外文翻譯---從一般角度看經(jīng)濟(jì)增值

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Economic Value Added - A General Perspective </p><p>　　Performance Measurement</p&

2、gt;<p>　　Investors measure overall performance of a firm as a whole to decide whether to invest in the firm or to continue with the firm or to exit from it. In order to achieve goal congruence, managers’ compensat

3、ion is often linked with the performance of the responsibility centers and also with firm-performance. Therefore selection of the right measure is critical to the success of a firm. To measure performance of a firm we ne

4、ed a simple method for correctly measuring value created/ enhanced by it in </p><p>　　There is a continuous endeavor to develop a single measure that captures the overall performance, yet it is easy to calcu

5、late.</p><p>　　Each metric of performance claims its superiority over others. Performance of a firm is usually measured with reference to its past record and the performance of other firms with comparable ri

6、sk profile. The various performance metrics currently in use are based on the returns on investment generated by the business entity . Therefore to reach a meaningful conclusion, returns generated by the firm in a partic

7、ular year should be compared with returns generated by assets with similar risk profile </p><p>　　Similarly return on investment for the current period should be compared with returns generated in past (time

8、 series analysis). A firm creates value only if it is able to generate return higher than its cost of capital. Cost of capital is the weighted average cost of equity and debt (WACC).</p><p>　　The performance

9、 of a firm gets reflected on its valuation by the capital market. Market valuation reflects investor’s perception about the current performance of the firm and also their expectation on its future performance. They build

10、 their expectations on the estimated growth of the business in terms of return on capital. This results in an incongruence between current performance and the value of the firm. Even if the current performance is better

11、in relative terms, poor growth prospects adve</p><p>　　Perfect correlation is impossible because as shown by empirical research fundamentals of a company cannot fully explain its market capitalization, other

12、 factors such as speculative activities, market sentiments and macro-economic factors influence movement in share prices. However the superiority of a performance metric over others lies in providing better information t

13、o investors.</p><p>　　Metrics of performance have a very important and critical role not only in evaluating the current performance of a firm but also in achieving high performance and growth in the future.

14、The metrics of performance have a variety of users, which include all the stakeholders whose well being depends on the continued well being of the firm. Principal stakeholders are the equity holders, debt holders, manage

15、ment, and suppliers of material and services, employees and the end-users of the products and s</p><p>　　Most of the conventional performance measures directly relate to the current net income of a business

16、entity with equity, total assets, net sales or similar surrogates of inputs or outputs. Examples of such measures are return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and operating profit margin. Each of these indices meas

17、ure a different aspect of performance, ROE measures the performance from the perspective of the equity holders,</p><p>　　ROA measures the asset productivity and operating profit margin reflects the margin re

18、alized by the firm at the market place. The net income figure in itself is dependent on the operational efficiency, financial leverage and the ability of the entity to formulate right strategy to earn adequate margin in

19、the market place.</p><p>　　It is important to note that none of these measures truly reflect the complete picture by themselves but have to be seen in conjunction with other metrics. These measures are also

20、plagued by the firm level inconsistencies in the accounting figures as well as the inconsistencies in the valuation methods used by accountants in measuring assets, liabilities and income of the firm. Accounting valuatio

21、n methods are in variance with the methods that are being used to value individual projects and firm</p><p>　　Eva as a performance measure</p><p>　　Proponents of EVA argue that EVA is a superior

22、 measure as compared to other performance measures on four counts:</p><p>　　It is nearer to the real cash flows of the business entity;</p><p>　　It is easy to calculate and understand;</p>

23、<p>　　It has a higher correlation to the market value of the firm and;</p><p>　　Its application to employee compensation leads to the alignment of managerial interests with those of the shareholders,

24、thus minimizing the supposedly dysfunctional behavior of the management.</p><p>　　The last two merits can be considered as a reflection of the first two. If EVA truly represents the real cash flows of a busi

25、ness entity and it is easy to calculate and understand, then it automatically follows that it should be closely related to the market valuation and it should minimize the dysfunctional behavior of the management when use

26、d as an incentive measure. In other words, close relation to market valuation and convergence of managerial interests with shareholders interests is a vind</p><p>　　EVA as a performance measure looks into th

27、e efficacy of EVA both as an absolute measure in comparison with net income, residual income and similar measures as well as a ratio in relation with performance measures like ROE, ROA and Operating Profit Margin, which

28、are commonly used by both managers and equity analysts alike .These measures are normally used internally by the management to evaluate employee performance, incentive calculation and investment decisions and externally

