工程招投標外文翻譯--不平衡投標的檢測和預防（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1900單詞，10200英文字符，3150漢字</p><p>　　出處：Chotibhongs D A R. Detection and prevention of unbalanced bids[J]. Construction Management & Economics, 2009, 27(8):721-732.</p><p>　　Detection

2、 and prevention of unbalanced bids</p><p>　　DAVID ARDITI* and RANON CHOTIBHONGS</p><p>　　Unbalanced bidding is a serious problem for the construction owner because it may increase the cost of co

3、nstruction The most common way to mathematically unbalance a bid is frontloading where a bidder overstates the unit price of line items scheduled to be performed early in the project and understates the unit price of lin

4、e items performed later. A bidder can also overstate the unit price of a line item whose quantity was somehow underrated by the engineer. If the owner proves that a mathematic</p><p>　　Keywords: Bids, mathem

5、atical models, financial management, construction costs, optimization.</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Unbalanced bids constitute a serious problem for construction owners. In competitive bidding

6、, awarding a contract to an unbalanced bid may cause the owner’s overall project cost to get higher. In some cases, it generates contentious change orders (Manzo, 1997). The owner has the right to reject unbalanced bids,

7、 but it is hard to detect unbalancing. While Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) linear programming model of unbalancing bids in highway construction contracts is relatively easy to detect by the o</p><p>　　After a d

8、escription of the forms and implications of unbalancing bids, a review is presented of current practices by some state and federal agencies in the US in relation to detecting unbalanced bids. A model is then proposed tha

9、t formalizes the detection of unbalanced bids and that automates the process, allowing the owner to reject unbalanced bids with confidence, hence deterring bidders from unbalancing their bids.</p><p>　　Unbal

10、anced bidding</p><p>　　Since unit price contracts are awarded on the basis of low bids, it is difficult to challenge the low bidders on the validity of their unit prices except for obvious unbalanced bidding

11、. A mathematically unbalanced bid is a bid that contains some line items’ unit price determined to be significantly overstated or under- stated. This can be determined by comparing the unit price of the line item with th

12、e engineer’s estimate, the unit prices quoted by the other bidders, or other historical data of </p><p>　　If a mathematically unbalanced bid is detected, the bid has to be further analysed to determine wheth

13、er it is also materially unbalanced. A materially unbalanced bid is a mathematically unbalanced bid that may cost more money to the owner. According to Heinz’s (1988) interpretation of FHWA guidelines, the materially unb

14、alanced bid is defined as a bid which generates ‘a(chǎn) reasonable doubt that award to the bidder submitting a mathematically unbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to </p><p>　　Frontloading is th

15、e most common way to unbalance a bid. Frontloading refers to increasing unit prices on items to be completed in the early period of the project and decreasing the unit prices on items that are to be completed in the late

16、r stages. The main purpose of frontloading on the part of the contractor is to relieve the financial problems that contractors face early in the project such as the initial expenses of mobilization and setting up. But if

17、 a contractor is set to be paid out in the</p><p>　　Unbalanced bid analysis</p><p>　　In 2004, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) initiated a survey o

18、f unbalanced bids (AASHTO, 2004). Twenty- seven state departments of transportation (DOT) responded to this survey. Many state DOTs (such as Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts and Connecticut) discovered unbalanced bids w

19、ithout having in place any formal procedure to detect such occurrences. Some states quoted their standard contracts that specify the consequences of unbalancing bids, or s</p><p>　　Detection and prevention o

20、f unbalanced bids</p><p>　　Because the extra cost of an unbalanced bid cannot be justified by the owner, and because owners have the right to legally reject unbalanced bids, owners should be able to stop and

21、 prevent unbalanced bids. A bidder’s line item prices can be compared to the engineer’s estimates to see if there are significant differences, an indication that the bid is potentially unbalanced. One can also compare a

22、bidder’s line item prices to the aver- age line item prices of all bidders. Two separate models are </p><p>　　Discussion of the proposed models</p><p>　　The two models proposed here compare a bi

23、dder’s line item prices (1) to the engineer’s estimates; or (2) to the average line item prices of all bidders. Neither model is perfect as the engineer’s estimates and the average line item prices may not constitute exa

24、ct measures of the true value of the line items. Indeed, the engineer’s estimate may at times be quite inaccurate (Beeston, 1999), and average line item prices may be skewed by several unbalanced bids in the same batch.

