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1、<p> 中文4500字</p><p> 本科畢業(yè)論文</p><p> 外文翻譯</p><p> A Graduated Punishment Approach to Environmental Crimes</p><p> Susan F. Mandiberg and Michael Faure</p>
2、<p> I. INTRODUCTION </p><p> Why do we have environmental crimes? What social harms are we addressing, and what interests are we vindicating through use of the criminal sanction? The answer to these
3、questions is not found in traditional criminal law principles. This is because environmental interests and values do not enjoy an absolute protection in the law. Unlike theft or homicide, for example, which may cause p
4、ersonal benefits only to the criminal, most polluting activities generate substantial societal benefits as</p><p> The interweaving of administrative and criminal law has been pronounced from the begi
5、nning of modern environmental crimes in the mid-twentieth century. Then, as now, environmental criminal law focused on punishing the lack of a permit or the violation of permit or other regulatory requirements and condit
6、ions. However, although this administrative dependence of environmental criminal law may have been the general starting point, European commentators have increasingly pointed to serious weaknes</p><p> The
7、goal of this paper is to examine and advocate for approaches to environmental crimes in addition to the punishment of disobedience to administrative rules and decisions. We acknowledge that an effective environmental cri
8、minal scheme must include administrative-disobedience crimes. For one thing, disobedience to at least some administrative decisions is a serious matter. For another, such offenses are easiest to prove6 and thus provide a
9、 mechanism for punishing some environmental malfeasance </p><p> II. FOUR MODELS OF CRIMINALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM </p><p> Criminal statutes address specific social harms. The act elem
10、ent of a criminal statute articulates the social harm at which the crime is directed. The mental-state element articulates the attitude a defendant must have had toward the social harm in order to be criminally culpable.
11、13 While mental state is a crucial element in determining criminal liability, the analysis in this article focuses exclusively on the act element of environmental crimes. </p><p> Focusing on the act elemen
12、t in a 1995 article, Michael Faure and Marjolein Visser proposed and examined four models of environmental crimes. First is Abstract Endangerment, a model criminalizing disobedience to administrative rules and requiremen
13、ts perse . Second is Concrete Endangerment Crimes with Administrative Predicates (“Concrete Endangerment”). Concrete Endangerment crimes involve behavior that both violates regulatory law and poses a threat of harm to th
14、e environment; thus, on the surfac</p><p> A. Model I: Abstract Endangerment</p><p> Offenses following the Abstract Endangerment Model do not punish environmental pollution. Instead, their ro
15、le is to enforce prior administrative decisions, and so they punish the failure of a regulated entity to adhere to administrative dictates concerning environmental regulations. In essence, the Abstract Endangerment Model
