[雙語翻譯]城市管理外文翻譯--街道上的沖突驅(qū)逐曼谷街頭小販（英文）

1、Contents lists available at ScienceDirectCitiesjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/citiesConflicts over streets: The eviction of Bangkok street vendorsChaitawat Boonjubun1Department of Social Research, Faculty of S

2、ocial Sciences, University of Helsinki, FinlandA R T I C L E I N F OKeywords:BangkokEvictionEyes on the streetInformalityRight to the cityStreet vendingA B S T R A C TIn 2014, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA

3、) introduced the ‘Reclaiming pavements for pedes-trians’ plan. This plan, appealing to the Act on Maintaining Public Cleanliness and Public Order, promised tobring ‘safety and orderliness’ to the city, and its implementa

4、tion led to the removal of street vendors. This articleinvestigates the goals, practices, and effects of the street clean-up plan in Bangkok's old town and shows theironic consequences of the plan: the streets became

5、 less safe. By analysing the vendors' rights, interests, andstrategies for coping with the eviction that affected their livelihood, this article focuses on street vendors' sur-vival strategies and analyses variou

6、s forms of conflicts over streets: the vendors versus city authorities, amongthe vendors, and the vendors versus powerful gangsters, and discusses the mediation of these conflicts by asenior Buddhist monk who spoke on be

7、half of street vendors in negotiations with city authorities.1. IntroductionSuntraporn,2 a 44-year-old street vendor, had a small stall that soldhand-made jewellery on a pavement of Tha Chang, a tourist neigh-bourhood by

8、 the Chao Phraya River in Bangkok's old town. On 30 July2014, Suntraporn and other vendors in the area were informed by theBangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) of ‘Reclaiming pavementsfor pedestrians’, a new pla

9、n for spatial reorganisation. In line with themilitary government's National Council for Peace and Order's (NCPO)campaign to make public spaces safe across the country, this city planobliged the district office a

10、nd the City Law Enforcement Department (orThetsakit) to clear vending stalls on the pavements and return the pa-vements to pedestrians by 31 August 2014 (Phra Nakhon District,2014).Suntraporn, who had traded in Tha Chang

11、 for ten years, was hor-rified at the authorities' one-month notice. She explained:‘I've been in this business for a decade… I was totally shocked whenI heard that I′d have only thirty days to find a new place. W

12、hatshould I do? Tourists know that if they want to get inexpensive,exotic souvenirs, they have to come to Tha Chang. If the vendorsmove to a marketplace assigned by the Bangkok administration, willtourists follow? No way

13、!’Somjai, a former government employee in her sixties who soldwomen's plastic accessories such as bracelets, necklaces, and earrings inTha Chang, was also affected by the clearance plan. She suspected thatthe whole i

14、dea was just a question of local politics. In her words: ‘Thestall clean-up is all about politics. If local politicians don't see vendorsas their voters, they may try to remove us from the streets.’Suntraporn and Som

15、jai were among 300 Tha Chang street vendorsaffected by the street clean-up plan. Focusing on the effects ofBangkok's recent spatial reorganisation policy, this article asks thefollowing questions: What were the reaso

16、ns for the ‘Reclaiming pave-ments for pedestrians’ plan, and did the authorities consult with thestreet vendors when making it? How was the plan introduced to streetvendors, and what were their reactions to the reorganis

17、ation of theirvending space? How was the plan implemented, and what were its ef-fects? This study pays particular attention to street vendors' conflictsand their survival strategies.Unlike several studies on street v

18、endors that group all vendors inone category, and thus assume that they share similar experiences ofvulnerability and adopt similar survival strategy, my study reveals thatthe interests and strategies of the Tha Chang st

19、reet vendors facingeviction were heterogeneous. Vendors saw the eviction differently, andadopted different strategies to cope with the disastrous effects of spatialreorganisation on their livelihood. In contrast to a rec

20、ent study on streetvendors in Bangkok (Batréau Received in revised form 15 April 2017; Accepted 9 June 20171 Permanent address: Department of Social Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Uni

21、oninkatu 37, FI-00014 Helsinki, Finland.E-mail address: chaitawat.boonjubun@helsinki.fi.2 The names of street vendors have been changed and the actual vending locations are not mentioned. Other details are accurate.Citie

22、s 70 (2017) 22–31Available online 24 June 20170264-2751/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.MARKnot collect money for rent from the vendors.An unintended consequence of these cleaning fees and penalty fineswas

