外文翻譯--成本效益模式下企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露的決定因素

1、<p>　　2260單詞，14000英文字符，4100漢字</p><p>　　出處: Denis Cormier, Michel Magnan. Corporate Environmental Disclosure Strategies: Determinants, Costs and Benefits. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,

2、 Vol. 14, Fall1999:P429-451.</p><p><b>　　外文原文</b></p><p>　　Corporate Environmental Disclosure Strategies: Determinants, Costs and Benefits</p><p>　　In response to inves

3、tors' and other stakeholders' concerns about corporate environmental policies, many firms are voluntarily increasing their level of environmental disclosure since there is a scarcity of alternative information so

4、urces. Using a cost-benefit framework, this study intends to identify determinants of corporate environmental reporting by Canadian firms subject to water pollution compliance regulations during the 1986-1993 period. Res

5、ults suggest that information costs and a firm's</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　While regulators (e.g., securities commissions) set guidelines for financial and nonfinancial information d

6、isclosure, finns often reveal more about their activities than required. Many executives recognize that a firm's disclosure policy is a strategic tool that provides economic benefits if managed properly. In fact, the

7、re is evidence that an open disclosure policy has a positive impact on firm value (Lev[1992]; Skinner [1994]; Blacconiere and Patten [1994]; Botosan [1997]). However, the potent</p><p>　　This paper conjectur

8、es that managers weigh shareholders' information costs as well as costs and benefits arising from a firm's financial condition in deciding its environmental disclosure strategy. For instance, a cost-benefit analy

9、sis of shareholders' information needs may suggest that it is more efficient for management of widely held firms to disclose environmental information directly than for individual investors to collect it themselves.

10、However, for firms in poor financial condition, the </p><p>　　The paper's contribution to the environmental disclosure literature is threefold.First, a cost-benefit framework is proposed that identifies

11、potential economic-based determinants of corporate environmental disclosure. Second, environmental disclosure is viewed in a comprehensive manner as comprising both financial and nonfinancial information. Third, the incr

12、emental relevance of environmental performance and of other firm-specific attributes in explaining corporate environmental disclosure is as</p><p>　　A sample of Canadian finns is examined during the period 1

13、986 to 1993.Canadian firms face a reporting environment that is less rule-oriented (prescriptive)than that in the United States and less subject to lawsuits or litigation.' A priori,such an environment is more conduc

14、ive to voluntary disclosure. Since resource-based firms in Canada are subject to specific pollution standards, environmental matters are expected to be an important part of these firms' overall disclosure strategy. W

15、iseman's (</p><p>　　2. A Cost-Benefit Framework for Environmental Disclosure</p><p>　　2.1 Overview</p><p>　　Surveys conducted by KPMG (1997) and Deloitte Touche Tomatsu (1994),

16、as well as descriptive studies (Gamhle et al. [1995]), suggest that firms have increased the level of environmental disclosure over the past decade.' However, since corporate environmental disclosure is only partiall

17、y regulated, it tends to vary widely across firms.' Items that often are mentioned by firms (but need not be disclosed specifically) include capital expenditures for antipollution equipment, recycling and conservati&

18、lt;/p><p>　　Although environmental disclosure levels have increased, it is not clear why firms choose to disclose more about their environmental activities. In fact, a firm may have strong disincentives to disc

19、lose information about its environmental activities. For example, corporate pollution often makes for negative headlines, with leakages of contaminated waters at mine sites owned by Cambior Inc., Placer Dome, and Boliden

20、 being widely reported in the Canadian press even though the properties were in Gu</p><p>　　2.2 Toward a Framework of Environmental Disclosure</p><p>　　Two distinct perspectives underlie recent

21、attempts to explain corporate environmental disclosure. First, environmental reporting has been posited to be a response to pressures exerted by various stakeholders or constituencies, with corporate management attemptin

22、g to manage the public's impression of its environmental performance (Neu et al. [1998]). Most conceptual work under this perspective (as well as some empirical studies) rely on stakeholder theory (e.g.,Roberts [1992

23、]), legitimacy theory </p><p>　　Corporate social and environmental reporting through the organizational-environmental nexus, with public pressure playing a dominant role (Scott[1991]); Neu et al. [1998]; Wal

