中小企業(yè)融資外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Financing of SMEs</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　The main

2、 sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each fina

3、ncing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the s

4、tatic trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that</p><p>　　For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing

5、 is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise f

6、rom collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the</p><p>　　2. Asset side theory of SME financing</p><p>　　In

7、 the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section

8、the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.</p><p>　　2.1. Cheap Trade credits</p><p>　　The first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits

9、are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation t

10、o the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large </p><p>　　S

11、trategic motives</p><p>　　The first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality befor

12、e submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade cre

13、dits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymm</p><p>　　The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a

14、 price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advanta

15、geous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price di</p><p>　　www.fuguangzhuz

16、ao.com Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial

17、 difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nat

18、ure.</p><p>　　The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between

19、 delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount

20、of cash required on“hand” .</p><p>　　Financing motives</p><p>　　The basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view

21、of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller a

22、nd medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relation</p><p>　　But with trade credits non-financial firms are

23、competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may

24、 have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visits the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders o

25、rders with th</p><p>　　The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful i

26、ncentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a b

27、etter use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales networ</p><p>　　If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms ca

28、n use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal

29、 of the credit worthiness of the firm. </p><p>　　That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot us

30、e trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.</p><p>　　In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the bo

31、rrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade c

32、redits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.</p><p>　　2.2 Bank loans</p><p>　　Banks have less info

33、rmation than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the coll

34、ateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using

35、tangible assets as collateral, also due </p><p>　　The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It i

36、s also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and ma

37、rketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus,</p><p>　　2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loans</p><p>　　After ot

38、her sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type

39、of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs c

40、an be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the</p><p>　　Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt ar

41、e financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.</p><

42、p>　　Conclusions</p><p>　　Currently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest sourc

43、e and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are g

44、reater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs”</p><p>　　We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationsh

45、ip between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.</p>&

46、lt;p>　　Source: Jan Bartholdy, Cesario Mateus, “Financing of SMEs”.London business review. 2007(9).pp.43-45</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　中小企業(yè)融資</b></p>

47、<p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　中小企業(yè)融資的主要來源有：股權(quán)融資、按時兌現(xiàn)的貿(mào)易信貸融資、中長期銀行信貸融資、延遲兌現(xiàn)的貿(mào)易信貸融資以及其他債務融資，每種融資方式的邊際成本取決于與其滯納金相關的信息不對稱成本和交易成本。根據(jù)啄食理論，企業(yè)在融資時，會優(yōu)先選擇成本最低的融資方式；而根據(jù)靜態(tài)權(quán)衡理論，企業(yè)在進行融資時，各種資金來源的邊際成本都是相同的；再者，

48、根據(jù)優(yōu)序融資理論，企業(yè)進行融資時要結(jié)合企業(yè)自身具體情況，是考慮多重因素下的優(yōu)序融資。在本文中，我們認為，以上這些理論都忽略了一點，那就是邊際成本的確定主要依賴于融資資金的使用，以及資產(chǎn)負債表中資產(chǎn)方作為融資來源的重要影響作用。一個來自葡萄牙中小企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù)分析證實，企業(yè)資產(chǎn)負債表資產(chǎn)方對于融資方式的選擇有著重要的影響，而這是靜態(tài)權(quán)衡理論和優(yōu)序融資理論所不能接受的。</p><p>　　中小企業(yè)的融資主要來源于股權(quán)（

49、內(nèi)部融資），商業(yè)信用，銀行信貸和其他債務。融資方式的選擇取決于資金成本，而資金成本又是由信息不對稱成本和基于無債務負擔情況下的預期成本決定的。信息不對稱成本主要是為了支持管理決策而收集和分析信息所產(chǎn)生的費用，無債預期成本主要產(chǎn)生于企業(yè)為收回債務而收集和出售抵押品時的費用。由于中小企業(yè)的管理層和股東往往是同一個人，股權(quán)和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的資金沒有信息不對稱成本，因此股權(quán)融資是成本最低的融資渠道。</p><p>　　2 中

50、小企業(yè)資產(chǎn)融資理論</p><p>　　在前面的論述中，我們曾建議，葡萄牙的中小企業(yè)多采用內(nèi)部資金、廉價貿(mào)易信貸、中長期銀行信貸、高價貿(mào)易信貸和其他貸款進行融資。接下來，我們將對以上各種類型的融資動機進行討論。</p><p>　　2.1 廉價貿(mào)易信貸</p><p>　　首先，我們將討論的是貿(mào)易信貸。貿(mào)易信貸很有意思，因為它們代表的非金融企業(yè)與金融中介機構(gòu)在提供金

