出現(xiàn)金融危機去怪罪公允價值的計量公平嗎？【外文翻譯】

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　題 目 新環(huán)境下公允價值在我國應(yīng)用的若干問題研究 </p><p>　　外文題目 Is It Fair to Blame Fair Value Accounting </p><p>　　For the

2、 Financial Crisis? </p><p>　　外文出處 Harvard Business Review </p><p>　　外文作者 Robert C. Pozen </p><p><b>　　原文：</b>

3、</p><p>　　Is It Fair to Blame Fair Value Accounting </p><p>　　For the Financial Crisis ?</p><p>　　Investors and corporate executives don’t agree on how to value distressed assets

4、. But maybe they don’t have to. </p><p>　　—— Robert C. Pozen</p><p>　　What was the primary cause of the current financial crisis? Subprime mortgages, credit default swaps, or excessive debt? Non

5、e of those, says Steve Forbes, chairman of Forbes Media and sometime political candidate. In his view, mark-to-mark accounting was “the principal reason” that the U.S. financial system melted down in 2008.</p><

6、;p>　　Do accounting rules actually pack such wallop? For readers not schooled in financial jargon, marking to market is the practice of revaluing an asset quarterly according to the price it would fetch if sold on the

7、open market, regardless of what was actually paid for it. Because the practice allows for no outdated or wishful-thinking valuations, it is a key component of what is known as fair value accounting. And it is at the cent

8、er of the hottest accounting debate in decades. </p><p>　　Economist Brian Wesbury represented the views of that group when he declared, “Mark-to market accounting rules have turned alarge problem into a hum

9、ongous one. A vast majority of mortgages, corporate bonds, and structured debts are still performing. But because the market is frozen, the prices of these assets have fallen below their true value.” Wesbury and Forbes a

10、rgue that marking to market pushed many banks toward insolvency and forced them to unload assets at fire sale prices, which then cau</p><p>　　Yet mark-to-market accounting continues to have its proponents, w

11、ho are equally adamant. Lisa Koonce, an accounting professor at the University of Texas, wrote in Texas magazine: “This is simply a case of blaming the messenger. Fair value accounting is not the cause of the current cri

12、sis. Rather, it communicated the effects of such bad decisions as granting subprime loans and writing credit default swaps.… The alternative, keeping those loans on the books at their original amounts, is akin to ig</

13、p><p>　　Which camp has the right answer? Perhaps neither. We do not want banks to become insolvent because of shortterm declines in the prices of mortgage-related securities. Nor do we want to hide bank losses

14、from investors and delay the cleanup of toxic assets – as happened in Japan in the decade after 1990. To meet the legitimate needs of both bankers and investors, regulatory officials should adopt new multidimensional app

15、roaches to financial reporting.</p><p>　　Before we can begin to implement sensible reforms, though, we must first clear up some misperceptions about accounting methods. Critics have often lambasted the requi

16、rement to write down impaired assets to their fair value, but in reality impairment is a more important concept for historical cost accounting than for fair value accounting. Many journalists have incorrectly assumed tha

17、t most assets of banks are reported at fair market value, rather than at historical cost. Similarly, many politici</p><p>　　1、Historical Cost Accounting Has No Connection to Current Market Value</p>&

18、lt;p>　　Fair value proponents argue that historical costs of assets on a company’s balance sheet oft en bear little relation to their current value. Under historical cost accounting rules, most assets are carried at th

19、eir purchase price or original value, with minor adjustments for depreciation over their life (as in the case of buildings) or for appreciation until maturity (as in the case of a bond bought at a discount to par). A bui

20、lding owned by a company for decades, therefore, is likely to appear o</p><p>　　However, even under historical accounting, current market values are factored into financial statements. U.S. regulators requir

21、e all publicly traded companies to scrutinize their assets carefully each quarter and ascertain whether they have been permanently impaired – that is, whether their market value is likely to remain materially below their

