社區(qū)銀行相關(guān)外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3000字,1800單詞，9400英文字符</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)出處：Martin, David L. Needed: A New Community Bank Model [J], Bank Accounting & Finance, 2009:21-29.</p><p>　　http://www.wenku1.com/news/33960B2F5

2、ABD4621.html</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Needed: A New Community Bank Model</p><p>　　Martin, David L.</p><p>　　Community banks need to find a new business m

3、odel. Why? Because the old one doesn’t work anymore. The evidence is a large and widening gap in profitability between community banks and larger banks, a gap that didn’t exist 10 years ago.</p><p>　　Having

4、been involved with community banks for the past 20 years, I believe that many of the smallest banks are using largely the same business model today that they were 10 or 20 years ago; but today’s new competitive, legislat

5、ive and operating environ- ment is radically different from the 1980s and early 1990s. By one CEO’s description, many community banks are generating expense in multiple business models and generating revenue in only one,

6、 and an old one at that.</p><p>　　■What happened during the decade?</p><p>　　■Why did smaller banks lose ground?</p><p>　　■What’s the outlook for small banks?</p><p>　　

7、In this article, I’ll try to answer all three questions. The views expressed here are based on personal observation and numerous contacts with community bankers. The evidence, therefore, is anecdotal, but industry operat

8、ing results support these observations.</p><p>　　Community Bank Profitability in Decline</p><p>　　Community banking profitability suffered in the past decade. Exhibits 1 and 2 show the changed p

9、icture: In 1996, all of the asset size groups had a return on average assets (ROAA) above 1.00 percent, and there was no apparent correlation between size and profitability. By 2006, the smallest banks’ ROAA had dropped

10、below 1.00 percent and only the largest banks gained ground during the decade. Moreover, the ascending bars in the right-hand graph suggest a strong positive correlation between size a</p><p>　　The smallest

11、banks lost profitability not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the larger asset size groups. Exhibit 3 shows both the 10-year change in profitability for each asset size group and each group’s change relati

12、ve to the next-larger size group, in other words, the growth in the gap. In 1996, the smallest banks, those with assets under $500 million, earned 1.13 percent on assets; the larger banks—all four size groups—earned slig

13、htly more. By 2006, the smallest banks had lost</p><p>　　For All Banks, Net-Interest Margin Under Pressure</p><p>　　The profitability gap developed against the backdrop of a persistent decline i

14、n net-interest margin. The ta ble in Exhibit 4 shows the deterioration in net-interest margin for all banks from 1996 through 2006. The drop in net-interest margin was uneven across the five asset size groups, with the s

15、mallest and largest banks losing the most. Exhibit 4 shows that the small- est banks lost not only 83 bps in net-interest margin but also most of their margin advantage vis-à-vis the larger banks. In 19</p>&

16、lt;p>　　Banks’ main defense against the falling net-interest margin was improved efficiency and, as shown in Exhibit 5, banks in all five groups improved their operating efficiency as measured by net operating expense

17、(NOE) as a percentage of average assets. 3 But, as foreshadowed in the ROAA graphs in Exhibits 1 and 2, only the largest banks were able to improve efficiency enough to significantly offset their loss in net-interest mar

18、gin.</p><p>　　It’s easy to conclude that the decline in net-interest margin was responsible for all of the damage and that the future of the banking industry is tied to the destiny of that measure. We can ho

19、pe that the outlook is better than that, because few observers expect net-interest margins to return to 1990s levels. Moreover, net-interest margin is considerably more important to banks in the four smaller asset size g

20、roups since they rely more heavily on net-interest income than the largest banks.</p><p>　　A Transformed Competitive Environment</p><p>　　The smallest banks not only lost most of their net-inter

21、est-margin advantage in the last decade they had only a modest improvement in efficiency. Legislation, industry consolidation, new competi- tion, new technology and delivery channels and more intense regulation and super

22、vision have squeezed margins and added expense for all banks, but these forces seemed to hit the smallest banks hardest.</p><p>　　Banks Merged at a Slower Pace Than Larger Banks</p><p>　　While t

