外文翻譯---匯率制度透析

1、<p><b>　　吉林化工學(xué)院</b></p><p><b>　　外 文 翻 譯</b></p><p>　　中文題目 外文原文的題目的中文翻譯 </p><p>　　外文題目 外文原文的題目 </p><p>　　性 質(zhì): □畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)

2、 畢業(yè)論文</p><p>　　教 學(xué) 院 </p><p>　　專 業(yè) </p><p>　　班 級(jí) </p><p>　　學(xué)生姓名 </p><p>　　學(xué)

3、生學(xué)號(hào) </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師 </p><p>　　2012年4月27日 </p><p><b>　　匯率制度透析</b></p><p>　　作為一種經(jīng)濟(jì)政策，匯率制度的選擇被過分吹噓，比起認(rèn)真界定并建立產(chǎn)權(quán)法律體系，創(chuàng)造一個(gè)人們可以自

4、由利用和交易其資源的體制框架，這一選擇顯得容易得多，它還遠(yuǎn)不如避免政策掠奪、為分割財(cái)產(chǎn)而浪費(fèi)稀有資源的法律爭(zhēng)論，以及避免產(chǎn)生低效率和阻礙生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展的稅收政策和法規(guī)重要。</p><p>　　匯率制度的選擇問題貫穿于整個(gè)貨幣政策當(dāng)中。貨幣政策十分重要，它的作用不容小覷，正如弗里德曼（1968）三十多年前指出的那樣，縱觀美國(guó)與世界各國(guó)的貨幣政策的歷史，無(wú)論是政府行為形成的政治力量，還是在許多關(guān)鍵經(jīng)濟(jì)問題上的科學(xué)假設(shè)（

5、即使事實(shí)上許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家在政治領(lǐng)域研究時(shí)否認(rèn)這些不確定性的存在，并夸大自己的知識(shí)范圍），或許最好的選擇一種接近真實(shí)生活的匯率制度的辦法就是從一個(gè)廣闊的視角分析如何將損失降到最低。</p><p>　　過去的數(shù)十年見證了匯率制度在世界各個(gè)國(guó)家的巨大變革：自布雷頓森林體系瓦解之后，出現(xiàn)了一段時(shí)間純粹的浮動(dòng)和政府控制的浮動(dòng)，繼而是爬行盯?。粡馁H值，否定貶值，到更貶值；從浮動(dòng)匯率到貨幣局，以及歐洲共同貨幣的涌現(xiàn)。匯率的頻繁

6、變動(dòng)和差異與經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯模型中先進(jìn)知識(shí)突破的緩慢出現(xiàn)和影響匯率體制選擇證據(jù)積累的速度形成對(duì)比。</p><p><b>　　傳統(tǒng)模式</b></p><p>　　貨幣相對(duì)需求量與實(shí)際需求量的沖突，國(guó)家之間在沖突中的相互關(guān)系，以及勞動(dòng)力的流動(dòng)，這些因素在20世紀(jì)60年代凱恩斯（蒙代爾—弗萊明）模型中起至關(guān)重要的作用，而這一模型在許多重要的經(jīng)濟(jì)期刊中發(fā)表的理論里仍發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用

7、。</p><p>　　受主導(dǎo)貨幣需求變動(dòng)的影響，固定匯率制度被認(rèn)為優(yōu)于浮動(dòng)匯率制度，因?yàn)樨泿殴┙o可自動(dòng)地對(duì)應(yīng)貨幣需求進(jìn)行調(diào)整，而不受利率變動(dòng)、價(jià)格水平變化、以及當(dāng)名義價(jià)格水平反映較慢而導(dǎo)致的各種短期停滯的影響。同樣，當(dāng)主導(dǎo)貨幣變動(dòng)是真實(shí)的時(shí)候，浮動(dòng)匯率制度優(yōu)于固定匯率制度，匯率會(huì)自動(dòng)調(diào)整——正如弗里德曼“日光節(jié)約時(shí)間”的說法——伴隨真正的變動(dòng)，而不規(guī)定價(jià)格水平的變化和因名義價(jià)格水平反映緩慢而導(dǎo)致的短期中斷。后者

