’s dividend payout can affect firm value? Based on a set of highly restrictive assumptions, Miller and Modigliani (1961) contend that dividend policy has no effect on eith

43、er the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. We expect that managers generally believe that dividend policy matters because they operate in a world in which market imperfection can make dividend policy relevant

44、. Therefore, we expect to observe</p><p>　　We do not expect the majority of respondents to agree with statements involving the residual dividend model, which implies that dividends are paid out of "left

45、over" earnings. Although using the residual policy may help a firm set its long-run target payout ratio, we believe that managers typically do not use this approach to guide the payout in any one year because this w

46、ould lead to erratic dividends. </p><p>　　Third, what explanations for paying dividends do Nasdaq managers tend to favor? As previously discussed, researchers have conducted many studies involving various ex

47、planations of why companies pay dividends. The empirical evidence is generally consistent with several hypotheses generated by the dividend-signaling and agency-cost models, and inconsistent with tax preference theory. A

48、s indicated earlier, there is virtually no empirical evidence supporting the bird-in-the-hand theory. Because our d</p><p><b>　　譯文 </b></p><p>　　從管理角度反思股利政策</p><p>

49、　　股利是企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)困惑的問題之一。在世界完善的資本市場(chǎng)中,米勒和莫迪里阿尼1961提供了一個(gè)令人信服和廣為接受的論點(diǎn),即股利無關(guān)論。許多年后,米勒(1986)認(rèn)為觀察偏愛的現(xiàn)金股利是“當(dāng)今理論的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)”之一。所以,公司為什么要分紅,投資者為什么要關(guān)心股利問題?布萊克(1976)曾經(jīng)用“股利之謎”來描述。 </p><p>　　為了幫助解釋這個(gè)難題,財(cái)務(wù)學(xué)家提出了許多理論,信號(hào)理論,稅收偏好理論,代理成本,還有一

50、鳥在手理論。豐富的理論經(jīng)驗(yàn)使Ang(1987)觀察到,“因此,我們從一地轉(zhuǎn)移到另一位置沒有足夠多的理由來解釋為什么支付的股息太多了?！毙袨榻鹑趯W(xué)的擁護(hù)者,例如謝夫瑞和斯塔特曼(1984),介紹前景理論和心理會(huì)計(jì)來解釋為什么投資者喜歡股利。斯塔特曼(1997)認(rèn)為解決股利難題是不可能的,但卻忽略了正常的投資者的行為模式。今天,企業(yè)管理者,剩下的只是一個(gè)巨大而沖突的有關(guān)股利的研究。 </p><p>　　一種增強(qiáng)我們

51、了解為什么公司支付股利的觀點(diǎn)來探討管理者負(fù)責(zé)作出這樣的決定。過去的實(shí)地考察和調(diào)查提供了重要的見解,管理者如何確定自己公司的股息支出和關(guān)于他們對(duì)不同股利政策問題的見解。例如,林特納1956在發(fā)展領(lǐng)域關(guān)于確定股利政策的研究。其他研究人員,包括貝克,法拉利、埃德曼1985和鮑威爾1999調(diào)查了那些管理人員還有包括他們對(duì)股利政策的觀點(diǎn)。這樣的研究補(bǔ)充了關(guān)于股利政策的其他類型的實(shí)證研究。 </p><p>　　我們的研究是

52、調(diào)查管理者如何看待股利政策,但使用不同的數(shù)據(jù)集的擴(kuò)展和完善的調(diào)查研究的范圍。確切地說,我們調(diào)查納斯達(dá)克公司的管理層一致性的用支付現(xiàn)金股利來決定他們對(duì)股利政策的看法,在股利政策與價(jià)值關(guān)系中,四種常見的理論是信號(hào)理論,稅收偏好理論,代理成本,還有一鳥在手理論。我們進(jìn)行這項(xiàng)研究的動(dòng)機(jī)是決定這些證據(jù)是否能夠簡(jiǎn)單的再次肯定我們已經(jīng)知道或提供關(guān)于股利政策的新的洞察力。法瑪與弗蘭奇及時(shí)提供了關(guān)于股利付款者發(fā)生率下降的證據(jù),不僅反映了股利付款者的變化特

