外文翻譯--股票期權(quán)重新定價正面我贏，反面你輸

1、<p><b>　　中文3900字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Stock Option Repricing: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose</p><p>　　Introduc

2、tion</p><p>　　In most publicly traded companies, stock options are a big part of executive compensation, favored as a way to bind the financial interests of executives with shareholders. Although the exercis

3、e price of these options is fixed at the time of grant, some companies reprice stock options when stock price drops below the exercise price. The recent downturn in stock markets has prompted many companies to jump on th

4、e repricing bandwagon ( Business Week, December11, 2000). Repricing occurs in two ways:</p><p>　　Critics oppose repricing because managers stand to gain whether stock price goes up or down. This undermines t

5、he incentive effects of stock options by eliminating the financial punishment to executives whose mismanagement perhaps led to stock price decline in the first place. The ultimate irony is that repricing increases manage

6、rial compensation when managers ought to be fired for poor performance.</p><p>　　Institutional investors view repricing as a symptom of managerial entrenchment caused by ineffective corporate governance and

7、routinely use their voting power to block repricing proposals. They are opposed to repricing because each new share granted to employees dilutes the control and returns of existing stockholders.</p><p>　　Boa

8、rd of directors of repricing firms defend the practice by arguing that options far out-of-money are devoid of any motivational power, and repricing can restore managerial incentives. Another explanation, prevalent in Sil

9、icon Valley, is that repricing is necessary to retain talented employees who would be otherwise lured by rival firms. These firms grant employees stock options to conserve cash and view repricing as necessary to preserve

10、 their most valuable asset – human capital. An implicit a</p><p>　　Suggestions</p><p>　　Theoretical literature suggests that repricing can be an effective antidote to the problems of low employ

11、ee morale and high turnover especially in firms where intellectual capital is the most important asset. However, due to weaknesses in corporate governance and dysfunctional incentives under the current regulatory regime,

12、 repricing has lost its purpose and resulted in undesirable outcomes. To mitigate the side-effects of repricing, we offer the following suggestions: (1) educate public about </p><p>　　1. Educate public about

13、 the true economic costs of stock options</p><p>　　Many corporate boards perceive repricing as a low cost option because repricing does not require companies to record an accounting charge and there is no ca

14、sh outflow. The only cost is equity dilution when options are exercised. The dilution effect can be easily offset by share repurchases. It is little wonder that the boards tend to reprice when stock prices fall.</p>

15、;<p>　　Some politicians have repeatedly made statements that employee stock options have no value if the strike price is equal to the market price on the grant date. Their statements reflect either a tremendous la

16、ck of knowledge about accounting or considerable intent to deceive. Yet, the claim that stock options have no value at the grant date seems to be widely held both within the business community and the general public.<

17、/p><p>　　Ex ante economic cost of an option is the amount of money an outside investor would pay if the company decides to sell such options rather than giving them to executives. Ex post economic cost of the o

18、ption is the difference between strike price and the market price on the date options are exercised. Accounting and finance academics can play a useful role in educating executives, directors, politicians, and the genera

19、l public about the true economic costs of options. They can help corporate boar</p><p>　　2. Promote regulatory changes</p><p>　　Two most critical regulatory reforms needed are (1) to ensure that

20、 the cost of options is recognized explicitly in the financial statements, and (2) that there is symmetry between accounting and tax treatments. Financial economists agree that stock options are costly. In a recent testi

21、mony to U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan described the severe market distortions from not showing the cost of options in financial statements. In the same hearings, Nobel </p

22、><p>　　The distinction between fixed and variable price options is absurd and so is the perpetuation of repricing by the “six and one” tactic allowed under I44. Changes in the tax code are also needed to ensure

23、 symmetry between accounting and tax treatments. Specifically, if companies deduct NQOs from taxable income, they should also be required to charge it against reported income.</p><p>　　3. Strengthen corporat

24、e governance</p><p>　　One obvious way to curb abusive repricing is to strengthen corporate governance. In principle, it involves implementing the model of separation of duties. Based on the discussion , some

25、 of the action steps that can be taken are: (1) appoint a non-executive director as chairman of board, (2) appoint outside and independent directors on board compensation committees, (3) seek shareholder approval for any

26、 repricing, (4) encourage institutional ownership or block ownership to monitor manager’s decis</p><p>　　4. Revise CEO compensation plans</p><p>　　Even though routine repricing has become more p

27、ainful under the new accounting rule, the continuing slide in stock market requires that boards respond with appropriate compensation tools. We recommend the following changes in compensation plan to retain and motivate