8、在勞動(dòng)力流動(dòng)匱乏時(shí)發(fā)揮重要作用——因?yàn)橛凶銐虻牧鲃?dòng)，工人才得以持續(xù)移動(dòng)。</p><p>　　當(dāng)仔細(xì)分析，可發(fā)現(xiàn)這些模型暗含的意思是微妙的，例如，不同性質(zhì)的匯率制度，可影響一個(gè)企業(yè)的最優(yōu)定價(jià)；反過來(lái)，這也會(huì)影響生產(chǎn)在最優(yōu)狀態(tài)和正常水平時(shí)的變化。這些問題會(huì)由于固定匯率制度或浮動(dòng)匯率制度的效益和成本而對(duì)這些模型的含義產(chǎn)生影響。</p><p>　　不幸的是，支持這些模型的預(yù)言的證據(jù)只較核冷聚變

9、的證據(jù)好一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)。因此，將這個(gè)問題作為應(yīng)包含在政治決定中的重大因素來(lái)認(rèn)真對(duì)待很難。</p><p>　　而且，這些得出關(guān)于匯率政策結(jié)論的邏輯相當(dāng)膚淺。例如，聯(lián)邦也深知在美國(guó)發(fā)生貨幣需求的沖擊 （事實(shí)上，許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，這些沖擊已經(jīng)變得很重要，因?yàn)樨泿判枨蠛瘮?shù)的實(shí)證正被打破，這些對(duì)貨幣的統(tǒng)計(jì)對(duì)貨幣政策幾乎無(wú)用）。然而，美國(guó)在20世紀(jì)90年代的短期穩(wěn)定中并沒有遇到重大困難。原因何在？因?yàn)槎唐谡邔?shí)施的重點(diǎn)對(duì)象是名義利

10、率，而這就像固定匯率制度，允許聯(lián)邦提供一種貨幣供給對(duì)貨幣需求自動(dòng)做出反應(yīng)的“彈性貨幣”。焦點(diǎn)不在于這種方法運(yùn)行的是否完美，或者是它是否合乎需要，關(guān)鍵是存在一種“提出不重要模式結(jié)論”的政策選擇，即在不同的條件下適用不同的匯率制度。如果不考慮各種選擇并對(duì)這些選擇做一個(gè)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的分析，即使證據(jù)支持其積極的預(yù)言，這些模型的政策結(jié)論將接近無(wú)用。</p><p><b>　　交易成本問題</b></p

11、><p>　　浮動(dòng)匯率制度帶來(lái)交易成本的貨幣轉(zhuǎn)換及相關(guān)信息——處理成本時(shí)應(yīng)如何將價(jià)格從不熟悉的貨幣轉(zhuǎn)換到人們可以直觀的理解并顯現(xiàn)在腦海中的貨幣。然而，無(wú)論與因?yàn)槠渌蚨鸬臐撛诔杀竞托б娴捏w制相比還是與加上銷售稅的成本或確定最優(yōu)價(jià)格的成本相比，這些成本顯得并不那么龐大。對(duì)于日常的研究者，由于不重要任務(wù)的分解和智能計(jì)算機(jī)的出現(xiàn)，這些成本已經(jīng)降低，伴隨著新技術(shù)的出現(xiàn)和更多信息的掌握，成本將進(jìn)一步下降。</p&g

12、t;<p>　　弗里德曼的日光節(jié)約時(shí)間的說法</p><p>　　弗里德曼的日光節(jié)約時(shí)間的說法，涉及較多的成本和利益。正如設(shè)置時(shí)間比設(shè)置每個(gè)日常活動(dòng)更容易。隨著協(xié)調(diào)體制的瓦解，匯率相對(duì)于潛在條件變動(dòng)的反映比對(duì)整體指導(dǎo)價(jià)格水平反應(yīng)更容易。</p><p>　　弗里德曼的主要論點(diǎn)是：我們不知道市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)是否正確，即匯率的調(diào)整是否適應(yīng)新的均衡。誠(chéng)實(shí)的回答是，“誰(shuí)知道？” 經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們也

