透明度與公司治理外文翻譯

1、<p>　　Transparency and Corporate Governance</p><p>　　MaterialSource:http://www.hbs.edu/units/am/pdf/HWTransparencyJan2007.pdf Author: Benjamin Hamelin</

2、p><p>　　1 Abstract</p><p>　　An objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is increased transparency. This goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believe increased

3、transparency to be unambiguously good. We argue that, from a corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both costs and benefits to increased transparency, leading to an optimum level beyond which increasing

4、 transparency lowers profits. This result holds even when there is no direct cost of increasing transparency an</p><p>　　2 Introductions</p><p>　　In response to recent corporate governance scand

5、als, governments have responded by adopted a number of regulatory changes. One component of these changes has been increased disclosure requirements. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley(sox), adopted in response to Enron, WorldC

6、om, and other public governance failures, required detailed reporting of off-balance sheet financing and special purpose entities. Additionally, sox increased the penalties to executives for misreporting. The link betwee

7、n governance</p><p>　　Yet, most academic discussions about transparency have nothing to do with corporate governance. The most commonly discussed benefit of transparency is that it reduces asymmetric informa

8、tion, and hence lowers the cost of trading the firm’s securities and the firm’s cost of capital. To offset this benefit, commentators typically focus on the direct costs of disclosure, as well as the competitive costs ar

9、ising because the disclosure provides potentially useful information to product-market rivals. </p><p>　　In this paper, we provide a framework for understanding the role of transparency in corporate governan

10、ce. We analyze the effect that disclosure has on the contractual and monitoring relationship between the board and the CEO. We view the quality of information the firm discloses as a choice variable that affects the cont

11、racts the firm and its managers. Through its impact on corporate governance, higher quality disclosure both provides benefits and imposes costs. The benefits reflect the fact tha</p><p>　　We formalize this i

12、dea through an extension of Hamelin and Wasatch (1998) and Hamelin’s (2005) adaptation of Hailstorm’s (1999) career-concerns model to consider the question of optimal transparency. Section 2 lays out the basics of this m

13、odel, in which the company chooses the “quality” of the performance measure that directors use to assess the CEO’s ability. In this model, the optimal quality of information for the firm to reveal can be zero, infinite,

14、or a finite positive value depending on t</p><p>　　We evaluate the implications of penalties and incentives that potentially affect the motives of CEOs to distort the information coming from their firms. Mea

15、sures that punish exaggerating effort can be effective if they are sufficiently severe to curtail this effort; however, relatively minor penalties can be counterproductive. In addition, incentives for CEOs to improve the

16、 accuracy of information can harm shareholders because such incentives push a CEO to disclose more than the value-maximizing</p><p>　　3 Concealing Information</p><p>　　In light of some recent co

17、rporate scandals, one concern is not that executives distort information, but rather that they conceal it. In this subsection, we briefly address what our analysis can say with respect to concealing information. One ques

18、tion is whether the other players know if the CEO has concealed information? If so, then presumably they can punish the CEO for non-disclosure Moreover, if it is common knowledge that the CEO knows the value of signals t

19、hat he conceals, then an unravelin</p><p>　　Suppose, in contrast, that the other players did not know what the complete set of signals was(e.g., the set varies over time).If the CEO did not know the realized

20、 value when he deciding to reveal or conceal a signal, then he would wish to conceal all signals that he could: more signals means a more precise posterior estimate of his ability, which means greater career risk for him

21、. Our model, thus, predicts that when (i) the CEO has discretion over what signals are revealed and (ii) must commit </p><p>　　If, instead, the CEO is not committed to a disclosure decision prior to learning

22、 the value of the signals, then he will be tempted to reveal those that are favorable to him. The other players will infer that they are getting a biased sample and, thus, make a downward adjustment. In this sense, the s

23、ituation is similar to that of “exaggerating effort. “The details of the analysis are, to be sure, different and await future analysis, but our general conclusions will generally hold.</p><p>　　4 Discussions

24、 and Conclusion</p><p>　　Most corporate governance reforms involve increased transparency. Yet, discussions of disclosure generally focus on issues other than governance, such as the cost of capital and prod

25、uct-market competition. The logic of how transparency potentially affects governance is absent from the academic literature.</p><p>　　We provide such analysis in this paper. We show that the level of transpa

26、rency can be understood as deriving from the governance relation between the CEO and the board of directors. The directors set the level of transparency (e.g., amount and quality of disclosure) and it is, thus, part of a

