金融學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯---國際貨幣和金融安排現(xiàn)狀與未來

1、<p><b>　　中文3950字</b></p><p><b>　　外文原文</b></p><p>　　International Monetary and Financial Arrangements: Present and Future</p><p>　　3. National economic p

2、olicies under the present international monetary system</p><p>　　In this part, we examine central bank independence and monetary and fiscal policies under the present international monetary system. We also e

3、xamine global financial integration and the effectiveness of monetary policy.</p><p>　　3.1. Central bank independence</p><p>　　In recent years, many nations have passed laws removing government

4、control on their central bank (i.e., making their central bank more independent) in order to overcome the inflationary bias that was otherwise believed to exist in the conduct of monetary policy. The central banks of som

5、e nations, such as Switzerland and Germany, have enjoyed a high degree of independence during most of the postwar period. Recently, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand enacted legislation to make their central banks mo</p&

6、gt;<p>　　But what is meant by central bank independence? Fisher (1995) introduced the distinction between goal independence and instrument independence. A central bank has goal independence if it can set its own

7、goals, such as the rate of inflation that the nation should aim for. Instrument independence means that the central bank has control over the levers of monetary policy. That is, it has no obligation to finance government

8、 deficits, directly or indirectly, and that it has the power to set interest</p><p>　　Theoretically, there are two different approaches to central bank independence. One is the conservative-banker approach o

9、f Rogoff (1985) and the other is the principal-agent approach of Walsh (1995). In the conservative-banker approach, the central bank has both goal and instrument independence. Presumably, the conservative banker will wei

10、gh deviations of both inflation and output from target levels in setting monetary policy, but with a bias in favor of lower inflation, even if this comes at th</p><p>　　Today, there is general agreement that

11、 a central bank should have instrument, but not goal independence. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the monetary goal of the nation should reflect the social welfare function of the nation and not just t

12、he preferences of the central bank governor. The second is that there is the need to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies to avoid their operating at cross purposes of each other. Central bank accountability, however,

13、 is needed to ensure t</p><p>　　3.2. Central bank independence and inflation</p><p>　　As expected, a number of empirical studies have shown an inverse relationship between central bank independe

14、nce and the rate of inflation in industrial countries. That is, the more independent the central bank of an industrial country is, the lower the rate of inflation in the nation. One of the most comprehensive of these stu

15、dies is the one by Alesina and Summers (1993). The authors included the following 16 industrial countries in the study: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany</p><p>　　The sample period was fro

16、m 1955 to 1988. As in previous studies, the authors found a negative correlation between the level of central bank independence and the rate of inflation. They also found that the more independent a central bank was, the

17、 smaller was the variability of the inflation rate (because of the positive correlation between the level and variability of inflation).</p><p>　　As it is well known, however, correlation does not establish

18、causality. That is, the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation found in empirical studies does not imply that the former causes the latter. It may very well be that countries with a stronger

19、 aversion to inflation are more likely to give more independence to their central banks. Thus, it is the inflation aversion in the nation that gives rise both to lower inflation and to a more independent central bank in&

20、lt;/p><p>　　As support for central bank independence has increased around the world, so has the tendency to entrust to central banks the sole function of achieving a given inflation target or range. This, howev

21、er, raises the question of whether it would be more appropriate to entrust the central bank with a target that is more directly controllable by the central bank, such as the growth of a narrow money aggregate, rather tha

22、n a specific inflation target. Setting an inflation target, however, seems more ap</p><p>　　As a result, it is better to assign an explicit inflation target to the central bank and provide it with instrument

23、 independence to pursue the inflation target. As to why the central bank should be given a specific inflation target rather than a growth-of-real-GDP or rate-of-unemployment target, the answer is that inflation is a mone

24、tary phenomenon while the rate of growth of real GDP and the rate of unemployment are real phenomena. Real phenomena are, of course, affected by monetary phenomena, </p><p>　　Thus, a country that is trying t

25、o move from a high to a low inflation environment would do well to adopt a fixed rather than a variable exchange rate system as a means of anchoring monetary policy and market expectations. Many developing countries, how

