外商直接投資如何使發(fā)展中國(guó)家收益外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文3773字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries? </p>&l

2、t;p>　　出 處： Finance & Development, June 2001 </p><p>　　作 者： Prakash Loungani and Assaf Razin </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　How Beneficial Is Foreign D

3、irect Investment for</p><p>　　Developing Countries?</p><p>　　The resilience of foreign direct investment during financial crises may lead many developing countries to regard it as the private ca

4、pital inflow of choice. Although there is substantial evidence that such investment benefits host countries, they should assess its potential impact carefully and realistically.</p><p>　　Foreign direct inves

5、tment (FDI) has proved to be resilient during financial crises. For instance, in East Asian countries, such investment was remarkably stable during the global financial crises of 1997-98. In sharp contrast, other forms o

6、f private capital flows—portfolio equity and debt flows, and particularly short-term flows—were subject to large reversals during the same period (see Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha, 2000; and Lipsey, 2001). The resilience

7、of FDI during financial crises was also </p><p>　　This resilience could lead many developing countries to favor FDI over other forms of capital flows, furthering a trend that has been in evidence for many ye

8、ars (see Chart 1). Is the preference for FDI over other forms of private capital inflows justified? This article sheds some light on this issue by reviewing recent theoretical and empirical work on its impact on developi

9、ng countries' investment and growth.</p><p>　　The case for free capital flows</p><p>　　Economists tend to favor the free flow of capital across national borders because it allows capital to

10、seek out the highest rate of return. Unrestricted capital flows may also offer several other advantages, as noted by Feldstein (2000). First, international flows of capital reduce the risk faced by owners of capital by a

11、llowing them to diversify their lending and investment. Second, the global integration of capital markets can contribute to the spread of best practices in corporate governance,</p><p>　　In addition to these

12、 advantages, which in principle apply to all kinds of private capital inflows, Feldstein (2000) and Razin and Sadka (forthcoming) note that the gains to host countries from FDI can take several other forms:</p>&l

13、t;p>　?。?）FDI allows the transfer of technology—particularly in the form of new varieties of capital inputs—that cannot be achieved through financial investments or trade in goods and services. FDI can also promote com

14、petition in the domestic input market.</p><p>　?。?）Recipients of FDI often gain employee training in the course of operating the new businesses, which contributes to human capital development in the host cou

15、ntry.</p><p>　?。?）Profits generated by FDI contribute to corporate tax revenues in the host country.</p><p>　　Of course, countries often choose to forgo some of this revenue when they cut corpor

16、ate tax rates in an attempt to attract FDI from other locations. For instance, the sharp decline in corporate tax revenues in some of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development may

17、 be the result of such competition. (For a discussion, see the article by Reint Gropp and Kristina Kostial in this issue.)</p><p>　　In principle, therefore, FDI should contribute to investment and growth in

18、host countries through these various channels.</p><p>　　FDI versus other flows</p><p>　　Despite the strong theoretical case for the advantages of free capital flows, the conventional wisdom now

19、seems to be that many private capital flows pose countervailing risks. Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000) suggest why many host countries, even when they are in favor of capital inflows, view international debt flo

20、ws, especially of the short-term variety, as "bad cholesterol":</p><p>　　It [short-term lending from abroad] is driven by speculative considerations based on interest rate differentials and exchang

21、e rate expectations, not on long-term considerations. Its movement is often the result of moral hazard distortions such as implicit exchange rate guarantees or the willingness of governments to bailout the banking system

22、. It is the first to run for the exits in times of trouble and is responsible for the boom-bust cycles of the 1990s.</p><p>　　In contrast, FDI is viewed as "good cholesterol" because it can confer

23、the benefits enumerated earlier. An additional benefit is that FDI is thought to be "bolted down and cannot leave so easily at the first sign of trouble." Unlike short-term debt, direct investments in a country

24、 are immediately repriced in the event of a crisis.</p><p>　　Recent evidence</p><p>　　To what extent is there empirical support for such claims of the beneficial impact of FDI? A comprehensive s

