外文翻譯--關(guān)于美國(guó)建筑業(yè)收購(gòu)兼并后的經(jīng)營(yíng)表現(xiàn)的假設(shè)（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1900單詞，1.1萬(wàn)英文字符,3280漢字</p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： Post-operating performance of construction mergers and acquisition of the </p><p>　　United States of America Hy

2、potheses </p><p>　　出 處： Net Economy, 2011, 33(3):266-277. </p><p>　　作 者： Jongsoo Choi and Donald Harmatuck </p>

3、<p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　Post-operating performance of construction mergers and acquisition of the United States of America Hypotheses</p><p>　　Jongsoo Choi and Donald Harma

4、tuck</p><p>　　I. Hypothesis</p><p>　　Hypothesis I: do mergers and acquisitions generate synergistic gains?</p><p>　　The empirical research findings tend to support no synergistic ga

5、ins from M&A activities. For example, Kusewitt (1985) argued that the financial performance of an acquirer would suffer in the long run if the price paid for acquisitions was more than they were worth, even taking in

6、to account any synergistic benefits. Similarly, Sirower (1997) rigorously examined the premium paid on M&A transactions and showed that synergy could not be realized if one considers the amount of premium paid. Also,

7、 He</p><p>　　Theoretically, there may exist a variety of sources of synergy gains, as noted in an earlier section. Most construction firms that have engaged in M&A activities expected synergistic gains w

8、hen implementing M&A transactions. For example, many construction firms have engaged in multiple M&A transactions. If firms had experienced loss in the earlier transactions, they would not jump into the game agai

9、n. The implication is that there may be a sort of synergy that is realized through M&A transaction</p><p>　　Hypothesis I. By engaging in M&A transactions, construction firms may realize a kind of syn

10、ergistic gain, and this would be an improved operating performance of the firm. </p><p>　　Hypothesis II: management welfare versus shareholder wealth maximization </p><p>　　Theoretically, there

11、are two conflicting motivations regarding M&A transactions: the shareholder wealth maximization and the managerial welfare hypotheses. The managerial welfare hypothesis states that managers just want to maximize firm

12、 size and thus build an empire. For example, “Penrose (1959) and Williamson (1964) argued that the significantly positive relationship between organization size and executive compensation provides top managers with an in

13、centive for growth even when there is no ex</p><p>　　Post-operating performance can serve as an indicator in relation to this issue. Suppose that a firm decided to implement M&A transactions that usually

14、 increase the size of a firm. Further, link the change of firm size with the actual operating performance, which is frequently not under the control of the management. Then the decision may be interpreted in two ways fro

15、m a managerial standpoint. The first one is the shareholder wealth maximization argument, which states that if a management decisi</p><p>　　The firm size can be represented by various indices such as turnove

16、r, number of employees, total assets, profits, and market capitalization (Weston and Mansinghka 1971; Kreitl et al. 2002). There are also other arguments regarding this issue. For example, Marris (1963) and Fowler and Sc

17、hmidt (1988) postulate that managers engage in acquisition activity to increase growth in sales or assets, control a large empire, or experience compensatory gains. Fowler and Schmidt further argue that if firms p</p&

18、gt;<p>　　By summing up the previous arguments and empirical research findings, the management wealth maximization theory could be tested by aligning and comparing the operating performance and the size changes of

19、a firm. Specifically, the change of firm size, measured as sales volume or employment, and post-operating performance will be compared to test the management wealth maximization hypothesis. Hence, if there is a significa

20、nt increase in sales volumes or employment level without improved operating </p><p>　　Hypothesis II. Managements of public firms tend to increase firm size to increase their own wealth rather than improve fi

21、rm performance. </p><p>　　Hypothesis III: the consistency between short-term-based stock market return and long-term-based operating performance</p><p>　　According to Franks et al. (1977), in an

22、 efficient capital market, stock (or share) prices fully and instantaneously reflect all new information, and thus the value of expected benefits from merging would be reflected in share prices when the merger is first a

23、nticipated. It follows that, if the stock market is strongly efficient, the market should effectively forecast the post-operating performance at the time of an M&A transaction. Therefore, one can test the market effi

24、ciency by aligning the e</p><p>　　Hypothesis III. If the equity market is efficient, the expost-operating performance should be reflected in the exante expectations at the time a firm is implementing an M&am

25、p;A transaction. </p><p>　　II. Methodology: operating cash flow return and adjustment </p><p>　　This section describes a widely debated issue associated with accounting measures of firm performa

