畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯-小額信貸

1、<p><b>　　畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　小額信貸是否幫助窮人？</p><p>　　——孟加拉國旗艦計(jì)劃所帶來的新證據(jù)</p><p>　　摘要：小額信貸運(yùn)動(dòng)使金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)得到了創(chuàng)新，同樣使貧困家庭減少了貸款的成本和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。孟加拉國鄉(xiāng)村銀行的小額信貸機(jī)制已經(jīng)在全世界得到推廣。雖然小額貸款機(jī)制的目的是為客戶帶來社

2、會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)效益， 但是通過其獲得一定量的利益的嘗試已經(jīng)開始實(shí)施了。本文借鑒一個(gè)新調(diào)查來研究小額信貸是是否真正的幫助窮人，該調(diào)查覆蓋面近1800個(gè)家庭，其中部分家庭獲得了孟加拉鄉(xiāng)村銀行的貸款，而另一部分則沒有參與到小額貸款運(yùn)動(dòng)中。有資格獲得貸款的家庭，他們的消費(fèi)水平低于平均消費(fèi)水平，這種家庭中，絕大部分的孩子不可能上得起學(xué)，男子也往往會(huì)有更多的工作壓力，而女子沒有工作。更明顯的，相對(duì)于對(duì)照組，符合貸款資格的家庭在消費(fèi)上的變化很小以及可以常年

3、提供勞動(dòng)力的特點(diǎn)。最重要的潛在影響不是貧窮本身，而是因而最重要是減少相關(guān)的家庭漏洞。似乎導(dǎo)致消費(fèi)平滑主要原因是收入平滑，而不是借款和貸款。</p><p>　　評(píng)論家有大量的關(guān)于低收入國家的其他方案的研究經(jīng)驗(yàn)。雖然通常人們都是使用固定效力評(píng)估來控制與安置方案有關(guān)的不易觀察的變量，但是使用固定效力評(píng)估會(huì)加劇偏見的影響，就如同本方案——在較大的社區(qū)里特定人群的方案。 </p><p>　　關(guān)鍵

4、詞：小額信貸，項(xiàng)目評(píng)估，鄉(xiāng)村銀行，孟加拉 </p><p><b>　　介紹</b></p><p>　　小額信貸在很多人的腦海里是用來減少貧困。前提是操作簡單。小額信貸提供小額貸款，以促進(jìn)小規(guī)模的創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)，而不是向貧困家庭提供救濟(jì)。這種信貸除非放債人收取非常高的利率(往往收費(fèi)高達(dá)每月10%)，否則不會(huì)發(fā)生。放債運(yùn)作缺乏競爭，因?yàn)闈撛诘倪M(jìn)入者很快發(fā)現(xiàn)，借款人通常不能提

5、供任何形式的抵押品，這就使貸款存在高成本和該風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。(拉希德和湯森，1993)。</p><p>　　然而，體制創(chuàng)新下的小額信貸運(yùn)動(dòng)似乎大大降低了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和提供金融服務(wù)和為貧困家庭提供服務(wù)的費(fèi)用。創(chuàng)新包括借款合同、給予獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)、配出不良信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和連帶借款人的活動(dòng)，要求每周或每半周還款(Morduch,1997)。2005年該運(yùn)動(dòng)已經(jīng)在世界銀行，聯(lián)合國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，以及其他已加入的國際組織的推動(dòng)下成為聯(lián)系100萬家庭的全球性的運(yùn)動(dòng)

6、(小額信貸首腦會(huì)議，1997)。該運(yùn)動(dòng)在美國還得到相當(dāng)多的支持(包括錢第一夫人希拉里克林頓)，現(xiàn)在該方案在美國有300個(gè)經(jīng)營點(diǎn)(經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，1997)。紐約時(shí)報(bào)(1997)還發(fā)表《慶祝這個(gè)“繼續(xù)的反貧窮方案的革命” 》文章呼吁支持。</p><p>　　但是，小額貸款到底給貧困家庭帶來了怎樣的巨大的影響？ </p><p>　　雖然小額貸款確實(shí)做到了減少貧困，但只有極少數(shù)研究使用相當(dāng)大的樣本