25、tudy by Bosworth and Collins (1999) provides evidence on the effect of capital inflows on domestic investment for 58 developing countries during 1978-95. The sample covers nearly all of Latin America and Asia, as well as

26、 many countries in Africa. The authors distinguish among three types of inflows: FDI, portfolio investment, and other financial flows (primarily bank loans).</p><p>　　Bosworth and Collins find that an increa

27、se of a dollar in capital inflows is associated with an increase in domestic investment of about 50 cents. (Both capital inflows and domestic investment are expressed as percentages of GDP.) This result, however, masks s

28、ignificant differences among types of inflow. FDI appears to bring about a one-for-one increase in domestic investment; there is virtually no discernible relationship between portfolio inflows and investment (little or n

29、o impact); and the i</p><p>　　Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find that FDI increases economic growth when the level of education in the host country—a measure of its absorptive capacity—is high. Th

30、e World Bank's latest Global Development Finance (2001) report summarizes the findings of several other studies on the relationships between private capital flows and growth, and also provides new evidence on these r

31、elationships. (For a summary, see the article by Deepak Mishra, Ashoka Mody, and Antu Panini Murshid in thi</p><p>　　Reasons for caution?</p><p>　　Despite the evidence presented in recent studie

32、s, other work indicates that developing countries should be cautious about taking too uncritical an attitude toward the benefits of FDI.</p><p>　　Is a high FDI share a sign of weakness? Hausmann and Fern

33、5;ndez-Arias (2000) point to reasons why a high share of FDI in total capital inflows may be a sign of a host country's weakness rather than its strength.</p><p>　　One striking feature of FDI flows is th

34、at their share in total inflows is higher in riskier countries, with risk measured either by countries' credit ratings for sovereign (government) debt or by other indicators of country risk (see Chart 3). There is al

35、so some evidence that its share is higher in countries where the quality of institutions is lower. What can explain these seemingly paradoxical findings? One explanation is that FDI is more likely than other forms of cap

36、ital flows to take place </p><p>　　In a similar vein, Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000, page 5) suggest that "Countries should concentrate on improving the environment for investment and the func

37、tioning of markets. They are likely to be rewarded with increasingly efficient overall investment as well as with more capital inflows." Although it is very likely that FDI is higher, as a share of capital inflows,

38、where domestic policies and institutions are weak, this cannot be regarded as a criticism of FDI per se. Indeed, without it</p><p>　　Fire sales, adverse selection, and leverage. FDI is not only a transfer of

39、 ownership from domestic to foreign residents but also a mechanism that makes it possible for foreign investors to exercise management and control over host country firms—that is, it is a corporate governance mechanism.

40、The transfer of control may not always benefit the host country because of the circumstances under which it occurs, problems of adverse selection, or excessive leverage.</p><p>　　Krugman (1998) notes that so

41、metimes the transfer of control occurs in the midst of a crisis and asks:</p><p>　　Is the transfer of control that is associated with foreign ownership appropriate under these circumstances? That is, loosely

42、 speaking, are foreign corporations taking over control of domestic enterprises because they have special competence, and can run them better, or simply because they have cash and the locals do not? . . . Does the fire-s

43、ale of domestic firms and their assets represent a burden to the afflicted countries, over and above the cost of the crisis itself?</p><p>　　Even outside of such fire-sale situations, FDI may not necessarily

44、 benefit the host country, as demonstrated by Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1999) and Razin and Sadka (forthcoming). Through FDI, foreign investors gain crucial inside information about the productivity of the firms under thei

45、r control. This gives them an informational advantage over "uninformed" domestic savers, whose buying of shares in domestic firms does not entail control. Taking advantage of this superior information, foreign

46、dire</p><p>　　Excessive leverage can also limit the benefits of FDI. Typically, the domestic investment undertaken by FDI establishments is heavily leveraged owing to borrowing in the domestic credit market.