24、den and Schwartz [1997]; see Gray et al. [1995]. for a comprehensive review of the corporate social and environmental reporting literature).</p><p>　　Second, corporate environmental reporting has been viewed

25、 strictly as an economic decision, with management assessing the various costs and benefits to be derived from additional disclosure. These costs and benefits are determined by explicit and implicit contractual relations

26、hips between the firm's various stakeholders. For instance, there may be a cost from disclosure if the information is used by outside parties against the firm's interests (e.g., competitors, pressure groups). The

27、re may be b</p><p>　　With respect to environmental disclosure, Li et al. (1997) and Barth et al.(1997) adopt a similar focus and investigate the determinants of environmental liabilities disclosure by firms.

28、 Both papers provide results suggesting that firms adopt a strategic posture when disclosing (or not disclosing) environmental liabilities, with their actual environmental performance playing a significant role. However,

29、 it can be argued that a firm's disclosure of environmental liabilities is part of an overall </p><p>　　2.3 Determinants of Environmental Disclosure Strategy</p><p>　　Based on the literature

30、, it is conjectured that a firm's environmental disclosure strategy depends upon:</p><p>　　1. The benefit from a reduction in information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and in information ga

31、thering costs by shareholders (information cost) and</p><p>　　2. The costs from the use of environmental disclosure by stakeholders other than shareholders in light of a firm's financial condition (finan

32、cial condition)</p><p>　　In addition, by choosing an environmental disclosure strategy, a firm essentially selects which facet of its environmental management performance is to be revealed to the public. It

33、can be assumed that a firm's propensity to enhance its environmental disclosure stance may be facilitated or hindered by its environmental performance (i.e.. is the information to be revealed favorable, neutral, or u

34、nfavorable). Thus, environmental performance is considered a determinant of environmental disclosure s</p><p>　　Information Costs. Prior research suggests that information costs potentially influence corpora

35、te disclosure. For instance, Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) argue that there is extensive information asymmetry between investors and managers. In the absence of credible information, investors tend to assume the wor

36、st and bid down stock prices in the absence of maximum disclosure by managers. However, instead of reacting passively to the lack of information, investors can choose to privately colle</p><p>　　In summary,

37、it is in the interest of firms with a higher level of perceived risk to provide additional disclosure. Moreover, it is expected that environmental disclosure by a firm is related positively to the overall level of inform

38、ation costs to be incurred by its shareholders.</p><p>　　Financial Condition, Despite prior evidence that more extensive disclosure can benefit a firm and its shareholders, it is unlikely that managers will

39、reveal all value-relevant information. For instance, one would expect shareholders to demand environmental information such as environmentally related capital expenditures and operating costs, estimates of site remediati

40、on and reclamation costs, budgeted environmental investments, environmental management strategies, and environmental liabilities o</p><p>　　The relative magnitude of these costs as well as the ability to wit

41、hstand them are influenced by a firm's financial condition. For example, for a firm in poor financial condition, the disclosure of implicit environmental liabilities or of new pollution regulations may undermine its

42、reputation as a reliable and trustworthy supplier or debtor. Additional capital expenditures in the future may concern debtholders, suppliers, and customers of a firm in poor financial condition. Such disclosure impli<

43、;/p><p>　　If the information to be disclosed is of a positive nature (e.g., environmental award), a firm in good financial condition also is expected to provide more extensive environmental disclosure than a fi

44、rm in poor financial condition. Prior research shows that credible corporate disclosure is value-enhancing, since it makes investors' decision making less risky and more efficient (Beaver [1989]; Datar et al. [1991];

45、 Feltham et al. [1991]; Clarkson and Simunic [1994]). Good financial condition incre</p><p>　　Environmental Performance. Prior research has investigated the link between environmental performance (e.g., conf

46、ormity or not to current emission standards; absence or not of fines, penalties, orders to conform, or legal actions) and environmental disclosure (Ingram and Frazier [1980]; Wiseman [1982]; Freedman and Wasley [1990]).

