工商管理專業(yè)畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯----公司為何必須開放商業(yè)模式

1、<p><b>　?、?外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　外文翻譯之一</b></p><p>　　Why companies should have open business models</p><p>　　作者：Henry Chesbrough</p><p>　　國籍

2、：American</p><p>　　出處：Sloan Management Review, Winter 2007, 48 (2): 22-28</p><p><b>　　原文正文：</b></p><p>　　Innovation is becoming an increasingly open process thanks to a

3、growing division of labor. One company develops a novel idea but does not bring it to market. Instead, the company decides to partner with or sell the idea to another party, which then commercializes it. To get the most

4、out of this new system of innovation, companies must open their business models by actively searching for and exploiting outside ideas and by allowing unused internal technologies to flow to the outside, where other <

5、/p><p>　　Open business models enable an organization to be more effective in creating as well as capturing value. They help create value by leveraging many more ideas because of their inclusion of a variety of

6、external concepts. They also allow greater value capture by utilizing a firm’s key asset, resource or position not only in that organization’s own operations but also in other companies’ businesses.</p><p>　

7、　To appreciate the potential of this new approach, consider the following names: Qualcomm Inc., the maker of cellular phone technology; Genzyme Corp., a biotechnology company; The Procter & Gamble Co., a consumer pro

8、ducts corporation; and Chicago, the musical stage show and movie. This assortment might appear to be random, but they all have something in common: Each required an open business model in which an idea traveled from inve

9、ntion to commercialization through at least two different compani</p><p>　　Qualcomm used to make its own cell phones and base stations but ceased doing so years ago.1 Now others manufacture those products, a

10、nd Qualcomm just makes chips and sells licenses to its technologies, period. In fact, every phone that uses its technology is sold by a customer of Qualcomm, not by the company itself. </p><p>　　Genzyme lice

11、nses technology from the outside and then develops it in-house. The company has turned these external ideas into an array of novel therapies that deliver important cures for previously untreatable rare diseases. It has a

12、lso built an impressive financial record in an industry in which profits have been difficult to achieve.2 </p><p>　　Procter & Gamble has rejuvenated its growth through a program called Connect and Develo

13、p, which licenses or acquires products from other companies and brings them to market as P&G brands. With early successes like the Crest SpinBrush, Olay Regenerist and Swiffer Dusters, P&G now actively seeks exte

14、rnal ideas and technologies through an extensive network of scouts. Chicago, the often-revived musical, emerged out of a creative extension of a play written decades ago that had gone out of print.3 Ot</p><p&g

15、t;　　If these ideas were so valuable, then the obvious question is: Why didn’t the original owners figure out the best way to take them to market on their own? The answer goes to the very heart of why markets for innovati

16、on are so important. Different companies possess different assets, resources and market positions, and each has a unique history.4 Because of that, companies look at opportunities differently. They will quickly recognize

17、 ideas that fit the pattern that has proven successful for them </p><p>　　Innovation Inefficiencies</p><p>　　In many industries, markets for innovation have existed for a long time. In the chemi

18、cal industry, for instance, compounds have often moved from one company to another.5 Historically, though, such markets have been highly inefficient. Even now, much of the exchange of technology and its associated intell

19、ectual property occurs through a cottage industry of brokers and patent attorneys. Although transactions do occur, the price and other terms of the transactions are difficult to discern. This mak</p><p>　　Ri

20、sing Costs, Shorter Times</p><p>　　An important factor spurring the process of open innovation is the rising cost of technology development in many industries. Case in point: the soaring cost of building a s

21、emiconductor fabrication facility, or “fab.” In 2006, Intel Corp. announced two new fabs, one in Arizona and the other in Israel. Each was estimated to cost more than $3 billion. Just 20 years ago, a new fab would have c

22、ost about 1% of that. Another example is pharmaceutical drug development. Investment in a successful product</p><p>　　The rising costs of technology development would imply that only the big will get bigger,

23、 with everyone else falling behind. But there’s a second force at play: the shortening life cycles of new products. In the computer industry during the early 1980s, for example, hard disk drives would typically ship for

24、four to six years, after which a new and better product became available. By the late 1980s, the expected shipping life had fallen to two to three years. By the 1990s, it was just six to nine</p><p>　　In pha