16、 merely adds criminal law to the enforcement mechanisms available to ensure compliance with monitoring, paperwork, licensing, and other rules meant to regulate pollution pro</p><p> If the criminal provisio
17、n requires or presumes environmental harm or the threat of such harm, the statute is not of the Abstract Endangerment variety. </p><p> Although Abstract Endangerment crimes focus on vindicating administrat
18、ive values, punishing the administrative violation indirectly furthers ecological values in two ways. First, an entity that follows administrative rules is less likely to harm the environment. More to the point, if admin
19、istrative rules are followed, the regulatory agency can monitor the entity’s operations to ensure that harm is less likely to occur. </p><p> Nevertheless, although environmental values are implicated by Ab
20、stract Endangerment crimes, the overlap with such values is incomplete. For one thing, an entity in compliance with all administrative rules can still cause environmental “harm.” Consider that, for each parameter—air, wa
21、ter, soil— the administrative agency will set a baseline of “acceptable” contact between a pollutant and the environment. This baseline will reflect a compromise among such considerations as the pollutant’s effect on<
22、/p><p> B. Model II: Concrete Endangerment Crimes with Administrative Predicates </p><p> The second model is that of Concrete Endangerment Crimes with Administrative Predicates (“Concrete Endang
23、erment”). As with the first model, the activity in question must take place in an unlawful way by engaging in the activity without a required permit or other authorization or by violating conditions in a statute, regula
24、tion, or permit.51 However, the characteristic of unlawfulness may be integrated in different ways. Some of the crimes in this model include as an element the fact of violati</p><p> C. Model III: Concrete
25、 Harm Crimes with Administrative Predicates</p><p> The third model is Concrete Harm Crimes with Administrative Predicates (“Concrete Harm”). As noted above, this model has been added to Faure’s and Visser
26、’s original approach. Statutes fitting this model are similar to Concrete Endangerment crimes in that they require proof that the actor violated an administrative rule. However, these crimes go beyond threats and require
27、 proof of actual environmental harm. </p><p> The identification of crimes fitting Model III can be tricky, as it depends upon the definition of “environmental harm.” As we will show in Part 1 of this sect
28、ion, some statutory definitions focus on the environment directly, but others adopt an anthropocentric definition of “environmental harm.” These latter seem based on the premise that emissions or releases that threaten o
29、r harm human health, safety, or other interests must of necessity also harm the environment. To the extent that this int</p><p> Because we are working toward a graduated punishment approach to environmenta