13、未得到有大量實(shí)證支持的匯率模型。但是匯率完全沒有變好的可能么？再一次是，沒有人真正知道。而且，目前證據(jù)不足以提供一個(gè)良好的答案。</p><p>　　無(wú)論是什么答案，例如勞動(dòng)力流動(dòng)、資本流動(dòng)、金融流動(dòng)，如果缺少法律法規(guī)就會(huì)阻礙獲得可觀利益的靈活性（如法律本身難以幫助失業(yè)的人或控制錄用新工人成本的提高）。整體靈活性越大，匯率體制對(duì)人們福利的巨大影響就會(huì)越少，除非該體制導(dǎo)致重大危機(jī)。</p><p

14、><b>　　政治體制和經(jīng)濟(jì)問題</b></p><p>　　自20世紀(jì)中葉，嚴(yán)肅討論的焦點(diǎn)已經(jīng)從匯率制度的問題轉(zhuǎn)向于信用貨幣政策、決策機(jī)制替代承諾、金融體系的穩(wěn)定和實(shí)力與機(jī)制設(shè)置問題，即機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)和政治經(jīng)濟(jì)問題。</p><p>　　有些是老問題，靈活的匯率體系為一個(gè)民族謀求自己的發(fā)展，提供貨幣政策選擇，這種政策選擇有利于否取決于國(guó)內(nèi)公共機(jī)構(gòu)、政治力量如何運(yùn)行。

15、固定匯率制度的相關(guān)好處是制約了貨幣政策。當(dāng)一個(gè)民族有政治意志強(qiáng)加在他們身上，也有其他選擇，即可以搞浮動(dòng)匯率制度（如憲法規(guī)則、政策變革等等）。固定匯率制度可提供一個(gè)承諾以約束現(xiàn)在，不過，有許多方法可采用，當(dāng)然沒有什么理由認(rèn)為，一個(gè)盯住匯率比其他如獨(dú)立的中央銀行、貨幣局、支付系統(tǒng)、中央銀行經(jīng)濟(jì)獎(jiǎng)懲結(jié)果更有公信力，其中有些可能比頂住匯率需要更大的可信度。</p><p>　　浮動(dòng)匯率的多變性、不確定性和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)</p

16、><p>　　靈活的匯率常常被指控制造多變性，不確定性和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但這些指控來(lái)自何方？當(dāng)匯率可自由浮動(dòng)、政策條件不穩(wěn)定時(shí)，匯率就有可能產(chǎn)生不穩(wěn)定和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，如果風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者為這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)負(fù)責(zé)，那么頂住匯率政策是把這些人趕出經(jīng)濟(jì)市場(chǎng)還是僅僅分散到不同方向？也就是固定匯率不能從投機(jī)泡沫中提供絕對(duì)真實(shí)。相反，這些泡沫的來(lái)源可能有其他渠道。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，在浮動(dòng)匯率制度下，每天的匯率不同，但國(guó)際金融市場(chǎng)

17、發(fā)展的機(jī)遇使公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)沖這些變化?？上У氖?，在盯住匯率制度下，通常不會(huì)提供套期保值，也不會(huì)提供風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投機(jī)聯(lián)系匯率制度下的貨幣貶值，他們也沒有對(duì)政府政策變動(dòng)做出相關(guān)反應(yīng)（如管制法規(guī)、國(guó)際商品、服務(wù)和金融資產(chǎn)）來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)假設(shè)的危機(jī)。所以，浮動(dòng)匯率制度比盯住匯率制度的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要小一些。</p><p><b>　　匯率失調(diào)問題</b></p><p>　　經(jīng)歷近幾十年的浮動(dòng)匯率，由

