信息披露質(zhì)量和現(xiàn)金流外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2194字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Disclosure Quality and Cash Flow</p><p>　　We study a relatively recen

2、t change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely the issuance of management cash flow forecasts. While we find some management cash flow forecasts in the early 1980s, the incidence of such disclosures is

3、low until recent years. However, since 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in the issuance of management cash flow forecasts and the number of such forecasts has more than tripled from pre-2000 levels.</p>&

4、lt;p>　　One potential explanation for this trend is Regulation FD, which went into effect in 2000. For example, if managers were disclosing cash flow forecasts privately to analysts prior to Regulation FD, they would

5、have to publicly disclose such forecasts to all parties after Regulation FD or curtail their management cash flow forecasts completely. Regulation FD potentially increases company disclosure of a wide array of financial

6、information, including cash flow information. Consistent with this, we</p><p>　　Another potential explanation for the recent trend of more management cash flow forecasts is investors and analysts paying more

7、 attention to cash flow information than before. Recent corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and others, have heightened investor concern over potential accounting earnings manipulations. Such concerns were recen

8、tly noted in a Business Week article entitled “Fuzzy Numbers”. Consistent with an increase in the demand for cash flow information by investors, we also </p><p>　　We study voluntary management cash flow fore

9、casts and test hypotheses on managers’ incentives to issue these forecasts. Prior voluntary disclosure literature offers varying predictions for management’s incentives to provide disclosure as well as the nature of info

10、rmation conveyed in management disclosures. For example, theoretical models demonstrate that when there are proprietary costs of disclosure or when investors are uncertain about the information management has, firms will

11、 voluntarily dis</p><p>　　Earnings forecasts likely play a special role in reducing the risk of litigation, and a more important role than management cash flow forecasts. For firms with bad news and thus co

12、ncerned about potential litigation, earnings-related disclosures are likely to be more effective in conveying that bad news to investors than disclosures of other financial information such as cash flows because, in gene

13、ral, earnings is the most informative summary performance measure. Thus, earnings disclosure is mo</p><p>　　We predict that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet in

14、vestor demand for cash flow information, and to pre-commit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our findings are consiste

15、nt with these predictions. We find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts increases in periods when there is a large increase in operating cash flow, when analysts are</p><p>　　We document tha

16、t firms issuing management cash flow forecasts tend to have better cash flow information than those without a forecast and that management cash flow forecasts tend to beat existing expectations. This applies to situation

17、s where there is very bad or very good news in earnings and when the firm is young, suggesting that management uses cash flow forecasts to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good

18、 news in earnings and to signal economic viab</p><p>　　We provide evidence on how management reports actual cash flow information in (subsequent) press releases. We document that managers use discretion in

19、reporting realized cash flows in earnings announcement-related press releases and adopt alternative definitions of cash flows (vis-à-vis GAAP definitions of cash flow per the statement of cash flows). Specifically,

20、 management-announced actual cash flows tend to exceed actual GAAP cash flows. As a result, management-announced actual cash flows me</p><p>　　Sloan (1996) provides evidence that investors overestimate the p

21、ersistence of accruals and underestimate the persistence of cash flow. This results in mispricing – labeled the accrual anomaly – where a trading strategy designed to exploit investors’ misunderstanding of the persistenc

22、e of earnings components earns significant abnormal returns. Literature extending Sloan (1996) primarily focuses on accrual overvaluation (e.g., Xie [2001]; Thomas & Zhang [2002]; Collins, Gong, & Hribar [2003]).

