風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本融資外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1450單詞，7700英文字符，3050漢字</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)出處：Cumming D, Fleming G, Schwienbacher A. Liquidity risk and venture capital finance [J]. Financial Management, 2005, 34(4): 77-105.</p><p>　　http://

2、www.wenku1.com/news/81BF7706705B92FF.html</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Liquidity Risk and Venture Capital Finance</p><p>　　Douglas; Grant; Schwienbacher</p><p&

3、gt;　　This article provides theory and evidence in support of the proposition that venture capitalists adjust their investment decisions according to liquidity conditions on IPO exit markets. We refer to technological ris

4、k as a choice variable in terms of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm in which the venture capitalist invests, and liquidity risk as the current and expected future external exit market conditions. We show t

5、hat in times of expected illiquidity of exit markets (high liquid</p><p>　　Policymakers around the world often express concern about why there is not more investment in privately held early-stage companies.

6、Further, the extreme cyclically of early-stage investment, and what the drivers are, remains a relatively unexplored issue in private equity and venture capital research. This article introduces a new and somewhat counte

7、rintuitive theory to facilitate an understanding of these issues. The US data examined herein support the theory.</p><p>　　Venture capitalists ("VCs") invest in small private growth companies that

8、typically do not have cash flows to pay interest on debt or dividends on equity. VCs invest in private companies over a period that generally ranges from two to seven years prior to exit. As such, VCs derive their return

9、s through capital gains in exit transactions. IPO exits typically provide VCs with the greatest returns and reputational benefits (Gompers, 1996 and Gompers and Lerner, 1999,2001 ). Liquidity risk in the co</p>&l

10、t;p>　　Liquidity risk is, of course, not the only type of risk that VCs face when deciding to invest in a particular project. The other types of risk may be grouped into a broad category of what we refer to in this art

11、icle as technological risk, or the risk of investing in a project of uncertain quality (particular types of technological risk could include the quality of the product technology as well as the quality of entrepreneurs&#

12、39; technical and managerial abilities). This article considers whether c</p><p>　　如何翻譯外文文獻(xiàn) In particular, we investigate whether exit market liquidity affects the frequency of VC investment in nascent ea

13、rly-stage firms and hightech firms with intangible assets.5 We provide a theory and supporting empirical evidence that show the willingness of VCs to undertake projects of high technological risk is directly related to c

14、onditions of liquidity risk. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that external conditions of high liquidity risk give rise to more prevalen</p><p>　　It is important to point out that the ult

15、imate source of the liquidity risk analyzed in this article is the difference in time preferences between VCs and management, since there is a greater incentive for VCs to cash out earlier than management. The time horiz

16、on of a VC is typically shorter because of his exit requirements. If Cs were long-term investors and would not wish to exit already after a few years, liquidity risk would not matter and incentives between VCs and manage

17、ment would probably</p><p>　　With respect to early-stage investments, there are therefore two opposite effects documented in this article. On the one hand, more liquidity increases the likelihood of investin

18、g in new ventures; but on the other hand, it reduces the likelihood that these new ventures are in the early stage. In other words, liquidity increases the absolute number of new investments, but reduces the proportion o

19、f ventures that get early-stage finance relative to the total number of investments. These results thu</p><p>　　For such financial assets as publicly listed equity, there seems to be consensus about the conc

20、ept of liquidity. Four different dimensions have been suggested to define the concept for traded assets (Harris, 2003; Kyie, 1985): width, immediacy, depth, and resiliency. Loosely speaking, liquidity refers to the abili

21、ty to trade at low (explicit and implicit) transaction costs. KyIe (1985) further stresses the importance of continuous trading and frictionless markets to achieve perfect liquidity of </p><p>　　As for real

22、estate or art objects, private equity is infrequently traded and thus the standard concept of liquidity hardly applies. Private equity investments are not continuously traded, since by definition they are private prior t

23、o the IPO. An important element that distinguishes private from public equity is that IPO markets are characterized by "hot" and "cold" issue phases and by clustering waves. In this article, liquidity