25、It should also be n</p><p>　　It seems therefore that the major limitation of the proposed system lies in the absence of clear guidelines relating to the value of the four parameters one needs to specify to r

26、un the program, namely: (1) the accepted difference from the engineer’s estimate; (2) the accepted difference from the average line item prices;(3) the proportion of the project that describes ‘early’ schedule; and (4) t

27、he discount rate. On the other hand, one should note that the ability to input these parameters is an </p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　Unbalanced bidding is a serious problem for the construction o

28、wner. Unbalancing a bid is considered by many as unethical. Unbalanced bids can be rejected if caught by the owner. If awarded, the cost of these contracts to the owner is unjustifiably increased. Despite these facts, mo

29、st researchers appear to be interested in the optimization of a contractor’s cash flow by unbalancing a bid and how not to be caught in the process (e.g. Nassar, 2004; Cattell et al., 2007). Detecting an unbalanced bid&l

30、t;/p><p>　　FHWA and a number of state DOTs in the US have spelled out general principles to protect their interests with respect to unbalanced bids. Many DOTs routinely but informally check bids for unbalancing

31、 using different processes. Some DOTs such as the ones in Florida, Texas, North Carolina and Wisconsin have a formal process in place but each uses different approaches and different assumptions. The proposed model repre

32、sents a marked improvement on existing practice because it is an attempt to devel</p><p>　　The proposed model can be improved by further research into developing guidelines for the acceptable difference betw

33、een the engineer’s estimate and the estimate proposed by the bidder for any line item, and the acceptable difference between the average of the line item prices and the prices proposed by a bidder. It is also recommended

34、 that the owner keep bid price and final cost data in a database for future reference in tracking over-run and under-run trends in every bid item.</p><p>　　不平衡投標的檢測和預防</p><p>　　摘要：不平衡投標是建筑行業(yè)最常見的

35、問題之一，因為投標人高估了項目前期單價，低估了項目執(zhí)行后的單價，可能會增加施工成本。投標人也可以夸大項目的單價，再由工程師將其數(shù)量在某種程度上低估。如果業(yè)主證明，一個數(shù)學上不平衡的投標需要更大的成本執(zhí)行，該出價被認為是實質(zhì)性的不平衡，在這種情況下，業(yè)主可以拒標。本文提出了一個模型，由項目的價格與工程師的估算和投標人所提供的平均價格相比較來檢測數(shù)學和物質(zhì)不平衡投標的過程，該模型允許業(yè)主檢測和拒絕不平衡出價,并阻止投標人重新投標他們的出價。

36、</p><p>　　關鍵詞：出價，數(shù)學模型，財務管理，工程造價，優(yōu)化。</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　不平衡報價是施工業(yè)主面臨的一個嚴重問題。在競標中,將合同授予不平衡報價可能會導致業(yè)主項目的總體成本上升。在某些情況下,它會產(chǎn)生有爭議的變更(Manzo,1997年)。業(yè)主有權(quán)拒絕不平衡報價,但很難檢測到失去平衡

37、。雖然斯塔克（1968年，1972年，1974年）在公路建設合同不平衡投標的線性規(guī)劃模型，是相對容易被業(yè)主檢測，納薩爾（2004）研究的目的是不平衡的投標，而不是陷入這一過程?？ㄌ貭柕热? 2007)總結(jié)了失去平衡投標的方法,并認為客戶得到了承包商項目定價的全部信息,客戶可以選擇在承包商的競爭者中選擇,這意味著投標沒有道德方面的影響。換句話說,如果業(yè)主遭受不平衡投標的高成本,則是業(yè)主選擇不平衡投標承包商的過失,而不是不平衡投標承包商的過