27、n endogenously chosen governance arrangement.</p><p>　　Increasing transparency provides benefits to the firm, but entails costs as well. Better transparency improves the board’s monitoring of the CEO by prov

28、iding it with an improved signal about his quality. But better transparency is not free: The better able the market is to learn about the CEO’s ability, the greater the risk to which the CEO is exposed. In our setting, t

29、he profit-maximizing level of transparency requires balancing these two factors.</p><p>　　Our model implies that there can be an optimal level of transparency. Consequently, attempts to mandate levels beyond

30、 this optimum decrease profits. Profits decrease both because managers will have to be paid higher salaries to compensate them for the increased career risk they face, and because greater transparency increases manageria

31、l incentives to engage in costly and counterproductive efforts to distort information. We emphasize that these effects occur in a model in which all other things e</p><p>　　One key assumption we make through

32、out the paper is that the board relies on the same information that is released to the public in making its monitoring decisions. Undoubtedly, this assumption is literally false in most firms, as the board has access to

33、better information than the public. Nonetheless, CEOs do have incentives to manipulate information transfers to improve the board’s perception of them, and this idea has been an important factor in a number of recent stu

34、dies(see, e.g., Adams and </p><p>　　Our model is set in the context of a board that is perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests. One could equally well apply it to direct monitoring by shareholders. If

35、 there were an increase in the quality of available information either due to more stringent reporting requirements or because of better analysis (e.g., of the sort performed by institutional investors or a more attentiv

36、e press),then our model contains clear empirical predictions. In particular, it suggests that consequences of</p><p>　　impact on corporate governance.</p><p>　　Some issues remain. As discussed a

37、bove, we have only scratched the surface with respect to issues of managerial concealment of information. We have abstracted away from any of the concerns about revealing information to rivals or regulators that earlier

38、work has raised. We have also ignored other competing demands for better information, such as to help better resolve the principal-agent problem through incentive contracts (see e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983, Singh, 2004

39、).Finally, we have ignored</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p><b>　　透明度與公司治理</b></p><p>　　資料來源:哈佛商學(xué)院教育網(wǎng) 作者：本杰明?埃爾馬蘭，邁克爾?魏斯巴赫</p><p><b>　　1 摘要</b

40、></p><p>　　許多提出的關(guān)于公司治理改革的目標(biāo)是提高透明度。這個目標(biāo)已比較不會引起爭議，因為大多數(shù)觀察家認(rèn)為提高透明度還是清楚明確的比較好。我們認(rèn)為，從公司治理的角度來看，可能存在著成本與效益均提高了透明度，導(dǎo)致超過其最佳水平即提高了透明度卻降低了利潤。這一結(jié)果認(rèn)為，即使沒有提高透明度的直接成本，也沒有向監(jiān)管機構(gòu)或產(chǎn)品市場競爭對手信息披露的問題。我們的分析表明，改革旨在提高透明度可以減少公司利潤，

41、提高管理層薪資水平并提高缺乏能力的首席執(zhí)行官的離職率。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)進一步考慮存在著行政管理人員將采取措施來扭曲信息的可能性。我們的分析表明，由于就業(yè)問題管理人員就可以有動力，提高透明度和增加信息的扭曲，從而增加罰金降低利潤。</p><p><b>　　2 論文簡介</b></p><p>　　對于最近的公司治理丑聞，各國政府已作出回應(yīng)，并采取了一系列的監(jiān)管調(diào)整措施。這些

42、調(diào)整措施的一個組成部分是提高信息披露要求。例如，薩班斯-奧克斯利法案說明，應(yīng)對安然、世通和其他公共治理的失敗，要求對資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表表外融資和特殊目的實體進行詳細(xì)報告。此外，薩班斯-奧克斯利法案中提出增加了管理人員誤報的處罰。關(guān)于治理與透明度之間的關(guān)系，公眾和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的看法是明確的，即增加透明度是為了提高治理。</p><p>　　然而，大多數(shù)關(guān)于透明度的學(xué)術(shù)討論認(rèn)為透明度與公司治理沒有關(guān)系。最常見的關(guān)于信息透明度的好