26、nce and defines the performance measure employed in this study. In assessing the performance of firms, different performance measures have been favored depending on the field of study. For example, event study has been a

27、 dominant analysis methodology in the finance research field. However, the argument of strategic management researchers is that, even though event studies are statistically rigorous,</p><p>　　There are numer

28、ous definitions of organizational performance, but there is relatively little agreement about which definitions are best (Barney 2002). Most early research in strategy and strategic management focused on evaluating the i

29、mpact of strategy on the accounting performance of a firm and heavily relied on ratio analysis; for example, “return on sales is a commonly used measure of financial performance in strategy research” (Powell 1996, p. 329

30、), whereas it is possible to integrate financ</p><p>　　Accounting returns and associated problems</p><p>　　Although accounting-based returns have been widely used in assessing firm performance,

31、many researchers point out the problems or biases present in accounting-return calculation. For example, as Barney (2002) asserts, bias may be present if simple accounting approaches are used to measure the performance o

32、f a firm because longer term, multiple year investments in a firm are usually treated, for accounting purposes, simply as costs in those years where they do not generate revenues that exceed co</p><p>　　A wi

33、dely used alternative measure of business performance, return on investment (ROI), has also been extensively criticized because “it does not properly relate the stream of profits to the investment that it produced” (Jaco

34、bson 1987, p.470). Thus, it is the general belief that ROI is not a true indicator of economic rate of return. The underlying rationale is that the income (the numerator in the ROI formula) is a consequence of investment

35、 decisions made in the past, but the assets (the denomin</p><p>　　Operating cash flow returns </p><p>　　Many scholars in the management research field support the use of cash flow returns for as

36、sessing firm performance because “it represents the actual economic benefits generated by the assets” (Healy et al. 1992, p. 139). Also, it is a measure of operating synergies because it reflects the true economic impact

37、 of the acquisition (Anand and Singh 1997). In addition, using the cash flow performance has advantages compared with the accounting return on book assets because it excludes the effect of d</p><p>　　Followi

38、ng Desai and Jain (1999) and Megginson et al. (2000), the OCF return measure was employed in the present study as a firm-performance index computed as the year-end operating cash flow of a firm (COMPUSTAT® data item

39、 13) divided by the year-end total assets of the firm (COMPUSTAT® data item 6). The OCF return is defined as follows: </p><p>　　The operating performances were then averaged over the 3 years both pr

40、ior to and after M&A transactions to minimize the bias that may arise when a single-year performance is used. The theoretical rationale on this procedure is that the acquiring business can be regarded as an investmen

41、t of the acquiring firm and its impact may spread over a long time horizon after the investment. Thus, measuring the performance of multiple years overcomes the bias of a short-term snapshot measure of operating pe</p

42、><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　關(guān)于美國(guó)建筑業(yè)收購(gòu)兼并后的經(jīng)營(yíng)表現(xiàn)的假設(shè)</p><p>　　Jongsoo Choi and Donald Harmatuck</p><p><b>　　一、假設(shè)</b></p><p>　　（一）假設(shè)一：并購(gòu)是

43、否產(chǎn)生協(xié)同收益</p><p>　　實(shí)證研究結(jié)果傾向于支持并購(gòu)活動(dòng)無(wú)協(xié)同收益產(chǎn)生。例如，Kusewitt（1985）認(rèn)為，如果進(jìn)行收購(gòu)的支付價(jià)格大于其本身價(jià)值，甚至沒有任何協(xié)同收益，并購(gòu)方的財(cái)政業(yè)績(jī)將遭受長(zhǎng)期威脅。類似的，Sirower（1997）嚴(yán)格審查了并購(gòu)交易支付的最低保費(fèi)，并且表示，如果考慮了保費(fèi)支付的總額，協(xié)同效應(yīng)就無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)。另外，Hensey（2000，pp.36-37）指出在并購(gòu)交易中的協(xié)同收益：“

44、當(dāng)一家企業(yè)尋找收購(gòu)，期望收購(gòu)活動(dòng)能帶來(lái)協(xié)同作用和收益，那么企業(yè)便無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)該愿望，并且，在同一公司‘屋檐’下，總是會(huì)帶來(lái)新的可預(yù)見的沖突”。</p><p>　　理論上說(shuō)，可能存在大量的協(xié)同收益的來(lái)源，就像前面部分提到的。多數(shù)進(jìn)入并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的建筑公司期待在實(shí)施并購(gòu)交易時(shí)，獲得協(xié)同收益。例如，很多建筑企業(yè)都參與了多個(gè)并購(gòu)交易。如果企業(yè)在早期遭受利益損失，企業(yè)將不會(huì)再次參與這類交易。這意味著，有一系列的協(xié)同作用是通過并購(gòu)