25、rmaceuticals, the expected shipping life of new drugs while they enjoy patent protection has shortened because of longer testing procedures and quicker entry by manufacturers of generics. And in the largest market segmen

26、ts, successful drugs must often contend with a number of rival products. For example, at least five statin prescription drugs are currently being sold, all of them aimed at addressing elevated cholesterol levels and hear

27、t disease.</p><p>　　As a result of both trends — rising development costs and shorter product life cycles — companies are finding it increasingly difficult to justify investments in innovation. (See “The Eco

28、nomic Pressures on Innovation.”) Open business models address both effects. It attacks the cost side of the problem by leveraging external research-and-development resources to save time and money in the innovation proce

29、ss. Consider P&G’s 6 Pringles Print initiative, through which the company now offers Pringles</p><p>　　Open business models also attack the revenue side. P&G, for instance, is creating new brands by

30、licensing technologies from other companies around the world, resulting in products like the SpinBrush, a battery-operated toothbrush, which generated firstyear sales of $200 million. And P&G is also getting money fr

31、om licensing its technologies to other firms.</p><p>　　The combination of leveraged cost and time savings with new revenue opportunities confers powerful advantages for companies willing to open their busine

32、ss models. (See “The New Business Model of Open Innovation,” p. 27.) The development costs of innovation are reduced by the greater use of external technology in a firm’s own R&D process. This saves time as well as m

33、oney. And the firm no longer restricts itself to the markets it serves directly. Now it participates in other segments through licen</p><p>　　Open Experiments</p><p>　　What can companies do to p

34、artake more fully in the benefits of open innovation? The short answer is that they need to develop the ability to experiment with their business models. Developing that capability requires the creation of processes for

35、conducting experiments and for assessing their results. Although that might seem obvious, many companies simply do not have such processes in place. In most organizations, no single person short of the chief executive of

36、ficer bears responsibility for the</p><p>　　Companies also face certain constraints. Many firms, for example, are understandably hesitant to launch experiments that might risk the reputation of an establishe

37、d brand. The same is true for companies with respect to their distribution channels, manufacturing strategies and so on. But some companies have developed tactics to work around such limitations. Consider, for instance,

38、a food manufacturer that is exploring ways to provide healthier but shelf-stable foods and snacks in high school vend</p><p>　　Managerial Implications</p><p>　　Each of the three companies began

39、the journey toward a more open business model with a shock or challenge to the status quo. For IBM, the shock was so severe that the company was nearly broken up. In the case of P&G, its stock had fallen in half and

40、a new CEO had been brought in. Air Products did not face the brutal financial adjustments that IBM and P&G did, but a potential merger triggered a deep self-examination of how the company did business.</p><

41、;p>　　Generally speaking, making fundamental changes to a company’s business model requires clear commitment and support from the top. P&G is the prime example here, as CEO Lafley strongly and explicitly endorsed t

42、he Connect and Develop approach to innovation. Lacking that kind of support, the Air Products approach of starting small provides a subtler way to effect change. Either way, the important thing is to build and maintain m

43、omentum by continually supplying evidence that supports the transformati</p><p>　　Of course, experimentation only yields value when a company is able (and willing) to act on the information that the experime

44、nts generate. Larry Huston’s early success at P&G with insourcing external products showed that there was money to be made, but it was Gil Cloyd and A.G. Lafley who realized that this new logic could transform P&

45、G’s business model and boost its overall growth rate.12 Air Products’ experience to date is helping the company to rethink how it might finance the high fixed capi</p><p>　　Making the Transition</p>&

46、lt;p>　　When building a new business model, companies must figure out what to do with their existing model. Praising a new business model can inadvertently suggest that the current one is somehow obsolete. But the trad

47、itional business model can continue to play an important role. P&G, for instance, still develops its own brands and invests substantially in its internal technologies. </p><p>　　Managing the coexistence

48、of a new business model alongside an existing one can be tricky. Indeed, when Durk Jager of P&G tried to push too many change initiatives at once, P&G did begin to transform itself but lost the operational discip

49、line to deliver the quarterly earnings numbers that investors expected. Nevertheless, as successful experiments begin to point the way toward a new and more effective business model, the company must undergo a final phas

50、e in its transformation. In this stage, the</p><p>　　First, the business model must be adjusted or rebuilt to handle significant volume. Many business models that work well when only a small number of highly