47、Although results are weak, the evidence suggests that better performance is associated with more disclosure. Furthermore, the nature of a firm's environmental performa</p><p>　　Therefore, after controlli

48、ng for environmental performance, it is expected that the level of environmental disclosure by firms is determined by its information costs and by its financial condition. Firms with extensive (limited) outside sharehold

49、ers' information needs should disclose more (less) environmental information while firms in poor (good) financial condition should disclose less (more) environmental information. It is expected that most "good n

50、ews" and "bad news" in environmental disclo</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　成本效益模式下企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露的決定因素</p><p>　　由于投資者和其他利益相關(guān)者缺乏可選擇的信息來源，為了引起他們對(duì)有關(guān)環(huán)境政策的關(guān)注，許多公司自愿披露環(huán)境

51、信息。本研究采用成本效益模式，擬在通過加拿大公司1986-1993年水污染環(huán)境報(bào)告的法規(guī)遵循狀況來確定企業(yè)環(huán)境報(bào)告的決定因素。結(jié)果表明，信息成本和企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)狀況是環(huán)境信息披露的決定因素。企業(yè)規(guī)模、企業(yè)監(jiān)管制度和行業(yè)狀況也是企業(yè)披露環(huán)境信息的重要原因。</p><p><b>　　1.介紹</b></p><p>　　雖然監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)和非財(cái)務(wù)信息披露設(shè)定了相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但芬

52、蘭企業(yè)往往披露更多的是有關(guān)企業(yè)的活動(dòng)，而這不一定是符合要求的披露。許多管理者認(rèn)識(shí)到，一個(gè)公司被妥善管理的信息披露政策是一個(gè)提供經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的戰(zhàn)略工具。事實(shí)上，有證據(jù)表明，一個(gè)開放的信息披露政策對(duì)公司價(jià)值有積極的影響(Lev[1992]; Skinner [1994]; Blacconiere and Patten [1994]; Botosan [1997]). 然而，法律或政治上的潛在成本，可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)披露的減少。因此，要在查明事件的情

53、況下提示公司披露，而不是使“什么是必須的”成為一個(gè)相關(guān)問題。管理決策是敏感的，尤其是環(huán)境信息披露事件。因?yàn)槿绻怯捎趯?duì)環(huán)境的疏忽或不負(fù)責(zé)任造成的，公司將承擔(dān)一部分費(fèi)用。這些費(fèi)用是對(duì)在公眾或客戶、員工、債權(quán)人以及供應(yīng)商中所造成的聲譽(yù)損失的賠償。</p><p>　　文章猜測(cè)，經(jīng)營(yíng)者權(quán)衡股東信息及其成本和效益源于公司財(cái)務(wù)狀況所決定的環(huán)境信息披露策略。例如，對(duì)股東的信息需求進(jìn)行成本效益分析表明，通過對(duì)公司的管理來直接

54、披露環(huán)境信息比個(gè)人投資者自行收集信息更為有效。然而，對(duì)于財(cái)政狀況不佳的公司，披露關(guān)于環(huán)境義務(wù)和責(zé)任的其他信息，是不可能提高他們?cè)诠?yīng)商和債權(quán)人之中的聲譽(yù)的。</p><p>　　本文對(duì)環(huán)境信息披露研究的貢獻(xiàn)有三個(gè)方面。第一，成本效益模式下，確定以潛在經(jīng)濟(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露的決定因素。第二，環(huán)境信息披露的完整形式，包括金融和非金融信息。第三，對(duì)環(huán)保性能增量相關(guān)性和其他企業(yè)特有的企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露屬性進(jìn)行評(píng)估。&

55、lt;/p><p>　　1983-1993年，某芬蘭人對(duì)加拿大的一個(gè)樣本進(jìn)行審查。相比于美國(guó)，加拿大公司面臨的報(bào)告環(huán)境是不太規(guī)范和缺乏法律約束的。自然，對(duì)于這樣的環(huán)境，自愿披露是更有利的。由于加拿大資源型企業(yè)受制于特定的污染標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，環(huán)境問題預(yù)計(jì)將成為這些公司總體披露戰(zhàn)略的重要組成部分。懷斯曼（1982）的方法被用來研究企業(yè)的環(huán)境披露措施。一個(gè)企業(yè)的信息化和環(huán)保立場(chǎng)是從環(huán)境會(huì)計(jì)披露措施中推斷而來的（例如，斯科特[1994