18、于炒家的行動(dòng)導(dǎo)致我們更關(guān)注浮動(dòng)匯率是否成了“完結(jié)”的代名詞。當(dāng)然，研究的重點(diǎn)是這些失調(diào)在某種意義是否或多或少比盯住匯率制度下更嚴(yán)重。日光節(jié)約時(shí)間理論是：盯住匯率對(duì)失調(diào)的經(jīng)濟(jì)反應(yīng)必須包括名義價(jià)格的變動(dòng)。</p><p><b>　　浮動(dòng)下的貨幣競(jìng)爭(zhēng)</b></p><p>　　浮動(dòng)匯率制度為貨幣競(jìng)爭(zhēng)提供機(jī)會(huì)。固定匯率制度在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中幾乎不起作用，因?yàn)楣┙o者（中央銀行）固定了

19、它們的相關(guān)價(jià)格。</p><p>　　浮動(dòng)匯率制度也鼓勵(lì)國(guó)際合作的貨幣政策，雖然國(guó)際合作聽起來(lái)更合理，其暗含的卻在各國(guó)政府的特殊利益方面有可能出現(xiàn)利益勾結(jié)（弗里德曼曾半認(rèn)真地說，政府官員喜歡固定匯率，因?yàn)檫@種體制產(chǎn)生的持續(xù)的危機(jī)和問題提供了參加國(guó)際性會(huì)議旅行的機(jī)會(huì)）。</p><p><b>　　政治勢(shì)力</b></p><p>　　什么樣的政

20、治勢(shì)力影響以前的匯率制度選擇？從制度的改變或任何一種體制的運(yùn)行來(lái)看，誰(shuí)是贏家？誰(shuí)是輸家？（如果你不知道，那么你大概不會(huì)是贏家）。是倡導(dǎo)仁慈一些的“共同富?！保€是倡導(dǎo)注重特殊利益，匯率體制的討論常常忽視這些，而注重所謂“典型個(gè)體”的成本和效益，而政府政策很少改變，尤其是貨幣和金融政策方面，不會(huì)涉及隱藏在表面下的特殊利益。</p><p>　　貨幣離不開央行或貨幣局。共同貨幣要有所改變，如歐元，需要對(duì)貨幣政策和影響

21、金融市場(chǎng)的調(diào)控和監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)、稅收政策、監(jiān)管政策進(jìn)行改變。伴隨著貨幣制度的改變，政府支出也有可能發(fā)生變化，這些變革后的結(jié)果意義重大，并可能輕易的控制其它成本與效益，這歸因于共同貨幣和多種貨幣之間的差異。</p><p>　　相對(duì)與有獨(dú)立銀行的國(guó)家的盯住匯率制度，這個(gè)問題概括起來(lái)超出共同貨幣體系的范圍，盯住匯率政策引出的問題導(dǎo)致扮演多種角色的“國(guó)際貨幣體系”制度的形成（如國(guó)際貨幣基金）。當(dāng)然這些變革可能賺取更多的利益而

22、不是提高成本。但是當(dāng)政治勢(shì)力開始插手時(shí)，明智的人們會(huì)在政府來(lái)人之前做出相應(yīng)的反應(yīng)。</p><p><b>　　未來(lái)</b></p><p>　　一種對(duì)未來(lái)的看法稱，美元對(duì)歐元的匯率會(huì)成為關(guān)鍵匯率，為了穩(wěn)定此匯率，會(huì)帶來(lái)一定壓力，而日本希望保持日元與這兩種貨幣保持密切聯(lián)系。蒙代爾認(rèn)為：“到2010年，我們將回到這樣的世界——有更穩(wěn)定的匯率，且國(guó)際貨幣基金組織將恢復(fù)原來(lái)