30、l crimes, it makes sense to us to differentiate Concrete Harm statutes from the crimes in Model II. Concrete Harm crimes require proof of actual harm, and so it is logical for such statutes to impose higher penalties th
31、an those requiring merely a threat of harm. When the government can prove both an administrative violation and actual environmental harm, the authorization and imposition of increased punishment would be</p><p
32、> 1. Defining Environmental “Harm” </p><p> A traditional way of measuring environmental harm is to look through the lens of harm to human beings instead of focusing on the environment itself. One varia
33、tion focuses on threats to human health or safety. A second variation is to focus on harm to private property. A final way to look through the lens of harm to human beings is to measure financial costs other than damage
34、to property itself. At first, it may not be clear that statutes such as these vindicate environmental values at all. After</p><p> There are drawbacks to this surrogate approach. One obvious problem is that
35、 environmental damage might occur far from populated areas and thus remain outside the scope of statutes that define harm in human terms. However, there is another, more serious drawback. Consider, for instance, the act
36、of draining a wetland and filling it with soil or rocks. Elimination of wetlands may endanger human health and safety in the long term, for example by changing hydrological patterns, contributing to floodi</p><
37、;p> A legislature that wants to address a full spectrum of environmental harm must articulate a standard that reflects purely environmental values. The statute must require proof of something more than mere contact b
38、etween a pollutant and the environment; otherwise, it would be functionally no different from the “presumed harm” variety of the Concrete Endangerment Model. But what’s more? And how can a legislature define what may be
39、ineffable without violating the principle of legality? </p><p> Examples do exist of criminal statutes that attempt to go beyond an anthropocentric focus. Some speak in terms of environmental “harm” or “dam
40、age” or authorize differences in sanctions based on degrees of “harm.”</p><p> Others require proof of “pollution.” Still others punish negative changes to the existing environment. While such provisions ar
41、e laudable for their focus on environmental values, they leave it to either the fact finder or appellate case law to make the notion of harm (or “damage,” “suitability,” “detriment,” or even “pollution”) more concrete. T
42、he same problem may exist even in provisions that appear at first glance to be quite clear. One German statute, for instance, punishes any actor in a pr</p><p> Open-ended definitions of environmental harm
43、 may be attractive to legislators, but they also create problems. One problem arises if the statute allows the fact finder to equate “harm” with any negative change in the quality of water, air, or soil no matter how min
44、or. This is because any contact between a pollutant and the environment is likely to cause some minor negative change in the latter. Such an interpretation of “harm” conflates Model II, involving a threat of “harm” and M