29、by equity analysts</p><p>　　EVA a superior performance measure?</p><p>　　First let us look into the claim of EVA being superior than the conventional measures such as ROI, ROE and ROA, which are

30、 based on the accounting figures. Most of these measures give us the rate of return earned by the firm with respect to capital invested in the firm. The most important limitation of these measures are derived from limita

31、tions inherent in the measurement of accounting profit. As per current accounting practices, while historical-cost-based accounting measures are being used to </p><p>　　The other important limitation of acco

32、unting measures is that they ignore the cost of equity and only consider the borrowing cost. As a result it ignores the risk inherent in the project and fails to highlight whether the return is commensurate with the risk

33、 of the underlying assets. This might result in selecting projects that produce attractive rate of return but destroys firm value because their cost of capital is higher than the benchmark return established by the manag

34、ement. On the other ha</p><p>　　EVA proponents claim that because of these imperfections, the accounting based measures are not good proxies for value creation. Managerial compensation based on these measure

35、s does not encourage value enhancement actions by managers. Value enhancement and earnings are two different things and might be at cross-purposes because short-term performance might be improved at the cost of long term

36、 health of the firm. Activities involving enhancement of current earnings may be short term in nature, wh</p><p>　　The question arises whether EVA is an improvement over conventional measures and serves the

37、purpose of motivating managers to pay attention to shareholders value even if that results in compromising current performance. The answer may be negative because all the above limitations are also associated with EVA. A

38、s shown in equation III the calculation of EVA entails the usage of an accounting rate of return, the difference lies only in the fact that the cost of equity is also factored in to arrive</p><p>　　In India

39、EVA is being used with impunity. A case at point is the study published by Economic times (11th December 2000), on corporate performance. While computing EVA it used a flat rate of 13 percent as the cost of capital of al

40、l the enterprises included in the study. The study explains that an average 13 percent interest for both the years covered by the study is used as it is almost equal to the prime-lending rate of the commercial bank and f

41、inancial institution. It is a basic principle of ec</p><p>　　Source: Asish K. Bhattacharyya , B. V. Phani,2004. “Economic Value Added - A General Perspective”.Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Calcutta a

42、nd Indian Institute of Techonology Kanpur. Working Paper Series.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　從一般角度看經(jīng)濟(jì)增值</p><p><b>　　業(yè)績評價(jià)指標(biāo)</b></p><p>　　投資者評價(jià)一家

43、公司的整體業(yè)績，來決定是否繼續(xù)投資這家公司或者是從這家公司中撤出投資。為了能夠獲得預(yù)期的目標(biāo)，經(jīng)理人的激勵(lì)制度總是跟責(zé)任中心的業(yè)績相聯(lián)系，同時(shí)也跟公司的業(yè)績相聯(lián)系。因此選擇正確的業(yè)績評價(jià)對于公司的成功也是至至關(guān)重要。評價(jià)一家公司的業(yè)績我們需要一種正確的能夠測試公司的在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)的價(jià)值增加或擴(kuò)張的簡單方法。所有當(dāng)前的測量方法在測量價(jià)值的精度和它測量成本的協(xié)調(diào)?？傊?，每一種方法都必須考慮到數(shù)量化根本措施的復(fù)雜程度。過程越復(fù)雜，業(yè)績評價(jià)的客觀

44、水平和測量成本越高。</p><p>　　發(fā)展一種單項(xiàng)的能評價(jià)所有業(yè)績的評價(jià)措施要有連續(xù)不斷地努力，但這還是比較容易計(jì)算的。</p><p>　　每一種業(yè)績評價(jià)的方法都有自己的優(yōu)勢。一家公司的業(yè)績的評價(jià)一般都和它過去的記錄和其他具有類似風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的公司的相聯(lián)系起來。當(dāng)前多種的業(yè)績評價(jià)指標(biāo)是基于商業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)的投資項(xiàng)目所取得的回報(bào)。因此為了得到有意義的結(jié)論，公司在一系列年度所得到的回報(bào)要和具有相同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的

45、資產(chǎn)所得到的回報(bào)相比較（同行業(yè)分析比較）。</p><p>　　當(dāng)前階段的投資項(xiàng)目的相似的回報(bào)必須和以前的回報(bào)相比較（時(shí)間系列分析）。只有投資回報(bào)高于資本成本是一家公司才會(huì)創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。資本成本是由平均的股權(quán)成本和債務(wù)陳本所衡量（WACC）。</p><p>　　一家公司的業(yè)績獲取反映其資本市場的估值。市場估值反映了該公司的當(dāng)前性能投資者的認(rèn)識(shí)，也對其未來的業(yè)績的期望。他們做出的期望是基于業(yè)務(wù)