7、和適當(dāng)?shù)闹委?控制框架來研究這個(gè)問題。本研究調(diào)查了1800戶家庭在1991—1992年間的孟加拉國格拉名銀行的小額信貸項(xiàng)目，孟加拉國農(nóng)村發(fā)展委員會(huì)(BRAC)，和孟加拉國農(nóng)村發(fā)展委員會(huì)(BRDB)，本案例還包括了一組沒有任何小額貸款項(xiàng)目服務(wù)地區(qū)的家庭。這里考慮的這三個(gè)貸款方案在孟加拉國一共超過了400萬貧困客戶，它們的作用是非常廣泛的。格拉米銀行的國際小額信貸旗艦運(yùn)動(dòng)，其模式已經(jīng)被四大洲所復(fù)制，包括在美國的阿肯色州和內(nèi)城芝加哥都取得明顯

8、成就。</p><p>　　從其帶來的影響我們可以簡單得出小額信貸所帶來的成就。例如，如果享受鄉(xiāng)村銀行服務(wù)的家庭按照從小額信貸項(xiàng)目貸款的總數(shù)來安排，則前四分之一的家庭享有人均消費(fèi)相較于在底層四分之一的家庭要高出十五個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。另外， 62%的從鄉(xiāng)村銀行貸款的家庭的男孩可以上學(xué)，而34%的上學(xué)的男孩的家庭沒有貸款。而女孩的比例分別是55%對(duì)40%。</p><p>　　然而， 這些簡單的比較，

9、大部分是由于選擇偏差造成的。一旦，對(duì)照組坐出了適當(dāng)?shù)谋容^，不管是受教育的男孩還是受教育的女孩，有權(quán)使用小額貸款項(xiàng)目的家庭并沒有明顯提高人均消費(fèi)水平。總之，人均消費(fèi)水平低于對(duì)照組。這一結(jié)論是驚人的，關(guān)于小額貸款的反對(duì)聲音也頻繁的在國際響起。</p><p>　　然而，有權(quán)獲得項(xiàng)目資助確實(shí)使常年勞動(dòng)力變得多元化。相應(yīng)的，該方法也降低常年各種各樣的消費(fèi)，所以，盡管該項(xiàng)目并沒有提高平均消費(fèi)水平，但他可以通過穩(wěn)定收入的方法

10、使這些家庭穩(wěn)定消費(fèi)水平。至于在其弱點(diǎn)上的影響，結(jié)果突出了小額貸款的優(yōu)勢(shì)，這些優(yōu)勢(shì)很少被關(guān)于小額信貸的文獻(xiàn)所關(guān)注（除皮特及科韓德科，1998b）。該項(xiàng)目得到了一億美金的援助，由此，我們也可以看到它的優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p>　　這一結(jié)果同樣證明，評(píng)估者很容易誤導(dǎo)項(xiàng)目的成就，而且，他們擁有許多相似評(píng)估經(jīng)驗(yàn)，這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)包括公眾醫(yī)療及其他低收入國家的社會(huì)項(xiàng)目。同這里一樣，這些項(xiàng)目經(jīng)常被限制在特殊的區(qū)域和特殊的目標(biāo)人群，尤其是

11、貧困家庭。不同于那些富有國家，收入為基礎(chǔ)意味著測試似乎從未進(jìn)行過。反而，例如，孟加拉國鄉(xiāng)村小額貸款項(xiàng)目致力于“無地機(jī)能”，這條規(guī)定要求貸款的家庭必須有超過半英畝的可耕種土地。</p><p>　　如果這條合理要求被強(qiáng)制實(shí)施，并且是建立在家庭外因的特殊之上，這條項(xiàng)目規(guī)定將是合理統(tǒng)計(jì)的基礎(chǔ)。然后，我們就能從參與該項(xiàng)目的家庭組及未參與該項(xiàng)目的家庭組的比較中得到非常明朗的效果。這一方法是回歸間斷設(shè)計(jì)的一個(gè)形式（坎貝爾，1

