金融學外文翻譯-----一個國際歷史性的比較2007美國次貸金融危機是否不同

1、<p><b>　　外文原文</b></p><p>　　Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison</p><p>　　Carmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland an

2、d the NBER and Kenneth S. Rogoff Harvard University and the NBER</p><p>　　The first major financial crisis of the 21st century involves esoteric instruments, unaware regulators, and skittish investors. It al

3、so follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of sub-prime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number

4、of major crisis indicators from the standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing price</p><p>　　The book is still open on the how the current disl

5、ocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the aftermath of other bank-centered financial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they

6、 can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop in (real per capita) o

7、utput grow</p><p>　　1. Post War Bank-Centered Financial Crises: The Data</p><p>　　Our main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward comparisons of the</p><p>　　United Stat

8、es 2007 crisis with other post-war crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008.) The extended data set catalogues banking

9、 and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In order to focus here on data most relevant to present U.S. situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises

10、, nor industrialized country financial crises fro</p><p>　　First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge run-upin U.S. housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justifie

11、d by financial innovation (including to sub-prime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petroleum exporters. The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks t

12、o a surge in U.S. productivity growth a fall in risk that accompanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the</p><p>　　Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a stri

13、king contractionin wealth, increases in risk spreads, and deterioration in market functioning. The 2007</p><p>　　United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling U.S. housing prices,</p&

14、gt;<p>　　which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthy</p><p>　　borrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been greatly magnified due t

15、o complex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices.</p><p>　

16、　As a benchmark for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, we draw on data from nineteen bank-centered financial crises from the post-War period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or

17、segment of financial sector collapsed in a manner similar to that described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For further discussion and documentation, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).</p><p>　　These crisis ep

18、isodes include:</p><p>　　The Five Big Five Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. Other Banking and Financial Crises:

19、Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France (1994), Germany (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy (1990), and New Zealand (1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and United States (1984, 2007).

20、</p><p>　　The “Big Five” crises are all protracted large scale financial crises that are associated with major declines in economic performance for a protracted period. Japan (1992), of course, is the start

21、of the “l(fā)ost decade,” although the Nordic Crises and the Spanish crisis of 1977 all left deep marks on their economies as well.</p><p>　　The remaining rich country financial crises represent a broad range of

22、 lesser events. The 1984 U.S. crisis is the savings and loan crisis and, of course, the 2007 crisis is the sub-prime crisis, which we have represented as a U.S. crisis though of course it has had a severe impact on banks

23、 from Europe to Central Asia.</p><p>　　While generally all the crises centrally involved the banking system, we have included the 1995 UK crisis that resulted from the bankruptcy of Barings, which was essent

24、ially an investment bank. </p><p>　　We note that one crisis episode not encompassed by our selection criteria is the period of severe bank stress in the U.S. and Europe, especially, caused by the developing

25、country debt crisis that began in 1982. We omit it because the bank crisis was not clearly at the epi-center of problem (which had it roots in U.S. disinflation and a drop in world commodity prices). Moreover, it overlap

26、s somewhat with our dating of the thrift crisis. However, including it would not weaken our results.</p><p>　　2. Comparisons</p><p>　　We now proceed to a variety of simple comparisons between th

27、e 2007 U.S. crisis and previous episodes. Drawing on the standard literature on financial crises, we look at asset prices, growth and public debt. We begin in Figure 1 by comparing the run-up in housing prices. Period T

28、represents the year of the onset of the financial crisis. So period T-4 is four years prior to the crisis, and the graph in each case continues to T+3, except of course in the case of the U.S. 2007 crisis.1 The chart con

29、</p><p>　　Figure 2 looks at real rates of growth in equity market price indices. (For the United States, the index is the S&P 500; Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008 provide the complete listing for foreign mar

30、kets.)</p><p>　　The U.S. again looks like the archetypical crisis country, only more so. Here, however, the big five crisis countries tended to experience equity price falls earlier on. Of course, each of th

31、ese crises occurred at different points in the global productivity cycle, which may explain some of the difference. Then, too, the monetary responses differed across these episodes, with the Federal Reserve pumping in an

32、 extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode.</p><p>　　Figure 3 looks at the current account as a share of GDP, again starting four years before the crisis. Again, the Unite

33、d States looks like the typical pre-crisis country, in the capital inflows accelerate going into the crisis. However, the U.S. deficits are more severe, reaching over six percent of GDP. As already mentioned, there is a