23、he biggest banks were becoming much bigger and more efficient through the wave of very large mergers described above, community banks were not merging at nearly the same rate. Exhibit 8 plots all of the bank and thrift m

24、ergers in the United States from 1998 through 2007 by the buyer’s asset size (vertical axis) and seller’s asset size (horizontal axis). Using $1 billion in assets as the dividing line between larger and smaller banks, th

25、ere were 8,776 smaller banks and thrifts on January 1</p><p>　　Why were smaller banks less apt to merge than larger banks? For a long list of familiar reasons, but mostly because they didn’t want to—and unti

26、l now they haven’t had to. But the mandate for greater efficiency, especially when added to the realities of the current crisis, may change that reluctance to merge. Small banks’ attitude toward efficiency and profitabil

27、ity may be best illustrated by the size of their branches. Branch productivity is a key factor in any bank’s profit- ability, and a bank</p><p>　　A New Community Bank Model</p><p>　　Will communi

28、ty banks be able to recover from the current credit crisis and their long term decline in profitability? The analysis above suggests that the smallest community banks—even if they are not capital market dependent—will ne

29、ed to improve their profitability simply to remain viable. More- over, many community bankers know that they are or will become capital market dependent and that they must achieve better profitability and earnings growth

30、 either to achieve an acceptable return that wil</p><p>　　As this analysis has shown, the old model doesn’t work anymore and community banks need a new one. What will it look like?</p><p>　　Desc

31、ribing the new model is easy. In an industry with 8,000 players, all of them described in detail in publicly available financial reports and easily accessible databases, it’s not difficult to identify the elements of goo

32、d performance. They turn out to be uncomplicated. Again, I used Pennsylvania for the analysis. With more than 150 commercial banks in the state within the community bank definition—banks with assets under $1 billion— the

33、 state provides an ample database. We divided Pennsylvan</p><p>　　■Asset growth in the previous five years</p><p>　　■Asset quality</p><p>　　■Loans as a percentage of total assets<

34、;/p><p>　　■Net-interest margin</p><p>　　■Productivity measured by net operating expense (NOE) as a percentage of average assets.</p><p>　　There were no surprises except for the size of

35、 the variation in NOE, both within each peer group and among the groups. The clear correlation between size and productivity apparent in the national averages in Exhibit 5 was equally evident in the one-state analysis. T

36、he fact that the community banks had to be divided into size groups to get usable results makes the point: Size matters, and for a performance-oriented (read capital-market- dependent) community bank, minimum viable asse

37、t size in this</p><p>　　The revelation here is not that all the characteristics that mattered in the past still matter. What’s new is that they matter even more than they used to and, given the level of the

38、smaller banks’ profitability and the current asset-quality crisis (that isn’t reflected in the 2006 numbers), there’s a greater urgency for improvement now.</p><p>　　How would the new community bank model co

39、mpare with the old one?</p><p>　　■It probably has more lenders making more loans at better rates, and collecting more of them. (Nothing to it!)</p><p>　　■It’s found a way to grow either organica

40、lly, if its market permits, or through mergers if its market doesn’t.</p><p>　　■It’s gotten very serious about productivity and has shed or fixed the least productive aspects of its delivery channels.</p&

41、gt;<p>　　■It’s bigger.</p><p>　　We’ve seen above that community banks, in re- lation to their population, tend not to merge with larger banks or with each other for that matter. The new pressure on co

42、mmunity banks’ profitability, which seems unlikely to abate, may change that reluctance to merge. (It should come as no surprise that an investment banker would suggest mergers as a solution)</p><p><b>

43、;　　譯文</b></p><p>　　社區(qū)銀行需要一個(gè)新的模式</p><p><b>　　馬丁·大衛(wèi)</b></p><p>　　社區(qū)銀行需要找到一種新的商業(yè)模式。為什么?因?yàn)槔系纳虡I(yè)模式已經(jīng)不適應(yīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)的發(fā)展需求了。這主要是因?yàn)樯鐓^(qū)銀行和大型商業(yè)銀行大型之間的盈利能力差距進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大，并且這一差距遠(yuǎn)不是十年前存在的差

