外文翻譯--從信息披露規(guī)則角度看企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　2200單詞，12700英文字符，3587漢字</p><p>　　出處:Laura F. Spira. Michael Page .Regulation by disclosure: the case of internal control, Springer Science, Business Media, LLC. 2009(14):409-433.</p><p&

2、gt;<b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Regulation by disclosure: the case of internal control</p><p>　　Introduction: disclosure as a regulatory tool </p><p>　　The traditional framewor

3、k of corporate accountability relies on disclosure of information to stakeholders. The form, content and reliability of this disclosure have been a matter of concern and debate ever since the establishment of legislative

4、 protection for investors and creditors in the mid nineteenth century. Financial scandals typically prompt calls for improvements in disclosure. The assumption underlying this form of disclosure is that stakeholders will

5、 be provided with information throug</p><p>　　A different view of the purpose of disclosure underlies developments in standardising financial reporting which have been justified on the basis that users of fi

6、nancial statements need information in order to make a broad range of economic decisions about their relationships with corporations, an assumption which underpins the development of conceptual frameworks for financial r

7、eporting. </p><p>　　More recently, disclosure has become viewed as a tool of regulation. For example, the UK Companies Act 2006 has required companies to make disclosures relating to risks and future prospec

8、ts. This approach to disclosure as a regulatory tool is reflected in recent discussions of European policy. The Winter Report1 of 2002 stated: </p><p>　　Disclosure requirements can sometimes provide a more e

9、fficient regulatory tool than substantive regulation through more or less detailed rules. Such disclosure creates a lighter regulatory environment and allows for greater flexibility and adaptability. (p. 34) </p>

10、<p>　　The discussion paper “Risk Management and Internal Control in the EU” states that: </p><p>　　…if regulation is necessary, then disclosure of information should be the preferred regulatory tool bec

11、ause it puts power in the hands of shareholders and markets rather than leaving it entirely with regulators (Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens 2005, p. 4) </p><p>　　Disclosure is thu

12、s seen to be beneficial from three linked and overlapping perspectives: in securing corporate accountability and the exercise of good corporate governance on behalf of stakeholders; in enabling better investment decision

13、s and the smooth running of capital markets; and as a form of indirect regulation that achieves the goals of regulators. </p><p>　　In the US, securities legislation has relied on mandated disclosure since th

14、e 1930s. Although disclosure is central to its regime of corporate accountability, the UK approach to corporate legislation has been significantly different: recognition of this difference has been heightened in much of

15、the recent ‘rules v. principles’ debate following the Enron debacle (Bush 2005). The response to such apparent failings of the system of accountability is typically a demand for fuller disclosure of infor</p><

16、p>　　The development of UK corporate governance policy has been characterised by a ‘softer’ approach, based on the principle of ‘comply or explain’, under which disclosure of information about compliance becomes mandat

17、ory, although code compliance remains voluntary. Arguments in support of this approach rest on the need for flexibility to recognise the range of diversity among companies and their activities and the assumption that the

18、 information provided about compliance will allow enforcement throu</p><p>　　Studies of disclosure tend to focus on the readily observable—the content of the disclosures themselves—rather than the behavioura

19、l effects in corporate policies and processes which disclosure is intended to secure but which are far more difficult to assess. However, the knowledge that disclosure is required may have an earlier and equally importan

20、t effect on management behaviour as that produced by market response. This is hinted at in the comment of William L Cary, former chairman of the Secur</p><p>　　Disclosure is the most realistic means of copin

21、g with the ever-present problem of conflicts of interest. In some instances our conduct is motivated by what we think is right, without regard to anything else. But, perhaps equally important, ethical behaviour—and wise

22、counselling—results from estimating the public reaction to a full knowledge of a planned course of conduct. The requirement of disclosure in certain instances, and its possibility always, is thus a most important regulat

23、ory force in </p><p>　　Although statements such as those above identify disclosure as a regulatory tool, Cary’s is unusual in that it attempts to describe the mechanisms by which it works. </p><p&

24、gt;　　In this paper we focus on a specific form of disclosure—that relating to internal control—in a specific context—that of the UK’s “comply or explain” corporate governance regime. Our choice of internal control as a d

25、isclosure topic reflects the continuing focus on this area. In 1999 the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) published “Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code” [Internal

26、Control Working Party (The Turnbull Report) 1999]. It was prepare</p><p>　　In contrast to other recent studies (e.g. Beattie et al. 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan 2004; Abraham et al. 2005; Linsley and Shrives 2

27、005) which have sought to measure disclosure quality through the adoption of a content analysis approach, our research method is informed by grounded theory as an appropriate means of generating insights into the present