24、 is related to the possibility of exiting by either listing the comp</p><p>　　Finally, our evidence is consistent with the view that illiquidity is one reason why VCs require high returns on their investment

25、s (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a, 2001 ; see also Barry, Muscarella, Perry, and Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner and Schoar, 2004; Cochrane, 2005; Das et al., 2003). Our evidence is consistent, in that the

26、 greater assumption of technological risk occurs at times when we may infer that the relative cost of financing innovative deals is lower. That is, in </p><p>　　The issues considered in this article give ris

27、e to a number of questions and further research issues. Our sample was based on data from a randomly selected group of limited partnership VCs in the United States over the period 1985 - 2004. We considered a large numbe

28、r of robustness checks, many of which we have provided. An earlier version of this article reported other robustness checks, such as the exclusion/inclusion of Internet firms, and hot and cold markets; those excluded res

29、ults were very</p><p>　　This article puts forth a theoretical model whereby VCs time their investments according to exit opportunities. When exit markets become less liquid, VCs invest proportionately more i

30、n new early-stage projects (relative to new projects in other stages of development) in order to postpone exit requirements and thus invest in riskier projects. As such, VCs trade-off liquidity risk against technological

31、 risk when exit markets lack liquidity. In contrast, when liquidity is high, VCs invest more in e</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本融資</p><p>　　道格拉斯;格蘭特; 斯科威巴徹</p

32、><p>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家會(huì)根據(jù)IPO退出市場的流動(dòng)性狀況來適時(shí)地調(diào)整他們的投資決策，本文對(duì)這一觀點(diǎn)提供了理論和實(shí)證上的支持。我們將技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作為一個(gè)選擇性變量，這是就創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的特點(diǎn)而言的，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可以反映出當(dāng)前和未來的外部出口市場狀況。我們的研究表明，就退出市場的預(yù)期流動(dòng)性不足的時(shí)候,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家會(huì)將更多的投資比例放到高新技術(shù)和高技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)項(xiàng)目上。退出市場是流動(dòng)性的，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家會(huì)急于退出，以保證有足夠的資金用于

33、后續(xù)階段項(xiàng)目的投資。我們進(jìn)一步提供的補(bǔ)充證據(jù)表明，低流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)產(chǎn)生更少的聚合。我們的理論和實(shí)證結(jié)果支持了這一觀點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　世界各地的決策者嘗嘗對(duì)為什么在企業(yè)的早期發(fā)展階段，沒有更多的私人投資表示了擔(dān)憂。而且早期階段投資的極端的周期性以及驅(qū)動(dòng)力是什么，這仍然是一個(gè)需要進(jìn)一步深入研究和探索的問題。本文引入了一個(gè)新的，也可以說有點(diǎn)違反直覺的理論，來促進(jìn)讀者對(duì)這些問題的理解。來自美國的實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)分析也支持這

34、一理論。</p><p>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家(“風(fēng)投”)經(jīng)常會(huì)將資金投在小型私人公司，這些小型公司通常不具備足夠的流動(dòng)資金以支付企業(yè)債務(wù)利息和公司股東的股利分紅。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資資金會(huì)在私營企業(yè)中持續(xù)一段時(shí)間內(nèi),通常會(huì)在七年左右就退出。因此，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家們可以通過資本利息獲得他們的投資，并推出目標(biāo)投資企業(yè)。IPO退出機(jī)制通常為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資提供了最大的投資回報(bào)率。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)主要指的是資金退出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，特別是IPO退出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。流動(dòng)

35、性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指無法有效地退出資金而帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因此被迫需要將資金投資在該企業(yè)更長的時(shí)間，而這樣一來會(huì)大大增加風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并且到時(shí)出售股票時(shí)會(huì)影響股票價(jià)值，會(huì)以折扣出售，這是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資所不愿意看到的。無法有效推出帶來的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資需要高投資回報(bào)率的一個(gè)重要的原因，因?yàn)轱L(fēng)險(xiǎn)與投資收益是成正比的，高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)必須能帶來高的投資回報(bào)率，不然就沒有人或投資公司愿意去投資了 (勒納，2000，2002；肖爾和勒納，2004,2005)。因此，自然就能