22、 historical cost for an extended period. If the impairment is not just temporary, the company must write the asset down to its current market value on it</p><p>　　Permanent impairments of assets happen frequ

23、ently under historical cost accounting. In 2008 alone, Sandler O’Neill & Partners reports, U.S. banks wrote down more than $25 billion in goodwill from acquisitions that were no longer worth their purchase price. In

24、an example outside the banking field, Cimarex Energy declared a loss for the first quarter of 2009, despite an operating profit, owing to a noncash impairment charge of more than $500 million (net of taxes) against its o

25、il and gas propertie</p><p>　　2、Most Assets of Financial Institutions Are Marked to Market</p><p>　　Those who heap blame on the head of fair value accounting like to imply that financial institu

26、tions saw a majority of their assets marked to the deteriorating market. In fact, according to an SEC study in late 2008, only 31% of bank assets were treated in this fashion, and the rest were accounted for at historica

27、l cost.</p><p>　　Why? Under fair value accounting, management must divide all loans and securities into a maximum of three asset categories: those that are held, those that are traded, and those that are ava

28、ilable for sale. (See the exhibit “Which Bank Assets Are Marked to Market?”) If management has the intent and ability to hold loans or securities to maturity, they are carried on the books at historical cost. Most loans

29、and many bonds are held to maturity; they will be written down only if permanently impaire</p><p>　　By contrast, all traded assets are marked to market each quarter. Any decrease in the fair market value of

30、a bank’s traded assets reduces the equity on its balance sheet and flows through its income statement as a loss. As a simple illustration, suppose a bank buys a bond for $1 million, and the bond’s market price declines t

31、o $900,000 at the end of the next quarter. Although the bank does not sell the bond, the left side of its balance sheet will show a $100,000 decrease in assets, and the righ</p><p>　　3、Assets Must Be Valued

32、at Current Market Prices Even If the Market for Them Is Illiquid</p><p>　　Fair value accounting would be straightforward if all financial assets were what FASB deems Level 1 – highly liquid and easy to value

33、 at direct market prices. Since they do not always have these characteristics, however, FASB created a standard, FAS 157, which allows for two other levels. Whenever possible, the standard states, assets should be valued

34、 according to the Level 1 method: on the basis of observable market prices. But the standard recognizes that market prices are not always available</p><p>　　When trading assets are classified as Level 3, bec

35、ause of illiquid markets or for other reasons, financial executives are allowed to value them by “marking to model” instead of marking to market. In marking assets to model, executives may use their own reasonable assump

36、tions to estimate fair market value.</p><p>　　When the debt markets froze during the fall of 2008, FASB released a staff paper clarifying the application of fair value accounting to illiquid markets. That pa

37、per emphasized the flexibility of standard 157 and made companies aware that they could reclassify trading assets from Level 2 to Level 3 as markets became more illiquid. FASB also stressed that companies did not have to

38、 use prices from forced or distressed sales to value illiquid assets.</p><p>　　However, these rulings did not provide enough comfort for bankers watching the market value of their toxic assets plummet; they

39、complained loudly to their elected representatives, who threatened to legislate accounting standards unless FASB provided more relief. As a result, in April 2009 FASB quickly proposed and adopted a new rule, which detail

40、ed criteria for determining when a market is illiquid enough to qualify for mark-to-model valuation. The rule was designed to allow more securities to b</p><p>　　Those two retroactive rulings made it possibl

41、e for large U.S. banks to significantly reduce the size of write-downs they took on assets in the first quarter of 2009. The rulings improved the short-term financial picture of these banks, although they also led bank e

42、xecutives to resist sales of toxic assets at what investors believed to be reasonable prices.</p><p>　　Three Recommendations for Realistic Reporting</p><p>　　Once we get beyond the mythmaking an

43、d arm waving, it becomes clear that historical cost and fair value accounting are much closer to each other than people think. Nevertheless, the differences between the two forms of accounting may be signify cant for a p