56、]；巴特和麥克尼科爾斯[1994]）。結(jié)果表明，信息成本和財(cái)務(wù)狀況決定企業(yè)的環(huán)境信息披露策略。</p><p>　　2.環(huán)境信息披露的成本效益模式</p><p><b>　　2.1概述</b></p><p>　　畢馬威會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所（1997）和德勤會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所(1994）的調(diào)查和描述性研究（Gamhle等，[1995]）表明，在過去的十年，

57、許多公司提高了環(huán)境信息披露水平。然而，由于環(huán)境信息披露僅僅使部分企業(yè)得以規(guī)范，更廣泛的企業(yè)披露是趨勢(shì)。一些項(xiàng)目經(jīng)常被企業(yè)提到（但不能透露具體需要），包括防污設(shè)備的資本支出，回收和保護(hù)政策，環(huán)境管理和審計(jì)制度，以及符合政府的排放標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。</p><p>　　雖然企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露水平有所提高，但目前尚不清楚為什么企業(yè)更關(guān)注于披露環(huán)境活動(dòng)信息。事實(shí)上，一個(gè)公司披露其有關(guān)環(huán)境活動(dòng)的信息，可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生強(qiáng)烈的抑制因素。例如，發(fā)生

58、在屬于加拿大坎比奧公司、加拿大普萊斯多姆公司及瑞典博利登礦業(yè)公司的礦區(qū)的水污染泄露事件，被加拿大甚至是圭亞那、菲律賓和西班牙的媒體廣泛報(bào)道，造成負(fù)面新聞。此外，對(duì)環(huán)境不負(fù)責(zé)任的公司可能承擔(dān)政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)上的后果（Lanoie和拉普蘭特[1994]）。相反，遵守環(huán)境法規(guī)或利用廢棄物循環(huán)制造的公司具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。例如，管理人員可能需要提供額外的環(huán)境信息，來建立與社會(huì)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的支持關(guān)系，以獲得更便宜的資金或提高公司作為一個(gè)可靠的商業(yè)合作伙伴的聲譽(yù)。

59、</p><p>　　2.2關(guān)于環(huán)境信息披露模式</p><p>　　以最近的實(shí)踐為基礎(chǔ)的兩種截然不同的觀點(diǎn)，試圖解釋企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露。第一，環(huán)境報(bào)告已經(jīng)被設(shè)定成為對(duì)各種團(tuán)體或利益相關(guān)者的壓力反應(yīng)，以及公司管理層企圖控制公眾對(duì)其環(huán)境績(jī)效印象的工具（諾伊等[1998]）。大多數(shù)基于這種觀點(diǎn)的理論著作（以及一些實(shí)證研究）依靠利益相關(guān)者理論（如，羅伯茨[1992]）、合法性理論（如，帕滕[199

60、1]）或政治經(jīng)濟(jì)理論（如，廷克等[1991]）。整體而言，所有這些理論集中于通過環(huán)境組織關(guān)系及公眾壓力的主導(dǎo)作用來關(guān)注企業(yè)的社會(huì)環(huán)境報(bào)告（參見斯科特[1991]、諾伊等[1998]、沃爾登和施瓦茲[1997]和格雷等[1995]從綜合視角出發(fā)的企業(yè)社會(huì)環(huán)境報(bào)告文獻(xiàn)）。</p><p>　　第二，企業(yè)環(huán)境報(bào)告已被視為一項(xiàng)嚴(yán)格的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策，通過對(duì)額外披露得來的各項(xiàng)成本和收益的管理評(píng)價(jià)。這些成本和收益取決于公司潛在的和非

61、潛在的各利益相關(guān)者之間的契約關(guān)系。例如，外部各方（如，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手、受壓群體）可能利用成本披露信息損害公司利益。披露可能會(huì)有額外的好處，通過可靠的投資者對(duì)公司的運(yùn)作，能減少資金成本。這種方法已被用來解釋具體財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的選擇問題（如斯科特[1994]）。</p><p>　　關(guān)于環(huán)境信息披露，李等（1997）和巴特等（1997）采用類似的觀點(diǎn)研究了各公司環(huán)境負(fù)債披露的決定因素。這兩篇文獻(xiàn)提供的結(jié)果表明，當(dāng)企業(yè)采取戰(zhàn)略性的

62、處理方式披露（或不披露）環(huán)境負(fù)債時(shí)，實(shí)際的環(huán)境績(jī)效扮演著重要角色。但是，可以說，一個(gè)公司的環(huán)境負(fù)債披露是整體環(huán)境披露戰(zhàn)略的一部分，是由客觀的成本效益來評(píng)定的。因此，本文探討的企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露的決定因素采用成本效益模式。</p><p>　　2.3環(huán)境信息披露策略的決定因素</p><p>　　根據(jù)文獻(xiàn)推測(cè)，一個(gè)公司的環(huán)境信息披露策略取決于：</p><p>　?。?