46、方面預(yù)計(jì)的增長資本回報(bào)。這將導(dǎo)致當(dāng)前的業(yè)績和公司價(jià)值的相一致。即使當(dāng)前的業(yè)績比相關(guān)的項(xiàng)目好，較差的增長前景不利于公司的價(jià)值。因此任何業(yè)績評價(jià)的指標(biāo)，要是需要有效，不但要衡量當(dāng)前的業(yè)績而且要衡量未來的增長的方向和數(shù)量。因此一項(xiàng)措施的穩(wěn)健是有特定度量對市場估值的相關(guān)度所證明的。</p><p>　　由于是實(shí)證的研究，完全的關(guān)系是不太可能的，市場資本化和其他的因素比如投機(jī)活動(dòng)，市場變動(dòng)和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素會(huì)影響股票價(jià)格不太能

47、充分說明公司的基礎(chǔ)。但是對其他業(yè)績度量的優(yōu)勢在于為投資者提供更好的信息。</p><p>　　業(yè)績評價(jià)的度量不僅在評價(jià)公司當(dāng)前的業(yè)績還是在未來取得業(yè)績更高更好的增長上都是重要和關(guān)鍵的角色。業(yè)績評價(jià)指標(biāo)有很多的使用者其中也包括由于公司良好經(jīng)意而保持良好狀態(tài)的股東。主要的股東是指股票持有人、債務(wù)持有人、 管理和材料及服務(wù)、雇員和最終用戶的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的供應(yīng)商。價(jià)值創(chuàng)造和擴(kuò)張依賴于全部股東相一致于朝向同一個(gè)目標(biāo)。這意味著

48、擴(kuò)大公司價(jià)值不能損害任何利益攸關(guān)者的利益。任何的不基于他利益攸關(guān)者或任何特定類別的股東的評價(jià)公司業(yè)績的方法，能正確評價(jià)公司真實(shí)的業(yè)績。但是如果不可能發(fā)展這種評價(jià)方法，正確評價(jià)業(yè)績也是很困難的。</p><p>　　很多簡便的業(yè)績評價(jià)方法和當(dāng)前的商業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)利潤，全部資本，凈資本和類似代理項(xiàng)的收入和支出相關(guān)。比如，股東資產(chǎn)凈值的盈利（ROE）,資本收益（ROA），邊際收益。每個(gè)這些指標(biāo)衡量業(yè)績的不同方面，ROE措施從股

49、本持有人的角度性能、ROA測算資產(chǎn)生產(chǎn)率和經(jīng)營利潤，反映了該公司在市場上實(shí)現(xiàn)的利潤。凈利潤由自身的經(jīng)營效率、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿和制訂適當(dāng)?shù)牟呗院驮谑袌鲋匈嵢∽銐虻陌踩鹊哪芰Α?lt;/p><p>　　還有重要的是需要注意到這些措施都不能真正的反應(yīng)全部的情況，但是必須和其他的指標(biāo)相聯(lián)系起來。這些措施受到公司會(huì)計(jì)特征與由會(huì)計(jì)師測量資產(chǎn)、負(fù)債和公司收入中使用的估價(jià)方法不一致的影響。會(huì)計(jì)估價(jià)方法會(huì)隨著用來計(jì)算個(gè)別項(xiàng)目和公司的價(jià)值所使

50、用的方法而變化。一項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)或一家公司的資產(chǎn)，是由公司資產(chǎn)扣除未來的現(xiàn)金流計(jì)算的。凈現(xiàn)值（NPV）現(xiàn)值是投資的盈余預(yù)期將生成的資本成本。評價(jià)一家公司的階段性的業(yè)績，綜合資產(chǎn)的的措施應(yīng)遵循相同的基本原則。經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值增加值（EVA）是獲取估價(jià)原則的一項(xiàng)措施。</p><p>　　EVA 作為一種業(yè)績評價(jià)的方法</p><p>　　EVA 的支持者認(rèn)為 EVA 是相對于其他的優(yōu)良措施性能有更優(yōu)的四項(xiàng)措

51、施：(1）是接近真正的商業(yè)實(shí)體的現(xiàn)金流量 ；(2）容易計(jì)算和了解 ；(3)與該公司的市場價(jià)值有緊密的聯(lián)系；(4) 應(yīng)用于雇員補(bǔ)償中從而促使管理者和股東的利益相一致，這被稱為管理功能調(diào)節(jié)方法。后面兩個(gè)優(yōu)點(diǎn)可以被視為前兩個(gè)的體現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　如果 EVA 真正代表真正的商業(yè)實(shí)體的現(xiàn)金流量，它有很容易計(jì)算和了解，自然地，它將與市場估價(jià)密切相關(guān)，在作為一項(xiàng)激勵(lì)措施時(shí)它就會(huì)盡量減少管理的功能失調(diào)行為。換言之，與市

