國(guó)際貿(mào)易外文翻譯---美國(guó)歐洲農(nóng)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘

1、<p><b>　　中文3683字</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)譯文</b></p><p>　　資料來(lái)源：Silvia Weyerbrock.Technical Trade Barriers in US/Europe Agricultural Trade[D].Newark：University of Delaware

2、，2000．</p><p>　　作者：Silvia Weyerbrock</p><p>　　美國(guó)/歐洲農(nóng)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘嚴(yán)重影響了美國(guó)/歐洲的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易。一項(xiàng)1996年美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部的調(diào)查顯示，有57個(gè)歐洲的貿(mào)易壁壘影響了美國(guó)的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出

3、口，產(chǎn)生了估計(jì)有89955萬(wàn)美元的貿(mào)易影響。本文闡述了歐洲和美國(guó)的技術(shù)法規(guī)妨礙雙邊貿(mào)易。本文為個(gè)案研究提供了一個(gè)背景，并對(duì)技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的未來(lái)作用下了定論。由于貿(mào)易規(guī)則的變更，更高的食品安全和食品質(zhì)量的需求以及歐盟的東歐國(guó)家，我們希望美國(guó)/歐洲的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘能夠在將來(lái)得到發(fā)展。</p><p>　　什么是技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘？</p><p>　　美國(guó)/歐洲的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易受到技術(shù)性貿(mào)易的強(qiáng)烈影響

4、。如上所述，對(duì)于技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘沒(méi)有統(tǒng)一的定義。研究人員建議把定義建立在意圖，經(jīng)濟(jì)影響，工具使用的基礎(chǔ)之上。</p><p>　　在本次調(diào)查中，我們遵循了由Thornsbury等人（1997年）、羅伯茨和DeRemer（1997年）提出的定義。他們把技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘定義為“能夠管制外國(guó)產(chǎn)品在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)上銷售的法規(guī)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn),并且這些法規(guī)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的表面目的是為了糾正與這些產(chǎn)品的產(chǎn)、分配和消費(fèi)相聯(lián)系的外部作用產(chǎn)生的市場(chǎng)無(wú)效?！边@

5、一定義包括身份，措施，質(zhì)量的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，動(dòng)植物衛(wèi)生檢疫措施，全球共同展區(qū)及包裝要求。不過(guò)，該定義并不包括諸如補(bǔ)貼和稅收（羅伯茨和DeRemer，1997）的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)措施。除了技術(shù)法規(guī)，羅伯茨和DeRemer強(qiáng)調(diào)，表明符合外國(guó)法規(guī)可能成為一個(gè)技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘。</p><p>　　技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘有別于其他貿(mào)易壁壘的原因在于它可以產(chǎn)生經(jīng)濟(jì)效率。而且，動(dòng)植物衛(wèi)生檢疫措施協(xié)議不是最惠國(guó)待遇，換言之，不同的貿(mào)易方為了獲得進(jìn)入一個(gè)進(jìn)口國(guó)

6、市場(chǎng)可能需要符合不同的條件。因此，為這些措施設(shè)計(jì)有效的規(guī)則是有難度的（羅伯茨和DeRemer，1997）。</p><p>　　為了遏制近年來(lái)盛行的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘，關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定的成員國(guó)組織了關(guān)于動(dòng)植物衛(wèi)生檢疫措施協(xié)議（SPS）和技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘協(xié)議（TBT）的談判，作為烏拉圭回合談判的一部分（世界貿(mào)易組織，1994年a，1994年b）。這些協(xié)議大大加強(qiáng)了對(duì)技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘使用的國(guó)際規(guī)則。所有世貿(mào)組織的成員國(guó)都受到了這些

7、協(xié)議的制約。該協(xié)議規(guī)定，動(dòng)植物衛(wèi)生檢疫措施和技術(shù)措施，不應(yīng)成為變相的貿(mào)易壁壘或以武斷或歧視性的方式被使用。他們應(yīng)該只被適用于必要的范圍之內(nèi)，并且必須以科學(xué)的原則和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估（世界貿(mào)易組織，1994年a，1994年b）為基礎(chǔ)。各國(guó)被鼓勵(lì)使用由國(guó)際科學(xué)組織制定的國(guó)際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，諸如食品規(guī)范委員會(huì)，國(guó)際獸疫局（OIE）和國(guó)際植物保護(hù)公約（IPPC）。但是，如果各國(guó)的理由是科學(xué)或一個(gè)非歧視性的更低水平的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的話，他們可能保持比國(guó)際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)更為嚴(yán)格的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在