53、點(diǎn)。而且有低股利分紅的傾向。 </p><p>　　在此項(xiàng)研究中,我們不關(guān)注“典型的”納斯達(dá)克公司管理者對(duì)于股利政策的看法,因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)納斯達(dá)克公司要么不支付股利,要么在不規(guī)則的基礎(chǔ)上支付股利。相反,我們調(diào)查納斯達(dá)克公司的一個(gè)子集的觀點(diǎn),即,一貫支付現(xiàn)金股利的那些。事實(shí)上,大多數(shù)納斯達(dá)克公司不支付股息并不奇怪,這個(gè)就是他們的特征。在達(dá)蒙德理(1999)的筆記中,一個(gè)公司的股利政策傾向于遵循公司的生命周期。在引進(jìn)與快

54、速擴(kuò)張階段,公司通常不支付或者支付很低的股利。這些公司表征的很大一部分企業(yè)在納斯達(dá)克交易。 </p><p>　　我們的研究不同于先前在幾個(gè)方面對(duì)股利政策的研究。首先,不像先前的實(shí)地調(diào)查那樣僅僅聚焦于公司的幾個(gè)行業(yè)紐,我們研究了納斯達(dá)克公司分紅的眾多行業(yè)中的管理者,米歇爾1979和貝克1988提供的證據(jù)說明股利政策在整個(gè)行業(yè)中變化。我們依靠檢驗(yàn)納斯達(dá)克公司信念的理由是納斯達(dá)克公司管理者的觀點(diǎn)也許與那些公司紐不同,

55、因?yàn)楣镜奶卣鞑煌?例如在規(guī)模方面等。第二,我們研究的領(lǐng)域在以前沒有被涉及過,例如關(guān)于歷史股利的觀點(diǎn),生命周期、殘留的股息紅利政策。最后,不像大多數(shù)研究是聚焦在單一解釋為什么公司要分紅,我們是通過多方面來解釋的。通過這種方式,我們可以根據(jù)水平的協(xié)議或異議及各種報(bào)表涉及的每一個(gè)解釋來評(píng)估關(guān)于支付股利的相對(duì)重要性的不同原因。 </p><p><b>　　歷史研究</b></p>

56、<p>　　在本部分中,我們介紹三種基本領(lǐng)域的股利研究。首先,我們討論林特納關(guān)于考察企業(yè)管理者決定他們公司股利政策的經(jīng)典著作。我們也回顧一些關(guān)于林特納后續(xù)研究的結(jié)果。第二,我們回顧探討股利政策是否影響公司價(jià)值。第三,我們目前主要研究相關(guān)的四種常見的理論,信號(hào)理論,稅收偏好理論,代理成本,還有一鳥在手理論。因?yàn)樵谶@些領(lǐng)域的研究是浩瀚的,而我們卻限制在每一個(gè)領(lǐng)域的一些關(guān)鍵研究發(fā)現(xiàn)。 </p><p><

57、;b>　　確定一個(gè)公司的股利</b></p><p>　　在林特納(1956)的研究中,他指出公司有長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)派息率,并把更多的注意力放在股利的變化上,而不是放在絕對(duì)股利水平上。他還發(fā)現(xiàn)股利的變化是遵循可持續(xù)發(fā)展變化收益(管理者的平穩(wěn)收益),管理者猶豫使股利變化,但過后可能會(huì)被逆轉(zhuǎn)。管理者也盡量避免股利削減和穩(wěn)定股利。林特納開發(fā)了一種局部-調(diào)整模型來描述股利決策過程來解釋了85%的逐年的股利變化。