47、 As a result, the fraction of domestic investment actually financed by foreign savings through FDI flows may not be as large as it seems (because foreign investors can repatriate funds borrowed in the domestic market), a

48、nd the size of the gains from FDI may be reduced by the domestic borrowing done by fore</p><p>　　FDI reversals? Recent work has also cast the evidence on the stability of FDI in a new light. Though it is tru

49、e that the machines are "bolted down" and, hence, difficult to move out of the host country on short notice, financial transactions can sometimes accomplish a reversal of FDI. For instance, the foreign subsidia

50、ry can borrow against its collateral domestically and then lend the money back to the parent company. Likewise, because a significant portion of FDI is intercompany debt, the paren</p><p>　　Other considerati

51、ons. There are some other cases in which FDI might not be beneficial to the recipient country—for instance, when such investment is geared toward serving domestic markets protected by high tariff or nontariff barriers.

52、Under these circumstances, FDI may strengthen lobbying efforts to perpetuate the existing misallocation of resources. There could also be a loss of domestic competition arising from foreign acquisitions leading to a cons

53、olidation of domestic producers, through ei</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　Both economic theory and recent empirical evidence suggest that FDI has a beneficial impact on developing host countries.

54、 But recent work also points to some potential risks: it can be reversed through financial transactions; it can be excessive owing to adverse selection and fire sales; its benefits can be limited by leverage; and a high

55、share of FDI in a country's total capital inflows may reflect its institutions' weakness rather than their strength. Though the empirical relevance of some of </p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>

56、;　　外文題目： How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries? </p><p>　　出 處： Finance & Development, June 2001

57、 </p><p>　　作 者： Prakash Loungani and Assaf Razin </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　外商直接投資如何使發(fā)展中國(guó)家收益</p>&l

58、t;p>　　引言：外國(guó)直接投資在金融危機(jī)中的應(yīng)變能力會(huì)導(dǎo)致許多發(fā)展中國(guó)家視其為私人資本流入而選擇它。盡管有大量證據(jù)表明，這種投資對(duì)東道國(guó)有好處，應(yīng)該仔細(xì)評(píng)估其對(duì)外商的潛在影響和現(xiàn)實(shí)。</p><p><b>　　正文：</b></p><p>　　外國(guó)直接投資（FDI）已被證明在金融危機(jī)中具有彈性。例如，外來(lái)直接投資早對(duì)1997-1998年期間發(fā)生在東亞國(guó)家的全

59、球金融危機(jī)中起到了穩(wěn)定的作用。與此形成鮮明對(duì)比的是私人資本流動(dòng)，投資組合的資產(chǎn)和債務(wù)流動(dòng)，尤其是短期流動(dòng)的其他形式，能在同一時(shí)期使經(jīng)濟(jì)格局受到大逆轉(zhuǎn)。外國(guó)直接投資在其他形式的金融危機(jī)中的應(yīng)變能力也很明顯，在1994-1995年的墨西哥危機(jī)和20世紀(jì)80年代拉丁美洲的債務(wù)危機(jī)起到了決定性作用。</p><p>　　這種彈性可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致許多發(fā)展中國(guó)家更喜歡通過(guò)其他形式流動(dòng)的外國(guó)直接投資，可以證明在一個(gè)已經(jīng)被眾多周知了（

60、見(jiàn)圖表1）許多年的趨勢(shì)。是不是外國(guó)直接投資中的私人資本流入超過(guò)其他形式的就是合理的嗎？本文通過(guò)回顧最近理論和實(shí)證及其對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的投資和增長(zhǎng)的影響對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題上進(jìn)行分析和理解。</p><p>　　對(duì)于資本自由流動(dòng)的情況</p><p>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家傾向于資本的跨國(guó)自由流動(dòng)，因?yàn)樗鼤?huì)能資本尋求最高的回報(bào)率。無(wú)限制的資本流動(dòng)也可能會(huì)提供一些其他優(yōu)點(diǎn)，如一篇費(fèi)爾德斯坦在2000年寫(xiě)的書(shū)中指出。首