51、 trained people are involved can easily break down when new layers of administration are needed to manage a much larger number of more general workers. If certain processes cannot be automated or standardized, the model

52、may not be able to handle large increases in activity without resulting in a severe degradation of quality. IBM faces this con</p><p>　　Second, the business model must obtain “buy in”from important constitue

53、ncies before being rolled out across the company. Scaling up a business model requires much more funding and far greater organizational commitment than a small experiment does, and those resources must come from somewher

54、e. This often creates “l(fā)osers” in the organization — groups whose budgets are cut to free up resources to support the new business model. Because of that, the scaling-up process can encounter tremendous intern</p>

55、<p>　　公司為何必須開放商業(yè)模式</p><p>　　作者：亨利·切薩布魯夫</p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　出處：斯隆管理評論，2007冬第2期第48卷: 22-28</p><p><b>　　中文譯文：</b></p>

56、<p>　　隨著勞動分工日益明確，創(chuàng)新正逐漸開放化。創(chuàng)意商業(yè)化不再由原創(chuàng)公司單獨完成，而是通過合作或轉(zhuǎn)讓的方式實現(xiàn)。為了在這種新式創(chuàng)新系統(tǒng)中獲得盡可能多的利益，公司必須通過積極探發(fā)外部理念及輸出尚未應(yīng)用的相應(yīng)內(nèi)部技術(shù)（使其他公司能發(fā)掘這些技術(shù)的經(jīng)濟(jì)潛力）來開放商業(yè)模式。</p><p>　　首先必須明確商業(yè)模式的概念。商業(yè)模式本質(zhì)上發(fā)揮兩大功能：創(chuàng)造價值；并使創(chuàng)造者從中獲取部分價值。前者要求定義一系列

57、創(chuàng)造新產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的相關(guān)環(huán)節(jié)（從原材料供應(yīng)到顧客終端銷售）。這些環(huán)節(jié)不斷提高了價值附加。后者要求在這些相關(guān)環(huán)節(jié)，確立獨特的資源、資產(chǎn)或地位，以使公司具備競爭優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　開放式商業(yè)模式使組織的價值創(chuàng)造及獲取都更有效。它通過融合外部概念來影響內(nèi)部創(chuàng)意，進(jìn)而促成價值創(chuàng)造。此外，它還通過利用公司內(nèi)外的核心資產(chǎn)、資源或地位來使公司獲取更多價值。</p><p>　　下列公司會有助于評價

58、開放式商業(yè)模式的潛力：高通公司——便攜式電話技術(shù)制造商；轉(zhuǎn)基因公司——生物技術(shù)行業(yè)巨頭；寶潔——日用消費(fèi)品業(yè)巨頭；以及芝加哥——音樂舞臺劇與電影業(yè)。此隨機(jī)分類卻包含上述公司的一些共性：每個企業(yè)都要求開放式商業(yè)模式——隨著由不同團(tuán)體參與創(chuàng)新分工，一項創(chuàng)意從誕生到實現(xiàn)商業(yè)化經(jīng)歷至少兩個不同企業(yè)。其間，創(chuàng)意和技術(shù)在入市前經(jīng)歷多次買賣，特許或轉(zhuǎn)讓。</p><p>　　高通公司（Qualcomm）曾自己生產(chǎn)便攜式電話及基

59、座，但已停止多年。如今，這些都由其他廠家完成，而高通自身只生產(chǎn)芯片及出售其技術(shù)的特許使用。實際上，每部使用高通技術(shù)的電話都不是由高通負(fù)責(zé)銷售，而是其加盟商。</p><p>　　轉(zhuǎn)基因公司（Genzyme）從外界獲得特許技術(shù)用以進(jìn)一步研發(fā)。公司成功將許多外部創(chuàng)意轉(zhuǎn)化成專治疑難雜癥的新療法。于是，公司也就在一個實現(xiàn)利潤較難的行業(yè)完成了輝煌的業(yè)績。</p><p>　　寶潔公司通過一個“聯(lián)結(jié)與