45、odel III, which </p><p> 2. The Issue of Causation </p><p> Concrete harm crimes require the prosecution to prove that the defendant’s behavior caused environmental harm, however that is defin
46、ed. Serious Environmental Harm crimes—some of those in Model IV, to be discussed below—carry the same requirement. Proving causation is not particularly difficult in the case of a single polluting event that results in c
47、lear damage. However, the requirement could present a challenge to prosecutors in other situations, reducing the number of cases in which these resu</p><p> Causation problems are likely to be common in pro
48、secutions requiring proof of actual harm. This is because in many situations a defendant may be able to show that one or more additional actors independently emitted pollutants into the same water, soil, or air, either p
49、reviously, simultaneously, or subsequently to the defendant’s own actions. Of course, similar causation problems also arise in the context of traditional crimes with result elements, most notably in the prosecution of ho
50、micides. T</p><p> It is valid to ask whether there is really a need to undertake the task of developing a body of causation law in the context of environmental crimes. Why not be content to use Abstract a
51、nd Concrete Endangerment crimes, which do not require proof that the defendant caused a concrete result? The answer is related to our suggestion of a graduated punishment approach, discussed in Section III. Under such an
52、 approach, Concrete Harm crimes would be punished more severely than Abstract or Concrete Enda</p><p> This section has addressed a model in which the government must prove both an administrative violation
53、and actual harm to the environment. While there are challenges involved in proving harm and causation, more severe punishment might accompany convictions in which these challenges have been met. But what if the governmen
54、t can prove both harm and causation but no administrative violation? Should compliance with administrative requirements shield polluters from the worst types of environmental da</p><p> D. Model IV: Serious
55、 Environmental Pollution: Eliminating the Administrative Link </p><p> This model, which we will call “Serious Environmental Pollution” for ease of reference, aims to punish very serious pollution regardles
56、s of whether there is any underlying regulatory violation. In fact, statutes following this model impose criminal sanctions despite the defendant having obeyed license or permit conditions or other regulatory laws. To pu
57、t it differently, in this model following the conditions of a license cannot constitute a defense: the “permit shield” does not apply. Thus, thi</p><p> The administrative link is broken for a reason: cri
58、mes following this model are based on the assumption that the environmental harm at issue is of a magnitude beyond that contemplated by the administrative rules with which the entity complied. Crimes following this model
59、 are relatively rare. However, as the examples to come show, they do exist. The existing crimes vary in the way they eliminate the link to administrative rules. Some eliminate the “permit shield.” Others eliminate the “u