63、）減少經(jīng)營(yíng)者和股東之間信息不對(duì)稱及股東收集信息的成本。（信息成本）</p><p>　　其他利益相關(guān)者按公司財(cái)務(wù)狀況使用披露的環(huán)境信息的成本。 （財(cái)務(wù)條件）</p><p>　　此外，選擇環(huán)境信息披露策略，基本上是代表選擇公司環(huán)境績(jī)效的哪一方面透露給公眾?？梢灶A(yù)見，一個(gè)公司加強(qiáng)環(huán)境信息披露的傾向可能會(huì)被其環(huán)境績(jī)效促進(jìn)或阻礙了（即披露有利，無影響，或不利的信息）。因此，環(huán)境績(jī)效被認(rèn)為是環(huán)境披

64、露策略的決定因素。</p><p>　　信息成本。此前的研究表明，信息成本可能影響公司披露。例如，格羅斯曼（1981年）和米爾格羅姆（1981）認(rèn)為，投資者和管理者之間有大量的信息不對(duì)稱。在缺乏可靠的信息時(shí)，投資者往往假定最壞的狀況，在管理者沒有完全披露時(shí)，投標(biāo)的股票價(jià)格下跌。然而，缺乏信息不是被動(dòng)的反應(yīng)，投資者可以選擇私下收集和分析數(shù)據(jù)。由于個(gè)人收集額外的信息是昂貴的，因此具有必要資源（時(shí)間和金錢）的投資者才能

65、進(jìn)行，他們期待著可觀的收益（收益>成本），低效率的投資者可能會(huì)被市場(chǎng)淘汰（黛蒙德[1985]）。由于投資者將面臨更高的交易成本，這會(huì)降低交易量和使流動(dòng)性不足。股票價(jià)格可能會(huì)下降（列夫[1988];卡爾波夫[1986]）。因此，在一定條件下，如果一家公司的成本低于市場(chǎng)參與者的成本，則該公司自愿披露信息是高效率的（Atiase [1985]；蘭和倫德霍爾姆 [1993]；米爾格羅姆和羅本斯[1992]）。例如，企業(yè)往往依靠廣泛的資本市

66、場(chǎng)來融資擴(kuò)建或被廣大投資者投資之后有動(dòng)力降低管理者和投資者之間的融資信息不對(duì)稱，因?yàn)檫@樣的舉動(dòng)具有更低的財(cái)務(wù)成本并能增加價(jià)值（吉賓斯等[1990]；弗蘭克爾等[1995]；克拉克森等[199</p><p>　　總之，以更高的水平來提供針對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的額外披露，是為了公司的利益。此外，企業(yè)環(huán)境信息披露的整體水平與股東將要承擔(dān)的信息成本是正相關(guān)的。</p><p>　　財(cái)務(wù)狀況。盡管過去的證據(jù)表明

67、，更廣泛的披露有益于公司及其股東，但管理者不可能披露所有的有關(guān)價(jià)值信息。例如，預(yù)計(jì)股東需要的環(huán)境信息，如與環(huán)境相關(guān)的資本開支和運(yùn)營(yíng)成本，土地補(bǔ)救回收費(fèi)用、預(yù)算環(huán)境投資、環(huán)境管理戰(zhàn)略以及環(huán)境責(zé)任或承諾等。然而，管理層關(guān)注的是這些披露的潛在成本（李等[1997]）。這些費(fèi)用具有多種形式（如名譽(yù)，政治，合同或財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)），基本上是由于其他利益相關(guān)者采取的行動(dòng)減少了企業(yè)的未來現(xiàn)金（戴伊[1985];卡爾波夫和洛特[1993]）。</p>