44、距可比的。</p><p>　　在過(guò)去的20年里，很多小型銀行包括社區(qū)銀行當(dāng)前使用的商業(yè)模式基本是</p><p>　　相同的，這模式是10年或20年前的老的商業(yè)模式，但是，當(dāng)今時(shí)代，銀行正面臨著新的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力、立法和操作環(huán)境，這些都完全不同于80年代末和90年代初的商業(yè)環(huán)境。根據(jù)一個(gè)首席執(zhí)行官的闡述，許多社區(qū)銀行的商業(yè)模式都需要產(chǎn)生費(fèi)用，而產(chǎn)生收入的卻只有一個(gè)，并且是老的商業(yè)模式。</

45、p><p>　　在這十年發(fā)生了什么事?</p><p>　　為什么小銀行的發(fā)展受到限制?</p><p>　　小銀行的前景是什么?</p><p>　　在本文中，我將嘗試回答這三個(gè)問(wèn)題。本文觀點(diǎn)是基于作者的個(gè)人觀察，以及與社區(qū)銀行家們的大量接觸。實(shí)際的研究結(jié)果也支持本文的觀點(diǎn)。 社區(qū)銀行的盈利能力下降社區(qū)銀行的盈利能力在過(guò)去的十年，發(fā)生了很大的變

46、化。資料顯示，1996年，所有的有一定規(guī)模的社區(qū)銀行組織的平均總資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率(ROAA)都在1.00%以上，并且銀行的規(guī)模和盈利能力之間也沒(méi)有明顯的相關(guān)性。到2006年，一些小型的社區(qū)銀行的ROAA已跌破1.00%，只有一些大銀行才取得了一些增長(zhǎng)。</p><p>　　小型銀行盈利能力逐步降低，這并不是絕對(duì)的，但是大致情況是這樣的。根據(jù)相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)的顯示，10年來(lái)的小型社區(qū)銀行的盈利能力不斷變化，各銀行之間的差距也越來(lái)

47、越大。在1996年，小型社區(qū)銀行，即那些擁有5億美元左右資產(chǎn)的小型銀行，獲得了1.13%的資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率，而四家更大的銀行，其資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率則稍微高點(diǎn)。到2006年，小型社區(qū)銀行的盈利能力又下降了21個(gè)基點(diǎn)(bps)，而其他銀行降低的幅度則稍微小點(diǎn)。而大型銀行的運(yùn)營(yíng)利潤(rùn)則實(shí)際上提高了18個(gè)基點(diǎn)。</p><p><b>　　銀行的凈利息差</b></p><p>　　由于凈利

48、息利潤(rùn)率的持續(xù)下降，導(dǎo)致銀行間的盈利能力差距也越來(lái)越大。根據(jù)相關(guān)資料顯示，從1996年到2006年，所有銀行的凈利息都出現(xiàn)很大的下降，情況逐漸惡化。各個(gè)銀行的凈利息的下降幅度，也有很大的差別，不論是大型銀行組織，還是像小型社區(qū)銀行這樣的小型銀行組織，其凈利息都有大幅度的下降。小型銀行下降了83個(gè)基點(diǎn)。在1996年，他們的凈利息為5.02%，比其他的大型銀行組織要好些，要高23個(gè)基點(diǎn)，而這些大型銀行凈利息為4.79%。不過(guò)到了 2006年

49、，23 個(gè)基點(diǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)也降低到了 7 個(gè)基點(diǎn)。 </p><p>　　銀行應(yīng)對(duì)凈利息下降的主要防御辦法，就是想方設(shè)法的提高銀行的效率，我們調(diào)查的幾家銀行組織都提高了運(yùn)營(yíng)效率，都在努力改變盈利下降的現(xiàn)狀，但是根據(jù)實(shí)際的調(diào)查情況顯示，只有一些大型銀行才能夠顯著地提高其效率，足以抵消凈利息的損失，而其他銀行組織的成效則較低。 </p><p>　　因此，我們很容易得出結(jié)論，凈利息收入水平的下降是導(dǎo)