34、large and growing literature that attempts to rationalize why it might be beneficial for the United States to a sustained current deficit. The simplest argument i</p><p>　　Real per capita GDP growth in the r

35、un-up to debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4. The United States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V shape that characterizes the earlier episodes. Growth momentum falls going into the typical crisis, and remains

36、low for two years after. In the more severe “Big Five” cases, however, the growth shock is ever larger and more prolonged. Not encouraging for the U.S. economic outlook, the aftermath of a banking crisis tends to have a

37、protracted effect on real</p><p>　　Figure 5 looks at public debt as a share of GDP. Rising public debt is a near universal precursor of other post-war crises, not least the 1984 U.S. crisis. Nevertheless, a

38、lthough public debt is rising prior to the 2007 U.S. crisis, it is rising notably more slowly than in the average of the other 18 episodes, and much more slowly than the Big Five. This shallow path of U.S. public debt al

39、so makes it clear that the large current account deficits shown earlier owe to factors other than just gover</p><p>　　The correlations in these graphs are not necessarily causal, but in combination neverthel

40、ess suggest that if the United States does not experience a significant and protracted growth slowdown, it should either be considered very lucky or even more “special” that most optimistic theories suggest. Indeed, giv

41、en the severity of most crisis indicators in the run-up to its 2007 financial crisis, the United States should consider itself fortunate if it can have post-crisis trajectory parallel to the </p><p>　　3. Con

42、clusions</p><p>　　Tolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Karenina with the line “Every happy family is alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way.” While each financial crisis no dou

43、bt has its own distinctions, there are also striking similarities, in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The majority of historical crises are preceded

44、by financial liberalization, as documented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). While in the ca</p><p>　　Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family. Despite</p><p>　　many

45、superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse comparable only to the mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different as so many argue. Whatever the long-term outcome, the quant

46、itative parallels to earlier post-war industrialized-country financial crises, at least in the pre-crisis period, is worthy of note. Of course, inflation is lower and better anchored today worldwide, and this may prove a

47、n important mitigating factor.</p><p>　　One last parallel deserves mention. During the 1970s, the U.S. banking system stood as an intermediary between oil-exporter surpluses and emerging market borrowers in

48、Latin America and elsewhere. While much praised at the time, 1970s petro-dollar recycling ultimately led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn placed enormous strain on money center banks.3 It is true that this time, a

49、 great deal of petro-dollars are again flowing into the United States, but many emerging markets have been runnin</p><p><b>　　翻譯文章</b></p><p>　　一個國際歷史性的比較：2007美國次貸金融危機是否不同</p>

50、<p>　　卡門萊因哈特米馬里蘭大學和國家經(jīng)濟研究局和哈佛大學肯尼斯羅格夫?qū)W和國家經(jīng)濟研究局</p><p>　　21世紀的第一次重大金融危機涉及深奧的手段，不易察覺的調(diào)整機構(gòu)和活躍的投資者。它也良好地遵循了百年來金融危機的鬧劇規(guī)律。這一次我們將面臨抵押貸款的問題,但與之前相比，也并無什么差異。事實上，在定量指標上，很大一批危機指標都和國際金融危機的標準文獻相吻合。例如，卡明斯基和卡門萊因哈特米（19

51、99年）通過密切跟蹤二戰(zhàn)后十九次主要工業(yè)國家的銀行危機研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)美國股票上漲和住房價格,是引起經(jīng)濟危機中國家大量資本流入的最好指標。因此，也就是倒V形實際增長在未來數(shù)年之前的危機。盡管2000年代初期，人們廣泛關(guān)注減稅國家的債務(wù)情況，但美國的公共債務(wù)卻低于其他經(jīng)濟危機波及的國家。與此相反，美國的赤字格局是明顯惡化。 </p><p>　　該書還對如何改變美國目前混亂的情況做深入的研究，但一些先例可在其他銀行的善后

52、事宜中找到。根據(jù)銀行系統(tǒng)不同程度的損傷，工業(yè)經(jīng)濟體的金融危機的相當嚴重。較之發(fā)生在隔離狀態(tài)下的貨幣危機，一次嚴重的銀行危機通常具有更深遠，更持久影響。平均降低產(chǎn)出的增長（人均）超過百分之二時通常需要2年時間才能恢復到原有趨勢。五個最災難性的案例（其中包括發(fā)作在瑞典，芬蘭，日本，挪威，西班牙）， 年產(chǎn)量從高峰下降到低谷，但三年后，其增長率超過百分之五，并保持良好的勢頭。</p><p>　　1.戰(zhàn)后銀行經(jīng)濟危機數(shù)據(jù)