60、開發(fā)”的項目煥發(fā)增長。該項目特許其他廠商貼牌生產(chǎn)。有了佳潔士電動牙刷，玉蘭油新生喚膚系列，斯威福除塵器(Swiffer Dusters)的成功，寶潔現(xiàn)在通過更廣泛的跟蹤網(wǎng)絡(luò)積極尋求外部創(chuàng)意和技術(shù)。</p><p>　　芝加哥(Chicago), 這部起起落落的音樂劇, 創(chuàng)造性的拓展了一部早已停印多年的劇本。旁人發(fā)現(xiàn)其潛在價值，數(shù)次使其重新煥發(fā)，以致成了一部獲獎劇。這部劇每次易主都重新煥發(fā)。最近一次則獲得了2002

61、年的奧斯卡最佳影片獎。</p><p>　　如果這些創(chuàng)意真的這么有價值，那有個明顯的問題：為什么原所有者不自己設(shè)法將它們市場化？答案涉及了創(chuàng)新市場重要性的關(guān)鍵。不同公司擁有不同資產(chǎn)、資源和市場地位，并且各有其獨特的歷史?；诖?，公司對待機(jī)遇不盡相同：他們會很快認(rèn)可與其以往成功經(jīng)歷相匹配的創(chuàng)意；他們也會很接受需要未知資產(chǎn)、資源和地位配置的概念。在創(chuàng)新市場里，創(chuàng)意從不合適的公司輸出，以尋找合適的公司。</p&g

62、t;<p><b>　　創(chuàng)新無效</b></p><p>　　創(chuàng)新市場，在很多行業(yè)都已存在多年。比如，在化工行業(yè)，化合物經(jīng)常轉(zhuǎn)來轉(zhuǎn)去。不過歷史上，這些市場都是非常低效的。甚至現(xiàn)在，在家庭手工業(yè)的許多技術(shù)及其知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的交易中也出現(xiàn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人和專利律師。盡管交易會發(fā)生，但是價格及其他交易術(shù)語卻很難辨別。這使得衡量技術(shù)交易的整體規(guī)模及判定市價非常困難。</p><p&

63、gt;　　毋庸置疑，在無效市場中不會發(fā)生很有潛在價值的創(chuàng)新交易。成本高且潛在價值難以識別，以致于創(chuàng)新經(jīng)常宿之高閣。這種浪費(fèi)可以通過專利利用率（以公司在商業(yè)領(lǐng)域得以利用的專利數(shù)除以其所有的專利數(shù)）來計量。一項非正式調(diào)查表明，公司至少在一項業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域有不足一半的專利技術(shù)利用率，甚至數(shù)值范圍僅在5%到25%之間。雖然抽樣法并不科學(xué)，但一定程度上也說明公司大部分的專利技術(shù)缺乏有效利用。</p><p><b>　

64、　成本上升，周期縮短</b></p><p>　　在很多行業(yè)，技術(shù)研發(fā)成本增加是驅(qū)動開放式創(chuàng)新過程的重要因素。半導(dǎo)體裝配設(shè)備的建造成本突增就是個很好的例子。2006年，英特爾公司宣布了將在亞利桑那州和以色列各建造一臺設(shè)備，每臺預(yù)算成本超過30億美元，而這在二十年前僅為現(xiàn)在的1%。藥用麻醉劑的發(fā)展是另一個例子。確保產(chǎn)品成功的投資總額超過8億美元，是十年前的十倍。這使得消費(fèi)品產(chǎn)業(yè)也倍感壓力。根據(jù)寶潔公司外

65、部業(yè)務(wù)拓展副總杰夫·魏德曼預(yù)計，寶潔公司十年前花費(fèi)10億美元開發(fā)的“好自在”女用護(hù)墊，在如今卻需要20到50億美金。</p><p>　　技術(shù)開發(fā)成本的增加可能導(dǎo)致強(qiáng)者更強(qiáng)，弱者愈弱的局面。同時，也有另一種力量左右這種局面：新產(chǎn)品生命周期的縮短。例如，在二十世紀(jì)八十年代早期的電子計算機(jī)行業(yè)，新產(chǎn)品上市后，原有硬盤驅(qū)動器的衰退期一般在4到6年。而到八十年代末期，期望衰退期降至2到3年。到了九十年代，更是只

66、有6到9個月。</p><p>　　在制藥業(yè)，由于臨床測試期延長及同類制造商的迅速模仿，盡管處于專利保護(hù)期，新藥的期望壽命還是減半。在最大的細(xì)分市場，成功的藥品往往要面臨成群的對手的挑戰(zhàn)。例如，市場上至少有五種降低膽固醇及心臟病發(fā)病率的他汀類處方藥出售。</p><p>　　成本上升，以及產(chǎn)品生命周期縮短，使公司越來越難以保證創(chuàng)新投資（見“創(chuàng)新經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力”圖）。開放式商業(yè)模式針對這兩個作用。