36、預(yù)期到，在不同類型的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資公司中，市場流動(dòng)性會(huì)影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及投資回報(bào)率。</p><p>　　流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)當(dāng)然不是投資面臨的唯一風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，在決定投資在一個(gè)特定的項(xiàng)目時(shí)，它只是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類型中的一種。其他類型的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，可以分為幾個(gè)類別，而我們將在本文中稱為技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)或者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目的不確定性風(fēng)險(xiǎn) (特殊類型的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能包括產(chǎn)品的品質(zhì)以及企業(yè)家的管理技術(shù)和能力)。本文認(rèn)為外部條件的變化是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，遮住要是看

37、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目的情況，以及所投資項(xiàng)目的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)程度。</p><p>　　我們特別調(diào)查了，在新成立的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司和科技公司中，是否市場退出流動(dòng)性會(huì)影響到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者的投資退出頻率。我們對(duì)這一問題進(jìn)行了一個(gè)理論和實(shí)證研究，結(jié)果表明，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司有意愿進(jìn)行高技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的項(xiàng)目投資，因?yàn)轱L(fēng)險(xiǎn)與流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況是直接相關(guān)，高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)帶來超額的投資回報(bào)。隨后，我們進(jìn)一步進(jìn)行了補(bǔ)充性的實(shí)證分析，證據(jù)表明，外部市場的高流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

38、會(huì)產(chǎn)生 更普遍的聚合效應(yīng)，進(jìn)而表明，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)愿意承擔(dān)更多的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以在流動(dòng)性較低的時(shí)期進(jìn)行投資，他們通過聯(lián)合采取措施減輕這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，以獲得投資的回報(bào)。我們的研究表明，需要融資的企業(yè)們可以利用這一機(jī)會(huì)，獲得風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資。</p><p>　　必須要指出的是，流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的最終來源在本文中進(jìn)行相應(yīng)地分析。另外，因?yàn)樵谶m合的時(shí)間早點(diǎn)退出資金，相對(duì)于把投資資金長期投到企業(yè)中來說，適時(shí)地抽出所投資的資金能夠有效的規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，以及

39、帶來更大的收益。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資一般來說是短期投資，這是由于其資金投資出口需求所決定的。如果風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者是長期投資者，不希望幾年后就退出，那么流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就不會(huì)與風(fēng)投家或公司管理層之間有太直接的聯(lián)系，因此也可能會(huì)引發(fā)更好的激勵(lì)機(jī)制(風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資經(jīng)理有能力并希望長期保持投資)。</p><p>　　對(duì)于早期投資，在本文的分析，有兩個(gè)相反的影響結(jié)果。一方面，更多的流動(dòng)性資金會(huì)增加投資家們對(duì)新項(xiàng)目投資的可能性；但是，另一方面，在這些新

40、建立企業(yè)的早期階段，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)也會(huì)減少對(duì)這些企業(yè)的投資。換句話說，流動(dòng)性增加了新投資的絕對(duì)數(shù)量，但可以減少投資者和投資機(jī)構(gòu)的目標(biāo)企業(yè)的數(shù)量。因此這些結(jié)果表明風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資要適時(shí)地調(diào)整投資字決策，以保證資金的流動(dòng)性，確保資金的供應(yīng)。如果他們預(yù)期到未來是一個(gè)低的流動(dòng)性，那么他們可能會(huì)減少他們資金的未來流動(dòng)性，并且減少目標(biāo)投資企業(yè)的數(shù)量，以及推遲部分投資計(jì)劃風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本和私人股本的流動(dòng)性。</p><p>　　對(duì)于金融資產(chǎn)上市