45、交易實(shí)現(xiàn)的。只要并購(gòu)交易產(chǎn)生任何協(xié)同收益，他們將獲得調(diào)整后的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)形式。由于在建筑行業(yè)，并購(gòu)交易的實(shí)證研究被嚴(yán)格的限制，筆者制定以下伴隨著理論斷層的協(xié)同假說(shuō)。</p><p>　　假設(shè)一：通過并購(gòu)，企業(yè)將獲得一系列的協(xié)同收益，并且這將推動(dòng)企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)。</p><p>　?。ǘ┘僭O(shè)二 管理福利和股東收益最大化</p><p>　　理論上講，并購(gòu)交易存在兩個(gè)相互沖突

46、的動(dòng)機(jī)：股東收益最大化和管理福利假說(shuō)。管理福利假說(shuō)認(rèn)為，管理者只想實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)規(guī)模最大化，并因此建立一個(gè)帝國(guó)。比如，“Penrose（1959）和Williamson（1964）認(rèn)為，在組織規(guī)模和行政補(bǔ)償?shù)恼@著關(guān)系激勵(lì)了高層管理者，即使并沒有為股東提供任何預(yù)期的收益”（Schmidt和Fowler 1990，p.560）。此外，“Murphy（1985）以及Coughlan和Schmidt（1985）發(fā)現(xiàn)了在行政補(bǔ)貼和公司業(yè)績(jī)之間的強(qiáng)大聯(lián)

47、系”（ Schmidt和Fowler 1990，p.562）。并且，Megginson et al.（2000）為這個(gè)以代理理論為基礎(chǔ)的問題提供了一個(gè)類似的解釋。這里，代理理論，是建立在代理成本的概念上，指的是由于股東和管理者之間的沖突帶來(lái)的成本（Ross et al. 2000）。類似的，Shleifer和Vishiny（1989）以及Anderson et al.（2000），討論了公司法人結(jié)構(gòu)角度的企業(yè)多樣化，表明它使管理人員能夠

48、鞏固自己，并獲得以股東為代價(jià)的私人利益。</p><p>　　管理后業(yè)績(jī)可以被作為這個(gè)問題的一個(gè)指標(biāo)。首先假設(shè)有一公司決定實(shí)施會(huì)擴(kuò)大其規(guī)模的并購(gòu)交易。然后，聯(lián)系企業(yè)規(guī)模變化與實(shí)際管理業(yè)績(jī)（通常不是管理可以控制的）。這樣，可以從管理立場(chǎng)的兩方面來(lái)解釋最后的決策。第一個(gè)是股東財(cái)富最大化的觀點(diǎn)，這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為如果管理決策是以股東收益為基礎(chǔ)的，企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)?cè)诓①?gòu)交易之后會(huì)提升；另一方面，如果企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)下降，管理收益依然隨著企業(yè)

49、規(guī)模增加而增加，那么就要質(zhì)疑在并購(gòu)交易來(lái)的決策，質(zhì)疑管理財(cái)富最大化假說(shuō)。解釋企業(yè)規(guī)模變化和管理業(yè)績(jī)之間的關(guān)系是必要的，然而，即使管理層通過并購(gòu)交易打算增加股東收益，也存在實(shí)際經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)不會(huì)成功的可能性。</p><p>　　企業(yè)規(guī)模可以通過注入營(yíng)業(yè)額、員工人數(shù)、資產(chǎn)總額、利潤(rùn)多少以及市場(chǎng)資本化等指標(biāo)來(lái)體現(xiàn)（Weston和Mansinghka 1971；Kreitl et al.2002）。這里仍然有一些關(guān)于此問題的

50、爭(zhēng)論。比如，Marris（1963），F(xiàn)owler和Schmidt（1988）推測(cè)，管理者為了增加銷售量或資產(chǎn)，或者獲得補(bǔ)償收益而從事收購(gòu)活動(dòng)。Fowler和Schlidt隨后又指出，如果在收購(gòu)活動(dòng)之后企業(yè)的表現(xiàn)很不好，則很可能是因?yàn)楫?dāng)初收購(gòu)背后的執(zhí)行動(dòng)機(jī)是股東財(cái)富最大化。</p><p>　　通過總結(jié)以往的觀點(diǎn)和實(shí)證研究結(jié)果，財(cái)富最大化的管理理論可以通過調(diào)整和比較經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和企業(yè)的規(guī)模變化來(lái)測(cè)試。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，企業(yè)規(guī)