28、key employees.</p><p>　　Increase equity grants. If making managers owners aligns their incentives with stockholders and mitigates agency problems, firms can grant stocks rather than options to CEOs to achiev

29、e the same purpose. A steep decline in stock price can make options go underwater. Since top managers place little value on such options, they do not provide much incentive to them (Halland Murphy, 2000). On the other ha

30、nd, stocks continue to be valuable even in down market. Moreover, whereas stock options enable ma</p><p>　　Index stock options. One important drawback of traditional fixed-price options is that the executive

31、 is punished (rewarded) when stock price declines (rises) due to exogenous market or industry factors. This violates an important doctrine of contracting theory that managers should be shielded from the uncertainty gener

32、ated by factors outside their control. Repricing makes it worse because it weakens incentives to increase stock price while strengthening the incentives to increase volatility.</p><p>　　Index options can be

33、used to mute the undesirable effects of fixed-price option plans while preserving the incentives to increase shareholder wealth. This is achieved by replacing the fixed strike price with a moving benchmark, typically an

34、industry or market index. Index options pay off only if the firm’s stock price exceeds the benchmark. They can still result in a positive payoff even when fixed-price options go underwater in a bear market. Thus, the use

35、 of index options renders repricing unn</p><p>　　Johnson and Tian (2000a, b) analytically compare five variations of traditional fixed stock options, all of which have been used in practice: performance opti

36、ons, premium options, purchased options, reload options and indexed options. They find that compared to all other options, indexed options have a higher incentive intensity (measured by the sensitivity of option pay-off

37、to stock price movements) and encourage risk- averse executives to take on risky projects. They have a low sensitivity to </p><p>　　The idea of indexed options is not new. As far back as seven years, Akhigbe

38、 et al. (1996) advocated use of indexed options. Although some companies like Level 3, a telecom company, have used them, indexed options are not used widely despite their overwhelming theoretical superiority. One deterr

39、ent is current accounting rules that require variable accounting for stock options, which forces companies to expense changes in their value each quarter and face the prospect of increased earnings volatil</p><

40、;p>　　Reprice value-for-value. Simply lowering the strike price of existing options to the prevailing market price substantially increases the probability of finishing in-the-money and hence the value of options. The r

41、esult is a windfall gain to the executive who perhaps ought to be fired for poor performance. An alternative is to cancel old options and replace them with fewer options of lower strike price and/or shorter maturity so s

42、uch that the value of new options equals the value of cancelled opti</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　A rigorous look at the current repricing practices leads us to believe that it is more of a wind

43、fall gain to executives of poorly performing firms than a reincentivization mechanism aimed at retaining and motivating key managerial talent as suggested in the theoretical literature. Weaknesses in the corporate govern

44、ance structure, lax accounting regulations, and loopholes in tax laws enable executives to reprice options to favorably influence their own pay packages, and they do so in a way that c</p><p>　　There is no q

45、uestion in our minds that current accounting and tax rules are the driving force behind the grant of mega-size options and the wave of repricings witnessed in the last decade. The fiction that fixed-price options have no

46、 cost for GAAP financial statements, even though they form a central feature of executive compensation plans, should end. It is simply incredible that the same companies that say that no reasonable estimate of option val

47、ue is available for financial statements turn a</p><p>　　Source: Avinash Arya, Huey-Lian Sun .2004.“Stock Option Repricing: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose”. Journal of Business Ethics.50.pp.297-312.</p>

48、<p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　股票期權(quán)重新定價：正面我贏，反面你輸</p><p><b>　　簡介</b></p><p>　　在大多數(shù)上市公司，股票期權(quán)已占據(jù)了經(jīng)理層薪酬中的大部分，它作為一種約束高管與股東經(jīng)濟利益的方式，深受公司青睞。雖然這些期權(quán)的行使價在授出時是固定的，但是當(dāng)股票

49、價格下降到低于行使價時，一些公司會對股票期權(quán)進行重新定價。近期低迷的股市就促使了許多公司選擇重新定價（商業(yè)周刊，12月11日，2000）。重新定價在兩種情況下發(fā)生：（1）或者是行權(quán)價降低了（2）或者是現(xiàn)有的股票期權(quán)被取消了，并發(fā)行了較低行權(quán)價的新期權(quán)。</p><p>　　批評者反對重新定價，因為股票價格不管上漲或下跌，管理者都會得益。通過消除對管理人員因管理不善而導(dǎo)致股票價格下跌的財務(wù)處罰，這樣會破壞股票期權(quán)的