12、969年），其見解提供了皮特和科韓德科工作（1998a和1998 b；在這里，他們用了相同的數(shù)據(jù)）的基礎(chǔ)。</p><p>　　但是我們不能從這個(gè)例子里推出任何有效結(jié)論，這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)說明人們經(jīng)常違反規(guī)則。例如，30%的鄉(xiāng)村貸款人擁有遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)多于半英畝的土地，他們擁有土地所有權(quán)的面的有14英畝之大。那些記錄在案有權(quán)借款的家庭或有權(quán)參與項(xiàng)目的家庭，其中一部分所擁有的土地大概是2英畝，相對(duì)的其他那部分要少一點(diǎn)。</p&g

13、t;<p>　　下面的方法反而通過在鄉(xiāng)村的比較，運(yùn)用了測試組及對(duì)照組的數(shù)據(jù)。鄉(xiāng)村中沒有參與項(xiàng)目的組中，其采樣嚴(yán)格遵循半英畝規(guī)定。然而，參與項(xiàng)目的村里，同組的不對(duì)稱性在這里同樣出現(xiàn)了問題。采樣戰(zhàn)略在一開始就是一個(gè)解決辦法。采樣是設(shè)計(jì)好的，這樣，對(duì)照組才可以同測試組作比較。強(qiáng)制要求測試組需要同對(duì)照組一樣嚴(yán)格按照規(guī)定強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行要求。</p><p>　　另外需要關(guān)注非隨機(jī)安置方案的是，當(dāng)考慮到地區(qū)固定影響水

14、平或者他們的對(duì)等性時(shí)（例如皮特和科韓德科，1998a）。當(dāng)方案選擇已經(jīng)完成的好的地區(qū)的時(shí)候，出現(xiàn)向上偏差；當(dāng)項(xiàng)目傾向于不發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)時(shí)，則出現(xiàn)向下偏差。</p><p>　　然后，柜員頻繁聲明這并不是解決非隨機(jī)安置方案的萬靈藥。實(shí)際上，當(dāng)項(xiàng)目安置被預(yù)測到針對(duì)目標(biāo)人群沒有觀察到影響時(shí)，包括地區(qū)固定影響水平能使偏差增大。這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)暗示，這是經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)的狀況。但是，帶著減少變化和勞動(dòng)力供應(yīng)的期待，主要的定性結(jié)果對(duì)測試組及對(duì)照組

15、的不易觀察的鄉(xiāng)村水平是健全的。</p><p>　　小額信貸在新興優(yōu)勢(shì)突出的成果使得其很少考慮其脆弱性，這些好處應(yīng)當(dāng)判斷有數(shù)百萬美元支持這些方案。研究結(jié)果還表明如何判別簡單的誤導(dǎo)性的指標(biāo)，他們持有類似的在低收入國家其他社會(huì)項(xiàng)目評(píng)估如公共健康和低收入的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。由于，這些計(jì)劃往往局限于特定地區(qū)和特定目標(biāo)群體即典型的貧困家庭，所以，以收入為基礎(chǔ)的測試方法幾乎在較富裕的國家從來沒有使用過。</p><

16、;p>　　Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? </p><p>　　New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh</p><p><b>　　Abstract </b></p><p>　　The microfinance movement

17、has built on innovations in financial intermediation that reduce the costs and risks of lending to poor households. Replications of the movement’s flagship, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, have now spread around the worl

18、d. While programs aim to bring social and economic benefits to clients, few attempts have been made to quantify benefits rigorously. This paper draws on a new cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households, some of whi

19、ch are served by the Grameen Bank </p><p>　　Key words: microfinance, project evaluation, Grameen Bank, Bangladesh </p><p>　　1. Introduction </p><p>　　Microfinance has captured the i

20、maginations of many people working to reduce poverty. The premise is simple. Rather than giving handouts to poor households, microfinance programs offer small loans to foster small-scale entrepreneurial activities. Such