50、致銀行利潤(rùn)下降的主要原因，銀行的凈利息收入對(duì)銀行來(lái)說(shuō)，是至關(guān)重要的，關(guān)系到銀行業(yè)的未來(lái)與命運(yùn)。我們希望，銀行業(yè)的未來(lái)前景會(huì)越來(lái)越好，因?yàn)橐恍┯^察人士已經(jīng)預(yù)計(jì)到，銀行的凈利息收入水平將會(huì)回到90 年代的水平，會(huì)得到逐步的上升。此外，對(duì)于小型銀行，特別是社區(qū)銀行，相比于大型銀行來(lái)說(shuō)，凈利息指標(biāo)是更重要的，因?yàn)樾⌒豌y行比大銀行更依賴(lài)于凈利息收入。 </p><p><b>　　競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境的變化 </b&g

51、t;</p><p>　　在過(guò)去 10 年，小型銀行失去了大部分的凈息差優(yōu)勢(shì)，但是銀行效率提高的幅度很有限，效率提高獲得的收入遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)趕不上凈利息的下 降。國(guó)家立法、行業(yè)整合、新競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、新技術(shù)和交付渠道，以及更強(qiáng)烈的國(guó)家監(jiān)管等等，這些因素都進(jìn)一步加大了銀行的壓力，使它們的利潤(rùn)率逐步受到擠壓，特別是所有的銀行的費(fèi)用逐步提高，進(jìn)一步擠壓了銀行的利潤(rùn)空間，特別是對(duì)于小型銀行來(lái)說(shuō)，情況更為嚴(yán)重。 </p>

52、<p>　　社區(qū)銀行正以比大銀行稍慢的速度不斷的合并 </p><p>　　通過(guò)大規(guī)模的并購(gòu)浪潮，大銀行都變得更大的和更有效，而社區(qū)銀行卻達(dá)不到相同的合并速度。從 1998 年到 2007 年，所有銀行的并購(gòu)潮高漲，以 10 億美元資產(chǎn)為分界線(xiàn)，截至 1998 年 1 月 1 日，當(dāng)時(shí)有 8776 家小銀行和儲(chǔ)蓄機(jī)構(gòu)，以及 367 家大型銀行。有 2313 家銀行參與了合并，這意味著他們中的大多數(shù)并沒(méi)

53、有參與合并，據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)，銀行的參與合并率平均為 0.26。同樣的 10 年里，367 家大銀行參與了1367 起合并，這意味著每個(gè)大型銀行都參與了合并，參與率平均為3.7。換句話(huà)說(shuō)，在這十年期間，大銀行的參與合并率是小型銀行 10倍還多。這種現(xiàn)象完全改變了美國(guó)銀行的現(xiàn)狀，小銀行控制的資產(chǎn)達(dá)到 10 億美元，在 10 年期間里，大型銀行的控制資產(chǎn)大約是前者的兩倍。 </p><p>　　為什么小銀行沒(méi)有大銀行那么傾向于

54、合并嗎?這有很多的原因，但最主要的還是因?yàn)樗麄冏约翰幌脒@樣做，而現(xiàn)在是迫于形式不得不這樣做，并非出自其本意。但因?yàn)殂y行面臨的壓力越來(lái)，運(yùn)營(yíng)成本等也不斷地提高，對(duì)于銀行來(lái)說(shuō)，就只能通過(guò)提高效率，來(lái)緩解這一趨勢(shì)。尤其是當(dāng)銀行面臨危機(jī)時(shí)，這些小型銀行可能會(huì)改變其不愿合并的政策。小銀行對(duì)于效率和和盈利能力的態(tài)度，最好的體現(xiàn)就是他們 的分支機(jī)構(gòu)。分支機(jī)構(gòu)（分行）的生產(chǎn)力對(duì)任何銀行的盈利能力來(lái)說(shuō)，都是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素，銀行的業(yè)務(wù)顧問(wèn)會(huì)說(shuō)分行的設(shè)置都是比