51、融服務方面的競爭。這一領域內(nèi)的早期研究關注于貿(mào)易信貸同的信貸渠道的作用（或所謂的“梅爾策”影響）之間的關系，以及同貨幣政策的效率之間的關系。其基本思想是，企業(yè)尤其是大型知名企業(yè)，同的面臨財務困境小企業(yè)，直接在金融市場達成貿(mào)易信貸的交易。在最近的研究中，將對貿(mào)易信貸的利用分為戰(zhàn)略動機和財務動機。</p><p><b>　　戰(zhàn)略動機</b></p><p>　　第一種理

52、論是關于公司產(chǎn)品的信息不對稱。貿(mào)易信貸是由賣方提供，使買方可以在付款前確認產(chǎn)品的數(shù)量和質(zhì)量。通過提供貿(mào)易融資，供應商想證明的是，他們可以為買家提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的產(chǎn)品。由于中小企業(yè)在一般情況下信譽不高，因此這些企業(yè)迫于無奈，往往使用貿(mào)易信貸的方式以證明其產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量。由于產(chǎn)品的信息不對稱，買方對供應商的資料很少，或者供應商產(chǎn)品的情況復雜，質(zhì)量難以鑒定，因此貿(mào)易信貸被中小企業(yè)廣泛使用。</p><p>　　第二個戰(zhàn)略動機是定價。

53、以優(yōu)惠條件提供貿(mào)易融資，其作用同商品降價類似。因此，企業(yè)可以利用貿(mào)易信貸，間接的降低產(chǎn)品價格或作為不同買家之間的價格歧視工具，以促進銷售。相比于風險借款而言，貿(mào)易信貸是有利的，因為這種替代性融資的有著一個更為優(yōu)惠的融資利率。因此，貿(mào)易信貸可以被用來作為直接的價格歧視的工具，或者作為低信譽借款人的間接工具（如果所有的買家提供相同的條件）。</p><p>　　貿(mào)易信貸也可以幫助供應商發(fā)展與買家的長期合作關系。這往往

54、體現(xiàn)在買方出現(xiàn)暫時財務困難的情況下，供應商要允許其延長付款期。同金融機構(gòu)相比，供應商具有更好的的行業(yè)知識，因此能夠更好地判斷買方是面臨暫時的困難還是存在一個長期性的問題。</p><p>　　沒有嚴格意義上的戰(zhàn)略動機，最終動機都是基于交易成本。貿(mào)易信貸作為進行交易有效方式，可以明確地區(qū)分貨物交割和帳款支付。從最基本的方面講，卡車司機運送貨物，不必再四處找相關負責人支付帳單，買方還可以節(jié)約交易成本所需的現(xiàn)金。<

55、;/p><p><b>　　融資動機</b></p><p>　　這種觀點的基本內(nèi)容是，企業(yè)與金融機構(gòu)在為其他公司提供信貸業(yè)務上進行競爭。金融機構(gòu)的傳統(tǒng)觀點是，他們在向企業(yè)提供信用時的主要問題是信息不對稱。金融機構(gòu)在收集和分析來自企業(yè)，特別是受制與信息不對稱影響的中小型企業(yè)的信息時，具有一定優(yōu)勢。這種優(yōu)勢的確立，關鍵在于銀行與目標企業(yè)之間存在支付功能的密切關系，金融機構(gòu)可

56、以通過監(jiān)測目標企業(yè)的帳目現(xiàn)金流入和流出來獲取相關信息。</p><p>　　但隨著貿(mào)易信貸逐漸流行，非金融企業(yè)同金融機構(gòu)在解決這些問題及拓展信貸渠道方面，展開了激烈的競爭。非金融機構(gòu)如何能夠在這個市場進行競爭？彼得森和拉詹（1997）就此簡要討論幾種方式，并提出供應商對金融機構(gòu)可能存在的優(yōu)勢。相比于金融機構(gòu)，供應商同借款人之間有著更加密切的工作關系和更加頻繁的溝通交流。供應商和貸款人之間所達成訂單的時間及規(guī)模，提

57、供借款人有關業(yè)務情況的信息，需要注意的是，此信息是先提供給供應商的，金融機構(gòu)必須等待與訂單相關的現(xiàn)金流產(chǎn)生后，才能獲取相關的業(yè)務信息。還有早期付款折扣的提供，使供應商及早的同借款人達成了一種信用關系，因此供應商能夠比金融機構(gòu)更快，更方便地取得相關業(yè)務信息</p><p>　　供應商在收款方面也存在一定的優(yōu)勢。如果供應商至少能在一個地方形成供貨的壟斷，那么他們就能對客戶公司支付賬款形成強有力的督促。這種督促作用很明

58、顯，特別是當借款人的業(yè)務只占供應商業(yè)務中的很小一部分時。在相同的情況下，相比于金融機構(gòu)，供應商對借款人貨物的扣留能對借款人產(chǎn)生更大的影響，以及通過其銷售網(wǎng)絡，以更高的價格出售商品和更的速度回收賬款。當然這些優(yōu)勢都是要建立在供應商對借款人所提供貨物和借款的重要性的基礎之上。</p><p>　　鑒于信息不對稱是產(chǎn)生貿(mào)易信貸的因素之一，那么客戶企業(yè)就要明白，供應商在授予他們貿(mào)易信貸的同時，也能夠為自己爭取到更多的銀行