28、ation and interpretation of disclosures. </p><p>　　The paper begins with an outline of the development of the concept of internal control, noting the difficulties encountered in arriving at a suitable defini

29、tion for purposes of disclosure, and its recent identification with risk management. Focusing on the disclosure requirements of the UK Turnbull guidance, we investigate disclosers’ responses to the “comply or explain” re

30、gime through an analysis of selected disclosure narratives. We conclude by identifying a disclosure life cycle which highlig</p><p>　　Internal control and its disclosure </p><p>　　…the subject o

31、f internal control, once a guaranteed remedy for sleeplessness, has made a spectacular entry onto political and regulatory agendas. (Power 1997: 57) </p><p>　　In his analysis of the development of the role o

32、f audit, Power observes that internal control has become increasingly important as part of a system of regulation which relies on making internal mechanisms visible through forms of self-validation and disclosure. Corpor

33、ate governance requirements have frequently been couched in the form of codes of practice on the principle of ‘comply or explain’ rather than prescriptive legislation. The monitoring role of the board of directors, which

34、 forms the a</p><p>　　The use of internal control as a corporate governance device reflects a subtle but significant change in its conception, moving from the original “supportive” notion that internal contr

35、ol systems were an integral part of the structure of an organisation which enabled its goals to be achieved, to the more recent view of internal control as a substantially “preventive” system, designed to minimise obstru

36、ctions to goal achievement and carrying significantly greater expectations of the effectiveness</p><p>　　The emergence of risk-based approaches to internal control has resulted in a confluence of internal co

37、ntrol and risk management to the point that an influential publication (Jones and Sutherland 1999) issued at the same time as the Turnbull guidance referred frequently to “internal control and risk management” as a singl

38、e concept in providing practical assistance for boards in complying with the Turnbull disclosure requirements. </p><p>　　The demonstration of “good” corporate governance is a challenge for boards of director

39、s but describing structural mechanisms such as internal control processes may be one way of meeting demands for transparency. Thus, what was once an internal interest becomes a means of demonstrating regulatory complianc

40、e. </p><p>　　Concerns about internal control in the US and the UK arose initially from a desire to establish the boundaries of external auditor responsibility. The difficulties of defining internal control a

41、re illustrated in the earliest US experience, as summarised in a lecture by Mautz (1980). He quotes the 1949 AICPA definition: </p><p>　　Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all of the coo

42、rdinate methods and measures adopted within a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial

43、policies. </p><p>　　and describes the concern of firms’ legal counsel about the broadness of this definition. This concern led to a new definition issued in 1958 which split the four parts of the original de

44、finition between “accounting control” (safeguarding assets and checking reliability and accuracy of accounting data) and “administrative control” (promotion of operational efficiency and encouragement of adherence to pre

45、scribed management policies) and defined auditors’ responsibility as reviewing accounting con</p><p>　　Up to this point, the definition was really only of concern to companies and their auditors but the pass

46、ing of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 changed this. The Act was passed in response to bribery scandals and for the first time envisaged the use of internal control as regulation. It was based on a narrow conce

47、ption of internal control newly described as “internal accounting control”. It also changed the focus of internal control: whereas the concerns of “accounting control” had been</p><p>　　Further concern about

48、 inadequacies in financial reporting led to a private sector initiative which established the Treadway Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 1987. Its recommendations included a call for a review of the varying

49、 concepts of internal control to develop a consistent approach. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO 1992) subsequently produced an integrated framework for internal control in 1992, defining internal control

50、as: </p><p>　　A process … designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: </p><p>　　?  Effectiveness and efficiency

51、of operations.</p><p>　　?  Reliability of financial reporting.</p><p>　　?  Compliance with applicable laws and regulations (COSO 1992, p. 9) </p><p>　　However, the Sarba

52、nes Oxley legislation of 2002 introduced a further definition: “internal control over financial reporting”3 which suggests that consistency has not yet been achieved and ambiguity still exists. </p><p>　　In

53、the UK, internal control first entered the corporate governance agenda when the Cadbury Committee, reporting in 1992 on the financial aspects of corporate governance, adopted the view that directors’ responsibilities wit

54、h regard to internal control should be clarified. They recommended that directors should report on the effectiveness of internal control systems and that auditors should report on that statement but passed responsibility

55、 for implementing this to the accountancy profession. </p><p>　　In 1994 the Rutteman working party defined internal control using the US definition of 1958 and also replaced the Cadbury recommendation that d

56、irectors should report on the effectiveness of internal controls with the suggestion that they may wish to do so. In 1998 the Hampel review of the Cadbury Code weakened this recommendation even further but, for the first