44、articular bank on a specific reporting date. In these situations, the bank executives’ understandable desire to present assets in the best light is likely to conflict with investors’ legitimate interest in understanding

45、the bank’s potential exp</p><p>　　Enhance the credibility of marking to model.</p><p>　　Given FASB’s two recent pronouncements on Level 3 assets, there is no question that banks will increasingl

46、y value illiquid securities by marking them to model. During the first quarter of 2009, Level 3 assets at the 19 largest U.S. banks increased by 14.3%, as compared with the prior quarter. Because banks are allowed to mak

47、e reasonable assumptions based on their own estimates for rates of return on subprime loans, mortgage-backed securities, and other troubled assets over several years, mark-to</p><p>　　This is sure to give ri

48、se to real investor skepticism about the accuracy of bank valuations of troubled assets. As Warren Buffett has pointed out, mark to model can degenerate into “mark to myth.”</p><p>　　How can we counter that

49、skepticism and keep valuations defensible? To help investors understand how it arrived at values for assets marked to model, a bank should disclose a supplemental schedule listing Level 3 assets and summarizing their key

50、 characteristics. Most important, a bank should disclose enough detail about the assumptions underlying its models to allow investors to trace how it reached valuations.</p><p>　　Unlink accounting and capita

51、l requirements.</p><p>　　The most fundamental criticism of fair value accounting is that it drives banks to the brink of insolvency by eroding their capital base. In the view of many bankers, fair value acco

52、unting has forced an “artificial” reduction in asset values that are likely to rebound after the financial crisis subsides. To investors, on the other hand, nothing is more artificial than proclaiming that an asset is wo

53、rth a price no one is actually willing to pay. The typical investor, moreover, is less confident t</p><p>　　Resource: Harvard Business Review. November 2009：85-90.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b>

54、;</p><p>　　出現(xiàn)金融危機去怪罪公允價值的計量公平嗎？</p><p>　　投資者和企業(yè)主管不同意就如何不良資產(chǎn)的價值。但是，也許他們沒有。</p><p><b>　　——羅伯特C.波曾</b></p><p>　　什么是當(dāng)前金融危機的主要原因？次級房貸？信貸違約掉期或過度債務(wù)?不是這些，福布斯董事長斯蒂夫福

55、布斯跟某些政治候選人說。在他們眼里，2008年美國金融體系的崩潰的“罪魁禍?zhǔn)住笔且允袃r計算的會計。</p><p>　　一項會計規(guī)則實際上有這樣的沖擊力嗎？對于沒有受過金融術(shù)語教育的讀者,會按季對市場是一個資產(chǎn)升值標(biāo)記的做法，根據(jù)價格不顧一切的把公開市場上出售的買回來，而不管它實際支付的。由于估值的做法沒有過時或允許一廂情愿的思維，它是一個被認(rèn)為是公允價值會計的關(guān)鍵組成部分。它是幾十年來最熱門會計辯論的中心。&l

56、t;/p><p>　　經(jīng)濟學(xué)家布萊恩Wesbury代表該組的意見時，他宣布，“馬克對市場的會計規(guī)則已經(jīng)變成了堆積如山的一大問題。一個抵押貸款，企業(yè)債券的絕大多數(shù)，結(jié)構(gòu)性債務(wù)依然表現(xiàn)。但由于市場被凍結(jié)，這些資產(chǎn)的價格已經(jīng)跌破其真實價值?！盬esbury和福布斯認(rèn)為，以市場走向破產(chǎn)，導(dǎo)致許多銀行，迫使他們卸下火警的價格出售，然后造成資產(chǎn)值降低。按這種說法說服，在美國和歐洲一些政界人士呼吁暫停公允價值會計的購買，贊成會計歷