50、激勵效應(yīng)。具有諷刺意味的是，當(dāng)管理者因表現(xiàn)不佳被解雇時，重新定價會最終提高企業(yè)經(jīng)營者報酬。</p><p>　　機構(gòu)投資者認(rèn)為重新定價是由于公司無效的治理，管理者經(jīng)常使用他們的投票權(quán)以阻止重新定價的建議等原因而引起的一種公司為鞏固其管治不力從而采取措施的的現(xiàn)象。他們反對重新定價，因為每一授予員工的新股都會稀釋現(xiàn)有股東的控制權(quán)和回報。</p><p>　　支持重新定價的公司董事會認(rèn)為期權(quán)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)

51、超出預(yù)期一大筆錢，使任何激勵都缺乏了動力，而重新定價可以恢復(fù)管理層獎勵的做法。另一種在硅谷很流行的解釋是重新定價對留住人才是必要的，否則優(yōu)秀員工會被你的對手公司所挖掘。這些公司給予員工股票期權(quán)，以節(jié)省現(xiàn)金和留住其最寶貴的資產(chǎn)——人力資本。當(dāng)然，其中一個隱含的假設(shè)是，留住的這些管理人員對公司生存和業(yè)績改善是必不可少的。</p><p><b>　　建議</b></p><p

52、>　　理論文獻表明重新定價能有效解除員工士氣低落和高營業(yè)額的問題，尤其是那些智力資本是公司最重要的資產(chǎn)的企業(yè)。然而，由于目前監(jiān)管制度，公司治理和激勵功能失調(diào)等方面的不利影響，重新定價已失去其意義并會產(chǎn)生不良后果。為減輕重新定價的副作用和影響，我們提出了以下建議：（1）教育公眾了解關(guān)于股票期權(quán)的真實經(jīng)濟成本（2）推動監(jiān)管改革（3）加強公司治理（4）修訂CEO薪酬計劃</p><p>　　1、教育公眾了解關(guān)于股

53、票期權(quán)的真實經(jīng)濟成本</p><p>　　許多公司的董事會認(rèn)為重新定價是一種低成本的期權(quán)，因為重新定價并不要求記錄會計變更，也沒有現(xiàn)金流出。唯一的成本是期權(quán)行使時股權(quán)被稀釋。稀釋效應(yīng)可以通過購回股份很容易地抵消掉。這也就難怪當(dāng)股價下跌時議會傾向于重新定價。</p><p>　　一些政界人士一再聲明，如果執(zhí)行價格等于授予日時的市價，員工股票期權(quán)會沒有價值。他們的聲明反映了他們要么是會計知識的

54、匱乏，要么是意圖去欺騙大眾。然而，關(guān)于股票期權(quán)在授予日沒有價值的說法，似乎商界和大眾市民都已普遍認(rèn)同了。</p><p>　　如果公司決定出售期權(quán)，而不執(zhí)行期權(quán)，這樣事前期權(quán)的經(jīng)濟成本將是外部投資者支付的一大筆錢。事后期權(quán)的經(jīng)濟成本是執(zhí)行價格與股權(quán)行使日的市場價格之間的差額。會計和金融領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者能夠在教育管理人員，董事，政治家，以及有關(guān)廣大市民了解期權(quán)的真實經(jīng)濟成本中發(fā)揮有效的作用。他們可以幫助公司的董事會，人力

55、資源管理人員和高級管理人員理解布萊克斯科爾斯模型或二項式期權(quán)定價模型中期權(quán)估價公式如何運用，以便使那些參與設(shè)計薪酬的人意識到了股票期權(quán)授予和現(xiàn)有期權(quán)的重新定價的費用對公司而言是昂貴的。關(guān)于了解期權(quán)真實經(jīng)濟成本的意識的提高也會給決策者施加壓力，從而改變會計或稅務(wù)條例使成本費用更清晰明確，并確保重新定價的公司能承擔(dān)這些費用。</p><p><b>　　2、推動監(jiān)管改革</b></p>

56、;<p>　　監(jiān)管改革中最關(guān)鍵的兩個需要的是：（1）確保方案的成本在財務(wù)報表中能明確識別（2）會計處理與稅務(wù)處理有對稱性。金融經(jīng)濟學(xué)家都認(rèn)為股票期權(quán)是昂貴的。聯(lián)邦儲備銀行主席格林斯潘最近向美國參議院財政委員會的聲明中描述，期權(quán)成本并沒有顯示在財務(wù)報表中這會引起了市場嚴(yán)重的失真。在同一聽證會上，諾貝爾經(jīng)濟學(xué)獎獲得者約瑟夫斯蒂格利茨教授談到，市場是誤傳的，并主張股票期權(quán)成本應(yīng)確認(rèn)為一項能合理估價的費用。當(dāng)未來期權(quán)行使時，它的實