26、ever, have been moving toward greater exchange-rate flexibility in order to cope better with big swings in foreign capital flows.</p><p>　　Although many empirical studies have found a negative correlation be

27、tween central bank independence and inflation in industrial countries, this is not the case for developing countries. Cukierman (1992) found a positive, not a negative, relationship between central bank independence and

28、inflation for a group of 70 developing countries that he studied over the 1950–1989 period. This, however, may be due to the fact that the central banks of many developing countries are independent legally but no</p&g

29、t;<p>　　3.3. Central bank independence, the real economy, and fiscal deficits</p><p>　　Does the lower inflation rate with an independent central bank come at the expense of growth of output for the na

30、tion? Alesina and Summers (1993) found no negative correlation between central bank independence and average growth of real GDP or the variability of growth of real GDP for the same 16 industrial countries that they used

31、 to examine the relationship between central bank independence and inflation over the 1955–1988 period. Barro (1995) and Sarel (1996) confirm this for inflation rates </p><p>　　The same conclusion was reache

32、d for industrial nations in another study by Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers, and Webb (1992) by regressing the nation’s growth rate of real GDP on the degree of central bank independence, the initial level of real GDP

33、 in the nation, the initial level of primary and secondary education in the nation, and the nation’s terms of trade. For developing nations, however, Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers, and Webb found that central bank in

34、dependence did have a signific</p><p>　　Empirical studies were also conducted to examine the relationship between central bank independence and fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP in the nation. The expec

35、tation was that a more independent central bank would be able to resist better government efforts to monetize fiscal deficits and thus lead to lower long-run average fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP in the nation.

36、Such a negative relationship was in fact found by Parkin (1987) and Grilli et al. (1991) for industrial countries</p><p>　　Although empirical studies have found no relationship between central bank independe

37、nce and the rate of economic growth in industrial nations, there is a theoretical reason for expecting that a central bank that can set its own inflation target and operate independently of the fiscal authority of the na

38、tion can lead to a lower rate of growth in the nation. This can result when there is a conflict between the goals of the monetary and the fiscal authority of the nation.Then monetary and fiscal po</p><p>　　T

39、hus, the general tendency for economists today of endorsing the separation of power in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies may not be the best policy to maximize non-inflationary growth in the nation (see Nordhau

40、s, 1994). Better results can be obtained by the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. It is not just that in the absence of such a coordination, fiscal and monetary authorities might pursue contradictory goals. S

41、uboptimal results may arise simply because of the different</p><p>　　國際貨幣和金融安排：現(xiàn)狀與未來</p><p>　　3.在目前的國際貨幣體系下的國家經(jīng)濟(jì)政策</p><p>　　在這一部分，我們研究在現(xiàn)行國際貨幣體系下的中央銀行的獨(dú)立性、貨幣和財(cái)政政策。我們還研究全球金融一體化和貨幣政策的有

42、效性。</p><p>　　3.1 中央銀行的獨(dú)立性</p><p>　　近年來，許多國家都通過法律取消政府對(duì)中央銀行的控制力（即，使他們的中央銀行更加獨(dú)立）以克服存在于貨幣政策中對(duì)通貨膨脹的成見。一些國家的中央銀行，如瑞士和德國的中央銀行，在戰(zhàn)后時(shí)期都享有高度的獨(dú)立性。最近，加拿大、智利和新西蘭通過立法使他們的中央銀行更加獨(dú)立。1997年五月，英國也實(shí)行了相同的政策。共同的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革在拉丁

43、美洲和中歐、東歐的一些前共產(chǎn)主義國家都已建立獨(dú)立的中央銀行，至少在法律上，已實(shí)行日常運(yùn)作。馬斯特里赫特條約禁止中央銀行市服從政府的指示，作為條件之一，為歐洲貨幣聯(lián)盟。為確保央行的獨(dú)立性，該條約還要求央行行長任期至少為五年。更重要的是，該條約禁止央行從政府直接購買債務(wù)工具及提供設(shè)施信貸給政府。即中央銀行獨(dú)立于政治壓力會(huì)達(dá)到一個(gè)較低的通脹率。</p><p>　　但何謂中央銀行的獨(dú)立性？費(fèi)舍爾（1995）介紹了目標(biāo)獨(dú)