57、 time, suggested that internal control and risk management were related. </p><p>　　This link was built on by the internal control working party chaired by Nigel Turnbull which was charged with producing guid

58、ance for directors in interpreting the Code’s requirements for reporting on internal control, finally grasping the nettle avoided by Cadbury, Rutteman and Hampel. Using a broad definition of internal control, the Turnbul

59、l guidance views it as a key component of risk management. In terms of the apparent satisfaction of disclosers and their audiences, the guidance appears to </p><p>　　The study reported in this paper uses dis

60、closures required by the Turnbull guidance to illustrate aspects of the use of disclosure as a regulatory tool. Having outlined the background to current concerns about internal control disclosure, the next section consi

61、ders theories of disclosure. </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　從信息披露規(guī)則角度看企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制</p><p>　　引言：作為監(jiān)管工具的披露</p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)的企業(yè)責任框架依賴于利益相關(guān)者的信息披露。從十九世紀中期建立起對投資者、債權(quán)人的法律保護以來，

62、披露的形式、內(nèi)容和可靠性已經(jīng)成為人們普遍關(guān)注的爭論的焦點。典型的財務丑聞要求改進披露。我們假設這種披露的形式是通過利益相關(guān)者提供的信息實現(xiàn)的，這種信息來源與他們手中持有的公司資源的管理權(quán)。</p><p>　　財務報告使用者需要依據(jù)報告所披露的信息來做與企業(yè)的相關(guān)的經(jīng)濟決策，這就要求財務報告的規(guī)范化發(fā)展，這是財務報告概念框架發(fā)展的基礎同時也形成了不同披露目的觀點。</p><p>　　最近

63、，信息披露已經(jīng)成為一個監(jiān)管工具。例如，英國2006年公司法要求公司作出風險和未來前景有關(guān)的披露。這種披露方法作為一種監(jiān)管工具，最近在歐洲政策的會議討論中反映出來。2002冬季報告指出：披露要求可以提供一個比實質(zhì)性管理的更有效的監(jiān)管手段。這種披露創(chuàng)建了一個輕松的監(jiān)管環(huán)境，并且考慮到較大的靈活性和適應性（第34頁）。本文討論的“歐盟的風險管理和內(nèi)部控制”聲明如下：假如監(jiān)管是必要的，那么信息披露是首選的監(jiān)管工具，因為他將權(quán)力給予股東和市場而不

64、是全權(quán)交與監(jiān)管機構(gòu)（2005歐洲會計專家協(xié)會，第4頁）。由此看出，披露得益于三個相互聯(lián)系相互重疊的觀點：確保代表公司問責制的利益相關(guān)者和良好的公司治理；使投資決定能夠更好實現(xiàn)和資本市場的平穩(wěn)運行；作為一種實現(xiàn)監(jiān)管機構(gòu)目標的間接的調(diào)控形式。</p><p>　　美國的證券立法從上世紀30年代就已經(jīng)開始實行強制披露。盡管披露是公司問責制度的核心，但是英國對不同企業(yè)的立法方法已表現(xiàn)出明顯的差異。關(guān)于安然事件“道德對準則

65、”的爭論發(fā)生后，對這種差異的認識大大地提高了（Bush ，2005）。針對問責制度的這些明顯的缺點，所以要求充分地披露信息。</p><p>　　英國的公司治理政策在準則的基礎上“遵守或者是解釋”發(fā)展，其過程體現(xiàn)了“軟”方針的特征，，雖然準則上還是自愿遵守的，但是實際上卻是實行信息的強制披露。支持這種方法的論據(jù)是需要靈活地適用各種企業(yè)的經(jīng)營活動，提供合規(guī)信息可以加強市場自律。</p><p&g

66、t;　　披露的研究往往側(cè)重于那些易于觀察的內(nèi)容（關(guān)于披露自身，而不在于企業(yè)政策影響和披露的目的），但其中披露的保密安全性的難度要遠遠高于信息評估。然而，關(guān)于信息披露對管理行為的影響是最早的并且是重要的認知是通過市場反應產(chǎn)生的。這也證實了證券交易委員會前主席William L Cary在1967年寫的評論：披露是目前應對利益沖突不斷這一問題的最現(xiàn)實的途徑。在某些情況下，我們不考慮其他任何因素，認為自己行為的動機是正確的。但是道德行為和明智

