外文翻譯--中國與多邊貿(mào)易體制

1、<p>　　1877單詞，2050漢字</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯 </b></p><p><b>　　原文 </b></p><p>　　China and the Multilateral Trading System</p><p>　　Material Sou

2、rce: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH</p><p>　　Author: Robert Z. Lawrence</p><p>　　For more than two decades, China’s rapid growth has been driven by its global economic engagement. Since it

3、s accession to the WTO in 2001, foreign trade and foreign direct investment have made even more important contributions to Chinese growth. Between 2001 and 2005, for example, the dollar value of Chinese exports and impor

4、ts increased at annual rates of 29.3 and 25.3 percent respectively and in 2005, 58 percent of Chinese exports originated from foreign owned firm. As a result of this perform</p><p>　　Given its size, the pace

5、 of its expansion, and its outward orientation, China is likely to have a growing impact on the global trading system and its policies are likely to have an important influence on the system’s evolution. These policies h

6、ave been as dynamic as its trade and investment performance. In 2001 after fourteen years of negotiations, China became a full member of the WTO, assuming obligations that are at the level of many developed economies. Si

7、nce that time it has participated ac</p><p>　　What do these policies portend? When China proposed joining the WTO several concerns were raised. One was that the system as a whole could be weakened because Ch

8、ina was not a fully market driven economy and was therefore unlikely or unable to adhere to the WTO rules. China then acceded to the WTO under very demanding terms and there were fears that either deliberately or inadver

9、tently it would not implement these commitments. </p><p>　　A second concern was that China would not participate constructively in the WTO. It would throw its weight around, try quickly to obtain disproporti

10、onate influence and use its influence to fundamentally change the WTO system. China was also seen as a potentially powerful addition to the ranks of developing countries, and many in the developed world worried that it w

11、ould seek to limit the obligations required of developing countries. </p><p>　　More recently a third set of questions is being raised with respect to China’s trade policies in the East Asian region. Would Ch

12、inese regional initiatives undermine the multilateral trading order? Is China seeking to establish an East Asian trading bloc under its leadership that discriminates against outsiders? Will it use its market to create a

13、hub and spoke system in East Asia in which China gains serves as the hub and the other countries are the spokes? Finally there is the fear that not only</p><p>　　Like almost every other WTO member, China has

14、 not confined its trade policy to the WTO. Instead, it has both embraced and stimulated the current global trend towards Free Trade Agreements. China has concluded several agreements and is in the process of negotiating

15、many more. In 2001, it began talks with ASEAN that resulted in an agreement to eliminate tariffs and continue with a view to obtaining agreements with respect to investment and services. It 2003 an agreement in agricultu

16、re was conclude</p><p>　　Asean. In 2002 a framework agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed with ASEAN to serve as guide for achieving an FTA that covers goods services and investment. The

17、 goal is to have an FTA in place by 2010 among the more advanced of these countries. The newer ASEAN members Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia will have until 2015 to comply. An early harvest program reduced or elimina

18、ted tariffs in about 10 percent of lines by 2006. Most other tariffs are to be eliminated on betwe</p><p>　　Hong Kong and Macao. The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement CEPA Agreement signed by China and

19、 Hong Kong was the first completed FTA agreement signed by both parties. Its stated purpose is “to strengthen trade and investment cooperation by liberalizing tariff and non-tariff barriers on substantially all trade, li

20、beralizing services and promoting trade and investment facilitation.” CEPA Pre- amble The Agreement signed with Macao follows a very similar template. </p><p>　　Since Hong Kong did not apply tariffs on Chine

21、se goods, for China this agreement clearly was not about eliminating tariffs on its exports. It was given greater security from anti-dumping and countervailing actions. However there are additional advantages. First, it

22、signaled the special status of Hong Kong, second it gains relief from the discriminatory treatment in the WTO agreement. Third, it clearly used the agreement to signal government support for mainland financial institutio

23、ns in Hong Kon</p><p>　　Chile. In 2005 China and Chile concluded an FTA The two countries took less than a year to negotiate the accord, which immediately eliminates tariffs on 92% of Chile's exports to

24、China and 50% of the products that China sends to Chile. The pact does not cover services. In 10 years after the start of the tariff concession process, the import tariff of 97% of the tariff lines of both sides will be

25、zero. Furthermore, the Agreement provides that the two Parties may accelerate the tariff concession u</p><p>　　New Zealand hopes to become the first developed country to sign an FTA with China. It has alread

26、y become the first developed economy to grant it market economy status. The FTA talks have gone on for several years. The New Zealand government, which was criticized for signing an agreement with Thailand that failed to

27、 include services, is insistent that the deal should be comprehensive and in addition to covering covers goods, services and investment, include provisions for rules of origin, trade r</p><p>　　Australia. Ch