57、際成本是市場價與行使價之間的差額，可以確定出授予時的估計成本和真實成本之間的差異，以此來調(diào)整收入。如果該期權(quán)不行使，估計的股票期權(quán)成本是可以逆轉(zhuǎn)的。這可以阻止過多地給予期權(quán)，同時可以鼓勵公司提供管理理論上更優(yōu)的指數(shù)期權(quán)等激勵權(quán)利。</p><p>　　期權(quán)的固定價格和可變價格之間的區(qū)別是荒謬的，所以由I44允許的“六一”策略中，重新定價是永存的。稅法的變化也需要確保會計與稅務(wù)處理的對稱性。具體來說，如果公司從應(yīng)納

58、稅所得中扣除不合格股票期權(quán)，它們也應(yīng)該被計入費用，從而減少了報表收入。</p><p><b>　　3、加強公司治理</b></p><p>　　加強企業(yè)管治是一種遏制濫用重新定價方案的顯著措施。原則上，它涉及實施職責(zé)分離模型?；谝恍┯懻摰慕Y(jié)果，可以采取以下行動步驟：（1）委任一個非執(zhí)行董事作為董事會主席（2）在董事會的薪酬委員會里委任外面的獨立董事（3）重新定價的

59、一些意見要經(jīng)過股東的批準(zhǔn)（4）鼓勵機構(gòu)投資人或交易單位所有者持續(xù)監(jiān)測管理者的決定。</p><p>　　4、修訂CEO薪酬計劃</p><p>　　雖然在新的會計準(zhǔn)則下，常規(guī)的重新定價變得更困難，在股市持續(xù)下滑時，要求議會以薪酬形式做出適當(dāng)?shù)男匠昊貞?yīng)。我們建議薪酬計劃做出如下的改變，以此來留住和激勵關(guān)鍵員工。</p><p>　　a、增加股本補助。如果能使管理者的激

60、勵效應(yīng)與股東利益一致，這就可以相應(yīng)緩解代理問題，公司可以授予首席執(zhí)行官股票而不是期權(quán)，一樣能達(dá)到同一目的。 股票價格急劇下降使期權(quán)也貼水。由于高層管理者認(rèn)為這樣的期權(quán)沒有什么價值，所以公司不向他們提供任何獎勵補助（哈蘭墨菲，2000）。另一方面，在股市下跌時，股票仍然可能是珍貴的。此外，股市上升時股票期權(quán)能使管理者與股東都獲益，同時也抵免了股市下滑時帶來的財富損失。所以無論是股市上升還是下滑時，股權(quán)關(guān)系與管理者和股東的財富都緊密相連。因

61、此，授予股票似乎是一個比授予股票期權(quán)更好的選擇。</p><p>　　b、指數(shù)股票期權(quán)。當(dāng)股票價格因外部的市場或行業(yè)因素下跌（上漲）時，傳統(tǒng)的固定價格期權(quán)的重要缺點是管理者會被處罰（獎勵）。這違反了契約理論學(xué)說，因為管理者應(yīng)該免除由外部控制產(chǎn)生的不確定性因素的影響。而重新定價會使這種情況變得更糟，因為如果削弱激勵機制會提高股票價格，而強化激勵機制，會增加股票波動性。</p><p>　　指

62、數(shù)期權(quán)可用來減弱固定價格期權(quán)計劃帶來的不利影響，同時保持激勵機制效果，并增加股東財富。這主要通過用一個變動的基準(zhǔn)替代固定的行使價來達(dá)到目的，通常它是一個行業(yè)或市場的指數(shù)。當(dāng)公司的股票價格超過該基準(zhǔn)時，指數(shù)期權(quán)取得成功。即使在熊市固定期權(quán)價格貼水時，他們?nèi)匀豢梢援a(chǎn)生有利回報。因此，指數(shù)期權(quán)使得重新定價是不必要的。相反，如果股票價格上漲完全是因為市場因素，指數(shù)期權(quán)可能沒有回報。這能解決牛市時期權(quán)給管理者帶來的不公平獎勵這一批判性問題（商業(yè)周