41、股票，似乎對(duì)流動(dòng)性的概念有一個(gè)共識(shí)。定義這一概念可以從四個(gè)不同的維度來進(jìn)行(哈里斯,2003;卡伊,2003)：廣度、即時(shí)性、深度和彈性。廣義上說，流動(dòng)性是指以低交易成本進(jìn)行交易的能力(顯性和隱性的)?？ㄒ?(1985)進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)調(diào)了連續(xù)性交易的重要性，以及無摩擦的市場可以最終達(dá)到資產(chǎn)的完美流動(dòng)性。</p><p>　　至于房地產(chǎn)或藝術(shù)品，私人股本一般是很少參與交易的，因此幾乎沒有一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的關(guān)于流動(dòng)性的概念。私人股

42、本投資不是連續(xù)性交易，因?yàn)楦鶕?jù)定義，他們?cè)谏鲜星笆撬饺斯?。區(qū)分私人與公共權(quán)益的一個(gè)重要因素就是是否已經(jīng)上市。在這篇文章中，我們認(rèn)為，由于流動(dòng)性與退出的可能性, 上市公司通過股票市場或許可以找到一個(gè)戰(zhàn)略性的投資者。這里使用的流動(dòng)性的概念是最接近實(shí)際的，因?yàn)檫@里流動(dòng)性代表投資家能夠及時(shí)退出的可能性(直接成本)。達(dá)斯等人(2003)的研究表明，這種流動(dòng)性不足，很有可能會(huì)引起大量的非交易性折扣。</p><p>　　我

43、們關(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資聯(lián)合和流動(dòng)性的證據(jù)與流動(dòng)性和交易結(jié)構(gòu)相一致。布萊克和吉爾松(1998)探討了退出市場流動(dòng)性、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資收縮和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資市場發(fā)展之間的關(guān)系,。巴薩哈和沃茲(2001)提供了一個(gè)關(guān)于首次公開募股退出市場使用可轉(zhuǎn)換證券風(fēng)險(xiǎn)融資的理論。勒納和舍布爾(2005)認(rèn)為，發(fā)展中國家市場流動(dòng)性和其他風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資合約的結(jié)構(gòu)特征相一致。在開創(chuàng)性的工作中,卡帕斯(1995)分析了分段決策與市場狀況之間的關(guān)系,勒納(1994 a,1994 b)表明,企業(yè)

44、聯(lián)合組織受到激勵(lì)能降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響 (龔帕斯和勒納,1999,2001)。</p><p>　　結(jié)論表明,我們的證據(jù)和觀點(diǎn)是一致的,流動(dòng)性不足是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資需要高投資回報(bào)的原因之一(吉帕斯和勒納,1999 a,2001;巴里和馬蘇瑞拉,佩里和維特薩朋,1990;麥金森和威斯,1991;勒納和舍布爾,2004;科克倫,2005;巴基達(dá)斯,2003)。我們的證據(jù)是一致的,在這個(gè)更大的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)假設(shè)發(fā)生的時(shí)候，我們可以推斷,融

45、資創(chuàng)新交易的成本相對(duì)較低,也就是說, 人們普遍認(rèn)為,蕭條時(shí)期高流動(dòng)性不足時(shí),交易成本低(風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的金額在公司必須支付一定的普通股);因此,在蕭條時(shí)期,創(chuàng)新企業(yè)的融資成本更低。這與我們的研究更加符合，早期公司更高比例的融資退出市場的流動(dòng)性不足。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，本文的研究還存在一定的局限性，這也是難以避免的，本文中考慮的很多問題分析的還不夠深入，未來的研究可以進(jìn)一步深入地分析。我們所選的研究案例是，在19

46、85 – 2004年期間，選取的是一組隨機(jī)選擇的有限合伙制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司。我們考慮了數(shù)據(jù)的準(zhǔn)確性和穩(wěn)健性，這篇文章的早期版本也分析了數(shù)據(jù)庫的穩(wěn)健性，以及對(duì)股票市場的冷熱度與市場行情也進(jìn)行了分析，不過受到選企業(yè)的行業(yè)和數(shù)量限制，研究結(jié)果不一定適用于所有的公司，因此，未來的研究在選取案例時(shí)要注意控制好企業(yè)所在的行業(yè)與企業(yè)的數(shù)量。</p><p>　　本文提出了一個(gè)理論模型，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家會(huì)根據(jù)IPO退出市場的流動(dòng)性狀況來適