43、處的討論認(rèn)為它減少了信息不對稱，從而降低了公司證券的交易成本和公司的資本成本。為了彌補這個優(yōu)勢，評論家通常集中在信息披露的直接費用以及產(chǎn)生的競爭力成本上，因為披露可能為產(chǎn)品市場競爭者提供有用的信息。而這兩個因素在公司信息披露的決定中無疑是重要的考慮因素，它們并不特別與公司治理相關(guān)。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們提供了一個了解透明度在公司治理中的作用的框架。我們分析了信息披露在合同方面以及董事會與首席執(zhí)行官之

44、間的監(jiān)測方面的作用。我們認(rèn)為公司信息披露質(zhì)量作為選擇變量影響了合同的企業(yè)及其管理者。通過其對公司治理的影響，更高質(zhì)量的信息披露能提供效益和強加的成本。這些效益反映的事實是更準(zhǔn)確的業(yè)績信息能促使董事會做出更好的關(guān)于他們的管理人員的人事決定。這些成本的產(chǎn)生是因為管理人員在較高的隱性披露水平時必須取得增加他們事業(yè)風(fēng)險的賠償，以及他們試圖歪曲平衡的信息引發(fā)的增量成本。這些成本和效益補充了披露的現(xiàn)有解釋。此外，因為他們直接對企業(yè)進行治理，在與公司

45、為什么要披露信息的公共看法一致。</p><p>　　我們正式通過埃爾馬蘭，魏茲巴赫（1998），埃爾馬蘭（2005）擴展了霍姆斯特羅姆（1999）的職業(yè)生涯關(guān)注模型的適應(yīng)性的想法是考慮了最優(yōu)透明度的問題。第二章展示了最基本的模型，在該公司選擇績效的“質(zhì)量”指標(biāo)來衡量，從而使董事用來評估首席執(zhí)行官的能力。在這個模型中，公司的信息披露質(zhì)量最優(yōu)可以是零，無限的，或一個有限價值取決于參數(shù)。當(dāng)我們校準(zhǔn)模型來反映我們的實際

46、大型上市公司，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)所暗示的參數(shù)校準(zhǔn)導(dǎo)致最優(yōu)信息披露質(zhì)量的有限價值。因此，我們的分析表明，信息披露要求超出了這個最佳水平很可能產(chǎn)生意想不到的后果，并減少價值。</p><p>　　我們評估的懲罰和獎勵可能影響首席執(zhí)行官的動機去扭曲他們企業(yè)的信息。懲罰措施夸大了工作的有效性，如果他們能足夠遏制這一努力的話；然而，相對較輕的處罰可能會適得其反。此外，為了提高信息的準(zhǔn)確性，首席執(zhí)行官們的獎勵可能會損害股東利益，因為這

47、種激勵措施推動首席執(zhí)行官透露的信息價值最大化的數(shù)量更多。</p><p><b>　　3 隱藏信息</b></p><p>　　在最近的一些公司丑聞的曝光中，關(guān)心的不是管理人員歪曲信息，而是隱藏信息。在本小節(jié)中，我們簡單談?wù)勎覀兊姆治隹梢哉f是關(guān)于隱瞞信息。一個問題是，如果首席執(zhí)行官隱藏了信息是否其他參與者都知道？如果是這樣，那么他們大概可以懲罰就非公開的首席執(zhí)行官。此

48、外，如果眾所周知，首席執(zhí)行官知道他隱藏的信號值，進而闡明參數(shù)（格羅斯曼，1981）適用于：凡是未顯露信號推斷預(yù)期值時，首席執(zhí)行官將有動機透露上述那些預(yù)期的價值。因此，唯一的均衡是指未透露的信號推斷出的可能最低價值和首席執(zhí)行官相應(yīng)的誘導(dǎo)顯示所有的信號。因此，我們預(yù)測隱瞞不太可能是一個問題，如果其他參與者知道什么是信號集合。</p><p>　　假設(shè)，與此相反，其他參與者不知道什么是一套完整的信號（例如，隨時間的變化

49、而異）。如果首席執(zhí)行官在決定顯示或隱藏一個信號時，不知道實現(xiàn)價值，那么他就會想要隱藏他的所有信號：更多的信號是指以更精確的方法估計出的他的能力，這意味著他的職業(yè)風(fēng)險更大。因此，我們的模型預(yù)測，（一）當(dāng)首席執(zhí)行官決定揭示什么信號，（二）必須承諾事先學(xué)習(xí)顯示或隱藏的信號價值，他會選擇隱瞞承諾過的所有信號。</p><p>　　相反，如果首席執(zhí)行官不承諾在作出信息披露決定前學(xué)習(xí)的信號的價值，那么他將誘導(dǎo)揭示那些對他有利