8、協(xié)調(diào)統(tǒng)一的情況下，世貿(mào)組織的成員國(guó)被鼓勵(lì)運(yùn)用等效和談判的原則，例如，獸醫(yī)等效協(xié)議。等效意味著相同的健康保障水平可以由（世界貿(mào)易組織，1994年b）不同的方法實(shí)現(xiàn)。如果一個(gè)國(guó)家可以證明它的措施，盡管有些不同，仍能滿足其他國(guó)家合法目標(biāo)的要求，法規(guī)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)被等同看待。等效協(xié)議允</p><p>　　美國(guó)/歐洲的貿(mào)易壁壘</p><p><b>　　概覽</b></p&

9、gt;<p>　　在一項(xiàng)美國(guó)科學(xué)家聯(lián)合會(huì)，美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和美國(guó)貿(mào)易組織的調(diào)查中，羅伯茨和DeRemer（1997年）指出了在歐盟，東歐和前蘇聯(lián)的影響1996年6月美國(guó)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口的貿(mào)易壁壘。這些壁壘包括市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入壁壘，市場(chǎng)拓展壁壘和市場(chǎng)保留壁壘。市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入壁壘，包括進(jìn)口禁令；市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)大壁壘有限，但并不排除美國(guó)的出口；市場(chǎng)保留壁壘是目前正在考慮的措施，一旦獲得通過(guò)則很可能影響美國(guó)的出口。羅伯茨和DeRemer要求大使專員和貿(mào)易組

10、織從當(dāng)前美國(guó)出口收入的價(jià)值這個(gè)層面來(lái)估計(jì)受到此類壁壘的貿(mào)易影響，可能存在威脅和潛在的損失。請(qǐng)注意，這項(xiàng)調(diào)查只涵蓋影響美國(guó)出口到的那些包括在美國(guó)科學(xué)家聯(lián)合會(huì)海外辦事處項(xiàng)下的國(guó)家的貿(mào)易壁壘。它既不包括歐盟的貿(mào)易壁壘對(duì)其他國(guó)家特別是美國(guó)的影響，也不包括美國(guó)的壁壘對(duì)歐盟進(jìn)口的影響。</p><p>　　該調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)了歐洲的57個(gè)貿(mào)易壁壘并對(duì)美國(guó)的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口產(chǎn)生了估計(jì)有價(jià)值89955萬(wàn)美元的貿(mào)易影響。其中的6個(gè)貿(mào)易壁壘產(chǎn)生了

11、一個(gè)估計(jì)有超過(guò)5000萬(wàn)美元/人的個(gè)人貿(mào)易影響（見(jiàn)表2）。這些壁壘共計(jì)占所有估計(jì)貿(mào)易影響的61.8％。調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)在世界范圍內(nèi)只有12個(gè)其他的壁壘有如此大的影響。羅伯茨和DeRemer（1997）找到了23條美國(guó)/歐洲的貿(mào)易法規(guī)，它們產(chǎn)生了一個(gè)估計(jì)有超過(guò)500萬(wàn)的貿(mào)易影響。</p><p>　　考慮到產(chǎn)品包含貿(mào)易壁壘，調(diào)查顯示，許多壁壘影響美國(guó)出口至歐洲的動(dòng)物產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易（見(jiàn)表2）。關(guān)于動(dòng)物產(chǎn)品的所有壁壘的貿(mào)易影響達(dá)到估

12、計(jì)有47730萬(wàn)美元，占所有歐洲壁壘估計(jì)貿(mào)易影響的53％。相比之下，在世界上的所有其他國(guó)家動(dòng)物產(chǎn)品出口遭受貿(mào)易壁壘的只占10730萬(wàn)美元。此外，出口加工食品和糧食超過(guò)1億美元也分別受到了貿(mào)易壁壘的影響（羅伯茨和DeRemer，1997）。</p><p>　　美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部調(diào)查報(bào)告是關(guān)于技術(shù)貿(mào)易壁壘影響美國(guó)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口的最全面的調(diào)查。它通過(guò)詳細(xì)說(shuō)明這些壁壘是如何遍布的來(lái)為技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘找到光明。但是，其結(jié)果應(yīng)被仔細(xì)解釋