67、它通過外部研發(fā)資源的杠桿作用節(jié)省減少創(chuàng)新過程時間和成本?？匆幌聦殱嵉摹捌房陀』ā毙袆?，寶潔公司的薯片現(xiàn)在都因此印有“品客(Pringles)”的圖文。為了該產(chǎn)品的市場推廣，寶潔公司發(fā)現(xiàn)并采用了意大利博洛尼亞一家面包店的噴墨技術(shù)。這家面包店曾以此在蛋糕餅上噴印信息。于是，寶潔公司以比完全內(nèi)部開少的成本及一半時間開發(fā) 了“品客印花”。 </p><p>　　開放式商業(yè)模式也沖擊著收入方面。例如，寶潔通過從世界

68、上其他公司獲得特許技術(shù)創(chuàng)造新品牌，使得像電動牙刷這樣首年銷售額高達(dá)2億美元的產(chǎn)品不斷涌現(xiàn)。同時，寶潔公司也通過技術(shù)特許從其它公司獲得收入。</p><p>　　高杠桿效應(yīng)的成本及時間節(jié)省與新收入機(jī)遇的結(jié)合，使愿意開放商業(yè)模式的公司獲得巨大優(yōu)勢（見“開放式創(chuàng)新的新商業(yè)模式”圖）。外部技術(shù)在公司內(nèi)部研發(fā)過程中的應(yīng)用使得創(chuàng)新的開發(fā)成本大大降低。這省時省錢，并使公司不再局限于其直接服務(wù)的市場。公司現(xiàn)在可以通過特許費(fèi)、合資

69、、分拆及其他方式參與其它細(xì)分市場。這些各種各樣的收入流是創(chuàng)新所帶來的收入中最多的。于是，即使產(chǎn)品生命周期縮短，創(chuàng)新依然具有經(jīng)濟(jì)吸引力。</p><p>　　圖1，開放式創(chuàng)新的新商業(yè)模式</p><p><b>　　開放實驗</b></p><p>　　公司如何才能更充分地共享開放式創(chuàng)新的效益？簡言之，他們需要發(fā)展實驗檢驗商業(yè)模式的能力。發(fā)展這種

70、能力需要設(shè)立實驗并評估其結(jié)果的過程。這點看似簡單，實際上很多公司都不具備。大部分組織中，總裁以下幾乎無人負(fù)責(zé)商業(yè)模式。然而，事業(yè)部經(jīng)理（通常兩到三年就能升職）傾向于保持現(xiàn)狀。對他們而言，花費(fèi)無法短期實現(xiàn)并且風(fēng)險較高的實驗不會優(yōu)先考慮。</p><p>　　公司也感到一些約束。例如，公司很自然地會在面對影響現(xiàn)有品牌聲譽(yù)的實驗時猶豫不決。這對重視分銷渠道，生產(chǎn)策略等等的公司也是如此。但已有公司著手解決這種局限。例如，

71、可以試想一下正試圖向高校自動售貨機(jī)種提供更健康的耐貯存食品和點心的制造商。為了試驗不同產(chǎn)品，同時又不損害現(xiàn)有消費(fèi)品牌，制造商建立了“白盒”品牌。這個品牌沒有廣告過，沒有支持者，與公司也無明顯聯(lián)系。同樣，谷歌公司（網(wǎng)絡(luò)搜索引擎商）設(shè)立了一個獨立網(wǎng)站（www.SearchMash.com）,以使公司能獲得顧客關(guān)于用戶界面新方式的反饋。另外還有一些方法：分拆公司或起始期風(fēng)險投資。通過觀測小組織如何在特定商業(yè)模式下獲得較好發(fā)展，公司能獲取更多關(guān)

72、于該商業(yè)模式的生命力的有用信息。</p><p><b>　　管理層的暗示</b></p><p>　　通常來說，對公司的商業(yè)模式進(jìn)行根本性的改變需要高層明確的承諾與支持。寶潔就是個很好的例子：總裁雷富禮（Lafley）堅定而又明確地授權(quán)“聯(lián)結(jié)與開發(fā)”項目進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新。缺乏這種支持，空氣化工產(chǎn)品公司（Air Products）的點滴改革法收效甚微。無論那種方式，最重要的是