57、史成本會計，或一般的資產(chǎn)價值為原價。</p><p>　　然而按市價計算的會計仍然有同樣動搖的支持者。麗莎昆斯，一個在美國德州大學(xué)會計學(xué)教授，德克薩斯州的雜志中寫道：“這是一個簡單的指責(zé)使者案件。公允價值會計并非是目前的危機引起的原因。相反,它傳達(dá)了像授予次級貸款和寫作信貸違約交易期這樣的不好決定的效果溝通的效果。另一種，按照已載入史冊的，保持在原有的量,近乎忽視現(xiàn)實?！惫蓶|團體已進一步主張以市場為標(biāo)記在今天的環(huán)

58、境中更為必要。投資咨詢集團的財務(wù)會計準(zhǔn)則委員會(FASB)的投資咨詢集團強調(diào)：“要尤其批評當(dāng)市場處于流動性周期危機的時候，那些公允價值被用于供應(yīng)商和其他一些財務(wù)報表使用者?！睆倪@個觀點來看,如果銀行沒有標(biāo)記他們的債券市場,投資者會很不了解資產(chǎn)價值,因此不愿意幫助整合資金機構(gòu)。</p><p>　　這是正確的答案嗎？也許都不是。我們不希望銀行因為短期抵押貸款相關(guān)證券價格的下降導(dǎo)致破產(chǎn)。同時，我們也不希望銀行隱藏來自

59、投資者和推遲清理不良資產(chǎn)帶來的損失——就像日本在1990年后那近幾十年里發(fā)生的那樣。為了滿足銀行家和投資者的合法的需求，監(jiān)督管理官員應(yīng)該采用新的多面的方法來進行財務(wù)報告。</p><p>　　在我們開始實行明智的改革之前,我們必須先澄清一些會計處理的錯誤方法。批評家們經(jīng)常嚴(yán)責(zé)那些要求記下公允價值資產(chǎn)受損的要求；但在現(xiàn)實世界里，損害是一種比公允價值會計更為重要的歷史成本會計概念。許多記者錯誤的預(yù)計，大多數(shù)資產(chǎn)銀行以

60、公平市場價值的報告,而不是歷史成本計價。同樣，許多政客們認(rèn)為,更多的非流動性資產(chǎn)必須以市場價格進行估價,盡管一些財務(wù)會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會裁決出了相反的情況。每一個這些交易都經(jīng)過仔細(xì)的考慮。</p><p>　　1、歷史成本會計沒有連接到當(dāng)前的市場價值</p><p>　　公允價值支持者認(rèn)為一個企業(yè)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上以歷史成本計價的資產(chǎn)與當(dāng)前的價值沒有多大的關(guān)系。在歷史成本計價的會計準(zhǔn)則下,大多數(shù)資產(chǎn)是

61、帶著他們的購買價格或者原始的價值，對他們生活中的貶值做細(xì)微的調(diào)整(例如建筑)直到成熟(像在打折時買的政體債券)。公司擁有一個幾十年的建筑，因此，根據(jù)市場的實際需要，很可能出現(xiàn)比載入史冊以來更低的價值。</p><p>　　然而，即使在歷史會計下，目前市場價值也是被納入財務(wù)報表的。美國監(jiān)管部門要求所有上市公司每一季度都仔細(xì)檢查他們的資產(chǎn)和確定他們是否長期有損傷——也就是說，是否他們的市場價值仍有可能在一段時間內(nèi)極大

62、的低于歷史成本。如果減值不僅僅是暫時的,公司必須在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中按照當(dāng)前的市場價格把資產(chǎn)寫下來——并在損益表中記錄所造成的損失。</p><p>　　永久性損傷的資產(chǎn)在歷史成本會計下頻繁出現(xiàn)。僅2008年，在奧尼爾,森德勒的伙伴合作報告中,美國的銀行在收購的美譽下，用超過250億美元收購了已不再是值得購買的價格。在銀行領(lǐng)域外的另一個例子，Cimarex 能量宣布2009年第一季度的損失,盡管由營業(yè)利潤、和一個超過5