55、較簡(jiǎn)單的，其規(guī)模大小是通過(guò)其居民客戶(hù)的存款多少來(lái)衡量的。小銀行的分行，其經(jīng)營(yíng)規(guī)模一般都較小。賓夕法尼亞州就是一個(gè)很典型的例子，其大銀行和小銀行對(duì)分行的規(guī)模大小及設(shè)置，都有其自己的想法。 </p><p>　　截至 2008 年 6 月 30 日，在賓夕法尼亞州，有 252 家銀行和儲(chǔ)蓄機(jī)構(gòu)在該州開(kāi)設(shè)了分行機(jī)構(gòu)，總數(shù)達(dá) 4829 家。他們的存款總額是 2640億美元，分行的平均規(guī)模約為 5400 萬(wàn)美元。但是 12

56、 家最大的銀行，每家都有超過(guò) 50 億美元的存款，存款總額達(dá)到 1810 億美元，其 2607家分行的平均存款規(guī)模為 6900 萬(wàn)美元。在同一日期，有 117 家銀行，其客戶(hù)存款額在 1 億美元和 5 億美元之間，存款總額達(dá)到 300 億美元的，占到了 840 家，其分行的平均存款規(guī)模約為 3500 萬(wàn)美元。 </p><p>　　一個(gè)新的社區(qū)銀行模式 </p><p>　　社區(qū)銀行能從當(dāng)

57、前的信貸危機(jī)和長(zhǎng)期的盈利能力下降的現(xiàn)狀中恢復(fù)過(guò)來(lái)嗎? 上述分析表明，小型社區(qū)銀行，即使他們不用完全依資本市場(chǎng)，但是他們?nèi)匀恍枰岣咚麄兊挠芰Γ皇菫榱四軌蚶^續(xù)生存。此外，許多社區(qū)銀行家們知道他們或許將來(lái)要依賴(lài)資本市場(chǎng)，但是他們也必須獲得更好的盈利能力和盈利增長(zhǎng)率，獲得一個(gè)可以接受的資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率，讓他們能夠保持獨(dú)立性，避免合并。不過(guò)，他們要如何做呢？ </p><p>　　這一分析表明，以往的舊的商業(yè)模式已經(jīng)行不

58、通了，社區(qū)銀行需要一個(gè)新的商業(yè)模式。它會(huì)是什么樣子的呢? </p><p>　　描述這個(gè)新模型是很容易的。在一個(gè)擁有 8000 家參與者的行業(yè)，他們都公開(kāi)了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，信息都很詳細(xì)，很易于客戶(hù)的訪(fǎng)問(wèn)，大家不難識(shí)別出各家銀行的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效。這是很簡(jiǎn)單的。我再一次用賓夕法尼亞州作為案例用于分析。有 150 多家商業(yè)銀行都可以被稱(chēng)為社區(qū)銀行，他們的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模都在 10 億美元以下。我們將賓夕法尼亞州的社區(qū)銀行分為三個(gè)組:資產(chǎn)額

59、低于 2.5 億美元的社區(qū)銀行；銀行資產(chǎn)在2.5 億美元和 5 億美元之間的社區(qū)銀行，以及銀行資產(chǎn)在 5 億美元以上的社區(qū)銀行。主要涉及到以下內(nèi)容： </p><p>　　■過(guò)去 5 年資產(chǎn)的增長(zhǎng) </p><p><b>　　■資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量 </b></p><p>　　■貸款占總資產(chǎn)的比例 </p><p><b&

60、gt;　　■凈利息收入 </b></p><p>　　■通過(guò)凈營(yíng)業(yè)費(fèi)用來(lái)衡量生產(chǎn)率。 </p><p>　　除了凈營(yíng)業(yè)成本方面的變化外，其他方面并沒(méi)有什么能讓人感到驚奇的，這不僅是就小型社區(qū)銀行而言，也是就整個(gè)銀行業(yè)而言的。銀行的規(guī)模與績(jī)效之間有著顯著的相關(guān)性。根據(jù)現(xiàn)實(shí)情況，需要將社區(qū)銀行按照其具體的規(guī)模，分成幾組來(lái)進(jìn)行研究，這樣才能得到最有效地結(jié)果: 即相比于十年前來(lái)說(shuō)，社區(qū)