23、 bribery, or the collection of so-called ‘tea money’ by officers(Kusakabe, 2006). Because vendors were not always aware of what feesthey should pay and were not always given a receipt for their payment,they became easy t

24、argets for mistreatment (Yasmeen Yasmeen Winichakul, 2014).In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, the leader of the Thai Rak Thai party,won the general election and became Prime Minister. Unlike otherpoliticians whose families h

25、ad ties to military elites, Thaksin came froma rural, lower-middle class background (Forsyth, 2010). The mainreasons for his triumph were the success of his party's programmes thattargeted rural voters (the 30-baht (

26、US$ 1) universal cheap healthcare, avillage-level loan scheme, and a moratorium on debt payments); pre-vious governments' public policies that ignored rural populations; andresistance against the IMF in the wake of t

27、he 1997 Asian economiccrisis (Baker, 2005).To a certain extent, as Baker and Phongpaichit (2009) argue, thepopulist programmes of Thaksin's government had advanced welfareand provided peasants with improved access to

28、 capital. However,Thaksin was criticised for his alleged abuse of power and corruption. In2006, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) group, known as the‘Yellow Shirts’, was established to challenge Thaksin (Fors

29、yth, 2010).After the coup d'état in October 2006, the Thai Rak Thai party wasdissolved and 111 of its members were banned from running for poli-tical office for five years. Thaksin has lived in self-exile ever s

30、ince(McCargo, 2008). The Palang Prachachon party, which was funded byThaksin, later emerged and won the election in 2007, but was forced bythe Constitutional Court to disband, due to vote-buying. As in the caseof the Tha

31、i Rak Thai, the court prohibited Palang Prachachon's execu-tive members from holding political office for five years (Terwiel,2011). The Prachathipat (Democrat Party), supported by the YellowShirts, took office. It w

32、as believed that the Democrats formed a newgovernment through ‘a(chǎn) series of negotiations behind the scenes’ withformer MPs of Palang Prachachon, who later changed sides (Terwiel,2011: 299). To counter the new government a

33、s well as the military,judiciary, and the elites (these groups were believed to have roles indissolving the Thai Rak Thai and Palang Prachachon, and in supportingthe Democrats who assumed office), the United Front for De

34、mocracyagainst Dictatorship (UDD) – the ‘Red Shirts’ – arose.Whereas the Yellow Shirts represented the urban middle classes,mobilised against corrupt politicians and safeguarding the monarchy,the Red Shirts claimed that

35、they were the voice of the rural people andthe urban poor, defending democracy and seeking social justice(Winichakul, 2014). Some members of the Yellow Shirts labelled theRed Shirts as uneducated, calling them ‘buffaloes

36、’. The Red Shirts re-ferred to themselves as ‘phrai’ (serfs, as in feudal times) and protestedagainst the ammat (lord) (Phongpaichit Wissink Walsh Fong, 2012).In 2011, the Pheu Thai party led by Yingluck Shinawatra, T

37、haksin'ssister, won the election and Yingluck became Thailand's first femalePrime Minister. Nonetheless, she was removed from office in 2014,when a court decision found her guilty of abuse of power. Yingluck'

38、scourt conviction led to confrontations between the Red Shirts and theYellow Shirts in Bangkok city centre, and resulted in violence andbloodshed. A successful military coup in May of the same year, led byGeneral Prayut

39、Chan-o-cha, the Commander of the Royal Thai Army,was carried out on a claim to bring back peace and solidarity to Thaicitizens. Prayut became Prime Minister and established the NationalCouncil for Peace and Order (NCPO),

40、 an administrative body to governthe country (Hewison, 2014). Alongside its attempt to tackle inequality(Phongpaichit National EnvironmentAgency, 2016). Noticeably, the BMA's plan of taking back streets fromstreet v

41、endors neither provides the vendors with secured vendingspaces easily accessible to customers, nor offers social protection or anyintensive training programmes to sustainably enhance their livelihood.Bangkok's reclai

42、ming pavements plan may be read as an ad hocanswer to the military government's national-level spatial reorganisa-tion campaign. The hands of the BMA may have been tied by themilitary order. In fact, the BMA also has

43、 its ambitious ‘revitalisation’5 A hawker centre is ‘a(chǎn) collection of stalls selling different types of inexpensive cookedfood, predominantly but not exclusively local fare (Chinese, Malay, Indian), with drinksand dessert