50、的信息號。其他參與者將推斷出他們獲得到一個偏差的樣本，從而做一個向下調(diào)整。在這個意義上說，這種情況是類似的“夸大成果”。 根據(jù)分析的細(xì)節(jié)，可以肯定的是需要等待未來的不同分析，但我們普遍的結(jié)論通常會保留。</p><p><b>　　4討論與結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　大多數(shù)公司治理改革涉及提高透明度。然而，信息披露的討論通常集中在披露問題上除了治理問題，如資本成

51、本和產(chǎn)品市場競爭成本。透明度如何潛在地影響治理的邏輯已經(jīng)在學(xué)術(shù)文獻中缺席了。</p><p>　　本文中我們提供這樣的分析。我們的分析表明，透明度水平可以理解為由首席執(zhí)行官與董事會之間的關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的治理。董事們設(shè)置透明度水平（例如，透明度的量與質(zhì)），因此，選擇了一種內(nèi)在的治理安排的一部分。</p><p>　　提高透明度為公司帶來了利益，但也需要成本。通過提高他的質(zhì)量的信號來提供更好的透明度

52、，從而提高董事會對首席執(zhí)行官的監(jiān)測能力。但是更好的透明度不是免費的：更好的市場能夠了解首席執(zhí)行官的能力，并且首席執(zhí)行官會暴露更大的風(fēng)險。在我們的設(shè)定中，透明度的利潤最大化水平需要平衡這兩個因素。</p><p>　　我們的模型表明有一個透明度的最佳水平。因此，試圖超越這個最佳水平會降低利潤。利潤的減少一方面是因為管理者將不得不支付更高的工資，以彌補他們所面臨的更大職業(yè)風(fēng)險，另一方面是因為更高的透明度鼓勵管理者從事

53、昂貴的，產(chǎn)生反效果的工作來歪曲信息。我們強調(diào)，在一個模型中的影響在其他條件都相同的情況下，更好的信息披露提高公司的價值。</p><p>　　我們通過論文提出的一個關(guān)鍵的假設(shè)是董事會在做出監(jiān)察決定時依賴于向公眾發(fā)布相同的信息。毫無疑問，這種假設(shè)在大多數(shù)公司里確實是虛假的，因為董事會已經(jīng)獲得了比公眾信息更好的信息。不過，首席執(zhí)行官們有動機操縱信息的傳輸以提高董事會對他們的看法，而且這一理念在最近的一些研究中被認(rèn)為是

54、一個重要的因素（例如，亞當(dāng)斯和費雷拉，印刷中）。此外，在一些公開的案例中，董事會被蒙在鼓里除非通過自己的能力獲得公開披露的文件；在何種情況下，董事會必須依靠公開的可用信息，可能是在董事會與首席執(zhí)行官的關(guān)系是最抗拒時，因此，在這種情況下董事會監(jiān)督可能是最重要的。當(dāng)然，我們的基本假設(shè)是公開披露質(zhì)量對董事會監(jiān)督管理者的能力的巨大影響是有理的。</p><p>　　我們的模型設(shè)定在董事與股東的利益完全一致的情況下。人們可

55、以將它應(yīng)用于同樣也由股東直接監(jiān)控的公司。如果有一個可用信息質(zhì)量的提高要么是由于更嚴(yán)格的報告要求，要么是由于更好的分析（例如，由機構(gòu)投資者或更細(xì)心地出版社整理分析），那么我們的模型包含清晰的實證的預(yù)測。特別的是，它表明改進信息將提高首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬和離職率。事實上，首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬離職率的提高大體上開始于20世紀(jì)90年代,至少有一些學(xué)者認(rèn)為應(yīng)增加新聞審查和提高投資者的積極性（卡普蘭，明頓，2006）。這種模式的首席執(zhí)行官的薪水和離職率與我

56、們的模型是一致的；而且，它的一致觀點是更好的信息對公司治理的影響既有成本又有效益。</p><p>　　但有些問題任然存在，如上所述，我們只是涉及了有關(guān)管理的信息隱藏的表面問題。我們已經(jīng)忽視了早期工作中涉及向競爭對手和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)提出的披露信息。我們也忽視了其他競爭者需要更好的信息，例如通過激勵契約來幫助更好地解決委托代理問題（例如，格羅斯曼和哈特，1983，辛格，2004）。最后，我們忽略了企業(yè)實際上如何使信息或多