61、先，國(guó)際資本流動(dòng)的減少會(huì)使他們分散貸款和投資的資本從而降低所有者所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。其次，資本市場(chǎng)的全球一體化可以最好的促進(jìn)公司治理，會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)范及其法律傳統(tǒng)的傳播。第三，資本全球流動(dòng)限制了政府通過(guò)使用不良政策來(lái)限制資本自由流動(dòng)的行為</p><p>　　除了這些優(yōu)勢(shì)，這些原則適用于各種私人資本的流入，在費(fèi)爾德斯坦（2000年）和拉津和斯達(dá)卡的文章中可以知道外商對(duì)東道國(guó)的直接投資可以采取以下各種形式：</p>

62、<p>　　1.外國(guó)直接投資允許技術(shù)的轉(zhuǎn)移，特別是對(duì)各種各樣的新的資本投入的形式上，無(wú)法通過(guò)金融投資或商品和服務(wù)貿(mào)易取得的轉(zhuǎn)移。通過(guò)將外國(guó)直接投資投入本國(guó)市場(chǎng)可以提升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。</p><p>　　2.外國(guó)直接投資的接受者往往在經(jīng)營(yíng)有助于在本國(guó)人力資源的發(fā)展的員工培訓(xùn)的新業(yè)務(wù) 3.外商直接投資產(chǎn)生的利潤(rùn)對(duì)東道國(guó)企業(yè)的稅收具有很大的貢獻(xiàn)。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，各國(guó)往

63、往會(huì)選擇放棄這部分收入當(dāng)他們?cè)噲D降低公司的稅收收入用來(lái)吸引其他地區(qū)的外國(guó)直接投資時(shí)。例如，在經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織成員國(guó)（經(jīng)合組織）中對(duì)企業(yè)的稅收收入的明顯下降的原因可能是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)果。（有關(guān)對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的討論可以看Reint Gropp和Kristina Kostial的文章。）</p><p>　　原則上，外國(guó)直接投資應(yīng)有助于投資，并可以通過(guò)各種渠道使東道國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)迅速增長(zhǎng)。</p><p>　

64、　外國(guó)直接投資與其他流量</p><p>　　盡管有強(qiáng)大的理論支撐資本自由流動(dòng)的優(yōu)勢(shì)，現(xiàn)在的傳統(tǒng)智慧似乎對(duì)很多私人資本的流動(dòng)造成了對(duì)抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。哈市曼娜和費(fèi)爾南德斯，阿里亞斯在2000年發(fā)表的書(shū)中說(shuō)明為什么許多東道國(guó)，他們?cè)谫Y金流入中受到國(guó)際債務(wù)流動(dòng)的青睞，尤其是短期投入，就有如“壞的膽固醇”一樣：</p><p>　　它[短期貸款從國(guó)外]是由利率差和匯率預(yù)期的投機(jī)因素所造成而不是長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)考慮所驅(qū)

65、使。其行動(dòng)往往是隱含的，如匯率擔(dān)?；蛳蛘戎y行體系的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的意愿扭曲的結(jié)果。這是第一次運(yùn)行時(shí)失敗的，并且要對(duì)20世紀(jì)90年代全球經(jīng)濟(jì)從繁榮到蕭條的周期負(fù)責(zé)</p><p>　　與此相反，外國(guó)直接投資被認(rèn)為是“好的膽固醇”，因?yàn)樗梢再x予很多的較早被證明的好處。另外一個(gè)好處是，外商直接投資被認(rèn)為是“囫圇吞下，很容易的不會(huì)留下任何不好的麻煩”，不同于短期債務(wù)，在危機(jī)事件中一個(gè)國(guó)家的直接投資會(huì)立即造成重新定價(jià)。&

66、lt;/p><p><b>　　最近的跡象</b></p><p>　　在何種程度上是對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的有利影響的實(shí)證來(lái)支持經(jīng)濟(jì)的這種說(shuō)法？</p><p>　　按博斯沃思和柯林斯（1999年）的綜合研究中提供了對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)投資的影響，并提供了58個(gè)發(fā)展中國(guó)家在1978年至1995年的資本流入的依據(jù)。其樣本涵蓋幾乎所有的拉美和亞洲，以及在非洲許多國(guó)家。筆者