23、 Ho</p><p>　　Investigating the association between disclosure quality and the mispricing of accruals and cash flow is important because it highlights the role that disclosure quality plays in helping invest

24、ors to efficiently impound accounting information into prices, thus establishing a link between disclosure quality and market efficiency. As such, this study tests a conjecture in Thomas (2000) that the mispricing of ea

25、rnings information may result from low-quality disclosures. Our results contribute to t</p><p>　　Recent research provides evidence that temporary accounting distortions arising from accrual estimation errors

26、 plays a significant role in the lower earnings persistence of accruals relative to cash flow (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). These accrual estimation errors could be a result of both unintentional error

27、s in forecasting the future economic benefits of accruals and intentional managerial manipulation (Xie [2001]; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). Sloan (1996) argues</p><p>　　Theory suggests tha

28、t increased disclosure plays a role in equity markets by reducing information asymmetries, increasing liquidity, and reducing the cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia [1991]; Kim & Verrecchia [1994]). However, v

29、ery few papers investigate the role that disclosure plays in efficient pricing. Our focus on disclosure is based on the idea that more informative disclosures allow investors to more fully understand the information in

30、accruals and cash flow for future earnings. We co</p><p>　　Following Sloan (1996), we use the Mishkin (1983) rational expectations framework (hereafter referred to as the “Mishkin test”) to examine whether t

31、he earnings expectations embedded in stock prices accurately reflect the differential persistence of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). We first confirm that the mispricing phenomenon documented b

32、y Sloan (1996) occurs in our full sample of firms. That is, we find that investors behave as if they over-estimate the persistence o</p><p>　　Following prior literature (e.g., Collins, Gong, & Hribar [20

33、03]; Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Mashruwala, Rajgopal, & Shevlin [2006]; Barone & Magilke [2008]), we use a cross-sectional regression approach to investigate whether accruals and cash flow are a

34、ssociated with future returns after controlling for variables known to predict future returns (i.e., size, book-to-market). Consistent with recent research, in our full sample, we find no evidence that accruals are asso

35、ciated with</p><p>　　This study investigates the relationship between disclosure quality and the mispricing of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). Our results provide useful informatio

36、n to regulators, academics, and investors interested in the pricing of earnings components. Specifically, we illustrate a potential benefit of better quality disclosure by documenting a specific case in which higher-qual

37、ity disclosure is associated with more efficient prices. The results of this study are also r</p><p>　　Source:Michael S. Drake,James N. Myers and Linda A. Myers,2008“disclosure quality and cash flow”,August

38、.pp.2-4. </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　信息披露質(zhì)量和現(xiàn)金流</p><p>　　本文研究自愿性信息披露管理實踐方面的最新變化，即現(xiàn)金流量預測管理的發(fā)布。早期的現(xiàn)金流量預測管理始于20世紀80年代，對其進行披露是近幾年才興起的。然而，從2000年起對現(xiàn)金流量預測管理的發(fā)布有了顯著增長，并

39、且預測數(shù)量是2000年以前水平的三倍多。</p><p>　　導致這種趨勢的一個可能的解釋是在2000年生效的公平信息披露規(guī)則（以下簡稱“規(guī)則”）。例如 ，如果管理者在規(guī)則發(fā)布之前私下向分析師披露現(xiàn)金流量預測信息，則在規(guī)則發(fā)布之后，他們必須將這些預測信息向所有的利益相關者進行公開，否則將完全剝奪其現(xiàn)金流量預測管理的權利。規(guī)則潛在地增加了公司里包括現(xiàn)金流量信息在內(nèi)的各種財務信息的披露。</p><

40、;p>　　近期現(xiàn)金流量預測管理趨勢的加強可能還和投資者及分析師較以前更加關注現(xiàn)金流信息有關。安然、世通等公司的丑聞加重了投資者對潛在的會計盈余操縱的擔憂。這些擔憂最近被商業(yè)周刊稱為“模糊數(shù)”。與投資者對現(xiàn)金流量信息的需求增加相一致，我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)分析師對現(xiàn)金流量的預測在2000-2003年間是2000年以前水平的兩倍多。</p><p>　　我們研究自愿性的現(xiàn)金流量預測管理，并且對管理者發(fā)布這些預測的誘因進行假

41、設檢驗。以前的自愿披露文獻對管理者提供披露的誘因作出了多種預測。例如，理論模型表明，在有了競爭劣勢成本的披露或當投資者們不了解信息管理的情況時,企業(yè)會自愿披露好消息并保留較不利的消息。早期有關收益預測管理的實證研究為該預測提供了佐證。然而，近期的較多實證文獻指出訴訟風險對盈余預測管理有重要影響。斯金納（1994），卡斯尼克和列夫（1995）指出盈余預測管理更有可能傳達壞消息，符合管理者關心訴訟風險以及先發(fā)制人的發(fā)布盈余預測從而降低投資者