28、ina is also involved in FTA talks with Australia. Again the memorandum of understanding that launched the talks granted China market economy status. The Australian Government has also made clear that it is seeking a comp

29、rehensive agreement that applies to “substantially” all goods, trade in services “as well as other non-tariff issues such as the recognition of standards, customs cooperation, protection of intellectual property rights a

30、nd regulation of foreign investment.” Australia</p><p>　　The fact that China is willing to conclude FTAs with these two developed countries that are highly competitive agricultural producers is very signific

31、ant since it indicates a willingness to contemplate major adjustments in agriculture while also indicating these countries willingness to contemplate free trade in labor-intensive manufacturing. </p><p>　　Ot

32、hers. China has also launched talks with India and Pakistan. New Delhi does not quite share the enthusiasm for a conventional FTA although it is willing to talk about cooperation. But Pakistan and China have signed a fra

33、mework agreement, implemented an early harvest and Pakistan has provided China with the requisite market economy status. China is also discussing FTAs with many other potential partners in Latin America Brazil, Peru, Sou

34、th Africa, the Gulf GCC, Iceland, Asia Korea and with regi</p><p>　　Implications </p><p>　　China has numerous goals in signing these agreements. One immediate concern is to use them to obtain ma

35、rket status recognition and relief from being subject to special safeguards. -- Ironically China is using these discriminatory agreements as a way to remove the discrimination to which it has been subjected at the WTO. A

36、 second motive is to secure access to important raw materials? many of the countries are major suppliers of minerals Chile-copper, Australia -- iron-ore and uranium, and GCC?oil</p><p>　　China is well aware

37、of concerns that it is trying to dominate East Asia and/or close it to outsiders, and it has gone to great pains to allay such fears. It is particularly reluctant to appear domineering in its interactions with Asean and

38、it prefers that ASEAN take the leading role in the bilateral relationship. China also does not want to be seen as building a fortress Asia. </p><p><b>　　譯文 </b></p><p><b>

39、　　中國與多邊貿(mào)易體制</b></p><p>　　資料來源: 國家經(jīng)濟研究局作者:羅伯特 Z. 勞倫斯</p><p>　　在過去的二十多年里,中國的快速發(fā)展與經(jīng)濟全球化密切相關(guān)。自從2001年中國加入世貿(mào)組織,國外貿(mào)易和國外直接投資對中國的發(fā)展作出了重大貢獻。例如在2001年到2005年間,中國進出口的美元匯率每年分別增長了29.3%和25.3%,在2005年,中國58%的

40、出口產(chǎn)品由國外的公司發(fā)明。正因如此,中國的市場占有率從在世界進口中從2001年的3.3%增長到2004年的5.9%,與此同時,中國在世界出口的市場占有率也從2001年的3.9%增長到了2004年的6.5%。這一結(jié)果使中國超越了日本并成為了世界貿(mào)易中的主要成員國及東亞的主導(dǎo)貿(mào)易國,中國作為勞動密集型制成品及零部件的較大出口國,其生產(chǎn)的織布機因體積特別大而享譽中外并成為主要出口國,同時也成為了資本貨物、初級產(chǎn)品和半成品的主要進口國。此外,中

41、國也是第三世界中外商直接投資的最大接受方。 </p><p>　　鑒于其規(guī)模的擴大,擴張步伐的加快,與外向型的發(fā)展,中國極有可能對全球貿(mào)易體系的影響日益增強,中國的政策可能對貿(mào)易體制的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生重大影響。這些政策就如同其貿(mào)易和外商直接投資一樣呈現(xiàn)動態(tài)發(fā)展。在2001年,經(jīng)過長達14年的談判協(xié)商后,中國正式成為世貿(mào)組織的成員國,同時也承擔(dān)了很多發(fā)達國家經(jīng)濟水平才能承擔(dān)的義務(wù)。自加入世貿(mào)組織以來,中國積極參與各機構(gòu)部門

42、的活動和談判協(xié)商。為了滿足其加入世貿(mào)組織的條件,中國大幅開放國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟,推出眾多國內(nèi)政策使其過渡到市場經(jīng)濟的過程得以鞏固。此外,中國采取了多軌貿(mào)易政策戰(zhàn)略,使世貿(mào)組織、國內(nèi)自由化政策與區(qū)域貿(mào)易的主動性精神相結(jié)合。到2005年,中國已完成四個自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定(2003年泰國,2004年香港和澳門,2005年智利),正如黃和Hufbauer推測:未來至少還有15個國家或地區(qū)提議和(或)啟動談判。 </p><p>　　這些