44、立性和相對(duì)獨(dú)立的區(qū)別。中央銀行具有目標(biāo)獨(dú)立性，如果它可以設(shè)置自己的目標(biāo)，諸如國家應(yīng)該瞄準(zhǔn)的通貨膨脹率。相對(duì)獨(dú)立性意味著央行有貨幣政策上的杠桿控制力。也就是說，，它對(duì)政府赤字融資沒有直接或間接的責(zé)任，但它有權(quán)力來設(shè)定利率。當(dāng)然，央行有目標(biāo)獨(dú)立性和相對(duì)獨(dú)立性，可以設(shè)定自己的貨幣目標(biāo)，是貨幣自由利用其掌握的工具以實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)。即使有最獨(dú)立中央銀行的國家，但政府仍超越中央銀行，它通常在國家擁有的匯率安排類型上有最后決定權(quán)，并改變固定匯率系統(tǒng)中的匯率

45、，或通過對(duì)外匯市場的干預(yù)制度，影響水平，如果國家的匯率制度有一個(gè)靈活的選擇（Capie，1998）。</p><p>　　從理論上講，在中央銀行的獨(dú)立性上有兩個(gè)不同的方法。其一是羅格夫（1985年）的保守的銀行家的方法，其他的是沃爾什（1995年）的委托代理的方式。保守的銀行家認(rèn)為，央行同時(shí)具有絕對(duì)和相對(duì)的獨(dú)立性。據(jù)推測，保守的銀行家將從目標(biāo)制定貨幣政策的水平上權(quán)衡通貨膨脹和產(chǎn)出的偏差，但在通貨膨脹率較低偏向時(shí)，

46、可能要以低增長為代價(jià)。在委托代理的做法上，另一方面，中央銀行家相對(duì)獨(dú)立性，但不是絕對(duì)獨(dú)立性。也就是說，政府制定貨幣目標(biāo)，如為國家的通貨膨脹率，然后央行自由掌握任何一種貨幣工具來實(shí)現(xiàn)貨幣目標(biāo)。委托代理的目標(biāo)是新西蘭最明確的例子，那里的央行行長正式同意遵守由政府制定的通脹目標(biāo)。在加拿大和英國，如果超過了通貨膨脹的限定范圍，中央銀行的聲譽(yù)可能會(huì)受其影響。</p><p>　　今天，人們普遍認(rèn)為，央行應(yīng)該有相對(duì)政策，而不

47、是完全獨(dú)立的貨幣政策。有兩個(gè)原因來說明這個(gè)。首先，一個(gè)國家的貨幣政策應(yīng)該反映國家的社會(huì)財(cái)富，而不是僅僅是中央銀行行長的偏好。第二，需要協(xié)調(diào)貨幣和財(cái)政政策，以避免他們工作中的相互作用。然而，中央銀行問責(zé)制需要確保國家的貨幣目標(biāo)，在事實(shí)上，這是國家的中央銀行的追求。在新西蘭，央行行長要對(duì)財(cái)政部長負(fù)責(zé)。在美國，聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行或美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)（美國中央銀行）一般向國會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)，它必須經(jīng)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)選擇的主席批準(zhǔn)并且可以解釋其政策。在德國，聯(lián)邦銀行對(duì)辯護(hù)貨幣政策的廣

48、大市民負(fù)責(zé)。近幾年，越來越多的國家跟隨新西蘭的做法，為央行設(shè)定明確的通貨膨脹率。政府貨幣政策要建立信譽(yù)，提供透明度和問責(zé)制是非常重要的。中央銀行越可信，越能夠在經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩情況下不削減利率，也不引發(fā)較高的通貨膨脹預(yù)期和較高的長期利率，或提高利率以遏制通脹壓力，恐懼可能會(huì)引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。包括美國在內(nèi)的幾個(gè)國家的中央銀行繼續(xù)增加透明度和問責(zé)制，重視可信度和有效性，最近也已經(jīng)開始解釋自己的決策程序（包括美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)議紀(jì)要滯后出版）和操作貨幣政策的程序。