63、億美元的非現(xiàn)金損壞交易的稅收（凈稅）來對抗石油和天然氣(網(wǎng)對石油和天然氣的性質(zhì)。</p><p>　　2、大多數(shù)金融機構(gòu)的資產(chǎn)的以市場為標(biāo)記</p><p>　　那些堆積在公允價值會計頭上的指責(zé)暗示了金融機構(gòu)看到了日益惡化的市場上的大部分資產(chǎn)。事實上,根據(jù)一項在2008年晚期的研究，只有31%的銀行資產(chǎn)患者是以這種方式,而余下的是按照歷史成本計價。</p><p>

64、　　這是為什么呢？在公允價值計量下，管理層必須以最大的限度將所有的貸款和有價證券分配到三個資產(chǎn)類別中：一類是被保持的，一類是被用于交易的，還有一類是被用于出售的。(看這個例子“哪個銀行的資產(chǎn)是以市場定價的?”)如果管理層有意圖和能力使貸款或有價證券持有到期，在歷史成本計價中，他們將會被載入史冊。大多數(shù)貸款和許多債券是持有至到期的，只有在收到永久破壞的時候，才會被記錄下來。</p><p>　　與此形成鮮明對比的是

65、，每季度所有的資金交易資產(chǎn)都是以市場定價的。銀行在公允價值市場條件下任何一次交易資產(chǎn)下降，將減少資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上的權(quán)益和損失損益表上的現(xiàn)金流量。舉一個簡單的例子說明，假設(shè)一個銀行以100萬美元購買了債券，債券的交易價格在下個季度末下滑到90萬美元。盡管銀行不賣掉債券，資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的左邊將會顯示減少了10萬美元的資產(chǎn)，根據(jù)試算平衡，右側(cè)將會顯示相應(yīng)的也減少了10萬美元的資產(chǎn)(在沒有任何稅收的影響下)。這種減少,也會流過銀行的損益表，并且以稅前季

66、度損失10萬美元的形式被報告出來。</p><p>　　3、即使市場的流動性很低，資產(chǎn)也必須以當(dāng)前的市場價格估價</p><p>　　如果所有的金融資產(chǎn)都是像財務(wù)會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會認(rèn)為的那種一級的，高流動性，易于以市場價格直接估價的，那么公允價值會計將會變得很明確直接。因為他們不是總具備這些特點，F(xiàn)ASB創(chuàng)造了一個可以允許有兩種水平的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，F(xiàn)AS 157。</p><p&g

67、t;　　準(zhǔn)則說，只要有可能，資產(chǎn)應(yīng)該根據(jù)一級方法：在觀察市場價格的基礎(chǔ)上去估價。但是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)認(rèn)為，市場價格不會總是可用的，在這種情況下,它允許財務(wù)主管使用二級方法：觀察市場的投入使用進行資產(chǎn)估價。這些投入可以包括，比如像，交易價格和類似的折扣證券或其他一些相關(guān)的價值。當(dāng)這樣的投入甚至是不是可得到的時候，正如所說的那樣，投資于私人股本基金的資產(chǎn)應(yīng)該以三級方法估價。</p><p>　　因為市場的流動性差或其他一些原因，

68、交易資產(chǎn)被分成了三個等級，財務(wù)主管可以“以模型計價”，代替以市場計價。在資產(chǎn)的模型計價中，管理人員可以用自己的合理的假設(shè)去估計市場的公允價值。</p><p>　　在2008年秋天，當(dāng)債券市場凍結(jié)的時候，財務(wù)會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會發(fā)布了一個員工文件，明確應(yīng)用了非流動市場下的公允價值會計。那篇文章強調(diào)了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)157的靈活性，并且使企業(yè)意識到隨著市場的流動性變得越差，他們可以從二級到三級重新厘定交易資產(chǎn)。財務(wù)會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會還強