67、的意見也許是同樣重要的，通過他們可以評估公眾的反映從而掌握整個計劃過程。在某些情況下，披露可能是社會最重要的監(jiān)管力量。披露是內(nèi)部監(jiān)督依賴基礎基礎依靠，也為更廣泛的政府或機構(gòu)的等外部監(jiān)督提供可能（Cary1967年：第408頁）。</p><p>　　如上述所說的披露作為一種監(jiān)管工具，但是Cary試圖描述披露的有效的運行機制。在這篇文章中，我們以英國的“遵守或解釋”公司治理制度為背景，把研究重點集中在特定的內(nèi)部控制

68、的披露上。在這個領域里我們選擇內(nèi)部控制作為信息披露的主體并繼續(xù)加以關(guān)注。在1999年，英格蘭及威爾士特許會計師協(xié)會(ICAEW)公布“內(nèi)部控制：綜合準則董事指南”即特恩布爾報告。它是由Nigel</p><p>　　Turnbull為主席的內(nèi)部控制工作小組起草的通常稱為“特恩布爾報告”或者“特恩布爾指南”。2005年，財務報告委員會成立了特恩布爾的審查小組，并修訂了特恩布爾報告。在同一時間，英格蘭及威爾士特許會計

69、師協(xié)會（ICAEW）發(fā)表了一份簡報文件“特恩布爾實務”（Jones和Sutherland 1999）。根據(jù)內(nèi)部控制報告編制的特恩布爾指南，我們通過審查披露的本質(zhì)分析內(nèi)部控制信息披露的影響因素。我們注意到這種披露的形式和內(nèi)容可以形成一個標準化的“樣本”，下面我們來論述他的影響。</p><p>　　與其他近期的研究相比（Beattie等2004、 Beretta和Bozzolan2004、Abraham等2005、

70、Linsley和Shrives 2005）他們都設法通過采用內(nèi)容分析法衡量披露的質(zhì)量，但我們將基礎理論的研究方法作為一種手段，深入到披露的陳述和解釋中。</p><p>　　本文首先對內(nèi)部控制的發(fā)展概念進行概述，我們找到了合適的定義來定義披露的目的以及與風險管理有關(guān)的識別。我們以英國特恩布爾指南的披露要求為焦點，通過對選定的信息披露的分析來探討披露對“遵守或解釋”制度的反應。最后，我們從決策者贊成使用披露作為解決

71、監(jiān)管問題的調(diào)控手段這個問題得出一個結(jié)論——披露周期問題。</p><p><b>　　內(nèi)部控制及其披露</b></p><p>　　曾經(jīng)內(nèi)部控制僅僅是被當作緩解經(jīng)營不善的補救措施，如今成為政治和管理的議程的重要項目（Power，1997：第57頁）。</p><p>　　在Power對審計發(fā)展的分析歷程中，發(fā)現(xiàn)內(nèi)部控制通過自我調(diào)節(jié)的方式進行披露

72、，使得內(nèi)部控制對管理系統(tǒng)的作用變得愈來愈重要。他經(jīng)常把公司治理要求表示成行業(yè)準則的遵守或者是解釋，而不是以法律的形式，從而強調(diào)了董事會作為內(nèi)部控制制度系統(tǒng)的監(jiān)督作用。在內(nèi)部控制的發(fā)展中，特殊利益集團的影響力很重要。不管是內(nèi)部審計人員還是外部審計人員，都必須具有內(nèi)部控制的專業(yè)知識。對內(nèi)部審計人員來說可以提高他們在公司的地位(Spira和Page，2003)，同時增強了外部審計師對銷售服務企業(yè)內(nèi)部審計案件的專業(yè)能力(Cunningham，2

73、004)。管理者和立法者致力于把內(nèi)部控制作為應對危機的途徑(Cunningham，2004)。</p><p>　　使用內(nèi)部控制——作為企業(yè)管理的工具在設想中反映出了微妙且有意義的變化，從原來作為保證其目標實現(xiàn)的組織結(jié)構(gòu)的“監(jiān)督”，到近來被普遍認可的內(nèi)部控制，旨在最大限度地減少阻礙目標，使得執(zhí)行的效率和成就更加的突出。正如Page和Spira所說的，由于組織的控制系統(tǒng)變化得太快，導致公司無法備案，并且有公司甚至沒

74、有與IT基礎系統(tǒng)相關(guān)的完整文件，所以越來越多的公司采取了基于風險導向的內(nèi)部控制方法。出現(xiàn)這種情況的原因是管理組織在增加，也有可能是沒有中央檔案控制系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　Jones和Sutherland在1999年提出“由于內(nèi)部控制風險導向模式的出現(xiàn)，使得內(nèi)部控制和風險管理成為一體”這一觀點，同時特恩布爾指南將“內(nèi)部控制和風險管理”合為一體，認為兩者是近乎等同的概念。</p><p>