58、許多研究者包括法瑪(1968),貝克,法拉利,埃德曼(1985),貝克和鮑威爾1999都支持林特納的行為模式。巴納澤,米歇麗,泰勒(1997)總結(jié)說:“林特納的股利分配模型保留了股利設(shè)置過程的最佳描述。” </p><p><b>　　股利政策和價(jià)值</b></p><p>　　許多實(shí)證研究的存在就是為了研究股利政策是否會(huì)影響公司價(jià)值。多德夫人1951和戈登1959認(rèn)

59、為增加派息率,增加股票價(jià)格(價(jià)值),會(huì)降低股權(quán)成本,但是支持這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)的實(shí)證是稀少的。其他人例如里特貝格(1979),若摩世瓦(1982)布勒摩(1980),盎和彼得森(1985)持相反的意見。他們的研究報(bào)告稱,高的股利支付率會(huì)有更高的回報(bào),因此價(jià)格也會(huì)更低。還有一些諸如布萊克和斯科爾斯1974,米勒和斯科爾斯1978,米勒1986,佰思汀1996認(rèn)為保持股利政策沒有什么區(qū)別,因?yàn)樗挥绊懝善眱r(jià)格或股權(quán)成本。研究者們測(cè)試了這些選擇理論的股

60、利政策卻沒有取得決定性的結(jié)果。因此,最準(zhǔn)確的股利政策解釋仍然沒有解決。 </p><p>　　金融文獻(xiàn)包含了四個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的股利理論,即信號(hào)理論,稅收偏好理論,代理成本,還有一鳥在手理論。這個(gè)信號(hào),或信息不對(duì)稱,支付股利的模型,是由巴塔查亞(1979),約翰和威廉姆斯(1985),米勒和洛克1985,建議那些作為業(yè)內(nèi)人士的管理者選擇紅利付款水平和紅利增長(zhǎng)到信號(hào)私人信息投資者。管理者有一個(gè)激勵(lì)信號(hào)的投資私人信息,他們認(rèn)為

61、,目前公開市場(chǎng)公司股票價(jià)值低于其內(nèi)在價(jià)值。增加的股利支付作為可信信號(hào)時(shí),當(dāng)其他公司沒有良好的內(nèi)部信息,沒有過度增加承擔(dān)股利削減的機(jī)會(huì)就不能模仿股利增加。對(duì)信號(hào)理論持強(qiáng)烈支持存在的研究者包括:阿哈龍尼和斯瓦瑞(1986),阿斯奎斯和穆林斯(1983),卡拉拉和勞恩思坦(1986),希利和佩利浦(1988),奈森穆和西弗(2001)。 </p><p>　　第二個(gè)股利支付理論是稅收偏好理論。 良好的稅務(wù)處理對(duì)資本收益

62、(較低 的資本收益稅率和延遲資本利得稅) 會(huì)引起投資者不愿意給股票分紅。采用兩種方式來測(cè)試稅收偏好理論是否要支付股利。根據(jù)布倫南(1970) 版的資本資產(chǎn)定價(jià)模型，分紅股必須提供比不支付股利更高的稅前收益，其他一切都平等。然而，布倫南的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)被混雜在了 一起。布萊克和休爾斯(1974) 沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)稅收效應(yīng)的證據(jù)，但里特貝格和若摩世瓦(1979) ，卡拉拉和米歇麗(1993)找到了稅前收益與股利有關(guān)的證據(jù)。 </p><

63、;p>　　其他研究檢驗(yàn)了除息日價(jià)格的下降。股利支付比資本利得稅優(yōu)惠待遇更容易引起價(jià)格下降，會(huì)導(dǎo)致投資者偏愛沒有分紅。但這個(gè)理論的實(shí)證研究也是不確定的。 例如， 艾爾頓和格魯伯(1970) 認(rèn)為股息額比除息日下降的少，但是，米歇利(1991) 除息日和股利支付下降的價(jià)格是相等的。另一種解釋, 為何公司會(huì)支付股利的能力之間的關(guān)系是基于代理公司的各種要求持有者。布魯克(1984)認(rèn)為公司分紅來幫助降低代理成本與所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離。 通

