現(xiàn)行企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則下盈余管理分析研究外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2300字</b></p><p><b>　　外文翻譯之一</b></p><p>　　A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting</p><p>　　A

2、uthor： Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen</p><p>　　Nationality：America</p><p>　　Derivation: Accounting Horizons Vol.13 No.4 365-383</p><p>　　INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　In thi

3、s paper we review the academic evidence on earnings management. The primary purpose of this review is to summarize the implications of scholarly evidence on earnings management to help accounting standard setters and reg

4、ulators assess the pervasiveness of earnings management and the overall integrity of financial reporting. This review is also aimed at identifying fruitful areas for future academic research on earnings management.</p

5、><p>　　Standard setters define the accounting language that management uses to communicate with the firm’s external stakeholders.1 By creating a framework that independent auditors and the SEC can enforce, acco

6、unting standards can provide a relatively low-cost and credible means for corporate managers to report information on their firms’performance to external capital providers and other stakeholders.2 Ideally, financial repo

7、rting therefore helps the best-performing firms in the economy to distinguish</p><p>　　If financial reports are to convey managers’ information on their firms’ performance, standards must permit managers to

8、exercise judgment in financial reporting. Managers can then use their knowledge about the business and its opportunities to select reporting methods, estimates, and disclosures that match the firms’ business economics, p

9、otentially increasing the value of accounting as a form of communication. However, because auditing is imperfect, management’s use of judgment also creates oppo</p><p>　　estimates that do not accurately refl

10、ect their firms’ underlying economics.</p><p>　　The Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, recently expressed concerns over earnings management and its effect on resource allocation. He noted that management ab

11、uses of “big bath” restructuring charges, premature revenue recognition, “cookie jar” reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D are threatening the credibility of financial reporting. To address these conc

12、erns, the SEC is examining new disclosure requirements and has formed an earnings management task force to crack down on firm</p><p>　　A number of recent studies, however, sharpen the focus of their tests to

13、 examine earnings management using specific accruals, such as bank loan loss provisions, claim loss reserves for property-casualty insurers, and deferred tax valuation allowances.</p><p>　　There is evidence

14、that banks use loan loss provisions and insurers use claim loss reserves to manage earnings, particularly to meet regulatory requirements. There is little evidence that firms manage earnings using deferred tax valuation

15、allowances.</p><p>　　Much of the evidence on the capital market consequences of earnings management shows that investors are not “fooled” by earnings management and that financial statements provide useful i

16、nformation to investors. Current earnings, which reflect management reporting judgment, have been widely found to be value-relevant and are typically better predictors of future cash flow performance than are current cas

17、h flows.</p><p>　　Answers to the above questions are difficult to infer from current studies for a number of reasons. First, most academic studies attempt to document earnings management, but do not provide

18、evidence on its extent and scope. Consequently, existing evidence does not help standard setters to assess whether current standards are largely effective in facilitating communication with investors, or whether they enc

19、ourage widespread earnings management. Second, most studies have examined unexpected accrua</p><p>　　facilitating communication between managers and investors and which are ineffective.</p><p>　

20、　The studies that examine the effects of earnings management on the capital markets leave a number of unanswered questions for future research. First, as noted above, how pervasive is earnings management for capital mark

21、et reasons, both among the firms sampled and for the population of firms? Second, what is the magnitude of any earnings management? Third, what specific accruals do firms (other than banks and insurers) use to manage ear

22、nings? Fourth, why do some firms appear to manage earnings wh</p><p>　　In summary, the earnings management studies strongly suggest that regulatory considerations induce firms to manage earnings. There is li

23、mited evidence on whether this behavior is widespread or rare, however, and very little evidence on the effect on regulators or investors.</p><p>　　盈余管理文獻(xiàn)回顧及其對(duì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)設(shè)置的啟示</p><p>　　作者：Paul M. Healy a

24、nd James M. Wahlen</p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　選自：會(huì)計(jì)天涯 Vol.13 No.4 365-383</p><p><b>　　介紹:</b></p><p>　　本文我們回顧一些關(guān)于盈余管理的相關(guān)學(xué)術(shù)的研究，本文回顧的主要目的是為了總括