38、失。然而,根據(jù)對美國建設管理協(xié)會(CMAA )的失敗管理研究所( FMI )對建筑行業(yè)中的270名業(yè)主、建筑師、工程師、建筑經(jīng)理、總承包商和分包商進行的調(diào)查, 84%的受訪者認為投標被認為是不道德的(多蘭, 2004)。此外，choi（2004）認為不平衡投標為“不道德的邊界”（第206頁）和紐約市的采購道德指南（紐約市，2002年）明確要求承包商</p><p>　　在描述了失去平衡出價的形式和含義之后,介紹了

39、美國一些州和聯(lián)邦機構(gòu)在檢測不平衡報價方面的現(xiàn)行做法。然后提出了一個模型,即不平衡報價的檢測和自動化過程,允許業(yè)主有信心拒絕不平衡報價,從而阻止投標人重新投標他們的出價。</p><p><b>　　招標不平衡</b></p><p>　　由于單位價格合同是在低出價的基礎上授予的,因此很難對低投標人的單位價格的有效性提出質(zhì)疑,除了明顯的不平衡報價。數(shù)學上不平衡出價是包含

40、一些訂單項出價，其中包含一些項目的單位價格確定明顯夸大或低于規(guī)定。這可以通過將項目的單價與工程師的估算、其他投標人的單價或其他歷史成本來確定。根據(jù)海因茨( 1988)所報告的聯(lián)邦公路管理局(美國聯(lián)邦公路局)準則,不平衡投標的含義是一種不反映合理實際成本加投標人預期利潤、間接費用和其他間接費用的合理比例的投標項目。</p><p>　　如果檢測到不平衡的投標,則必須進一步分析投標,以確定其是否在實質(zhì)上不平衡。實質(zhì)上

41、不平衡的出價是一個數(shù)學不平衡的出價,可能會花費業(yè)主更多的錢。根據(jù)海因茨( 1988)對美國聯(lián)邦公路局準則的解釋,實質(zhì)上不平衡的投標被定義為一種讓人產(chǎn)生合理懷疑的投標，即向提交數(shù)學不平衡出價的投標人授予的,將會使政府最終費用最低。</p><p>　　前期投資是不平衡報價最常見的方法。前期投資是指在項目早期階段提高項目單價,并降低后期階段完成的項目單價。承包商前期投資的主要目的是緩解承包商在項目初期面臨的財務問題,

42、如初步的動員和建設費用。但是,如果在項目的早期階段要支付承包商的工資, 在考慮貨幣時間價值時業(yè)主會支付更多費用( mcgreevy,2002年)。</p><p><b>　　不平衡報價分析</b></p><p>　　2004年,美國國家公路和運輸協(xié)會( AASHTO )發(fā)起了對不平衡報價的調(diào)查( AASHTO , 2004)。27個國家部門( dot)對這次調(diào)查作

43、出了答復。許多州(如伊利諾斯州、堪薩斯州、馬薩諸塞州和康涅狄格州)發(fā)現(xiàn)了不平衡報價,而沒有建立任何檢測這類事件的正式程序。一些州援引了它們的標準合同,規(guī)定了失去平衡出價的后果,或提交不正常的提議。包括加利福尼亞、佛羅里達、北卡羅來納州、內(nèi)華達州、田納西州、得克薩斯州和威斯康辛在內(nèi)的7個州提供了評估不平衡出價的正式程序。其中一些使用的程序沒有公開具體說明出價中使用的具體參數(shù)和可接受范圍，例如項目成本與工程師估算之間的可接受差異,或項目成本