23、的功能?！?lt;/p><p>　　另一種看法是，不是簡(jiǎn)單的以歐洲為中心（在未來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)世界中，亞洲國(guó)家，包括日本在內(nèi)，作用會(huì)不斷增加）。雖然一些政治勢(shì)力在美元與歐元間尋求穩(wěn)定的匯率，但由于不同國(guó)家的政策不協(xié)調(diào)，會(huì)產(chǎn)生種種政治壓力。與此同時(shí)，科技的發(fā)展將導(dǎo)致資金和先進(jìn)支付系統(tǒng)的增加，使問題變得越來(lái)越簡(jiǎn)單。最終，人們可以選擇聘請(qǐng)記賬單位和交換中介為自己交易，他們甚至采用單位多賬戶、多種匯票的方式。因此，人們需要記賬單位間競(jìng)

24、爭(zhēng)，使他們可以自由選擇一個(gè)最適合自己需要的。</p><p>　　采用固定匯率或共同貨幣并不一定有助于創(chuàng)造效益，因?yàn)槿藗兛梢宰杂傻倪x擇記賬單位或交換中介。相反，民營(yíng)企業(yè)進(jìn)入這個(gè)市場(chǎng)可能存在的困難是關(guān)于“公益”的稅收問題，類似于記賬單位，而且這些單位可能涉及到市場(chǎng)決定的相關(guān)價(jià)格。五十年以后，在普通人民的生活中，由政府提供資金是不可能扮演重要角色的，除非政府大力打擊私營(yíng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致相對(duì)價(jià)格的變動(dòng)。<

25、/p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　貨幣政策的依據(jù)何在？經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家缺乏人們關(guān)心的匯率制度如何影響經(jīng)濟(jì)變量的有力證據(jù)，如長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)，避免經(jīng)濟(jì)周期混亂等等。他們還缺乏如何選擇影響政治勢(shì)力的體系的理論和證據(jù)，包括，對(duì)金融政策、調(diào)控政策、監(jiān)督和金融機(jī)構(gòu)的救援。</p><p>　　然而，嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果與匯率制度的選擇的聯(lián)系是明顯的。來(lái)自

26、于盯住匯率制度的假設(shè)危機(jī)使成本大大增加；盡管各個(gè)國(guó)家的基本政策不同，但保持匯率固定也會(huì)產(chǎn)生失調(diào)現(xiàn)象。通過加強(qiáng)國(guó)際貿(mào)易和金融市場(chǎng)的控制促使盯住匯率制度瓦解。這些措施的成本大大超過了與任何浮動(dòng)匯率制度有關(guān)的任何估計(jì)成本。這些因素為任何一個(gè)浮動(dòng)匯率和共同貨幣政策提供了強(qiáng)有力的支持。</p><p>　　當(dāng)一個(gè)國(guó)家的銀行體制脆弱的時(shí)候，這些成本會(huì)翻倍，導(dǎo)致銀行危機(jī)和匯率危機(jī)相互交織，一方影響另一方，這些因素使一個(gè)國(guó)家金融

27、體系的是否穩(wěn)定成為選擇匯率制度的關(guān)鍵因素，而健全的銀行體系是固定匯率制度的必要前提。</p><p>　　基于匯率制度選擇問題上非正規(guī)的成本——效益分析，我的結(jié)論是，浮動(dòng)匯率制度明顯優(yōu)于固定匯率制度，至少在缺乏共同貨幣的時(shí)候是這樣。相對(duì)于多種貨幣間的浮動(dòng)匯率制，共同貨幣是否具有相對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)，取決于上述問題的答案。</p><p>　　資料來(lái)源：http://www.cato.org/pubs/

28、journal/cj20n1/cj20n1-14.pdf</p><p>　?。ㄗⅲ河⑽囊摹Ｈ绻蔷W(wǎng)上的，直接打印原網(wǎng)頁(yè)；如果是書或期刊等紙介印刷品上的，復(fù)印翻譯部分。）</p><p><b>　　范例：</b></p><p>　　EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS IN PERSPECTIVE</p><p

29、>　　Alan C. Stockman</p><p>　　As an economic policy, the choice of an exchange rate regime has been oversold. That choice pales in comparison with establishing a legal system that carefully defines propert

30、y rights and creates an institutional framework in which people can freely utilize and trade</p><p>　　their resources. It also is far less important than avoiding the plunder of political and legal battles t