63、刊，1998年4月20日）。理論上，通過過濾出基準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)生的業(yè)績影響，指數(shù)期權(quán)能提供更有效的激勵。管理者要確保脫離外部控制常見的不確定性因素的影響。因此，他們會要求較低的風(fēng)險溢價，這樣公司也能節(jié)省賠償費用。</p><p>　　約翰遜和天（2000a，b）分析比較了五種已在實踐中使用過的傳統(tǒng)固定股票期權(quán)（業(yè)績期權(quán)，溢價期權(quán)，已購買選項，再裝期權(quán)和指數(shù)期權(quán)）之間的差異。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，相對于其他期權(quán)，指數(shù)期權(quán)有一個較高的激勵

64、強度（由股價變動引起期權(quán)變動的靈敏度測量得知），而且它鼓勵規(guī)避風(fēng)險的管理者承擔(dān)有風(fēng)險的項目。他們有一個低靈敏度的到期時間。既然主要的目是給予管理者期權(quán)獎勵，所以它不會在不久的未來轉(zhuǎn)化為公司價值的增長，指數(shù)期權(quán)能使公司在出售遠(yuǎn)期到期期權(quán)時不會增加薪酬費用。指數(shù)期權(quán)唯一的缺點是，相對于固定價格期權(quán)，它們有更低的貨幣整理率，會相應(yīng)降低執(zhí)行價。因此，如果一個公司需要替代傳統(tǒng)期權(quán)，它必須發(fā)行更大量的指數(shù)期權(quán)以保留現(xiàn)有的薪酬水平。</p>

65、;<p>　　指數(shù)期權(quán)的想法并不新鮮。早在七年前，艾克海貝（1996）已經(jīng)開始倡導(dǎo)指數(shù)期權(quán)的使用。有些3級類公司，如一家電信公司，已經(jīng)使用指數(shù)期權(quán)了。盡管指數(shù)期權(quán)在理論上有絕對壓倒性優(yōu)勢，但還是未被廣泛使用。其中一種制止其廣泛使用的因素是當(dāng)前會計規(guī)則要求股票期權(quán)是可變的會計，這就迫使其計算每季度支出的變化并要面臨盈利增加時會發(fā)生波動的現(xiàn)象。</p><p>　　c、重新定價的價值轉(zhuǎn)換。降低現(xiàn)有股權(quán)的

66、行使價至當(dāng)時的市價，這樣會大幅提高貨幣整理率和股票期權(quán)的價值。這會導(dǎo)致可能因表現(xiàn)欠佳本應(yīng)被解雇的管理者獲得暴利。另一種方法是取消舊的期權(quán)，取而代之的是更低執(zhí)行價或更短到期日的期權(quán)，同時使新期權(quán)的價值等于已取消期權(quán)的價值。薪酬方面有關(guān)的咨詢?nèi)耸糠Q之為重新定價的價值轉(zhuǎn)換。從股東的角度看，這不涉及任何薪酬變化，因為報酬總額保持不變?；魻柡湍疲?000）表明，規(guī)避風(fēng)險的管理者會喜歡少數(shù)低執(zhí)行價的期權(quán)而不是大量高執(zhí)行價的期權(quán)。因此，價值轉(zhuǎn)變對管

67、理者仍是有利的，并能無代價地為股東幫助恢復(fù)激勵效果。龍星，希林克，新光和勝騰是那些采取了重新定價價值轉(zhuǎn)換的領(lǐng)頭公司。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　當(dāng)前重新定價的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)做法使我們相信，這對業(yè)績不佳公司的管理者而言更是一個取得暴利的時機，而不是留住和激勵關(guān)鍵管理人才。公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)薄弱，會計法規(guī)不嚴(yán)和稅法漏洞會使管理者對期權(quán)重新定價，以有利于

68、自己的薪酬，他們這樣做是為了偽裝他們的真實動機。其結(jié)果是大量財富從股東轉(zhuǎn)移到管理者。</p><p>　　毫無疑問，目前的會計和稅務(wù)規(guī)則是授予超大型期權(quán)和過去十年重新定價風(fēng)靡的推動力。在公認(rèn)會計準(zhǔn)則要求的財務(wù)報表中，固定價格期權(quán)沒有成本，這是錯誤的，即使他們形成了管理者薪酬計劃的核心功能，所以這種觀念應(yīng)該改變。令人難以置信的是，同一家公司說沒有財務(wù)報表可取的合理的期權(quán)估價，而要將其成本作為一項費用在納稅申報中顯示