52、場估價(jià)密切相關(guān)和使管理者利益與股東利益的達(dá)到一致性是EVA優(yōu)越性的有效體現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　EVA作為一種業(yè)績評價(jià)方式，可以從兩個(gè)方面看EVA的有效性：一方面是與凈收入、 剩余收入等類似的措施相比，另一方面是與其他業(yè)績評價(jià)的措施，ROE, ROA 和經(jīng)營利潤等一些管理人員和股票分析師常用的指標(biāo)的聯(lián)系。這些措施通常用于內(nèi)部管理評估雇員性能、激勵(lì)的計(jì)算和投資決策和外部股權(quán)的分析，以確定公司的業(yè)績和增長。隨著這些

53、措施估價(jià)模型，如凈現(xiàn)值、內(nèi)部回報(bào)率，回報(bào)期和賬面回報(bào)率同時(shí)被內(nèi)部和外部的經(jīng)理用來做投資決定。前者的措施，考慮過去和當(dāng)前的性能和促進(jìn)未來的業(yè)績的預(yù)測，而后者的措施則更向一給定投資或新的投資和增加或減少預(yù)期未來現(xiàn)金流，同時(shí)確定的經(jīng)濟(jì)可行性。</p><p>　　EVA 是一種更為優(yōu)越的業(yè)績評價(jià)的方法？</p><p>　　首先讓我們看EVA優(yōu)于根據(jù)會(huì)計(jì)計(jì)算的傳統(tǒng)措施如ROI, ROE 和ROA

54、的原因。這些措施大多數(shù)給我們帶來的從公司賺取的回報(bào)率與資本投資公司相聯(lián)系。這些措施的最重要的限制是用被限制的固有的會(huì)計(jì)利潤來度量。按現(xiàn)行的會(huì)計(jì)做法，基于歷史成本的會(huì)計(jì)措施被廣泛的運(yùn)用，在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表、收入和開支（折舊以外的其他資產(chǎn)）被確認(rèn)在其當(dāng)前的損益帳中。因此會(huì)計(jì)率的返回不反映真正的投資回報(bào)，往往在最近幾年被低估而在以后的年份被高估。正如Malkelainen（2008）指出的一樣，失真發(fā)生在基于歷史成本和直線法計(jì)算資產(chǎn)的折舊計(jì)劃的大多

55、數(shù)企業(yè)。這將導(dǎo)致這些措施偏差，由于是在給定的時(shí)間點(diǎn)內(nèi)公司的資產(chǎn)組成。這篇文章指的是當(dāng)前的資產(chǎn)，越是當(dāng)前的的資產(chǎn)，計(jì)算的是回報(bào)率越接近真正匯報(bào)率。如果有多個(gè)的資產(chǎn)投資即資產(chǎn)組合的價(jià)值是靠近資產(chǎn)的當(dāng)前值，那么這種不正常的行為將不會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響。但在任何時(shí)刻，不論是舊的或較新的資產(chǎn)，一家公司大多數(shù)情況下應(yīng)該都會(huì)有一種比較罕見的資產(chǎn)組合。這不排除這些會(huì)計(jì)措施用于達(dá)成有關(guān)于該公司的真正業(yè)績有意義的結(jié)論。</p><p>　　其

56、他重要的會(huì)計(jì)措施缺陷是他們忽略了股權(quán)成本，并只考慮借貸成本。因此，它忽略了項(xiàng)目所固有的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而且沒有明確揭示回報(bào)和基本資產(chǎn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是等同的。這可能會(huì)影響在選擇項(xiàng)目時(shí)因?yàn)轫?xiàng)目的資本成本高于管理者既定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)從而選擇了吸引力高但破壞了公司的價(jià)值的項(xiàng)目。另一方面，這些會(huì)計(jì)措施會(huì)促使管理人員選擇能改善現(xiàn)時(shí)的回報(bào)率的項(xiàng)目卻忽略那些回報(bào)比的資本成本高的項(xiàng)目。選擇回報(bào)比現(xiàn)時(shí)的回報(bào)率高的目項(xiàng)的并不會(huì)自增加股東的財(cái)富。只有選擇那些回報(bào)率高于成本率的項(xiàng)目才能增