49、然而，事實(shí)上美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)相對(duì)于其他大多數(shù)中央銀行，是憲法規(guī)定追求價(jià)格穩(wěn)定和充分就業(yè)</p><p>　　3.2 中央銀行的獨(dú)立性與通貨膨脹</p><p>　　正如預(yù)期的那樣，一些有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的研究已經(jīng)證實(shí)中央銀行之間的獨(dú)立和工業(yè)國家的通脹率有反比關(guān)系。也就是說，工業(yè)國的央行越獨(dú)立，在全國范圍內(nèi)的通脹率越低。這些研究中最全面的一個(gè)是由Alesina和薩默斯（1993）提出的。研究中，作者提到了以下16

50、個(gè)工業(yè)國家：澳大利亞、比利時(shí)、加拿大、丹麥、法國、德國、意大利、日本、荷蘭、新西蘭、挪威、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、英國和美國。樣本期間為1955年至1988年。正如在以前的研究中，作者發(fā)現(xiàn)在中央銀行的獨(dú)立程度和通貨膨脹率呈負(fù)相關(guān)。他們還發(fā)現(xiàn)中央銀行越獨(dú)立，通貨膨脹率的變化越小（因?yàn)橥浰胶屯涀兓收嚓P(guān)關(guān)系）。</p><p>　　眾所周知，相關(guān)性并不意味著有因果關(guān)系。也就是說，實(shí)證研究中中央銀行的獨(dú)立性與通貨膨

51、脹負(fù)相關(guān)，并不意味著前者導(dǎo)致了后者。有較強(qiáng)的規(guī)避通脹的國家更可能給他們的中央銀行更多的獨(dú)立性。因此，通脹厭惡的國家，會(huì)使通貨膨脹降低和一個(gè)更獨(dú)立的中央銀行，而不是一個(gè)獨(dú)立的中央銀行責(zé)任（即造成）較低的通脹。除非，我們相信法律和機(jī)構(gòu)是完全不相干的，而且對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)沒有任何影響性能（這里的通貨膨脹率）。我們必須了解，其他條件相同的情況下，更獨(dú)立央行比不獨(dú)立的中央銀行更可能形成較低的通貨膨脹率。</p><p>　　對(duì)獨(dú)立性

52、中央銀行的支持已經(jīng)在世界各地增加，所以有傾向委托中央銀行來實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)給定的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)或范圍。然而，委托一個(gè)目標(biāo)越合適，直接由中央銀行控制就越多，如狹窄的增長貨幣總量而不是具體的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)。然而，在國家之間設(shè)定通脹目標(biāo)，似乎今天貨幣增長和通貨膨脹之間暴跌關(guān)系更恰當(dāng)。因此，最好是分配一個(gè)明確的通脹目標(biāo)給中央銀行，并提供相對(duì)獨(dú)立性以追求通脹目標(biāo)。至于為何央行應(yīng)給予具體的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)，而不是一個(gè)增長的國民生產(chǎn)總值或失業(yè)率目標(biāo)，是因?yàn)橥ㄘ浥蛎浭?/p>

53、一種貨幣現(xiàn)象，而國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值及失業(yè)率是真實(shí)的現(xiàn)象。當(dāng)然，真實(shí)的現(xiàn)象受貨幣現(xiàn)象，但這里的因果關(guān)系取決于政策和體制，而不是在中央銀行的直接控制之下。在給予中央銀行具體的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)的過程中，很重要的一點(diǎn)指出，固定匯率比浮動(dòng)匯率的通脹低。因此，一個(gè)國家如果試圖從高轉(zhuǎn)移到低通貨膨脹的環(huán)境最好還是通過一個(gè)固定的，而不是浮動(dòng)匯率制度作為錨定貨幣政策手段和市場預(yù)期。許多發(fā)展中國家，已朝向更大的匯率靈活性改變，以便應(yīng)對(duì)外國資本流動(dòng)大幅波動(dòng)更好。雖然許多