42、的期望。</p><p>　　盈余預測在降低訴訟風險中扮演著一個特殊角色，且比現(xiàn)金流量預測管理更為重要。有不利消息的公司通常關心潛在的訴訟，與盈余有關的披露在向投資者傳達不利信息時比其他財務信息例如現(xiàn)金流量更有效，因為一般來說,收入是最為有效的總結業(yè)績的尺度。盈利披露更有可能實現(xiàn)調(diào)整投資者期望的需要。從而，以前的一些偏好用盈余預測來反映不利信息的研究可能不適用于其他的預測管理類型，例如現(xiàn)金流量預測。與此一致，使用

43、20世紀80年代以來的數(shù)據(jù)，研究人員發(fā)現(xiàn)更好的業(yè)績伴隨著更高的整體信息披露水平。</p><p>　　我們預測管理層發(fā)布現(xiàn)金流量的利好信號，來滿足投資者對現(xiàn)金流量信息的要求，并根據(jù)現(xiàn)金流量與利潤額之間的差額對盈余作部分調(diào)整，因而減少了盈余管理的自由度。我們的研究結果與這些預測是一致的。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流量預測管理的加強時期伴隨著營運現(xiàn)金流量的增加，即當分析師預測收入減少、當管理層明確地在新聞報道中說明收入會低于或高于

44、預期以及公司處于起步階段時。除此之外，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流量預測管理的減少時期伴隨著頻繁的的審計師變更。</p><p>　　研究表明，相比那些不對現(xiàn)金流量進行預測以及傾向于超越現(xiàn)有預期的公司，發(fā)布現(xiàn)金流量預測管理的公司有著較佳的現(xiàn)金流量信息。這一點同樣適用于不論收入是利差還是利好以及處于起步階段的公司，意味著管理層使用現(xiàn)金流量預測來減輕收入利差消息的負面影響，并增加收入利好消息的可信度，對年輕的公司來說則給人以成長性

45、較好的信號。</p><p>　　我們對管理層如何報道實際的現(xiàn)金流量信息進行了說明，證實了管理層在與收入有關的公告中對已經(jīng)發(fā)生的現(xiàn)金流量使用自由裁量權進行報道，并采用現(xiàn)金流量的替代定義（相對于公認會計準則中現(xiàn)金流量表里現(xiàn)金流量的定義來說）。具體地說，管理層公布的實際現(xiàn)金流量往往超過按照公認會計準則計算的現(xiàn)金流量。因此，從滿足或超過現(xiàn)金流量預測數(shù)的情況來看，管理層公布的實際現(xiàn)金流量多于按公認會計準則計算的現(xiàn)金流量,

46、從而產(chǎn)生顯著的正現(xiàn)金流預測誤差。這個發(fā)現(xiàn)顯示，實踐中管理層在備考盈利與現(xiàn)金流量的公布方面有著相似之處。</p><p>　　斯隆（1996）指出投資者存在高估利潤低估現(xiàn)金流的觀念，這就導致了錯誤定價。繼斯隆之后的文獻主要研究利潤的過高估計（例如，謝（2001）；托馬斯和張（2002））；柯林斯（2003）。然而，近期研究表明，僅關注對利潤的錯誤定價而忽視對現(xiàn)金流的錯誤估價對研究而言是不全面的（德賽（2004）；余

47、（2007）；巴羅內(nèi)（2008））。因此，在本文中我們研究信息披露質(zhì)量在準確評估利潤和現(xiàn)金流時的重要作用，并特別檢驗投資者從信息披露質(zhì)量高的企業(yè)對其未來收入從利潤和現(xiàn)金流兩方面獲得更好理解的情況下，是如何對股票定價的。</p><p>　　研究信息披露質(zhì)量與利潤和現(xiàn)金流被錯誤估價之間的關系很重要，因為它強調(diào)了信息披露質(zhì)量幫助投資者有效運用會計信息進行估價的作用，從而在信息披露質(zhì)量與市場效率之間建立了聯(lián)系。本文檢驗