25、學(xué)者們以及會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的設(shè)定者和管理者評(píng)估盈余管理的普遍性以及對(duì)于財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的完整性，本文獻(xiàn)同時(shí)志于對(duì)盈余管理的未來學(xué)術(shù)研究提供有用的鑒戒。</p><p>　　標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定者們對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)語言定義成與公司的外部股東進(jìn)行交流溝通的管理用途，1通過創(chuàng)造出一種框架，使得獨(dú)立審計(jì)師以及SEC能夠加強(qiáng)準(zhǔn)則標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，而同時(shí)提供相對(duì)低成本和可信賴的方式供外部資本供應(yīng)者和其他的股東。2理想化來說，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告相應(yīng)地能夠幫助經(jīng)營最好的企業(yè)在經(jīng)濟(jì)上把它們

26、與經(jīng)營不好的企業(yè)區(qū)分開來，而同時(shí)使得股東能夠做好更好的資源配置和相應(yīng)的投資決策。</p><p>　　如果財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告是為了表達(dá)管理者對(duì)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營業(yè)績的信息，那么準(zhǔn)則必須應(yīng)該允許管理者們能夠在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中行使判斷能力。管理者因而能夠使用自我的知識(shí)來對(duì)業(yè)務(wù)和對(duì)適合企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)情況的報(bào)告方法，估計(jì)，披露方式的選擇，從而潛在地提高了會(huì)計(jì)作為一種溝通手段的價(jià)值。然而，由于審計(jì)的不完善，判斷能力作為一種管理手段同樣也產(chǎn)生了盈余管理

27、的機(jī)會(huì)，管理者們通過選擇會(huì)計(jì)方法以及會(huì)計(jì)假設(shè)，從而并不準(zhǔn)確地反映他們公司的真實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)情況。</p><p>　　美國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)的主席，Arthur Levitt，最近發(fā)表了一項(xiàng)對(duì)盈余管理以及其對(duì)資源分配的影響的顧慮。他表示，“大洗澡”來重構(gòu)費(fèi)用作為管理手段的任意使用，收入的提前確認(rèn)，“小金庫”的設(shè)置以及在產(chǎn)品研發(fā)費(fèi)用的沖銷，這些都正在威脅著財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的可行度。為了處理這些問題，美國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)正在研究一

28、些披露的條件并已經(jīng)形成處理那些進(jìn)行盈余管理的公司的盈余管理工作小組。此外，該組織同時(shí)希望更多的企業(yè)能夠進(jìn)行整治房地產(chǎn)的收入，并加強(qiáng)對(duì)披露的各個(gè)要求的執(zhí)行。</p><p>　　然而，最近大量的研究也加強(qiáng)了關(guān)于通過使用特定的加息的盈余管理的關(guān)注，包括利用銀行貸款的損失供應(yīng)，對(duì)資產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)人損失準(zhǔn)備金的計(jì)提，以及遞延稅款的價(jià)值補(bǔ)貼。</p><p>　　有證據(jù)表明銀行使用貸款損失量，投保人通過對(duì)損

29、失準(zhǔn)備金的計(jì)提來進(jìn)行盈余管理， 尤其是為了滿足調(diào)整的需要。也有一些證據(jù)表明企業(yè)的盈余管理可以通過遞延稅款的延期確認(rèn)。</p><p>　　對(duì)于資本市場盈余管理后果，有大量的證據(jù)表明投資者并沒有被盈余管理所戲弄，而那些財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表也提供了有用的信息給投資者?，F(xiàn)金收入，作為一項(xiàng)能夠反映管理者報(bào)告的判斷，已經(jīng)很大程度上對(duì)相關(guān)價(jià)值緊密聯(lián)系，而同時(shí)相對(duì)于當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)金流量，很典型地成為對(duì)未來現(xiàn)金流量表現(xiàn)的有效指示器。</p&