68、<p>　　這些費(fèi)用及對(duì)其承受能力的大小受企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)狀況的影響。例如，對(duì)于一個(gè)處于財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)狀況下的企業(yè)，公開潛在的環(huán)境責(zé)任或新污染制度可能會(huì)破壞其作為一個(gè)可靠的供應(yīng)商或債務(wù)人的聲譽(yù)。額外的資本支出在未來可能使公司的債務(wù)人、供應(yīng)商及客戶陷入財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的狀況。這種披露意味著將需要新的融資，現(xiàn)金流量將從其他的投資或債務(wù)償還中轉(zhuǎn)換過來，一些芬蘭人的業(yè)務(wù)在未來可能受到損害。所有這些影響可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致利益相關(guān)方重新評(píng)估該公司的業(yè)務(wù)條款。此外，

69、壓力團(tuán)體和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手可能對(duì)所披露的信息采取行動(dòng)，公司將帶著不好的配備準(zhǔn)備有效應(yīng)對(duì)這些行動(dòng)?？傮w而言，公司不佳的財(cái)務(wù)狀況會(huì)削弱其承受利益相關(guān)者壓力的能力。相比之下，擁有良好的財(cái)務(wù)狀況的公司披露類似的信息將有能力更好地抵御利益相關(guān)者的壓力，更迅速地解決環(huán)境問題。因此，在良好的財(cái)務(wù)狀況下的企業(yè)可能自愿參與“昂貴的”披露，因?yàn)檫@將增進(jìn)其在投資者中的可信度（如休斯[1986]；斯科特[1994]）。</p><p>　　如果

70、披露的信息是積極的（如環(huán)境獎(jiǎng)），相比于財(cái)務(wù)狀況不佳的公司，財(cái)務(wù)狀況良好的企業(yè)預(yù)計(jì)也將提供更廣泛的環(huán)境信息披露。此前的研究表明，可信的公司信息披露能增強(qiáng)企業(yè)價(jià)值，因?yàn)樗雇顿Y者的決策風(fēng)險(xiǎn)減小、決策效率提高（比佛[1989]；達(dá)塔爾等[1991]；費(fèi)爾特姆等[1991] ；克拉克森和西穆尼克[1994]）。良好的財(cái)務(wù)狀況增加了可信度、增加了價(jià)值，因?yàn)閷?duì)股份制的公司來說大多的信息披露是股份上的。相比之下，財(cái)務(wù)狀況不佳的企業(yè)在市場(chǎng)上信譽(yù)低，因此

71、可以預(yù)計(jì)從額外積極性的披露上獲得的收益少。總之，財(cái)務(wù)狀況良好的企業(yè)相比于財(cái)務(wù)狀況不佳的企業(yè)提供更多的信息披露是為了公司的利益。</p><p>　　環(huán)境績(jī)效。此前的研究已研究了環(huán)境績(jī)效（例如，符不符合當(dāng)前的排放標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；遵不遵守罰款，罰金，命令，或合法行為的規(guī)定）和環(huán)境信息披露的關(guān)系（英格拉姆和弗雷澤[1980]；懷斯曼[1982 ]弗里德曼和沃斯利[1990]）。雖然結(jié)果是弱相關(guān)，但證據(jù)表明，更好的績(jī)效與更多的披露

72、相關(guān)聯(lián)。此外，公司環(huán)境績(jī)效屬性構(gòu)成環(huán)境披露信息相關(guān)性的基礎(chǔ)。因此，環(huán)境績(jī)效是環(huán)境信息披露的決定因素。與此前的結(jié)果一致，推測(cè)環(huán)境績(jī)效與環(huán)境信息披露之間呈正相關(guān)。</p><p>　　因此，在控制環(huán)境績(jī)效后，預(yù)計(jì)公司環(huán)境信息披露水平取決于信息成本和財(cái)務(wù)狀況。具有廣泛的（有限的）外部股東信息需求的企業(yè)應(yīng)該公開較多的（較少的）環(huán)境信息，同時(shí)財(cái)務(wù)狀況不佳的（良好的）企業(yè)應(yīng)披露較少的（較多的）環(huán)境信息。預(yù)計(jì)，大多數(shù)在環(huán)境披露