57、加股東的財(cái)富。因此使用ROE, ROA或類似的會(huì)計(jì)措施，可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致經(jīng)理人選擇那些雖然提供的回報(bào)率高于當(dāng)前的回報(bào)率卻減少了公司價(jià)值的項(xiàng)目。同樣使用這些措施將導(dǎo)致繼續(xù)減少企業(yè)價(jià)值，直到回報(bào)率低于基準(zhǔn)回報(bào)率。</p><p>　　EVA支持者聲稱因?yàn)檫@些不完善的地方使基于會(huì)計(jì)基礎(chǔ)業(yè)績評價(jià)措施不能成為價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的代理。這些措施不鼓勵(lì)高管理人員采取的行動(dòng)增加企業(yè)價(jià)值。價(jià)值增加和收入是兩個(gè)不同的概念，可能背道而馳，可能短期的業(yè)

58、績的改善會(huì)以公司的長期發(fā)展為代價(jià)。活動(dòng)涉及的當(dāng)前收入提高可能的情況下，短期內(nèi)加強(qiáng)活動(dòng)的任何值應(yīng)側(cè)重于增加公司長期的利益。避免酌情成本提高了當(dāng)前的性能，同時(shí)減少了公司的價(jià)值。經(jīng)理人的管理重點(diǎn)要是在短期業(yè)績增加下，長期業(yè)績也能得到增加。（Damodaran 1998，David Young 1999）</p><p>　　問題是，EVA是否是傳統(tǒng)業(yè)績評價(jià)指標(biāo)的改進(jìn)，能否達(dá)到使管理人重視股東價(jià)值即使這會(huì)導(dǎo)致影響當(dāng)前的業(yè)

59、績。答案可能是負(fù)面，因?yàn)樗猩鲜龅南拗埔嗯c EVA 相關(guān)聯(lián)。方程三所示，EVA 計(jì)算需要用到回報(bào)率，基于剩余收入EVA區(qū)別于會(huì)計(jì)率只有考慮了資產(chǎn)成本。成立組合股權(quán)資本成本是EVA的一項(xiàng)優(yōu)勢，它用來度量經(jīng)濟(jì)盈余但不去掉會(huì)計(jì)利潤的局限性，這是計(jì)算EVA的基礎(chǔ)框架。此外，這種優(yōu)勢不可能在實(shí)現(xiàn)中常用因?yàn)樗且环N不容易計(jì)算資產(chǎn)的成本的做法。不能總是將市場回報(bào)作為支持資產(chǎn)成本的代理因?yàn)槭袌雠c期望的總是不同的。同樣很難使用資本資產(chǎn)定價(jià)模型中測量的資產(chǎn)

60、的成本，因?yàn)樗茈y衡量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)自由回報(bào)率、貝塔系數(shù)和市場匯水。在印度，由于是在利率經(jīng)常波動(dòng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境中：資本市場不穩(wěn)定和當(dāng)局管理仍未有完整的方法以提高其效率的資本市場，困難更是增加了更多。實(shí)證研究顯示在印度的資本市場波動(dòng)與在其他發(fā)展中國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)中的較發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的資本市場相似（Tusha Waghmare 2000)。同時(shí)研究顯示在印度資本市場上市公司的貝塔系數(shù)是不穩(wěn)定的（Guha Roy，Sanyal 2000 ）。由于印度資本市場歷史只有

61、短短的一二十年，也由于其</p><p>　　在印度，EVA的運(yùn)用是不受限制的。這是發(fā)表在研究經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代（2000年12 月）上的研究企業(yè)的業(yè)績的一個(gè)案例。它計(jì)算EVA時(shí)將所有企業(yè)的資本成本看為13%。研究解釋說這兩年的平均 13%權(quán)益涵蓋的研究與銀行和金融機(jī)構(gòu)的最優(yōu)惠貸款率幾乎相等。更高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)帶來更高預(yù)期的回報(bào)是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的一個(gè)基本原則。違反了資本成本為13%這一假設(shè)，可能是認(rèn)為采取存入債務(wù)成本和因此在計(jì)算中成立為股

62、權(quán)的組合有效的成本高于13%。該假設(shè)不能證明計(jì)算，因?yàn)榻邮茉搮?shù)的成本資本不可能使用完全被公認(rèn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)模型估計(jì)。</p><p>　　此外，為了更公平，公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況的變化已被忽略。這篇文章這同時(shí)顯示了EVA 在印度受歡迎程度和運(yùn)用的困難。研究亦忽略在了EVA 的支持者提出的資本和經(jīng)營收入中的調(diào)整。</p><p>　　出處: 阿斯伊士K.貝哈塔查雅，B.V.法尼，《從一般角度看經(jīng)濟(jì)增值》,