54、實(shí)證研究已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)了一種中央銀行的獨(dú)立性和工業(yè)化國家的通貨膨脹的負(fù)相關(guān)系，這不是發(fā)展中國家的案例。 Cukierm</p><p>　　3.3 央行的獨(dú)立性，實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)和財(cái)政的赤字 </p><p>　　是否獨(dú)立中央銀行以較低的通脹率為代價(jià)來使國家產(chǎn)出增長？ Alesina和薩默斯（1993）發(fā)現(xiàn)中央銀行的獨(dú)立性，國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值實(shí)際平均增長率或16個(gè)工業(yè)變異相同國家中實(shí)際國民生產(chǎn)總值的增長率沒有

55、直接負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，他們用來研究在1955至88年通貨膨脹時(shí)期中央銀行的獨(dú)立性之間的關(guān)系。巴羅（1995）和薩雷爾西利（1996年）確保低于8％的通貨膨脹率。因此，它似乎并不認(rèn)為中央銀行在從事工業(yè)國家貿(mào)易時(shí)以較低的增長速度來使通貨膨脹率較低。</p><p>　　同樣的結(jié)論在工業(yè)國家由Cukierman，Kalaitzidakis，薩默斯和Webb（1992）寫作的另一項(xiàng)研究中也有提到，在中央銀行的獨(dú)立性程度通過歸納

56、實(shí)際國民生產(chǎn)總值的國內(nèi)增長率，在全國的實(shí)際GDP初始水平、國家的小學(xué)和中學(xué)的初始教育水平、民族貿(mào)易的條款。對(duì)于發(fā)展中國家國家，但是，Cukierman，Kalaitzidakis，薩默斯和韋伯發(fā)現(xiàn)中央銀行的獨(dú)立性確實(shí)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長顯著正向影響。在大多數(shù)發(fā)展中國家中，當(dāng)通貨膨脹率高時(shí)，以至于更獨(dú)立的中央銀行伴隨的通貨膨脹率越高（鼓勵(lì)增長），中央銀行的獨(dú)立性越強(qiáng)，并且增長速度更快。由于工業(yè)國家普遍沒有面臨著高通貨膨脹，較高的增長率就不是用于他們

57、。</p><p>　　也進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究，研究中央銀行的獨(dú)立性和財(cái)政赤字占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分比之間的關(guān)系。人們期望的是一個(gè)更加獨(dú)立的中央銀行能夠更好地促進(jìn)政府對(duì)財(cái)政赤字的努力，從而形成長期的較低的占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的平均比例。這種消極的關(guān)系是由帕金（1987年）和Grilli（1991）等人在工業(yè)國家發(fā)現(xiàn)的事實(shí)。因此，總體結(jié)論是從實(shí)證研究中可以得到，日期是一個(gè)獨(dú)立的中央銀行關(guān)聯(lián)低通貨膨脹率和國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的比例降低財(cái)政

58、赤字，但是無關(guān)工業(yè)國家的增長。</p><p>　　雖然實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)中央銀行的獨(dú)立性和在工業(yè)國家中的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率之間沒有關(guān)系，有預(yù)期的理論性原因，即央行可以設(shè)定自己的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)，獨(dú)立經(jīng)營民族，這樣可能導(dǎo)致財(cái)政部門在一個(gè)國家的較低成長率。這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致貨幣目標(biāo)和民族財(cái)政之間的沖突。當(dāng)時(shí)的金融和財(cái)政政策可以在相互的目的中移動(dòng)，并導(dǎo)致國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)為次優(yōu)。因此，中央銀行不可以過于獨(dú)立。例如，中央銀行過分通貨膨脹厭惡，如央

59、行，可能過度抑制全國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。更好地為國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，會(huì)使財(cái)政和貨幣政策的協(xié)調(diào)。這可以通過賦予中央銀行獨(dú)立文書，但不是獨(dú)立的最終目的。</p><p>　　因此，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們普遍贊同分離傾向，今日在貨幣和財(cái)政政策的行為中可能不是權(quán)力最好的政策，以最大限度地發(fā)揮非通貨膨脹在全國的增長（見諾德豪斯，1994年）。更好的結(jié)果可以通過協(xié)調(diào)貨幣政策和財(cái)政政策。這不僅是在這樣一個(gè)缺乏協(xié)調(diào)，財(cái)政和貨幣當(dāng)局可能相互矛盾的目標(biāo)追求的