67、區(qū)分三種類(lèi)型的流入：外國(guó)直接投資，證券投資和其他資金流動(dòng)（主要是銀行貸款）。</p><p>　　博斯沃思和柯林斯發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)每當(dāng)資本流入增加一美元，在國(guó)內(nèi)投資的約增加50美分有關(guān)聯(lián)系。（兩個(gè)資本流入和國(guó)內(nèi)投資是國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分比表示。）但是這個(gè)結(jié)果在流入類(lèi)型的區(qū)分上有著明顯差異。外國(guó)直接投資出現(xiàn)帶來(lái)了對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)的投資項(xiàng)目的增加;而且與任何證券投資和投資（很少或沒(méi)有影響）幾乎沒(méi)有明顯關(guān)系，以及另外兩個(gè)人的范圍之間貸款的

68、影響。這些結(jié)果都為58個(gè)國(guó)和18個(gè)新興市場(chǎng)提供了依據(jù)。（見(jiàn)圖表2）博斯沃思和柯林斯總結(jié)說(shuō)：“什么事可以使這些金融資本流入足以抵消發(fā)展中國(guó)家境內(nèi)資本對(duì)其自本國(guó)的好處和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呢？答案是似乎是一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的外國(guó)直接投資。”</p><p>　　Borensztein，德格雷戈里奧和李（1998）發(fā)現(xiàn)，外國(guó)直接投資的增長(zhǎng)多少取決于東道國(guó)的教育水平的程度，從而決定了它吸收能力測(cè)量高。世界銀行的最新全球發(fā)展金融（2001）的報(bào)告中

69、總結(jié)了私人資本之間流動(dòng)和增長(zhǎng)的關(guān)系決定了其他研究結(jié)果，并提供了對(duì)這些關(guān)系的新證據(jù)。（對(duì)于這個(gè)問(wèn)題的總結(jié)，看看迪帕克米什拉，阿育王么，和安圖帕尼尼Murshid的文章。）</p><p><b>　　謹(jǐn)慎的理由？</b></p><p>　　盡管在最近的研究提出的證據(jù)和其他的工作表明，發(fā)展中國(guó)家應(yīng)采取對(duì)有關(guān)外國(guó)直接投資的益處不加批判的態(tài)度謹(jǐn)慎。</p>&

70、lt;p>　　是不是高的外國(guó)直接投資份額就是軟弱的表現(xiàn)呢？Hausmann和費(fèi)爾南德斯，阿里亞斯（2000）指出外國(guó)直接投資在總資本流入較高的市場(chǎng)份額可能是東道國(guó)的示弱而不是它的實(shí)力弱小的原因。</p><p>　　外國(guó)直接投資流動(dòng)的一個(gè)顯著特點(diǎn)是，它們流入總量的比例在高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)國(guó)家更高，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)衡量的主權(quán)（政府）債務(wù)的國(guó)家的信用評(píng)級(jí)按國(guó)家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)（見(jiàn)圖表3）或其他指標(biāo)來(lái)衡量。也有一些證據(jù)表明其份額較高的國(guó)家如該機(jī)構(gòu)的

71、質(zhì)量較低。什么可以解釋這些看似矛盾的問(wèn)題呢？一種解釋是外國(guó)直接投資的可能比其他形式的資本流動(dòng)的國(guó)家采取丟失或低效的市場(chǎng)的行為中占有一席之地。在這樣的設(shè)置下外國(guó)投資者會(huì)更喜歡直接操作，而不是通過(guò)對(duì)本地金融市場(chǎng)及供應(yīng)商或依靠法律安排。這一觀點(diǎn)的政策含義根據(jù)阿爾布開(kāi)克在2000年發(fā)表的書(shū)中表明： “各國(guó)試圖擴(kuò)大它們進(jìn)入國(guó)際資本市場(chǎng)的力度并集中力量發(fā)展可信的執(zhí)法機(jī)制，而不是試圖獲得更多的外國(guó)直接投資?！?lt;/p><p>