53、：</p><p>　　我們的主要目的是將美國2007年危機與其他戰(zhàn)后危機做簡單的比較，使用一小塊更大和較長遠的歷史數(shù)據(jù)集延長數(shù)據(jù)，我們已經(jīng)構(gòu)建（見萊因哈特和肯尼斯學 羅格夫，2008。）危機圍繞設(shè)定的目錄銀行和金融擴展數(shù)據(jù)，整個世界可以追溯到1800年（在某些情況下更早）。為了集中這些數(shù)據(jù)，目前在美國的相關(guān)情況下，我們不過多地考慮新興市場危機，也不涉及十九世紀的工業(yè)化國家或金融危機大蕭條。 不過，驚人的是“這一

54、次是不同的”綜合癥已經(jīng)被重復。 </p><p>　　首先是合理化。這一次，許多分析師認為，不是所有的美國房價的龐大升值都是泡沫經(jīng)濟，而是金融創(chuàng)新的理由（包括次級抵押貸款，以及來自亞洲的穩(wěn)定資金流入 和石油出口國。股票價格的巨大運行也同樣被認為伴隨持續(xù)激增得益于美國生產(chǎn)率增長下降的風險 下“大穩(wěn)定”的宏觀經(jīng)濟波動。至于非凡串聯(lián)的美國項目赤字過于龐大，目前大約吸收世界上所有賬戶盈余的三分之二。受到全球經(jīng)濟的新元素的

55、影響，許多分析家認為，這些也可能是合理的。由于經(jīng)濟與科技創(chuàng)新熱潮的靈活結(jié)合，美國可望在未來的幾十年里享受卓越生產(chǎn)力的不斷增長，而與外國人相比，優(yōu)越的美國人更能發(fā)現(xiàn)物理和經(jīng)濟投資所能帶來的高回報。</p><p>　　接下來是現(xiàn)實。在過去數(shù)月，我們已經(jīng)看到了顯著的財富收縮和增加的傳播風險還有市場運作的惡化。2007年，美國次貸危機，當然受美國房價下跌的影響， 這反過來又導致較高水平信貸違約，特別是信譽不高的借款人。

56、這些機構(gòu)的影響金融領(lǐng)域的拖欠率已經(jīng)大大放大捆綁技術(shù)，被認為分散風險有效投資,但實際上其取得的結(jié)果非常不透明，技術(shù)流動性不足，且不易面對下跌的房產(chǎn)價格。 </p><p>　　作為2007年美國次貸危機的基準，我們繪制了一戰(zhàn)后十九家銀行危機的數(shù)據(jù)圖。我們已經(jīng)涉及戰(zhàn)后波及點，其中一些重要的金融機構(gòu)或金融部門的倒塌類似于卡明斯基和萊因哈特在1999年進一步討論的文件（見Reinhart和Rogoff，2008）。<

57、;/p><p><b>　　這些危機事件包括：</b></p><p>　　“五大”的危機：西班牙（1977），挪威（1987年），芬蘭（1991），瑞典（1991年）和日本（1992年），其中今年開始在括號。其他銀行和金融危機：澳大利亞（1989年），加拿大（1983年），丹麥（1987年），法國（1994年），德國（1977年），希臘（1991年），冰島（1985年）

58、，意大利（1990年）和新西蘭（1987年），英國（1974年，1991年，1995年），美國（1984年，2007年）。</p><p>　　“五大”的危機，都是大規(guī)模的曠日持久的金融危機，表現(xiàn)在在較長的一段時間內(nèi)經(jīng)濟大幅下降。雖然北歐和西班牙1977年的經(jīng)濟危機也留下了深刻的印記，但日本1992年的經(jīng)濟危機才是“失去的十年”的開始。</p><p>　　其余的富裕國家的金融危機代表了廣