75、　　對董事會來說，如何證明公司有一個良好的治理是極具挑戰(zhàn)的。但是，描述內(nèi)部控制的結(jié)構(gòu)機制是展示公司透明度的一種方法。因此，這就是內(nèi)部利益曾經(jīng)成為一種證明合規(guī)手段的原因。</p><p>　　英國和美國對內(nèi)部控制的關(guān)注開始于最初對建立外部審計師的一種責任。正如1980年Mautz 的報告所說的，美國首次對內(nèi)部控制進行定義。他引用了1949年美國注冊會計師協(xié)會的定義：內(nèi)部控制包括組織機構(gòu)的設計和企業(yè)內(nèi)部采取的所有相互

76、協(xié)調(diào)的方法和措施，這些方法和措施都用于保護企業(yè)的財產(chǎn)，檢查會計信息的準確性，提高經(jīng)營效率，推動企業(yè)堅持執(zhí)行既定的管理政策并介紹了公司的法律顧問關(guān)于這個概念的廣義的定義，進而在1958年重新對內(nèi)部控制進行了定義，從原始的“會計控制”（保護資產(chǎn)的完整性，檢查會計信息的準確性和可靠性）和“行政控制”</p><p>　?。ㄌ岣呓?jīng)營效率，鼓推動企業(yè)堅持執(zhí)行既定的管理政策）的定義中分離出四個部分，并且定義了審計師的唯一責任

77、是審查會計控制。1972年，美國審計行業(yè)進一步縮小了“會計控制”的兩個因素。</p><p>　　至此，這個定義只涉及到他們的公司和審計師，但是1977年的反海外腐敗法案的通過改變了這種情況。該法案是針對賄賂行為而產(chǎn)生的，而且首次將內(nèi)部控制引入法規(guī)。在狹隘的內(nèi)部控制概念基礎上重新定義“內(nèi)部會計控制”。這個行為也改變了內(nèi)部控制的重點，由原來的會計控制的組織和辦事程序轉(zhuǎn)移到對董事會的高度重視。</p>

78、<p>　　對財務報告虛假的進一步關(guān)注導致了社會組織的倡議，于1987年成立了Treadway 委員會。其倡議包括對內(nèi)部控制的不同概念的審查，以制定一個統(tǒng)一的方法。隨后，COSO委員會在1992年發(fā)表了內(nèi)部控制綜合框架，確定內(nèi)部控制定義：內(nèi)部控制廣義上可以定義為一個受企業(yè)董事會、經(jīng)理層和其他人員影響的，為達到下列目標提供合理的保證的程序：經(jīng)營效率和效果，財務報告的可靠性，符合相應的法律法規(guī)（內(nèi)部控制綜合框架，1992）。然而，

79、薩班斯出臺了新的定義，認為“內(nèi)部控制與財務報告”并不等同，兩者仍然存在著歧義。</p><p>　　在英國，內(nèi)部控制剛進入到公司治理委員會的議程時，卡德伯里委員會在1992年提出了關(guān)于公司財務方面的治理報告，董事必須建立公司財務管理方面的內(nèi)部控制制度。他們建議董事會應對內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)的有效性進行描述和審計人員對其聲明進行復核報告。</p><p>　　1944年，拉特曼工作小組借鑒了1958

80、年美國對內(nèi)部控制的定義，取代了卡德伯里的建議，即董事會對內(nèi)部控制制度的有效性進行描述。1998年，哈姆佩爾報告將公司治理向前推進了一步，第一次認為很難將內(nèi)部控制與風險管理區(qū)分開來。</p><p>　　由尼格爾．特恩布爾為主席的內(nèi)部控制工作小組在卡德伯里報告、拉特曼報告、哈姆特爾報告的基礎上進一步發(fā)展，避免了他們的局限性，為構(gòu)建“內(nèi)部控制”提供具體指南。特恩布爾報告再次擴大了內(nèi)部控制的范圍，將其與風險管理聯(lián)系起來

81、。2005年，財務匯報局特恩布爾審查小組的成立，可以看出特恩布爾指南在信息披露上受到社會群體的滿意，因此還是比較成功的。該指南還被廣泛應用與公共部門。</p><p>　　本文研究報告使用特恩布爾披露規(guī)則去說明監(jiān)管工具的使用說明方法。在當前關(guān)注的內(nèi)部控制的披露背景下，我們將在下一節(jié)介紹信息披露的具體理論。</p><p>　　來源：勞拉·皮拉，邁克爾，從信息披露規(guī)則角度看企業(yè)內(nèi)部