72、　　與此類(lèi)似，Hausmann和費(fèi)爾南德斯，阿里亞斯（2000年，第5頁(yè)）認(rèn)為，“各國(guó)應(yīng)集中力量改善投資環(huán)境和市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)作。它們可能要與整體的投資效率越來(lái)越高，以及有更多的回報(bào)資本的流入有關(guān)?！半m然這極有可能是外國(guó)直接投資作為一種較高的資本流入，使其國(guó)內(nèi)政策和機(jī)構(gòu)的份額降低，但這不能被視為外國(guó)直接投資對(duì)其本身的批評(píng)。事實(shí)上，如果沒(méi)有它東道國(guó)很可能更差。</p><p>　　降價(jià)銷(xiāo)售，逆向選擇和杠桿。外國(guó)直接投資不僅

73、是從國(guó)內(nèi)到國(guó)外的居民轉(zhuǎn)移資金所有權(quán)，但同時(shí)這也是一種機(jī)制。它使外國(guó)投資者在東道國(guó)的公司行使管理和控制手段，這是一個(gè)公司治理機(jī)制。在控制轉(zhuǎn)移中可能并不總是有利的情況下，由于東道國(guó)根據(jù)它發(fā)生時(shí)逆向選擇或過(guò)度杠桿的問(wèn)題導(dǎo)致了問(wèn)題的出現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　克魯格曼（1998）指出，有時(shí)在發(fā)生危機(jī)之中進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)移控制中要求：控制權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)移在外國(guó)所有權(quán)的這種情況下是否合適？是不是就是說(shuō)超過(guò)國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)到對(duì)外國(guó)公司控制，因?yàn)樗鼈兙哂?/p>

74、特殊的能力，并能更好地運(yùn)營(yíng)，或僅僅是因?yàn)樗麄冇谐渥愕默F(xiàn)金，二當(dāng)?shù)厝藳](méi)有？是否由國(guó)內(nèi)公司和對(duì)他們資產(chǎn)的甩賣(mài)代表了受災(zāi)國(guó)的負(fù)擔(dān)，從而超出了危機(jī)本身的成本？</p><p>　　即使是在這樣的大甩賣(mài)的情況下，外國(guó)直接投資可能不一定有利于東道國(guó)，由拉津，斯達(dá)卡和圓（1999年）和拉津和斯達(dá)卡（即將出版）證明。通過(guò)外國(guó)直接投資，外國(guó)投資者在獲得有關(guān)的公司在其控制下的生產(chǎn)能力的重要信息。這使他們?cè)凇安恢椤钡膰?guó)內(nèi)儲(chǔ)蓄者在國(guó)內(nèi)

75、企業(yè)的股票買(mǎi)盤(pán)中并不意味著控制的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)。利用這種優(yōu)越的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)，外國(guó)直接投資者將傾向于保持其所有權(quán)和控制下的高生產(chǎn)力公司并出售低生產(chǎn)力的公司而儲(chǔ)戶(hù)不了解情況。與其他不利的問(wèn)題是這一過(guò)程可能導(dǎo)致外國(guó)直接投資者過(guò)度投資。</p><p>　　過(guò)高的杠桿影響率也會(huì)限制外國(guó)直接投資的好處。通常情況下，國(guó)內(nèi)投資機(jī)構(gòu)所進(jìn)行的大量外國(guó)直接投資的杠桿涉及由于在國(guó)內(nèi)信貸市場(chǎng)借貸。因此，國(guó)內(nèi)的投資比例實(shí)際上是通過(guò)外國(guó)直接投資流動(dòng)資

76、金，特別是來(lái)自外國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄可能不會(huì)很大，因?yàn)樗坪酰ㄒ驗(yàn)橥鈬?guó)投資者可以在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)遣返借貸基金），以及外國(guó)直接投資的收益的大小可能會(huì)減少由國(guó)內(nèi)借款從而由外商獨(dú)資企業(yè)完成。</p><p>　　外國(guó)直接投資逆轉(zhuǎn)？最近的工作是對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資穩(wěn)定在一個(gè)新的輕的水平的證據(jù)。雖然這是事實(shí)，機(jī)器是“囫圇吞下”，因此，難以移動(dòng)的東道國(guó)資本在短時(shí)間內(nèi)釋放出來(lái)，有時(shí)還可以完成金融交易的外國(guó)直接投資逆轉(zhuǎn)。例如，可以借鑒國(guó)外子公司在國(guó)內(nèi)反對(duì)