51、模的變化，如銷售或就業(yè)，以及企業(yè)的后經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)，都將用來(lái)與測(cè)驗(yàn)財(cái)富福利最大化的假設(shè)相比較。因此，在沒有改進(jìn)管理業(yè)績(jī)的情況下，存在一個(gè)在銷售量或就業(yè)水平顯著的增長(zhǎng)，管理的目標(biāo)將是實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模最大化，而不是增加股東財(cái)富。這將導(dǎo)致假設(shè)二的形成。</p><p>　　假設(shè)二：公共企業(yè)網(wǎng)的管理機(jī)構(gòu)傾向于增加企業(yè)規(guī)模，以增加自己的財(cái)富，而不是提高公司績(jī)效。</p><p>　?。ㄈ┘僭O(shè)三：短期股市收益與長(zhǎng)

52、期業(yè)績(jī)之間的一致性</p><p>　　根據(jù)Franks et al.（1977），在一個(gè)有效的資本市場(chǎng)，股票（或股本）價(jià)格充分反映了全部新資訊，并且當(dāng)兼并首次被預(yù)期，來(lái)自兼并的預(yù)期收益價(jià)值將會(huì)在股價(jià)中體現(xiàn)。如果股市是強(qiáng)有效的，市場(chǎng)應(yīng)該能有效的預(yù)測(cè)在并購(gòu)交易期間的后經(jīng)營(yíng)的業(yè)績(jī)。因此，可以專業(yè)化的檢測(cè)市場(chǎng)的有效性，即通過調(diào)整事前市場(chǎng)業(yè)績(jī)和前后經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)。如果這兩種指標(biāo)在意義和標(biāo)識(shí)水平上都是相同或相似的，股市可能會(huì)被認(rèn)

53、為非常有效。因此，對(duì)于測(cè)試市場(chǎng)效率的說(shuō)法，這個(gè)假設(shè)是可以形成的。</p><p>　　假設(shè)三：如果股市是有效的，在企業(yè)實(shí)施并購(gòu)交易時(shí)，后經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)應(yīng)該能在預(yù)期中反應(yīng)出來(lái)。</p><p>　　二、方法：資金流收益和經(jīng)營(yíng)調(diào)整</p><p>　　本節(jié)描述了一個(gè)與公司業(yè)績(jī)的會(huì)計(jì)績(jī)效指標(biāo)有關(guān)的問題，并定義了衡量運(yùn)用這項(xiàng)研究的績(jī)效。在公司業(yè)績(jī)的評(píng)估中，不同業(yè)績(jī)衡量法取決于研究

54、領(lǐng)域。例如，時(shí)間研究一直是金融研究領(lǐng)域的主導(dǎo)分析方法。然而，戰(zhàn)略管理研究者的觀點(diǎn)是，即使時(shí)間研究是屬于嚴(yán)格的數(shù)據(jù)性的，時(shí)間段的研究依然是相對(duì)短暫的（Fowler和Schmidt1989）。因此，在戰(zhàn)略管理研究領(lǐng)域的研究者們一般更青睞于評(píng)估伴隨著特定企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略措施的長(zhǎng)期組織業(yè)績(jī)。</p><p>　　關(guān)于組織績(jī)效的定義有很多，但是關(guān)于哪個(gè)定義最好，幾乎沒有一致的觀點(diǎn)（Barney 2002）。大多數(shù)在戰(zhàn)略和戰(zhàn)略管理的

55、早期研究關(guān)注與評(píng)估企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)上的戰(zhàn)略的影響，并且大部分依靠于比率分析。例如，“銷售回報(bào)是在戰(zhàn)略研究中，時(shí)常用來(lái)衡量金融業(yè)績(jī)”（Powell 1996，p.329），而它有可能將企業(yè)的金融比率整合成一個(gè)單個(gè)指數(shù)，比方說(shuō)Altman’s Z分?jǐn)?shù)，用來(lái)獲得更完整的經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)。</p><p>　?。ㄒ唬?huì)計(jì)報(bào)稅表及相關(guān)問題</p><p>　　盡管會(huì)計(jì)基礎(chǔ)的收益已經(jīng)被廣泛運(yùn)用于企業(yè)績(jī)效評(píng)估，很