73、通過不斷證明公司的改革行之有效，來建立并保持動力。這需要反復(fù)實驗：公司尋求收入和商業(yè)價值的新來源，并從市場上搜集關(guān)于這些創(chuàng)意和技術(shù)的潛在價值的關(guān)鍵信息。最終結(jié)果會推動向新模式轉(zhuǎn)變。例如，寶潔公司早期的電動牙刷及除塵器系列產(chǎn)品的成功足以證明公司的“聯(lián)結(jié)與開發(fā)”項目起到強(qiáng)大的支撐作用。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，實驗法只在公司可以或愿意根據(jù)實驗所得信息行動時才有價值。拉里·休斯頓（Larry Huston）

74、的外部產(chǎn)品內(nèi)包法在寶潔取得早期成功。但卻是吉爾·克洛伊德（Gil Cloyd）和A.G..雷富禮意識到這種新邏輯會轉(zhuǎn)變寶潔的商業(yè)模式并提升其總體增長率。空氣化工產(chǎn)品公司的長期經(jīng)歷促使公司重新思考如何為化工業(yè)所需的高固定資產(chǎn)投資進(jìn)行籌資。正如古斯·俄爾弗尼迪斯（Gus Orphanides）所言，“我們曾經(jīng)是龐大的資本耗費(fèi)公司，可能每年花費(fèi)公司1/6的資本。我們捫心自問，‘我們從股東的資本中獲得足夠的回報了嗎’？”如今

75、，空氣化工產(chǎn)品公司通過積極探尋新方法與其它公司分擔(dān)成本。</p><p><b>　　平穩(wěn)過渡</b></p><p>　　在商業(yè)模式創(chuàng)新時，公司必須決定如何處理現(xiàn)有商業(yè)模式。過分贊賞新商業(yè)模式會不合時宜地暗示現(xiàn)有模式的落后。但是原有商業(yè)模式依然可以發(fā)揮重要作用。例如，寶潔公司在通過內(nèi)包開發(fā)自身新品牌的同時，也對內(nèi)部技術(shù)開發(fā)大量投資。</p><p

76、>　　保持新舊商業(yè)模式共存可能會有點貪心。確實，當(dāng)寶潔前任總裁德克·雅格(Durk Jager)試圖一次性推動所有改革行動時，寶潔開始自我轉(zhuǎn)變，但是卻違反了投資者要求每期收益回報的運(yùn)營規(guī)則。盡管如此，當(dāng)成功的實驗開始指明一種新的并且更有效的商業(yè)模式時，公司必須承擔(dān)改革的最終階段：公司將提升該模式，把它領(lǐng)向組織大眾及顧客。這個過程中兩大因素是必需的。</p><p>　　首先，商業(yè)模式必須適應(yīng)或者重

77、建于大眾基礎(chǔ)。很多商業(yè)模式在一小部分接受過高度訓(xùn)練的員工中獲得成功，但在新管理層要以之管理大部分普通工人時很容易失敗。如果特定過程不能實現(xiàn)自動化或標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化，當(dāng)工作量增加時，新模式很可能無法保證質(zhì)量。IBM公司在其全球咨詢業(yè)務(wù)中經(jīng)歷了這種困擾。IBM的服務(wù)人員的技術(shù)因IBM的產(chǎn)品及技術(shù)人員而異。IBM現(xiàn)在需要更多的前臺（具體來說，就是能把顧客的IT要求轉(zhuǎn)換成IBM特定處理方法的人）和更少的后臺（設(shè)備物理學(xué)家和高分子化學(xué)家）。</p&g

78、t;<p>　　其次，商業(yè)模式在公司推廣前，必須獲得重要相關(guān)者的支持。提升商業(yè)模式需要小實驗所無可比擬的大量資金以及更多組織承諾，這些資源必不可少。這使組織經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)“失敗者”——那些預(yù)算被抽調(diào)作為支持新商業(yè)模式的資源的部門團(tuán)體。因此，提升過程會遭遇極大的內(nèi)部阻力。這就是陶約翰（John Tao）的點滴法在空氣化工產(chǎn)品公司造成如此效果的原因。起始項目需要很少資源及管理層的注意，這使組織部門間沒有發(fā)生多少沖突。當(dāng)然，隨著項目持