13、為幾個(gè)原因：</p><p>　　1．專家咨詢很可能有偏見(jiàn)：美國(guó)科學(xué)家聯(lián)合會(huì)和貿(mào)易組織的目標(biāo)是促進(jìn)美國(guó)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)曾經(jīng)以美國(guó)的立場(chǎng)來(lái)看待諸如科學(xué)依據(jù)和符合新的貿(mào)易協(xié)定的各項(xiàng)措施的問(wèn)題來(lái)審核他們的估計(jì)。</p><p>　　2．一些專家可能已經(jīng)知道，美國(guó)可能會(huì)考慮啟動(dòng)以他們的報(bào)告為基礎(chǔ)的世貿(mào)組織爭(zhēng)端解決程序。</p><p>　　3．這項(xiàng)調(diào)查涵蓋市場(chǎng)保留壁壘（

14、即正在審議的壁壘），其通過(guò)和實(shí)施是不確定的。</p><p>　　4．最后，出于保密的原因，羅伯茨和DeRemer（1997）沒(méi)有明確指出具體的問(wèn)題。由于缺乏信息，因此很難評(píng)估各種估計(jì)的可靠性。</p><p>　　表2 在1996年美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部調(diào)查報(bào)告中發(fā)現(xiàn)的歐洲的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘</p><p><b>　　續(xù)表</b></p>

15、<p>　　注意事項(xiàng)：只有當(dāng)（1）提供超過(guò)10個(gè)貿(mào)易壁壘，或者（2）估計(jì)的貿(mào)易影響超過(guò)5000萬(wàn)美元時(shí)，產(chǎn)品種類的信息可供提供。</p><p>　　資料來(lái)源：Thornsbury等人（1997年）；羅伯茨和DeRemer（1997年）。</p><p><b>　　具體措施</b></p><p>　　本節(jié)會(huì)提出近期具體的美國(guó)/歐洲

16、農(nóng)業(yè)貿(mào)易的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘。除了研究歐洲壁壘對(duì)美國(guó)進(jìn)口的影響，我們也會(huì)探討美國(guó)壁壘對(duì)歐洲進(jìn)口的影響。我們明確普遍存在這種壁壘的領(lǐng)域，并試圖概略估計(jì)它們的貿(mào)易影響。</p><p>　　我們的調(diào)查沒(méi)有提供關(guān)于美國(guó)/歐洲貿(mào)易的技術(shù)壁壘的系統(tǒng)證據(jù)。這需要一個(gè)詳細(xì)的評(píng)估，它關(guān)于許多標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和法規(guī)以及一個(gè)關(guān)于許多國(guó)家出口的全面的調(diào)查。相反，我們的研究是基于研究論文，報(bào)紙，工業(yè)和機(jī)構(gòu)的出版物諸如“阿格拉歐洲”（報(bào)刊名）上找到的信息

17、，美國(guó)對(duì)外農(nóng)業(yè)服務(wù)產(chǎn)業(yè)的文件以及一份關(guān)于美國(guó)貿(mào)易和投資的壁壘的歐盟委員會(huì)報(bào)告。我們省略了這些出版物沒(méi)有提及的貿(mào)易壁壘，可能有許多技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與合格評(píng)定和執(zhí)行方面相關(guān)。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們?cè)噲D概略地估計(jì)各種技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的影響。不幸的是，除了彼得森，帕吉和亨利（1998年美國(guó)）在論文上引發(fā)的歐盟荷爾蒙爭(zhēng)端以外，關(guān)于美國(guó)/歐洲的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘對(duì)價(jià)格和社會(huì)福利的影響的定量的經(jīng)濟(jì)研究仍處于莫衷一是的狀態(tài)