56、多研究者指出會(huì)計(jì)收益計(jì)算中的問題或偏移。例如，像Barney（2000）說(shuō)的，如果簡(jiǎn)單會(huì)計(jì)方法被用來(lái)衡量一個(gè)企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)，偏移會(huì)存在，因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)中長(zhǎng)期的多年限投資總是存在的。就會(huì)計(jì)而言，只是消耗成本而不產(chǎn)生收益。在這些問題中，最嚴(yán)峻的是經(jīng)營(yíng)自主權(quán)（Healy et al.1992；Revsine et al. 1999；Bodie et al.1998）。舉個(gè)例子，當(dāng)管理獎(jiǎng)金與會(huì)計(jì)績(jī)效掛鉤，管理者必須有強(qiáng)烈的動(dòng)機(jī)通過會(huì)計(jì)管理來(lái)提高當(dāng)期利潤(rùn)水

57、平。</p><p>　　一種廣泛使用于替代經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)衡量法——投資回報(bào)（ROI），因?yàn)椤八鼘⒗麧?rùn)流與帶來(lái)的投資不恰當(dāng)?shù)穆?lián)系起來(lái)”，而被廣泛批評(píng)（Jacobson 1987，p,470）。因此，人們普遍認(rèn)為，ROI不是經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)率的真實(shí)指標(biāo)。其基本理論是，收入（ROI中的分子）是過去制定的投資決策的結(jié)果，但是資產(chǎn)（分母）被認(rèn)為不僅對(duì)過去和現(xiàn)在的收入有影響，而且對(duì)將來(lái)的收入也有影響。類似的，Meeks和Meeks（19

58、81，p,4）斷言，“用盈利的措施來(lái)推斷由于兼并帶來(lái)的失真運(yùn)用效率”。然而，經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)谶@項(xiàng)研究中采取的措施，即OCF返回，在一定程度上克服了上述缺陷。在下節(jié)中，將詳細(xì)討論有關(guān)OCF返回的優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p>　?。ǘ┵Y金流收益的運(yùn)營(yíng)</p><p>　　很多在管理研究領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者都支持使用資金流收益來(lái)評(píng)估企業(yè)績(jī)效，因?yàn)椤八砹擞少Y產(chǎn)帶來(lái)的實(shí)際經(jīng)濟(jì)收益”（Healy et al. 199

59、2，p.139）。并且，它是經(jīng)營(yíng)協(xié)同作用的措施之一，因?yàn)樗从沉耸召?gòu)的真實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)影響（Anand和Singh 1997）。此外，使用資金流業(yè)績(jī)與會(huì)計(jì)收益對(duì)賬面收益有好處，因?yàn)樗话ㄕ叟f、商譽(yù)、信息開支、收入和稅收的影響。因此，它不受收購(gòu)和融資的影響。此外，它允許公司間的融資比較。而且，Barber和Lyon（1996）認(rèn)為，與盈利相比，收入業(yè)績(jī)是更好的衡量方式。他們的論據(jù)是，它比來(lái)自經(jīng)營(yíng)性資產(chǎn)的生產(chǎn)率更能清楚地起到衡量作用，因?yàn)榻?jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)

60、會(huì)被特殊項(xiàng)目、稅收考慮或者上述股東權(quán)益所遮蓋。</p><p>　　在Desai和Jain（1999）以及Megginson et al.（2000）之后，OCF的返回措施被用在當(dāng)下的研究，作為被企業(yè)年末總資產(chǎn)（COMPUSTAT®數(shù)據(jù)項(xiàng)6）分割的一個(gè)企業(yè)性能指標(biāo)（COMPUSTAT®數(shù)據(jù)項(xiàng)13）。OCF返回按照以下所列定義：</p><p>　　經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的平均值將超過

61、在并購(gòu)交易發(fā)生的前期和后期的三年均值，用來(lái)最小化由于使用一年業(yè)績(jī)而產(chǎn)生的偏移。關(guān)于這個(gè)過程的理論基礎(chǔ)是，收購(gòu)可以作為收購(gòu)企業(yè)的一項(xiàng)投資，并且它的影響將分散在投資后的一段很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間內(nèi)。因此，多年的業(yè)績(jī)衡量措施克服了經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)措施的短期偏見。另外，繼先前的研究，收購(gòu)年的OCF返回不包括消除來(lái)自一次性會(huì)計(jì)事項(xiàng)，諸如顧問費(fèi)用和重組費(fèi)用的潛在偏見?？紤]到這個(gè)，Ross et al.（2000）指出，對(duì)于任何特定的公司，異?；蛩矐B(tài)事件，例如來(lái)自資產(chǎn)出售