79、續(xù)擴(kuò)展，組織內(nèi)部資源競爭加劇了。盡管如此，陶的努力現(xiàn)在以獲取的新收入證明。這些新收入在參與的事業(yè)部間分配。由于有了更大的總份額，并且陶的經(jīng)歷證明使其更有資格分配份額，額外收入使得內(nèi)部阻力最小化。</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯之二</b></p><p>　　Business Model Innovation: It’s Not Just about Techn

80、ology Anymore</p><p>　　作者：Henry Chesbrough</p><p>　　國籍：American</p><p>　　出處：Strategy & Leadership, 2007(6) Vol.35:12-17</p><p><b>　　原文正文：</b></p>

81、<p>　　What is a business model?</p><p>　　Every company has a business model, whether they articulate it or not. At its heart, a business model performs two important functions: value creation and value

82、 capture. First, it defines a series of activities, from procuring raw materials to satisfying the final consumer, which will yield a new product or service in such a way that there is net value created throughout the va

83、rious activities. This is crucial, because if there is no net creation of value, the other companies involved in the set</p><p>　　There can be real tensions between the aspects of a business model that creat

84、e value and those that help to capture a portion of that value. A high-value proprietary technology, for example, easily earns a profit for the firm, if alternatives offer lesser value. But in many circumstances customer

85、s are reluctant to buy such products (because of price, limited availability, or delivery or service issues).Yet making the technology more open, which makes it more appealing to customers, makes it hard</p><p

86、>　　A better business model often will beat a better idea or technology.</p><p>　　One benefit of this working definition is that each of its six parameters identifies where innovation might generate new va

87、lue in an industry.</p><p>　　Value proposition. The GE Aircraft engines unit crafted an innovative value proposition when they shifted from selling airlines jet engines to selling them flight hours. This shi

88、fted the risk of downtime from the airline customer to GE, and enabled GE to establish a very profitable service operation.</p><p>　　Target market. Ryanair, a growing European discount airline, innovated a d

89、ifferent target market by going after leisure travelers, instead of the usual business travelers.</p><p>　　Value chain. Wal-Mart (which targeted an innovative market by going after underserved rural communit

90、ies in its early days) is celebrated for its management of its supply chain.</p><p>　　Revenue mechanism(s). Xerox got its start in the copier business by leasing its copiers, instead of selling them. Air Pro

91、ducts gets paid for the delivery of its industrial gases right to the manufacturing station inside the plant, instead of by the box car.</p><p>　　Value network or ecosystem. Ryanair again innovated here, by

92、striking novel arrangements with underutilized regional airports. Ryanair gets a percentage of concession sales at these airports, and in some circumstances even gets paid for landing passengers at the airports.</p>

93、;<p>　　Competitive strategy.. One interesting aspect of business models is how difficult it is for others to imitate them. Many airlines have tried to emulate Southwest’s low cost approach. Most of their attempts

94、have not fared well. Copying the Southwest model apparently creates too many conflicts with the airlines’ established business model.</p><p>　　Thus this working definition points the way to certain improveme

95、nts that can be made to a business model. But more can be done to improve a specific business model if managers think of stages of business model advancement. The Business Model Framework (BMF) is a model that sequences

96、possible business models from very basic (and not very valuable) models to far more advanced (and very valuable) models. Using the BMF, companies can assess where their current business model stands in relation to it<

97、/p><p>　　The Business Model Framework</p><p>　　Type 1 – Company has an undifferentiated business model. The vast majority of companies operating today do not articulate a distinct business model, a

98、nd lack a process for managing it. These companies are operating with Type 1 business models. A business using the undifferentiated model competes on price and availability, and serves customers who buy on those criteria

99、. In a word, firms utilizing Type 1 business models are selling commodities, and are doing so in ways that are no different from m</p><p>　　Type 2 – Company has some differentiation in its business model. In

100、 companies using Type 2 business models, the company has created some degree of differentiation in its products or services. This differentiation can also lead to a different business model from that of the Type 1 compan

101、y, allowing the company to target a customer other than those that buy simply upon price and availability (such as a performance-oriented customer). This allows the Type 2 company to serve a different and less con</p&