31、hat waste scarce resources to fight over the division of wealth, or avoiding taxes and regulations that create static inefficiencies and choke the forces of creativity and progress.</p><p>　　The issue of cho

32、osing an exchange rate system is merely a subissue in the broader question of overall monetary policy. And while monetary policy is clearly important, its role can be easily overstated, as Milton Friedman (1968) pointed

33、out more than three decades ago.</p><p>　　Given the history of monetary policy in the United States and around the world, including the political forces that inevitably shape the actions of governments, not

34、to mention scientific uncertainty over many key economic questions (and regardless of the fact that many economists operating in the policy realm deny the existence of this uncertainty and arrogantly exaggerate the exten

35、t of their knowledge), probably the best way to approach the real-life policy of choosing an exchange rate regime i</p><p>　　The past few decades have witnessed tremendous turmoil in the exchange rate practi

36、ces of the nations of the world: from the Bretton Woods system to its inevitable collapse, through a period of floating clean and dirty, through pegs, devaluations, denials of devaluations, and more devaluations, through

37、 floating rates, currency boards, and the emergence of a common currency over much of Europe. The massive swings and differences in exchange rate policies contrast with the slow emergence of greater</p><p>　

38、　Not that this increase in knowledge has created a consensus on policy—we are simply not that far along yet, and there are many places to slip and stumble between the knowledge we have to its policy applications, as I sh

39、all discuss—but a thoughtful policy analyst cannot afford to ignore this progress or to cast a less-than-critical eye on the cacophony of claims made about exchange rates and exchange rate systems by politicians, bureauc

40、rats, commentators, and, yes, academics.</p><p>　　Traditional Models </p><p>　　Factors such as the relative sizes of money demand shocks versus real shocks, the correlations among shocks in var

41、ious countries, and the mobility of labor, which played such key roles in the Keynesian (Mundell-Fleming) models of the 1960s continue to play key roles in many theoretical models appearing in major economic journals.<

42、;/p><p>　　With dominant money demand shocks, a fixed exchange rate system is supposed to be better than a flexible system, because the money supply automatically adjusts to changes in money demand, without requ

43、iring interest rate changes or price level changes, and the various short-run disruptions that can result when nominal price levels respond sluggishly. Similarly, a floating exchange rate system is supposed to be better

44、than a fixed rate system when the dominant shocks are real, because under a floa</p><p>　　When analyzed carefully, one finds that the implications of these models can be subtle. For example, differing proper

45、ties of pegged rate and floating rate systems affect optimal price-setting by firms; in turn, this affects the responses of production to changes in underlying conditions as well as the level of production in “normal” ti

46、mes. And these issues affect the models’ implications for the benefits and costs of fixed or floating exchange rates.</p><p>　　Unfortunately, the evidence supporting the predictions of these models is only s

47、lightly better than the evidence for cold nuclear fusion. Consequently, it is hard to take seriously these issues as the major factors that should be involved in a policy decision.</p><p>　　Moreover, the log

48、ic that reaches these conclusions about exchange rate policies is rather shallow. For example, the Fed is well aware that money demand shocks occur in the United States. (In fact, many economists argue that those shocks

49、have become so important, with empirical money demand functions breaking down, that statistics on monetary aggregates have become nearly useless for monetary policy.) Yet the Fed has not encountered major difficulties in

50、 shortrun stabilization in the 1990s. Why n</p><p>　　The Issue of Transaction Costs </p><p>　　Floating exchange rate systems entail transactions costs of changing currencies, and associated info

51、rmation-processing costs of figuring out how to translate prices from an unfamiliar currency into something that one can intuitively understand and place in perspective.</p><p>　　However, these costs do not

52、appear to be particularly large in comparison either with the potential costs and benefits of the systems for other reasons (see below), or in comparison to the costs of adding sales taxes (in the United States) or deter

53、mining the relative merits of the 32-oz size at $4.29 or the 20-oz size at $2.98. Moreover, these costs have been falling over time since the advent of calculators made mental multiplication and division less-important t