18、。有時(shí)，新聞和其他來(lái)源確定存在威脅或存在壁壘的貿(mào)易影響。如果沒(méi)有數(shù)據(jù)，我們近似估計(jì)最大可能的影響，例如，一個(gè)進(jìn)口禁令，在實(shí)施該項(xiàng)禁令以前給予貿(mào)易量的信息。但是請(qǐng)注意，這種估計(jì)可能言過(guò)其實(shí)。進(jìn)口禁令往往與具體的生產(chǎn)和加工技術(shù)有關(guān)。如果一家美國(guó)的加工企業(yè)遵循歐盟的法規(guī)，它就仍有可能與歐盟達(dá)成生意上的往來(lái)。</p><p>　　表3 節(jié)選的美國(guó)/歐洲技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的近似的貿(mào)易影響</p><p>

19、;　　a. 在1994到1995年間，酒和橄欖油的出口與所有出口類似。并不是所有的酒和橄欖油的出口都受到了貿(mào)易壁壘的影響。</p><p>　　b. 數(shù)據(jù)適用于所有紅肉但豬肉除外。</p><p>　　c. 東歐禽肉1997年的出口總額達(dá)到16000萬(wàn)美元。</p><p>　　最后，請(qǐng)注意，我們并不僅僅試圖精確地指出羅伯茨和DeRemer的關(guān)于歐洲技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘影

20、響美國(guó)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口的清單。美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部的調(diào)查構(gòu)成了1996年6月美國(guó)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口所面臨的國(guó)外技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的縮影。美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部調(diào)查所定義的第二猜測(cè)措施會(huì)使我們忽略諸如歐盟針對(duì)特定危險(xiǎn)材料的威脅禁令等的重大現(xiàn)實(shí)問(wèn)題。其他問(wèn)題可能會(huì)被同時(shí)解決。</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)原文</b></p><p>　　Material Source: Silvia Weyerbroc

21、k.Technical Trade Barriers in US/Europe Agricultural Trade[D].Newark：University of Delaware，2000．</p><p>　　Author: Silvia Weyerbrock</p><p>　　Technical Trade Barriers in US/Europe Agricultural T

22、rade</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Technical barriers strongly affect US/European agricultural and food trade. A 1996 USDA survey identifies 57 questionable European regulations

23、affecting US agricultural exports with an estimated trade impact of $899.55 million. This article identifies European and US technical regulations that impede bilateral trade. The article provides a background for case s

24、tudies and draws conclusions regarding the future role of technical barriers. We expect that technical barriers in US/Europe trade will p</p><p>　　What is a Technical Barrier to Trade?</p><p>　　

25、US/Europe agricultural trade is strongly affected by technical barriers to trade. As mentioned above there is no commonly agreed upon definition of technical barriers to trade. Researchers have proposed definitions based

26、 on intent, economic impact, and instruments used.</p><p>　　In this survey we follow a definition proposed by Thornsbury et al. (1997) and Roberts and DeRemer (1997). They define technical barriers as “inter

27、nationally divergent regulations and standards governing the sale of products in national markets which have as their prima facie objective the correction of market inefficiencies stemming from externalities associated w

28、ith the production, distribution, and consumption of these products.” This definition includes standards of identity, measure, and qu</p><p>　　Technical trade barriers differ from many other trade barriers b

29、ecause they can be economically efficient. Moreover, SPS regulations are not “most favored nation,” i.e., different trading partners may need to comply with different conditions for gaining access to, an importing countr

30、y’s market. Consequently, designing effective rules for such measures is difficult (Roberts & DeRemer, 1997).</p><p>　　To stem the proliferation of technical barriers in recent years, GATT members negoti

31、ated Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) as part of the Uruguay Round Agreement (World Trade Organization, 1994a, 1994b). These agreements considerably strengthen

32、 international rules on the use of technical barriers. All WTO members are now subject to these agreements. The agreements specify that SPS and technical measures should not be used as disguised t</p><p>　　T

33、echnical Regulations in US/Europe Trade</p><p><b>　　Overview</b></p><p>　　In a survey of FAS attaches, USDA regulatory agencies, and US trade organizations, Roberts and DeRemer (1997

34、) identify questionable regulations in the EU, Eastern Europe, and the FSU that affected US agricultural exports in June 1996. Such barriers include market access, market expansion, and market retention barriers. Market