21、credit would otherwise not be available -- or would be only available at the very high interest rates charged by moneylenders (who often charge as much as 10% per month). Moneylenders operate with little competition sinc

22、e potential entrants quickly </p><p>　　However, the emerging microfinance movement demonstrates institutional innovations that appear to greatly reduce the risk and cost of providing financial services to po

23、or households. Innovations include contracts that give borrowers incentives to exclude bad credit risks and monitor other borrowers’ activities, schedules of loans that increase over time conditional on successful perfor

24、mance, and weekly or semi-weekly loan repayment requirements (Morduch, 1997). The movement is now global, and le</p><p>　　But how great is the ultimate impact on poor households? While strong claims are made

25、 for the ability of microfinance to reduce poverty, only a handful of studies use sizeable samples and appropriate treatment/control frameworks to answer the question. The present study investigates a 1991-92 cross-secti

26、onal survey of nearly 1800 households in Bangladesh served by microfinance programs of the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and the Bangladesh Rural Development Bo</p><p>　　Si

27、mple estimates of impacts show clear achievements. For example, if households served by the Grameen Bank are ordered by the amounts they have borrowed from the program, the top quarter enjoys 15% higher consumption per c

28、apita than households in the bottom quarter. In addition, 62% of the school-age sons of Grameen Bank borrowers are enrolled in school versus 34% of the sons of eligible households that do not borrow. For daughters, the G

29、rameen advantage is 55% versus 40%. </p><p>　　These simple comparisons appear to be driven entirely by selection biases, however. Once appropriate comparisons with control groups are made, access to the thre

30、e microfinance programs does not yield meaningful increases in per capita consumption, the education of sons, nor the education of daughters. If anything, the levels are slightly lower than for control groups. The result

31、s are surprising and contradict frequent claims made about the programs in international discussions of microfinance. </p><p>　　Access to the programs does, however, appear to aid the diversification of labo

32、r supply across seasons. In turn, access is associated with a reduction in the variability of consumption across seasons. Thus, while the programs may not increase consumption on average, they may offer households ways t

33、o smooth consumption through smoothing income. In pointing to impacts on vulnerability, the results highlight an advantage that is seldom considered in the emerging microfinance literature (an exceptio</p><p&g

34、t;　　The results also demonstrate how misleading simple performance indicators can be, and they hold lessons for evaluations of similar public health and other social programs in low-income countries.1 As here, such progr

35、ams are often limited to particular regions and particular target groups, typically poor households. Unlike in wealthier countries, income-based means tests are almost never used. Instead, for example, the microfinance p

36、rograms in rural Bangladesh focus on the “functionally landless”</p><p>　　The program rule can be the basis of a plausible econometric strategy if the eligibility requirement is strictly enforced and built a

37、round a feature that is exogenous to the household.Then, clean impacts can be gauged by comparing the status of households clustered just below the arbitrary dividing line to households clustered just above. This approac

38、h is a form of regression discontinuity design (Campbell, 1969), and the insights provide the basis of Pitt and Khandker’s.1Simple evaluations are </p><p>　　But the idea can not be implemented reliably in th

39、is sample. The data demonstrate frequent violations of the rules. For example, 30% of Grameen borrowers own more land than the half-acre cut-off, with landholdings as large as fourteen acres. Among households labeled in

40、the survey as “eligible” to borrow and with access to programs, the fraction of borrowers is nearly twice as high for those holding over half an acre versus those below (63% versus 34% for the three programs combined; Th

41、e first tw</p><p>　　The approach below instead exploits the treatment/control aspect of the data through comparisons across villages. The groups in villages not served by programs were sampled with strict ad

42、herence to the half acre rule, however, and the asymmetry with groups in program villages creates problems here as well. A solution is to turn the sampling strategy on its head. While the sample was designed so that the

43、control groups are comparable to the “treated” groups, the rule violations require that the t</p><p>　　An additional concern is given by non-random program placement. Upward biases arise when programs choose