69、調(diào)說，企業(yè)不需要使用價格強制或受損的銷售去估算的非流動性資產(chǎn)價值。</p><p>　　然而，這些裁決沒有給銀行家提供足夠的舒適去觀察市場資產(chǎn)價值的暴跌，他們對那些他們選出來的曾威脅說要將會計準(zhǔn)則立法除非財務(wù)會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會給予更多的救濟的代表們大聲地抱怨。因此，在2009年的四月份的時候，F(xiàn)ASB迅速提出并采用了一種新的規(guī)則，當(dāng)市場的流動性足夠差到以至于可以用模型進行估價，給予了詳細(xì)的認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這個規(guī)則是為了讓更

70、多的有價證券以銀行估價，而不是由市場指標(biāo)估價。同時，財務(wù)會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會又發(fā)表了另一規(guī)則，當(dāng)證券受到永久的破壞的時候，應(yīng)如何去做出解釋。規(guī)則說只有信譽丟失的損傷的部分將會影響到銀行的收入和資金的管理，其余的(如與非流動性有關(guān)的未實現(xiàn)損失)將進入其他綜合專門收益賬戶。</p><p>　　追溯這兩個裁決使美國大銀行可能大幅減少沖減資產(chǎn)，他們參加了2009年第一季度的大小。的裁決提高了這些銀行的短期財務(wù)情況，但也導(dǎo)致銀

71、行高管抵制什么投資者認(rèn)為是合理的價格銷售的有毒資產(chǎn)。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)實主義的三個報告的建議</p><p>　　一旦我們超越了編造神話和手臂揮舞著得到的，它變得清楚，歷史成本和公允價值會計更接近對方比人們想象的。不過，會計之間的兩種形式的差異可能意味著在特定的報告日期某銀行公會。在這種情況下，銀行高管的理解的愿望，目前在最好的輕資產(chǎn)是可能的沖突與投資者在了解銀行的潛在風(fēng)險的合法權(quán)益

72、。因此，讓我們考慮如何可能的問題銀行的財務(wù)報告，以便收集他們的財務(wù)狀況的復(fù)雜現(xiàn)實。</p><p>　　加強對標(biāo)記，以模型的可信度</p><p>　　由于財務(wù)會計準(zhǔn)則委員會的兩個三級資產(chǎn)最近的聲明，但毫無疑問，銀行將越來越多地通過標(biāo)記他們的價值模型，流動性不足的證券。在2009年第一季度，3級在19家最大的美國銀行資產(chǎn)增加了14.3％，與上一季度相比。因為銀行被允許做出的次級貸款，抵押貸

73、款支持證券和其他問題資產(chǎn)的回報率超過他們自己的估計幾年基于合理的假設(shè)，馬克到模型估值會較近期的交易為基礎(chǔ)的高類似的資產(chǎn)。標(biāo)記，以模型讓銀行描繪了他們的財務(wù)狀況相對樂觀。</p><p>　　這是一定要引起對銀行的不良資產(chǎn)估值的準(zhǔn)確性真正的投資者的懷疑。正如沃倫巴菲特所指出的那樣，標(biāo)記模式可以淪為“馬克神話”。</p><p>　　如何才能應(yīng)對這種懷疑和保留估值防御？為了幫助投資者了解如何在

74、有標(biāo)記資產(chǎn)價值的模型來，銀行應(yīng)補充披露上市時間表3級資產(chǎn)和總結(jié)其主要特點。最重要的是，銀行應(yīng)披露其基本模式，讓投資者跟蹤估值假設(shè)它是如何達(dá)到足夠的細(xì)節(jié)。</p><p>　　取消鏈接的會計和資金需求</p><p>　　公允價值的會計最根本的批評是，它的驅(qū)動器由侵蝕其資本基礎(chǔ)，以破產(chǎn)邊緣的銀行。在許多銀行家認(rèn)為，公允價值會計，迫使一個“人造”的資產(chǎn)價值有可能反彈后金融危機消退減少。對投資者