59、信貸。銀行業(yè)會把供應商的貿(mào)易信貸質(zhì)量的優(yōu)劣，作為對他們授信的重要參考。</p><p>　　貿(mào)易信貸通常以貨物的供應作為擔保，客戶企業(yè)在獲取貿(mào)易信貸的額度上也有一定的限制，因此他們就不能隨意利用貿(mào)易信貸，以達到為其整個生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營提供融資支持的目的。</p><p>　　總而言之，由于對客戶企業(yè)及其所屬行業(yè)的了解畢竟還存在欠缺，貿(mào)易信貸的提供者同借款人之間的信息不對稱程度還比較低。貿(mào)易信貸發(fā)展

60、至今，經(jīng)驗告訴我們貿(mào)易信貸的實施主要是基于企業(yè)商譽風險和產(chǎn)品銷售成本。由于以貨物供應作為擔保，使企業(yè)的貿(mào)易信貸額度始終控制的貨物總價值之內(nèi)。</p><p><b>　　2.1 銀行信貸</b></p><p>　　相比于貿(mào)易信貸的提供者，銀行能夠獲取的信息更少，獲取信息的成本也更高。在使用貨物作為抵押時，貿(mào)易信貸提供者比銀行具有優(yōu)勢；然而，受交易的數(shù)量和規(guī)模的影響，

61、銀行往往以諸如建筑、機械設備等大宗資產(chǎn)作為抵押，在這個方面反而是銀行更具優(yōu)勢。因此，銀行更傾向于以有形資產(chǎn)作為信貸擔保，而且由于信息不對稱，他們也不愿意向信息不透明的公司，如增長迅速的小企業(yè)，發(fā)放貸款，相對的銀行更愿意提供的是有形資產(chǎn)作為擔保的長期貸款。在接下來基于有形資產(chǎn)和信用風險變量的實證研究中，我們將要重點闡述銀行長期貸款的授予和授予額度是如何取決于作為擔保的有形資產(chǎn)的價值的。</p><p>　　銀行在收

62、集和評價債務人應收賬款方面的相對優(yōu)勢，是發(fā)放短期銀行貸款的基礎。當然現(xiàn)金及其等價物也可以用作擔保，但由于存在現(xiàn)金流動和市場安全方面的風險，相比于其他信貸提供者，銀行在收集和研究這些信息并沒有任何優(yōu)勢。在存貨抵押方面，情況也是如此。因此，我們在解釋銀行短期信貸行為時，將會把債務人的數(shù)量作為主要的變量因素來研究。www.fuguangzhuzao.com</p><p>　　2.3 高價貿(mào)易信貸和其他貸款</p

63、><p>　　當其他融資手段都喪失作用時，企業(yè)還可以利用拖延支付賬款的貿(mào)易信貸方式。然而，采用此種方式的成本是非常高的，因為它意味著企業(yè)放棄了現(xiàn)金折扣，甚至會招致罰金。使用這種貿(mào)易信貸會降低企業(yè)的信譽，可能會使企業(yè)以后很難獲取同類的信貸。當然，成本的高低取決于企業(yè)所對應的供應商數(shù)量：如果只有一個供應商，那么這種成本還是相當高的；如果供應商有多個，那么這種成本也不算很高。</p><p>　　其

64、他種類的信貸如信用卡債務、汽車貸款等，其成本比銀行貸款還要高，同樣客戶財務表現(xiàn)的優(yōu)劣，也是決定其能否獲取這些信貸的主要因素。由于我們對此類貸款的關注較少，獲取的信息不夠充分，在這里就不多作論述。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　目前關于資本結(jié)構(gòu)的理論主要有兩種。第一種是優(yōu)序融資理論，即企業(yè)要首先選擇成本最低的融資來源，其次是成本較低的，然

65、后以此類推?；谛畔⒉粚ΨQ而進行的逆向選擇，是產(chǎn)生資金成本差異的主要原因。第二種是權(quán)衡理論，即企業(yè)債務增加的前提是其能帶來更多的利潤增加。債務的好處在于它可以作為企業(yè)的“抵稅盾牌”、“積極代理成本”以及“負代理成本”。這些理論的論述，對于企業(yè)資產(chǎn)負債表資產(chǎn)方的組成也有著重要影響。由此得出的結(jié)論是，由于企業(yè)在融資中所采用的債務類型不同，企業(yè)資產(chǎn)負債表的資產(chǎn)方組成對負債方組成也有著重要影響，或者說資金的用途很大程度上決定著企業(yè)的融資類型。&