外文翻譯-----中國國有企業(yè)會計監(jiān)督模式的進化和思考

1、<p>　　Evolution and Thinking of the Accounting Supervision Mode of China’s State-owned Enterprises</p><p>　　Guo Yaxiong</p><p>　　School of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Eco

2、nomics, P.R.C, 330013</p><p>　　4. COUNTERMEASURES</p><p>　　4.1. IMPLEMENT MODE COMBINATION MANAGEMENT</p><p>　　Accounting supervision modes of state-owned enterprises are various. F

3、ull implementation of these modes would be a waste of resources, increase the difficulty of accounting management. It’s necessary to targeted select two or more accounting supervision modes to implement accounting superv

4、ision according to operation characteristics of the supervised state-owned enterprises. The author believes that, generally, the internal audit system is a conventional system. If you want to select systems amo</p>

5、<p>　　4.2. Improve the efficiency of accounting supervision.</p><p>　　Asymmetric information theory suggests that private information possessed by agents is unobservable, hidden action is unverifiable

6、, thus the biggest problem brought is the opportunistic behavior. Therefore, it’s not necessary to emphasize the diversified forms of accounting supervision of state-owned enterprises, but necessary to emphasize the actu

7、al results, the efficiency of the accounting supervision, and limit opportunistic behavior of agents. Firstly, the appointment and assignment personne</p><p>　　4.3. Make clear the limits of accounting superv

8、ision</p><p>　　In the case of separation of ownership and management, insider control theory tells us that directors of enterprise in fact or in law control the enterprise, and make use of available informat

9、ion and the facility of management to gain more interests in enterprise management and decision-making. Accounting supervision is to maintain the economic order and prevent insider control to ensure normal economic activ

10、ity of state-owned enterprises. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, t</p><p>　　4.4. Develop incentive and restraint system</p><p>　　According to principal-agent theory, as the

11、 principal need the help and cooperation of agents to accomplish the intended goal, the client will use a series of incentives to motivate agents to work hard to maximize the value of the overall agent, so as to achieve

12、a balanced relationship between principal and agent. Under the circumstance of market economy, incentive and restraint mechanisms of accounting supervision are particularly important and directly related to the efficienc

13、y of the accounti</p><p>　　中國國有企業(yè)會計監(jiān)督模式的進化和思考</p><p><b>　　4 應對措施</b></p><p>　　4.1 實施模式組合管理</p><p>　　國有企業(yè)的會計監(jiān)管模式是多方面的。全面實施這些模式將會浪費資源,提高會計管理的難度。針對性的選擇兩個或兩個以上的

14、會計監(jiān)管模式來實現(xiàn)會計監(jiān)督根據(jù)運行特點監(jiān)督國有企業(yè)是非常必要的。筆者認為,一般來說,內(nèi)部審計系統(tǒng)是一個傳統(tǒng)的系統(tǒng)。如果你想選擇系統(tǒng)分配的會計系統(tǒng)中,分配的監(jiān)事會制度和外部董事系統(tǒng),系統(tǒng)數(shù)量的選擇更好的不超過兩個。與此同時,你就不需要實現(xiàn)分配會計師系統(tǒng)和調(diào)度的監(jiān)事會制度在相同的企業(yè),它不太合適,促進外部董事系統(tǒng)在較大范圍的。</p><p>　　4.2 提高效率的會計監(jiān)管。</p><p>

15、　　信息不對稱理論表明,私人信息被察覺到的代理,隱藏的行動是無憑無據(jù),因此帶來的最大問題是投機行為。因此,不需要強調(diào)國有企業(yè)會計監(jiān)督的多種形式,但有必要強調(diào)實際結(jié)果,會計監(jiān)管的效率,并限制代理的機會主義行為。首先,任命和分配任務人員應迅速掌握企業(yè)的財務信息如財務業(yè)績、經(jīng)營成果、現(xiàn)金流量,熟悉企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)和經(jīng)營活動。其次,責任必須分配到個人,保障機制的實施措施應該被建立,某人應該分配給追蹤、監(jiān)督、檢測和評價這一制度的實施。第三,建立一個國有

16、企業(yè)的全國的會計監(jiān)管專家的數(shù)據(jù)庫,加強職業(yè)培訓,在企業(yè)管理方面建立一個有高水平和豐富經(jīng)驗的專業(yè)的團隊。最后,在會計監(jiān)督模式實施過程中所獲得的各種各樣的信息應該被共享。國有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會應組織各種交流會議,現(xiàn)場會議和研討會,能吸引更多的任命和作業(yè)人員參加,磋商出現(xiàn)在會計監(jiān)督和溝通措施中的問題并提出解決方案。</p><p>　　4.3 明確會計監(jiān)督的權限</p><p>　　在所有權和管

17、理權分離的情況下，內(nèi)部控制理論告訴我們,企業(yè)董事在事實上或法律控制企業(yè),并利用管理過程中有效的信息和設施,在企業(yè)的管理和決策中獲得更多的利益。會計監(jiān)督是維護經(jīng)濟秩序,防止內(nèi)部人控制以確保國有企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟活動正常進行。國有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會,人事任命和分配應該清楚地理解會計監(jiān)督的性質(zhì)和局限性。會計監(jiān)督應根據(jù)經(jīng)濟發(fā)展和企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟效益,專注于企業(yè)的長遠利益。監(jiān)管不僅應該適當?shù)?也應該適度進行,不應該直接干預或參與日常管理活動。職員可以作為“裁判

18、”,但不應該作為“參賽選手”,更不應充當二者的結(jié)合。</p><p>　　4.4 發(fā)展激勵和約束制度</p><p>　　根據(jù)委托-代理理論,委托人需要代理人的幫助和合作以完成預期目標,委托人將使用一系列的獎勵措施來激勵代理人努力使得代理總體價值最大化,從而平衡委托人和代理人之間的關系。在市場經(jīng)濟條件下,企業(yè)激勵機制和約束機制的會計監(jiān)督是十分重要的，并且和會計監(jiān)管的效率直接相關。會計監(jiān)督的