59、泛范圍內(nèi)的小事件。1984年美國的危機是儲蓄和貸款危機，當然，2007年危機是次貸危機，一開始我們錯誤地只把它當成美國的危機，但它卻波及了整個歐洲還有中亞。</p><p>　　雖然一般危機都集中在銀行系統(tǒng)，1995年英國的危機是導致巴林銀行（本質(zhì)上是一個投資銀行）的破產(chǎn)的主要原因。</p><p>　　我們注意到，危機事件的選擇標準不涵蓋美國和歐洲的銀行壓力，特別是1982年發(fā)展中國家造

60、成的國家的債務(wù)危機年。我們忽略它，因為銀行危機并不是問題的中心，它植根于通貨緊縮和世界商品價格下降。此外,它有點重疊于我們所說的節(jié)儉危機。</p><p><b>　　2.比較</b></p><p>　　我們現(xiàn)在進行的2007年美國的金融危機和以往的各種事件的簡單比較。在金融危機的標準文獻繪圖中，我們來看看資產(chǎn)和公共債務(wù)的價格增長。我們開始通過比較圖1進行房屋價格上

61、漲的比較。T期間代表了金融危機爆發(fā)的一年。所以周期T - 4是前四年的危機，并在每一種情況下繼續(xù)為T +3期間，在美國2007年crisis.1圖表案件個案研究文獻證實，顯示了金融危機時期的房價，特別是在 “五大”危機的嚴重影響的情況下極為明顯。在美國住房價格中甚至有進一步上升的情形。</p><p>　　圖2著眼于市場的股票價格指數(shù)增長的實際利率。 （對于美國來說，該指數(shù)是標準普爾500;萊因哈特和Reinha

62、rt，2008年國外市場提供完整的清單。）</p><p>　　美國又看起來更加像如此原型危機的國家。在這里，從五個發(fā)生危機的國家的經(jīng)驗來看，跟之前相比股票價格趨于下跌。當然，這些危機發(fā)生在每一個全球生產(chǎn)力的周期，這也許可以解釋一些共同點。然后，這也是有差異的，在這些事件與美聯(lián)儲在最近的事件的初期，貨幣的反應(yīng)就說明了這一切。</p><p><b>　　朗讀</b>&

63、lt;/p><p>　　Měiguó yòu kàn qǐlái xiàng yuánxíng wéijī de guójiā, zhǐyǒu gèng rúcǐ. Zài zhèlǐ,Ránér, cóng dà wǔ gè fāshē

64、ng wéijī de guójiā de jīngyàn gǔpiào jiàgé qū yú xiàdié jiào zǎo qián. Dāngrán, zhèxiē wéijī fāshēng zài měi yīgè zài quánqiú

65、 shēngchǎnlì de zhōuqí, zhè yěxǔ kěyǐ jiěshì yīxiē bùtóng de chāyì diǎn. Ránhòu, yěyǒu chāyì, zài zhèxiē shìjiàn yǔ měiliánchǔ zài cìjī

66、 fēifán de chōushuǐ liàng zài zuìjìn de shìjiàn chūqí, huòbì de fǎnyìng.</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細內(nèi)容</p><p>　　Tú 2 zhuóyǎn yú sh&

67、#236;chǎng de gǔpiào jiàgé zhǐshù zēngzhǎng de shíjì lìlǜ. (Duìyú měiguó lái shuō, gāi zhǐshù shì biāozhǔn pǔěr 500; lái yīn hā tè hé Reinha

68、rt,2008 nián guówài shìchǎng tígōng wánzhěng de qīngdān.)</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細內(nèi)容</p><p><b>　　朗讀</b></p><p>　　Wǒmen xiànzài jì

69、;nxíng de 2007 nián měiguó zhī jiān de wéijī hé yǐwǎng de gè zhǒng shìjiàn de jiǎndān bǐjiào. Zài jīnróng wéijī de biāozhǔn wénxiàn huìtú, w

70、ǒmen lái kàn kàn zīchǎn jiàgé, zēngzhǎng hé gōnggòng zhàiwù. Wǒmen kāishǐ tōngguò bǐjiào tú 1 yùnxíng zài fángwū jiàgé shàngz

71、hǎng. Qíjiān T dàibiǎo le jīnróng wéijī bàofā de yī nián. Suǒyǐ zhōuqí T - 4 shì qián sì nián de wéijī, bìng zài měi yī zhǒng qíngkuàng xi&#

72、224; jìxù wèi T +3 tú chú dāngrán, zài měiguó 2007 nián crisis.1 Túbiǎo ànjiàn gèàn y</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細內(nèi)容</p><p>　　從圖3中看出