44、與該項目的平均費用之間的可接受差異。然而,正如下文所示,一些州的投標人確實可以查取這些參數(shù)和可接受的幅度。</p><p>　　檢測和預防不平衡的投標</p><p>　　因為業(yè)主不能接受一個不平衡報價的額外費用，業(yè)主有合法拒絕不平衡投標的權(quán)利，業(yè)主應該能夠制止和防止不平衡的投標。投標人的項目成本可以與工程師估算的作比較，確定是否有顯著差異，該出價是否可能不平衡。也可以將投標人的成本價格與

45、所有投標人的平均投標價格相比較。因此，下文提出了兩個獨立的模型。由于失去平衡可以采用前期投資的形式或由工程師估算的項目單價進行調(diào)整,兩種模型都設計用于處理這些情況。兩個模型都采用MS Excel的完全自動化。</p><p><b>　　對提出模型的探討</b></p><p>　　這里提出兩種模式比較投標者項目價格（1）工程師的估算; 或（2）所有投標人的平均項目的

46、價格。由于工程師估算和平均項目價格不能構(gòu)成項目真實價格的精確度量,這兩種模型都不完美。事實上，工程師的估算可能有時是相當不準確（比斯頓，1999年），平均項目價格可能會被同一批中幾個不平衡的出價影響。還應當指出的是，由投標人提出的個別項目價格也是估算的，因此增加了過程中固有的不確定性。結(jié)果表明,這兩種模型都是近似的,但如果分析者正確的設定模型參數(shù),可能仍然會產(chǎn)生有用的信息。在第一個模型中,如果業(yè)主確信工程師的估算是準確的,業(yè)主可以通過尋

47、找與工程師估算相對較小的差異的項目來尋找不平衡報價。另一方面,如果業(yè)主對工程師估計的準確性有懷疑,則要通過尋找工程師估算的相對較大的差異來進行非平衡投標。第二個模型,投標人的項目價格與平均線項目價格相比,比前一個備選方案更穩(wěn)定,因為該模型使用所有出價的平均值,從而減少批量不平衡報價引起的異常影響。但是這個模型依賴于分析師對項目比例的輸入,這是計劃的“早期”部分。在項目的“早期”部分檢測前期投資是必要的。分析師還需要輸入折扣率,這個很難確

48、定。</p><p>　　因此，該系統(tǒng)的主要局限在于沒有涉及到運行該程序四個參數(shù)值的明確準則，即：( 1 )接受工程師估計數(shù)的差異;(二)與平均項目價格的差額;(三)項目提前計劃的比例;( 4)貼現(xiàn)率。另一方面，我們應該注意到它允許分析師輸入這些參數(shù)進行假設分析，特別是對于最后兩個參數(shù)。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>

49、;　　不平衡報價是施工業(yè)主面臨的一個嚴重問題。失去平衡的報價被許多人認為是不道德的。如果業(yè)主遇到不平衡報價,可以拒絕。如果中標,這些合同將給業(yè)主增加費用。盡管有這些事實,大多數(shù)研究人員似乎對承包商通過投標和如何不被卷入的過程(例如納薩爾,2004年;卡特爾等人(2007年)的現(xiàn)金流量優(yōu)化感興趣,。檢測不平衡報價通常是困難的,由于這些研究人員的努力,變得更加困難。鑒于目前的文獻,積極試圖向承包商傳授失去平衡的各種方法,而不被抓住。現(xiàn)在是時

50、候提供一個明智的工具允許業(yè)主檢測和拒絕不平衡報價。</p><p>　　美國聯(lián)邦公路局和美國的一些州已經(jīng)闡明了保護他們利益的不平衡出價一般原則。許多州的運輸部門經(jīng)常通過不同的流程對不平衡報價進行非正式的檢查。一些州像佛羅里達、德克薩斯、北卡羅來納和威斯康辛的運輸部有一個正式的過程, 但是每個州的運輸部都采用不同的方法和不同的假設。該模型代表了現(xiàn)行做法的明顯改善，因為它試圖制定一種全面的方法,系統(tǒng)地涵蓋投標的所有方