60、nlawfuln</p><p> FROM:Susan F. Mandiberg,Michael Faure.</p><p> A Graduated Punishment Approach to Environmental Crimes[J].</p><p> Columbia Journal of Environmental Law,Vol.34,2
61、009.</p><p> 環(huán)境犯罪的分級懲罰模型構(gòu)想</p><p> [美]蘇珊·曼迪伯格 [比利時]邁克·福爾</p><p><b> 一、導語</b></p><p> 我們?yōu)槭裁匆?guī)范環(huán)境犯罪? 制裁犯罪時,我們應對的是哪些社會危害,又在維護什么利益? 在傳統(tǒng)刑法中這些問題是無
62、法找到答案的。這是因為環(huán)境利益和價值并未受到法律的絕對保護。與那些只可能給罪犯帶來個人利益的罪行(比如盜竊或殺人)不同,大多數(shù)污染環(huán)境的活動既產(chǎn)生巨大的社會效益,也付出巨大的環(huán)境代價。因此,許多國家環(huán)境法的主要目標是對污染進行行政控制,通常以許可和審批制度實現(xiàn),環(huán)境刑法的主要作用就是幫助實現(xiàn)這類控制。</p><p> 自從20世紀中期現(xiàn)代環(huán)境犯罪出現(xiàn)后,行政法和刑法的交織就一直很明顯。環(huán)境刑法主要對缺少許可違
63、反許可或其他行政規(guī)制要求和條件的行為進行處罰,一直都依賴于行政法 這種模式有嚴重缺陷: 首先,如果刑法的功能被限定在處罰行政性的違法行為,其他類型的污染就可能不會得到處罰,這就限制了刑法保護生態(tài)價值的功能。其次,與傳統(tǒng)刑法的情形不同,行政官員(而非立法者)變成了決定罪與非罪的主體本文旨在考察各類環(huán)境犯罪模型,而不限于上述僅違反行政規(guī)定的模型。我們認識到,一個有效的環(huán)境刑法體系必須包含違反行政法的罪名。但是,對環(huán)境的實際損害以及損害威脅比
64、單純的行政違法更為嚴重。此外,在極其嚴重的環(huán)境損害情況下,很有必要納入一項罪名,該罪無須公訴機關證明行為人有違反行政規(guī)則和行政裁決的行為。最后,對于這一環(huán)境刑法體系中的罪名對應的刑罰,應當根據(jù)其社會危害的嚴重程度,進行分級。</p><p> 二、損害環(huán)境行為的四種歸罪模式</p><p> 刑法中的行為要件表明了犯罪指向的社會危害。而主觀狀態(tài)要件指的是被告人要承擔刑事責任所必須具備的
65、對此種社會危害的態(tài)度。雖然主觀狀態(tài)在決定刑事責任時是一個關鍵要件,但本文只針對環(huán)境犯罪的行為要件進行分析。</p><p> 邁克·福爾和馬喬蘭·維薩在1995年的一篇文章( How to Punish Environmental Pollution Some Reflections on Various Models of Criminalization of Environmental
66、Harm)中以行為要件為重點,在歐洲一些做法的基礎上提出并考察了四種環(huán)境犯罪模型,即“抽象致害”具體致害、“嚴重環(huán)境污染”與“模糊立法”本文作者抱著探究福爾和維薩的分析在今日是否仍具有可行性的目的,細致地考察了福爾和維薩的前三種模式,并從兩方面修改了他們的框架: 首先,有必要增加一個模型,不妨稱之為“具體損害”模式,作為模式四。其次,我們從他們二人的體系中刪去了“模糊立法” 模式。在福爾和維薩那篇描述性的文章中納入它是很重要的,因為至少
67、兩個歐洲法域采用了它。然而,這個模型不但受到了嚴重的批評,而且在我們看來,其并不能為一種綜合性的環(huán)境犯罪模型提供額外價值。</p><p> ?。ㄒ唬┠P鸵? 抽象致害(Abstract Endangerment)</p><p> “抽象致害”模型對受法規(guī)約束卻未能遵從環(huán)境行政命令的單位進行懲罰。從本質(zhì)上來說,抽象致害模型只是將刑法算作一種強制機制,以保證檢查、文書、許可及其他意在規(guī)范
68、污染排放活動的規(guī)則得到遵守。這類刑法條文通常會規(guī)定: 任何違反刑法規(guī)定,或違反刑法的配套行政規(guī)定 執(zhí)照、許可證者,都應受到制裁。相反,取得并遵守許可證,以此證明其遵守行政規(guī)定的單位,有時能獲得一種“許可證庇護”( perm it shield),它能保護單位不受刑法或其他強制措施的制裁。</p><p> “抽象致害”模型體現(xiàn)在多數(shù)將無照或無證作業(yè)作為歸罪目標的立法中。一旦立法中的行政性規(guī)定被違反,這類案件通常
69、就能適用刑法,即使沒有發(fā)生對環(huán)境的損害或損害威脅。</p><p> 雖然“抽象致害”模型旨在維護行政性價值,對行政違法行為的懲罰卻也在兩方面間接地促進了環(huán)境價值。首先,獲得了法定許可并遵守了文書、監(jiān)督、檢查等要求的單位顯示出其遵守行政規(guī)則的意愿; 這樣的單位也很可能遵從那些與防止環(huán)境損害聯(lián)系更緊密的規(guī)則。其次,更為重要的是,如果行政規(guī)則得到遵守,行政機關就能監(jiān)督這些單位的運轉(zhuǎn),以保證發(fā)生損害的可能性減小。&l
70、t;/p><p> 然而,雖然環(huán)境價值也通過“抽象致害”模型體現(xiàn)出來,但并不是與其完全一致。一方面,遵守了所有行政規(guī)則的單位仍然可能導致環(huán)境“損害”行政機關會為污染物與環(huán)境間的接觸設定一個“可接受”的底線。這一底線往往反映出基于以下考慮作出的妥協(xié): 如污染物對環(huán)境的影響 社會對污染活動的需求以及用于減輕損害的技術(shù)是否存在( 及其成本多少) 因此,即使某個設施在底線以內(nèi)排放污染物,它遵從其他行政規(guī)則也不等于它不產(chǎn)生任
71、何環(huán)境 損害 相反,違反了行政規(guī)則的實體可能并不產(chǎn)生環(huán)境損害。以一個運輸危險廢物但不具備法定文書的單位為例,這種違規(guī)行為首先損害了行政規(guī)范,但如果沒有排放,就沒有環(huán)境損害。無論從哪方面來看,抽象致害 模型都不注重活動對環(huán)境的影響。結(jié)果是,它們在保護這些價值時并非完全有效。</p><p> ?。ǘ┠P投? 具體致害(Concrete Endangerment)</p><p> 第二種
72、模型“具體致害”與第一種模型的相同之處在于,其所涉及的活動必須以非法方式進行:或者無法定批準,或者違反法律、行政法規(guī)或許可證規(guī)定的條件。不過,該模型與第一種模型不同,因為這類罪名或者推定,或者要求證據(jù)證明,該非法活動產(chǎn)生了對環(huán)境損害的威脅。這一要件使該模型比模型一更能維護環(huán)境價值所有的“具體致害”罪名都涉及對環(huán)境的損害威脅,不過這一模型仍分為兩類。第一類可稱為“推定致害”。這一類別的立法假設,一定量污染物與環(huán)境的非法接觸必然導致至少一定