73、，作為一個經(jīng)常賬戶占GDP的份額，在危機開始的四年之前。美國看起來像典型的危機前的國家，其資本流入加速了沒過進入危機時代。然而，美國的赤字是如此的嚴重，甚至超過國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分之六之遠。如前所述，有一個龐大而越來越多的文獻資料庫，試圖找出各種理由，將美國當前的持續(xù)赤字進行合理化。最簡單的說法是，隨著全球貿(mào)易和金融的全球化支持較大的經(jīng)常賬戶失衡（Obstfeld和Rogoff，2001）。對于美國經(jīng)常的巨額赤字的各種理由會更放心，如果沒

74、有美國的赤字幾乎兩倍于危機前的早期發(fā)作的平均水平，金融危機也不會那么快發(fā)生。</p><p>　　人均國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值增長實際運行中的后續(xù)債務(wù)危機，如圖4所示。美國2007年危機遵循相同的倒V形為特征的早期事件。增長勢頭將持續(xù)下降的典型危機，兩年后仍然偏低。在較嚴重的“五大”的情況中，增長沖擊是越來越大，并且時間在不斷的延長。不為美國經(jīng)濟前景令人鼓舞，但銀行危機之后往往有一個長期的影響實際增長的過程。</p&g

75、t;<p>　　圖5看起來占GDP的比例在公共債務(wù)上比較大。公共債務(wù)增加是一個幾乎普遍的情況，它預示著金融危機的開始，是危機的前兆，尤其是1984年美國的危機。然而，盡管公共債務(wù)上升到2007年之前，美國的危機，它正在崛起，但是比所有危機的平均水滿，甚至遠遠慢于所有的五大危機。這個現(xiàn)象在美國的公共債務(wù)淺路徑也有清楚地表明，龐大的經(jīng)常帳赤字前面顯示負的因素不僅僅是政府的責任，其他的因素也不可忽視。</p>&l

76、t;p>　　而這些圖的相關(guān)性并不一定是因果關(guān)系，但在組合起來可以看出它給我們的建議，如果美國不發(fā)生重大和長期的增長放緩，它要么被認為是非常幸運的，甚至更多的“特殊”是最樂觀的理論認為。事實上，在金融危機的最嚴重的程度指標，在運行到2007年的金融危機，美國應(yīng)該考慮它本身的好日子，如果能有危機后的軌跡平行設(shè)置在比較溫和的銀行危機，相對于更大的增長停頓的嚴重財政危機期間，要參考西班牙，日本，瑞典，挪威和芬蘭的經(jīng)驗，來作出最合理的決策。

77、</p><p><b>　　3.結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　托爾斯泰在他的經(jīng)典小說安娜卡列尼娜中說到“每一個幸福的家庭是一樣的，但每個不幸的家庭都有他們自己的不幸?！彪m然毫無疑問，每一個金融危機有其自身的區(qū)別，也有驚人的相似之處，在運行的資產(chǎn)價格上漲，債務(wù)積累，以及增長模式，并有經(jīng)常帳赤字。歷史的危機大多是在金融自由化之前，如卡明斯基和Reinhart（199

78、9）記載。而在美國的情況下，一直沒有顯示出的法律上的自由化，但確實事實上是自由化的。新的管制，或?qū)捤傻谋O(jiān)管，金融實體來發(fā)揮在金融體系中的作用越來越大，無疑對提高某些類型的穩(wěn)定性沖擊，但可能增加對他人的安全漏洞。</p><p>　　也許美國會成為一個不同的幸福家庭。盡管一個典型的危機，國內(nèi)許多表面上否相似，它可能還受失誤相比只增長了最溫和的案件。也許這次會是不一樣的，因為這么多的爭論都強調(diào)了。無論長期結(jié)果，提供了

79、量化的相似之處早期戰(zhàn)后工業(yè)國的金融危機，至少在危機前的時期，是值得注意的。當然，通貨膨脹較低，當今世界上更好地錨，就是能證明這是一個重要的緩和因素。 值得一提的最后一點。 在20世紀70年代，美國的銀行體系作為一站之間的石油出口國的盈余，是拉丁美洲和其他地區(qū)的新興市場借款人的中介。雖然當時很多好評，但是20世紀70年代石油美元循環(huán)，最終還是導致了1980年代的債務(wù)危機，而這又放在貨幣中心銀行，造成巨大負擔，這是事實，這一次的石油