43、政策預(yù)示著什么?當(dāng)中國提出加入世貿(mào)組織,眾多的擔(dān)憂也隨之而來。其中一個擔(dān)憂就是整個體制可能會被削弱,因為中國并不完全是一個市場導(dǎo)向型經(jīng)濟,因此不可能或無法遵守世貿(mào)組織規(guī)則。隨后,中國在極其苛刻的條件下加入了世貿(mào)組織,很多人擔(dān)心中國會有意無意的違背其承諾。 </p><p>　　第二個擔(dān)憂就是中國會不參加世貿(mào)組織建設(shè)。這將會對整個世貿(mào)組織產(chǎn)生影響,試圖迅速獲得一定程度的影響力并利用其影響力從根本上改變世貿(mào)組織體系。

44、同時,中國在發(fā)展中國家中被視為一個潛在強國,很多發(fā)達國家擔(dān)心這會限制發(fā)展中國家在世貿(mào)組織的義務(wù)。 </p><p>　　最近第三套關(guān)于中國在東亞地區(qū)的貿(mào)易政策問題被一連串地提出。中國的區(qū)域行為是否會破壞多邊貿(mào)易秩序?中國是否正在尋求一個在其領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下建立東亞貿(mào)易集團的機會,從而排斥外來國?中國是否會利用其市場在東亞創(chuàng)造一個樞紐和講話平臺來充當(dāng)核心國家,而其他國家則成為配襯?此外,包括中國在內(nèi)的該區(qū)域的所有國家都擔(dān)心這

45、樣是否會創(chuàng)造一個重疊的貿(mào)易制度體系,這可能會增加不必要的交易成本,導(dǎo)致有害貿(mào)易,這實際上是分裂區(qū)域經(jīng)濟而不是整合區(qū)域經(jīng)濟。 </p><p>　　正如世貿(mào)組織的其他成員國,中國已不僅限于世貿(mào)組織貿(mào)易政策,相反,它推動和刺激了當(dāng)前全球走向自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定的趨勢。近幾年中國已簽訂了多項協(xié)議,在談判中將會締結(jié)更多的協(xié)議。2001年,中國開始與東盟會談,最終達成消除關(guān)稅的協(xié)定,并簽訂了有關(guān)投資與服務(wù)的協(xié)定。在2003年就農(nóng)業(yè)

46、方面與泰國達成協(xié)議,2004年香港及澳門與內(nèi)地簽署協(xié)議。2005年與智利簽署協(xié)議,目前與澳大利亞、新西蘭、巴基斯坦、南非關(guān)稅同盟和臺灣合作委員會就自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定談判正在進行中。另外與巴西、冰島、印度、日本及韓國的協(xié)定正在商討中。 </p><p>　　東盟。2002年,為了實現(xiàn)貨物服務(wù)和投資的自由貿(mào)易,與東盟簽署一個有關(guān)綜合經(jīng)濟合作框架性協(xié)議。其目標(biāo)是到2010年這些較先進的國家能夠逐步實現(xiàn)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。這些東盟新

47、成員(越南、老撾、緬甸和柬埔寨)都會遵守該協(xié)定直至2015年。早期收獲計劃到2006年消除或減少10%的關(guān)稅。更多的關(guān)稅將在2005年到2010年逐步消除,到那個時候90%的稅種將會被包含在內(nèi)。而其余的10%的稅目被視為敏感稅目,并會被逐漸消除。目前還有服務(wù)與投資方面的談判正在進行,以期望東盟可以從中國的入世承諾中得到好處,從而其加快服務(wù)貿(mào)易自由化發(fā)展。 </p><p>　　香港和澳門。中國與香港簽訂《內(nèi)地與香

48、港關(guān)于建立更緊密經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系安排》,這一協(xié)定是雙方簽訂的第一個自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。其既定目標(biāo)是“通過實質(zhì)的貿(mào)易關(guān)稅自由化和非關(guān)稅貿(mào)易壁壘來加強貿(mào)易和投資合作,促進貿(mào)易發(fā)展和投資便利化?！?《內(nèi)地與香港關(guān)于建立更緊密經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系安排》序言)與澳門簽署的協(xié)議遵循著非常相似的模式。 </p><p>　　由于香港對于中國商品的關(guān)稅并不適用,對于中國這個協(xié)議顯然不是在于消除其出口產(chǎn)品的關(guān)稅,而是為了反傾銷和反補貼更為安全。但是這個協(xié)議

49、有額外的好處。首先,這標(biāo)志著香港的特殊地位,第二,它在世貿(mào)組織協(xié)議中的歧視性待遇得以緩解。第三,通過該協(xié)議明確了政府支持在香港的內(nèi)地金融機構(gòu)。此外,它還提供了香港第一家外資占優(yōu)勢的服務(wù)公司。它同時也間接為香港和臺灣提供了優(yōu)勢。 </p><p>　　智利。2005年,中國和智利經(jīng)過不到一年的談判,成功簽訂了自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定,該事件立即消除了智利出口到中國的92%出口關(guān)稅,中國向智利出口的產(chǎn)品占50%。該協(xié)定不包括服務(wù)