54、asks for everyday travelers, and</p><p>　　Friedman’s Daylight-Saving-Time Argument </p><p>　　Friedman’s daylight-saving-time argument is likely to involve larger costs and benefits. Just as it

55、 is easier to reset clocks than to reset the times of every daily activity, it is easier for the exchange rate to respond to changes in underlying conditions than for the overall nominal price level to respond, with all

56、the accompanying real disruptions.</p><p>　　The main objection to Friedman’s argument is that we do not know if the market response will “get it right”—will the exchange rate adjust to the new equilibrium le

57、vel? The honest answer, of course, is “Who knows?” Economists don’t yet have a model of exchange rates with much empirical support. But is no change at all in the exchange rate likely to be better? Again, no one really k

58、nows, and current evidence is vastly insufficient to provide a good answer.</p><p>　　Whatever that answer, flexibility, such as labor mobility, capital mobility, financial mobility, absence of laws and regul

59、ations that hinder flexibility (such as laws making it difficult to fire people, or raising the costs of hiring new workers) has considerable benefits. The greater overall flexibility, the less likely any exchange rate s

60、ystem will have a major effect on human welfare, unless that system leads to a major crisis.</p><p>　　Institutional and Political Economy Issues </p><p>　　Since the middle of the 20th century,

61、the focus of serious discussion on exchange rate systems has shifted from the issues outlined thus far to questions about credibility of monetary (and other) policies, alternative commitment mechanisms for policymakers,

62、the stability and strength of financial systems, and mechanism-design issues—that is, the design of institutions and political-economy issues.</p><p>　　Some of the issues are old. Flexible exchange rates pro

63、vide the option for a nation to pursue its own monetary policies. Whether that option is a benefit or curse depends on factors such as how political forces operate within the nation’s institutions to affect its policies.

64、 The corresponding benefit of a fixed exchange rate system is that it constrains monetary policy. Of course, if a nation wants constraints—and has the political will to impose them on itself—it has other options availabl

65、e tha</p><p>　　Do Floating Exchange Rates Cause Variability, Uncertainty, and Risks?</p><p>　　Flexible exchange rates are often accused of creating variability, uncertainty, and risk. But from w

66、here do these alleged evils really arise? Unstable underlying conditions or policies may create variability and risks that appear in exchange rate movements when the exchange rate is free to move, but are channeled elsew

67、here when they are fixed. If unstable speculators are responsible for these risks, does a policy of pegging the exchange rate remove these speculators from the economy, or merely t</p><p>　　Of course, exchan

68、ge rates do vary daily under a floating rate system.</p><p>　　But international financial markets have developed to allow firms the opportunity to hedge risks associated with these changes. The same opportun

69、ities, unfortunately, are not usually available for hedging the risks of speculative attacks and devaluations under pegged exchange rate systems. Nor are they available for hedging the risks associated with various gover

70、nment policy responses (such as regulations and controls on international trade in goods, services, and financial assets) to threats of</p><p>　　The Issue of Misalignment </p><p>　　Experiences w

71、ith floating exchange rates in recent decades have led to the concern that floating exchange rates often become “misaligned” because of speculators’ actions. Of course, the important issue for research is whether these m

72、isalignments are in some sense more or less severe than the misalignments that can occur under pegged exchange rates. The daylight-saving-time argument applies here: When the exchange rate is pegged, economic responses t

73、o a misalignment must involve changes in many n</p><p>　　Currency Competition under Floating </p><p>　　A system of floating exchange rates provides the opportunity for competition among monies.