35、access barriers include import bans; market expansion barriers limit but do not preclude US exports; and market retention barriers are measures under consideration, which m</p><p>　　The survey finds 57 quest

36、ionable measures in Europe with an estimated trade impact on US agricultural and food exports of $899.55 million. Six of these questionable measures have an estimated individual trade impact of more than $50 million each

37、 (Table 2). Together these barriers account for 61.8% of the total estimated trade impact. Survey respondents identified only 12 other measures worldwide with such a large impact. Roberts and DeRemer (1997) find 23 regul

38、ations in US/Europe trade with an e</p><p>　　Considering the product coverage of questionable measures, the survey shows that many barriers affecting US exports to Europe affect trade in animal products (Tab

39、le 2). The estimated trade impact of all barriers on animal products is $477.3 million and accounts for 53% of estimated total trade impacts of all European barriers. By comparison, in all other countries of the world on

40、ly $107.3 million exports of animal products are subjected to questionable barriers. Moreover, exports of processed fo</p><p>　　The USDA survey is the first comprehensive survey of technical trade barriers a

41、ffecting US agricultural exports. It has shed the light on TBTs by detailing how pervasive such barriers are. However, its results should be interpreted carefully for several reasons.</p><p>　　1. The experts

42、 consulted are likely to be biased: the goal of FAS attaches and trade organizations is to promote US agricultural exports. The regulatory agencies used to vet their estimates are likely to take the US stance on issues s

43、uch as the scientific justification and conformity of various measures with the new trade agreements.</p><p>　　2. Some experts may have been aware that the US may consider initiating WTO dispute settlement p

44、rocedures based on their reports.</p><p>　　3. The survey covers market retention barriers (i.e., barriers under consideration) whose adoption and implementation are uncertain.</p><p>　　4. Finall

45、y, for confidentiality reasons, Roberts and DeRemer (1997) could not identify specific issues. Lacking this information, it is difficult to assess the reliability of various estimates.</p><p>　　TABLE 2 Europ

46、ean Technical Trade Barriers Identified in 1996 USDA Survey</p><p><b>　　Continued</b></p><p>　　Note: Information for product categories only given if (1) more than 10 barriers apply,

47、 or (2) if the ETI exceeds $50 million.</p><p>　　Source: Thornsbury et al. (1997); Roberts and DeRemer (1997).</p><p>　　Specific Measures</p><p>　　This section identifies recent and

48、 current specific technical barriers in US/Europe agricultural trade. In addition to studying European barriers on US imports, we also explore US barriers on European imports. We identify sectors in which such barriers a

49、re prevalent and attempt to approximate their trade impact.</p><p>　　Our survey does not provide systematic evidence on technical barriers in US/Europe trade. This requires a detailed assessment of many stan

50、dards and regulations and a comprehensive survey of exporters in many countries. Instead, our study is based on information found in research papers, newspapers, and industry and agency publications such as Agra-Europe,

51、documents of the US Foreign Agricultural Service, and a European Commission Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment. We omit questionabl</p><p>　　In this article, we attempt to approximate the trade im

52、pact of various TBTs. Unfortunately, with the exception of Peterson, Paggi, and Henry’s paper (1998) on the US/EU hormone dispute, quantitative economic studies on the price and welfare effects of TBTs in US/Europe trade

53、 are unavailable at this point. Occasionally, news and other sources identify the trade impact of threatened or existing barriers. If no data are available, we approximate the maximum possible impact of, for example, an

54、impor</p><p>　　TABLE 3. The Approximate Trade Impact of Selected US/Europe Technical Barriers</p><p>　　a. Wine and olive oil exports correspond to total exports in the quoted year. Not all wine

55、and olive oil may be affected by the ban.</p><p>　　b. Figure applies to total red meat rather than pork..</p><p>　　c. Eastern Europe’s poultry meat imports amounted to $160 million in 1997.</

56、p><p>　　Finally, please note that we do not attempt to merely pinpoint Roberts and DeRemer’s list of European technical barriers affecting US agricultural exports. The USDA survey constitutes a snapshot of ques

57、tionable foreign technical barriers facing US agricultural exports in June 1996. Second-guessing measures identified by the USDA survey would have led us to neglect important current issues such as the EU’s threatened ba