64、過支付股利，管理者必須在被審查和受專業(yè)人士訓(xùn)練的資本市場(chǎng)更頻繁的籌集資金， 簡(jiǎn)森(1986) 進(jìn)行了信號(hào)理論爭(zhēng)論，當(dāng)管理人員支付股息降低了公司的有益于管理者的可以用于基金投資效益的自 由現(xiàn)金流量， 但會(huì)降低股東財(cái)富。 瑟夫(1982) ，朗和里特貝格(1989) ， 阿格拉瓦和及亞若馬(1994) ，簡(jiǎn)森，索爾伯格，佐恩(1992) 為代理理論支付股利提供了實(shí)證支持。 </p><p>　　最后，一鳥在手理論認(rèn)為

65、支付更高的紅利會(huì)增加公司的價(jià)值，因?yàn)楣衫怼按_定事件” ，而未來股價(jià)增值是不確定的。米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961) 將其稱為一鳥在手謬誤。巴塔查亞正確地指出，一個(gè)項(xiàng)目的現(xiàn)金流的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)決定公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，當(dāng)日提高派息只會(huì)導(dǎo)致等效下跌股票的除息日價(jià)格。因此，提高當(dāng)日的股息不會(huì)通過降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的現(xiàn)金流量來增加公司的價(jià)值。雖然沒有對(duì)一鳥在手理論實(shí)證研究支持的存在，我們想要確定管理者先前理論和實(shí)證研究的看法是否是一致的。 </p><p

66、>　　研究的問題和經(jīng)驗(yàn)的預(yù)測(cè)</p><p>　　本研究中，我們主要著手三種研究。首先，納斯達(dá)克管理者對(duì)股利分紅公司設(shè)立過程持什么看法? 我們希望我們的調(diào)查受訪者強(qiáng)烈同意林特納關(guān)于股利支付模型涉及的報(bào)表。林特納著名的股利政策調(diào)查強(qiáng)調(diào)當(dāng)管理層認(rèn)為永久增加收入公司只增加股利，就像先前討論的，對(duì)于林特納如何設(shè)置他們公司的股利發(fā)放的支持仍然存在。我們希望所有納斯達(dá)克公司建立股利支付模型去支持類似的觀點(diǎn)。 </

67、p><p>　　其次，納斯達(dá)克公司分紅的管理者認(rèn)為公司的派息率會(huì)影響公司價(jià)值嗎?基于一套嚴(yán)格的假設(shè)，米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961) 主張股利政策沒有公司股票價(jià)格或資本成本。我們期待那些管理者相信股利政策問題， 因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)诓煌晟剖袌?chǎng)中操作能使股利政策相關(guān)。因此, 我們希望被管理者一般協(xié)議的觀察納斯達(dá)克 公司參與本研究以陳述紅利政策之間的關(guān)系和價(jià)值。林特納(1956) ，貝克，法拉利、埃德曼(1985) 的研究，以及其他的

68、報(bào)告使管理者相信股息穩(wěn)定性是可取的。如果這個(gè)職位是正確的,，從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看，但在一個(gè)更古怪的方式，投資者應(yīng)該喜歡支付更多股票股利的預(yù)測(cè)到那些支付相同數(shù)量的股息。我們不認(rèn)為大多數(shù)的受訪者同意殘余股息模型的報(bào)表，它暗示著“吃剩的” 股息盈利。盡管使用剩余的政策可以幫助公司設(shè)置長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)設(shè)定息率， 我們相信經(jīng)理通常不使用這個(gè)方法來指導(dǎo)支付任何一年的股利，因?yàn)檫@將會(huì)導(dǎo)致股息飄忽不定。 </p><p>　　第三，什么理論是納斯