77、其抵押，然后借給錢(qián)還給母公司。同樣，因?yàn)橛泻艽笠徊糠质峭鈬?guó)直接投資的公司間債務(wù)，母公司可以快速調(diào)用它。</p><p>　　其他的考慮因素。還有一些其他案件中，外國(guó)直接投資可能不利于受援國(guó)，例如，當(dāng)這種投資是對(duì)高關(guān)稅或非關(guān)稅壁壘保護(hù)的國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)服務(wù)為目標(biāo)。在這種情況下，外國(guó)直接投資可能會(huì)加強(qiáng)流通努力，以延續(xù)現(xiàn)有的資源配置不當(dāng)。也有可能成為導(dǎo)致?lián)p失國(guó)內(nèi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，通過(guò)鞏固外資收購(gòu)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)所產(chǎn)生，或者通過(guò)收購(gòu)或使企

78、業(yè)倒閉。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論朗讀</b></p><p>　　無(wú)論是通過(guò)經(jīng)濟(jì)理論還是最近的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)都表明，外國(guó)直接投資對(duì)發(fā)展中東道國(guó)的有利影響。但最近的工作也指出了一些潛在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：它可以使金融交易的逆轉(zhuǎn)，并被過(guò)度用于逆向選擇和降價(jià)銷(xiāo)售，其好處是可以通過(guò)有限的杠桿作用和外國(guó)直接投資較高的市場(chǎng)份額在一個(gè)國(guó)家的總資本流入中可能反映了其機(jī)構(gòu)的弱點(diǎn)，而不是通過(guò)自己

79、的力量。盡管對(duì)這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)來(lái)源還有待進(jìn)一步的證實(shí)，但潛在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)似乎的確存在，通過(guò)采取為外國(guó)直接投資可能產(chǎn)生的影響進(jìn)行細(xì)致入微的查看。對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的政策建議是應(yīng)著眼于提高所有類(lèi)型的資本，以及國(guó)外國(guó)內(nèi)的投資環(huán)境。</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容</p><p>　　Jīngjì xué jiā qīngxiàng yú zīběn de

80、kuàguó zìyóu liúdòng, yīnwèi tā yǔnxǔ zīběn xúnqiú zuìgāo de huíbào lǜ. Wú xiànzhì de zīběn liúdòng yě kěnéng huì tígōng

81、 yīxiē qítā yōudiǎn, rú fèi ěr dé sītǎn (2000) zhǐchū. Shǒuxiān, guójì zīběn liúdòng de jiǎnshǎo shǐ tāmen fēnsàn tāmen de dàikuǎn hé tóuzī de zīběn suǒyǒu zhě

82、suǒ miànlín de fēngxiǎn. Qícì, zīběn shìchǎng de quánqiú yītǐ huà kěyǐ cùjìn zuì jiā zuòfǎ de gōngsī zhìlǐ, kuàijì guīzé hé fǎlǜ chu

83、25;ntǒng de chuánbò. Dì sān, zīběn quánqiú liúdòng, x</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容</p><p><b>　　朗讀</b></p><p>　　Zhè zhǒng rènxì

84、;ng kěnéng huì dǎozhì xǔduō fāzhǎn zhōng guójiā de zīběn liúdòng yǒu lìyú duì qítā xíngshì de wàiguó zhíjiē tóuzī, tuīdòng zài yīg

85、è yǐjīng bèi zhèngmíng (jiàn túbiǎo 1) xǔduō nián de qūshì. Wàiguó zhíjiē tóuzī shì sīrén zīběn liúrù chāoguò qítā xíngsh

86、6; de yōuhuì hélǐ de? Běnwén tōngguò huígù zuìjìn jiēshì de lǐlùn hé shízhèng jí qí duì fāzhǎn zhōng guójiā de tóuzī hé zēngz