74、 A fixed rate system provides fewer roles for competition, because suppliers (central banks) fix the relative prices of their products.</p><p>　　Similarly, a system of fixed exchange rates also encourages in

75、ternational cooperation in monetary policies. While international cooperation may sound healthy, its real meaning is more likely to be collusion among governments for the benefit of special interests.</p><p>

76、;　　(Milton Friedman’s once stated, half-seriously, that government officials liked pegged exchange rates because the ongoing crises and problems of that system provided opportunities to travel to lavish international mee

77、tings.)</p><p>　　Political Forces </p><p>　　What political forces have affected past choices of exchange rate systems? Who are the winners and who are the losers from changes in the system, or

78、the continued operation of either system? (A rule of thumb: if you don’t know, then you’re probably not one of the big winners.) Are the main forces benevolent advocates of some “common good,” or more subtle proponents o

79、f special interests? Discussion of exchange rate systems has tended to ignore these issues, and focused mainly on costs and benefit</p><p>　　Currencies are naturally tied to central banks (or currency boards

80、).</p><p>　　A change to a common currency, such as the Euro, requires a change in institutions for monetary policy. And other institutional changes that affect regulation and oversight of financial markets a

81、nd institutions, tax policies, regulatory policies, and government spending are likely to accompany that change in monetary institutions. The consequences of these institutional changes may be far-reaching, and might eas

82、ily dominate other costs and benefits attributable to the difference between a common</p><p>　　This issue generalizes beyond a system of common currencies, to a system of pegged exchange rates among nations

83、with separate central banks. Policies of pegging exchange rates can create problems that lead to formation and involvement of institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund) that play various roles in “managing” t

84、he “international monetary system.” Those changes in institutions involve changes in political pressures and other kinds of policies. Of course, these institutional cha</p><p>　　The Future </p><p&

85、gt;　　One view of the future asserts that the dollar-Euro exchange rate will become the key exchange rate, leading to pressure to stabilize it, and that Japan will want to keep the value of the Yen closely linked to both

86、those currencies. Robert Mundell (1999: 444) believes that “by 2010 we will be back to a world where we get more fixed exchange rates, and the International Monetary Fund will be dragged back to its original function.”&l

87、t;/p><p>　　An alternative view is not simply less Euro-centric (noting the increased role of Asian nations in addition to Japan in the future world economy), but also less government-centric. While some politic

88、al forces will seek stabilization of the exchange rate between the dollar and the Euro, other sorts of political pressures will emerge for various national policies that are inconsistent with such stabilization. Meanwhil

89、e, technological developments will result in increased sophistication of financia</p><p>　　Conclusion </p><p>　　Where does this leave current policy? Economists lack strong evidence on how exch

90、ange rate systems affect the economic variables that people care about, such as long-run growth, avoidance of dislocations from business cycles, and so on. They also lack theory and evidence on how the choice of system a

91、ffects the political forces that operate on monetary policies of central banks, and on their policies toward regulation, oversight, and bailouts of financial institutions.</p><p>　　However, the worst economi

92、c outcomes associated with the choice of an exchange rate system are clear. Devastating costs arise from speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates; from the misalignments that arise when countries keep rates fixed des

93、pite differences in fundamental policies, by imposing controls on international trade and financial markets, and ultimately allow the peg to break down. The costs of the episodes vastly exceed any estimates of any other

94、costs associated with either excha</p><p>　　These costs are multiplied when a country’s banking system is fragile (as in many recent and unfortunate episodes), so that banking crises and exchange rate crises

95、 become intertwined, each contributing to the other. These factors make the stability of a country’s financial system a key factor in the choice of an exchange rate system, with a sound banking system almost a necessary

96、prerequisite for fixed exchange rates.</p><p>　　My conclusion from informal cost-benefit analysis of alternative exchange rate systems is that floating exchange rates have a strong advantage over fixed excha

97、nge rates, at least in the absence of common currencies. The relative merits of a common currency versus floating exchange rates between multiple currencies hinge on answers to questions posed above. My prediction is tha

98、t technological change will reduce the importance of a definitive answer sometime before economists can provide one.</p><p>　　References</p><p>　　Dorn, J.A. (ed.) (1997) The Future of Money in t

99、he Information Age. Washington,</p><p>　　D.C.: Cato Institute.</p><p>　　Friedman, M. (1953) “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates.” In Essays in</p><p>　　Positive Economics, 157–203