48、了托馬斯（2000）的一個推測，即對利潤的錯誤定價可能源于較低的信息披露質(zhì)量。通過提高信息披露質(zhì)量可以減少市場異常，我們的結果補充了這一領域的文獻研究。此外，我們的研究對政策制定者衡量提高信息披露質(zhì)量的成本和收益給予了建議。</p><p>　　近期研究表明暫時的會計失真主要源于利潤的估計錯誤（理查德森，斯隆，索里曼（2006）。這些利潤估計錯誤可能是對未來經(jīng)濟收益的無意識錯誤及有意識管理操縱造成的（謝（2001

49、；理查德森，斯隆，索里曼（2006））。斯?。?996）認為投資者并不完全理解利潤，因為他們不知道利潤比現(xiàn)金流融入了更多的主觀成分。近期研究也表明投資者低估現(xiàn)金流，因而對現(xiàn)金流在未來經(jīng)濟中的收益也無法完全理解。（德賽（2004）；余（2007）；巴羅內(nèi)（2008））。</p><p>　　理論研究表明提高信息披露水平能夠降低股市中的信息不對稱，增強流動性，降低資金成本（金姆（1994））。然而，很少有文獻研究信息

50、披露在有效定價方面的作用。我們對信息披露的研究圍繞信息披露能夠使投資者更全面地理解未來收益中的利潤和現(xiàn)金流這一主題。我們推測信息披露質(zhì)量提高后，投資者能夠更好地理解管理層操縱利潤的行為，并更好地預測未來經(jīng)濟收益以及評估利潤的影響。更具體地說，相對于信息披露質(zhì)量低的企業(yè)，我們預計信息披露質(zhì)量高的企業(yè)其利潤的收益持續(xù)性較低，現(xiàn)金流的收益持續(xù)性則較高。</p><p>　　繼斯?。?996）的研究之后，我們使用米什金（

51、1983）理性預期框架來檢驗股價中包含的收益期望是否準確反映收益的組成部分（即利潤和現(xiàn)金流）間的差異。我們用全面的樣本首次證實了斯?。?996）提出的錯誤定價現(xiàn)象。即，投資者存在過高估計利潤的持續(xù)性，過低估計現(xiàn)金流的持續(xù)性。我們用兩個子樣本即高質(zhì)量披露公司和低質(zhì)量披露公司重復了米什金的測試。結果顯示市場對利潤和現(xiàn)金流的定價與所選樣本公司不同。我們特別發(fā)現(xiàn)利潤的過高定價和現(xiàn)金流的過低估計更多地發(fā)生在信息披露質(zhì)量低的公司。相反，在信息披露質(zhì)

52、量高的企業(yè)不存在對利潤和現(xiàn)金流的錯誤估價。這個結果表明當信息披露質(zhì)量高時，投資者對利潤和現(xiàn)金流信息的理解會更好。</p><p>　　參考以前的研究，在對預計會影響未來收益的變量進行控制后，我們使用橫截面回歸法來研究利潤和現(xiàn)金流是否與未來收益有關。與近期研究相一致，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當現(xiàn)金流和控制變量包括在模型中時，未來收益與利潤無關。然而，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)未來收益與現(xiàn)金流的錯誤估價有關。</p><p>

53、　　本文研究信息披露質(zhì)量和收益的構成部分（即利潤和現(xiàn)金流）之間的關系，我們的研究結果為對這一領域感興趣的政策制定者、專業(yè)學者和投資者提供了有用信息。我們特別闡釋了較高的信息披露質(zhì)量帶來的有效定價方面的潛在收益。對利潤和現(xiàn)金流的錯誤定價的決定因素進行研究，也符合當前學術界的研究方向。</p><p>　　出處：邁克爾·S·德雷克，詹姆斯·N·梅耶斯和琳達·A