73、程度的損害威脅,它將這種接觸本身定為犯罪。第二類為“證實致害”這類立法規(guī)定,要有確切證據(jù)證明,除了非法排放這一單純事實外,環(huán)境受到了威脅。</p><p> ?。ㄈ┠P腿? 具體損害(Concrete Harm)</p><p> 如上所述,這一模型增添進了福爾和維薩原先的模型。符合這一模型的立法與“具體致害”類犯罪立法類似,因為它們都要求證明行為人違反了行政規(guī)則。不過,這一模型超越了
74、對“威脅” 這一要件的要求,它要求證明實際環(huán)境損害。</p><p> 要確定哪些犯罪符合模型三是有難度的,因為這有賴于“環(huán)境損害”的定義。正如我們將指出的那樣,一些立法直接針對環(huán)境進行定義,但另一些則對“環(huán)境損害”采用了以人類為中心的思路。后者似乎建立在這樣的前提上: 威脅、損害人類健康、安全或其他利益的排放行為也必然損害環(huán)境。若這一理解是準確的,那么CWA和RCRA的“故意致害”條款就是模型三的范例。此外,
75、歐洲也有一些“具體損害”型犯罪立法的例子當公訴機關能證明既有行政違法行為,又有實際環(huán)境損害時,便會預期制定、施加更重的刑罰,通過更大的威懾和報復以增進對環(huán)境價值的維護。不過,“具體損害”類立法面臨概念上和證據(jù)上的問題,可能會使上述目標受阻。一個問題是環(huán)境“損害”的概念難以定義,另一個問題涉及因果關系。我們將逐一來探討這些問題。</p><p> 1.對環(huán)境“損害”進行定義</p><p>
76、; 衡量環(huán)境損害的一種傳統(tǒng)方式是透視人類遭受的損害,而非考察環(huán)境本身受到的影響。一種方法是考察人類健康。安全受到的威脅,另一種是關注私有財產(chǎn)遭受的損害,還有一種是衡量經(jīng)濟代價而非財產(chǎn)損害本身。乍看上去,可能看不出這類立法能維護環(huán)境價值。畢竟,它們甚至提都沒提到環(huán)境損害或其威脅。但它們?nèi)匀皇黔h(huán)境保護體制的一部分。它們在這一體制中所處的位置使我們得出這樣的結(jié)論:人類所受損害。這一衡量標準是“環(huán)境所受損害”的替代標準;若污染嚴重到足以威脅人
77、類利益,環(huán)境也必然受到威脅。</p><p> 這一替代標準有些缺陷。一個明顯的問題是,環(huán)境損失可能發(fā)生于離人口聚集地較遠的地方,因而超出了那些從人類角度定義“損害”的立法的調(diào)整范圍。不過,還有一個更為嚴重的缺陷。例如,考慮一下排干濕地并向其填塞泥土或石塊的行為。濕地的消減可能會對人類健康及安全造成長遠危害,如改變水文模式、引起洪水泛濫。不過,清除濕地短期內(nèi)并不會造成危害。若只從短期來看待人類健康。安全與財產(chǎn)所
78、受的損害,那么填塞濕地的行為人不能以“具體損害”或“嚴重環(huán)境損害”類罪名遭到起訴,甚至“具體致害”類罪名也無法限制。但事實上發(fā)生了環(huán)境損害,因為清除濕地必定給當?shù)厣鷳B(tài)系統(tǒng)中的動植物群落帶來嚴重后果。</p><p> 立法機關必須制定一個純粹反映環(huán)境價值的標準。這種立法必須要求證明發(fā)生了比污染物接觸環(huán)境更嚴重的事情,否則它在功能上便與“具體致害”中的“推定致害”沒有差別。但還需要些什么? 立法機關又怎樣才能在不
79、違反合法性原則的情況下,定義那些難以用語言表達的東西?</p><p> 確實存在一些試圖擺脫以人類為中心的標準的例子。例如,CWA要求美國國家環(huán)境保護局 (EPA)列舉出有毒污染物,并為每一種都制定排污限額; 污染物對水生生物的影響是這些規(guī)定采用的標準之一另一種以行政標準為中心的模式是在刑法中定義環(huán)境損害。例如,立法機關可以依據(jù)以下因素來調(diào)整刑事制裁的嚴厲程度: 涉案物質(zhì)的毒性; 污染物與空氣水的接觸是僅有風
80、險還是已成事實; 動植物群落或人類受到影響是僅有風險還是已成事實; 違法行為的嚴重性。不過,還有另一些更為抽象的模式,它們確實更關注環(huán)境價值,這一點值得肯定,但它們?nèi)粤舸聦嵳{(diào)查人或上訴判例去具體確定“損害”的定義對“環(huán)境損害”的開放式定義也許會很吸引立法者,但它們也帶來了問題。若立法允許事實調(diào)查人將“損害”等同于水、空氣或土壤質(zhì)量的任何負面變化(不管多么微?。蜁霈F(xiàn)問題。這是因為污染物與環(huán)境的任何接觸都有可能導致后者微小的負面變化
81、。這就將關于損害威脅的模型二與關于實際損害的模型三混在了一起。</p><p><b> 2.因果關系問題</b></p><p> “具體損害”型罪名要求公訴方證明被告人的行為導致了環(huán)境損害(無論怎樣定義)。在單個污染事件立即導致明顯損失的案件中,證明因果關系并非特別困難然而,在其他情況下,這一要求可能對公訴人構(gòu)成挑戰(zhàn)。</p><p>
82、 因果關系問題往往普遍存在于要求證明實際損害的起訴中。一個問題是,某個污染事件的影響可能在很多年里都不明顯,以致妨礙起訴。另一個問題是,被告人也許可以證明,一個或多個其他行為人獨立地將污染物排放入同一河流。土壤或空氣,或者比被告人早,或者比被告人晚,或者與被告人同時。當然,類似的多因問題在傳統(tǒng)結(jié)果犯的背景下也會出現(xiàn),最明顯的就是殺人罪不過,即便假設將殺人罪(或企圖傷害罪,或是其他更傳統(tǒng)的罪名)背景下的解決方案移植到環(huán)境犯罪中,許多情況
83、下要證明因果關系也會很難。</p><p> 是否有必要在環(huán)境犯罪的背景下制定因果關系法?為何不滿足于使用無須證明被告人造成具體損害結(jié)果的“抽象致害”及“具體致害”模型?答案與我們所提議的分級懲罰模式有關。在這種模式下,“具體損害”型犯罪將受到比“抽象致害”或“具體致害”型犯罪嚴厲得多的刑罰(“嚴重環(huán)境損害”型犯罪所受刑罰甚至可能更為嚴厲)。在很難或不可能證明因果關系的情況下,只能認定較輕的罪名。但是,在可以證
84、明因果關系的案件中,更重的罪名能更精確地反映被告人的行為。若一個罪名體系中缺少以實際損害為要件的罪名,那么它就混淆了不同罪名的嚴重程度。</p><p> 這一部分論述的模型中,公訴機關必須證明既有行政違法行為,又有對環(huán)境的實際損害。盡管在證明損害和因果關系時會遇到挑戰(zhàn),不過若成功認定被告人有罪,就可采取更嚴厲的刑罰。</p><p> (四)模型四: 嚴重環(huán)境損害(Serious E
85、nvironment Harm)</p><p> 這一模型旨在懲罰極其嚴重的污染而不論是否有行政違法行為。因為它切斷了刑法與現(xiàn)有行政裁決間的關聯(lián),即刑法可以不顧行政法而進行干預,因此,它有別于模型三行政關聯(lián)斷裂是因為該模型以這一假設為基礎:所涉及的環(huán)境損害之嚴重性超過了行政規(guī)則的預判。這一模型下的犯罪相對比較罕見,不過還是存在的?,F(xiàn)有的各種類型中,有些去除了“許可證庇護”,另一些從犯罪定義中去除了“非法性”要
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