30、gt;<p>　　對(duì)于以上的問題的答案要從中推斷出一些原因是困難的。首先，大多數(shù)的學(xué)術(shù)研究都是試圖通過對(duì)盈余管理進(jìn)行評(píng)論，但是并沒有對(duì)其界限以及程度提供相應(yīng)的依據(jù)。因此，相應(yīng)地，當(dāng)前的證據(jù)確實(shí)不能幫助準(zhǔn)則制定者來評(píng)估是否當(dāng)前的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對(duì)于投資者的交流是很大的有效率，或者是否能夠允許大范圍的盈余管理的存在。其次，大多數(shù)的研究都已經(jīng)認(rèn)為盈余管理的證據(jù)在于不怎么預(yù)期的利潤增加。盡管本文的研究為盈余管理提供了一種有用的索引性的概括，但

31、是并沒有具體地指出對(duì)于在管理者和投資者之間哪種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)更加有效率以及哪一種是沒有效率的。</p><p>　　研究結(jié)果認(rèn)為關(guān)于資本市場的盈余管理的效果有很多在未來研究還是不能回答的，首先，正如上面所提到的，對(duì)于資本市場盈余管理已經(jīng)成為了多么普遍的行為，無論是在案例中的企業(yè)還是企業(yè)的數(shù)量角度來說。其次，任何盈余管理的限度是怎么樣的？第三，企業(yè)經(jīng)常用來管理收益的特定方法是什么？（而不是銀行和投保人）第四，為什么有些企業(yè)看

32、起來能夠進(jìn)行盈余管理而其他類似的企業(yè)卻不能？最后，市場參與者是在何種條件下發(fā)現(xiàn)，因此對(duì)盈余管理有所反應(yīng)，以及在何種條件下他們不能發(fā)覺盈余管理?例如，所需要的披露真的能夠利用會(huì)計(jì)判斷在更加透明的情況下幫助企業(yè)對(duì)資源分配進(jìn)行盈余管理嗎？</p><p>　　總而言之，盈余管理的研究鮮明地表明了調(diào)控性的考慮導(dǎo)致企業(yè)進(jìn)行盈余管理，但是，關(guān)于這種行為是否普遍存在還是比較稀少的存在，以及這種行為是對(duì)管理者產(chǎn)生影響還是對(duì)投資者

33、產(chǎn)生影響，相應(yīng)的證據(jù)還是很少的，</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯之二</b></p><p>　　Earnings Management Incentives and Techniques in China’s Listed Companies</p><p>　　Author：Daniel A.Cohen</p><

34、p>　　Nationality：America</p><p>　　Derivation: THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW VOL.83,NO.3 2008 757-787</p><p><b>　　1</b></p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Up to date,

35、there is no an agreed definition about earnings management. Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private

36、 gain (as opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the</p><p>　　process).” (Healy and Wahlen 1999) pointed out that “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial rep

37、orting in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported acco

38、unting numbers.” According to the two definitions, earnings management is viewed as a purposeful and deliberate intervention of the external financial report</p><p>　　Scott (1997) defines earnings management

39、 as a selection of accounting policies from a set of GAAP by managers to maximize their own utility and/or the market value of the company. Ortega and Grant (2003) argue that earnings management uses the flexibility in f

40、inancial reporting to alter the financial results of the company. From the two definitions, we can see that earnings management techniques only include accounting methods, and the accounting methods used in earnings mana

41、gement can not be pe</p><p>　　Levit (1998) defines earnings management as a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desi

42、res of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company. Levit considers that earnings management is equal to earnings manipulation.</p><p>　　Carlos Noronha and Yun Zeng (2008) view

43、 earnings management as a continuum of purposeful interventions in the external financial reporting process, from legitimate activities to fraud violating GAAP, with the intention of misleading some stakeholders about th

44、e underlying economics and performance of the company.In this study, earnings management is viewed as a purposeful intervention of the external financial reporting process, with the intention of misleading some stakehold

45、ers about the underly</p><p>　　2 Earnings Management Incentives</p><p>　　As stated by Healy and Wahlen( 1999), managers mainly engage in earnings management for four kinds of incentives namely,

46、external contract incentives, management compensation contract incentives, regulatory motivations and capital market motivations. Do the four kinds of earnings management incentives exist in Chin2.1 To avoid external-co

47、ntract violations External contracts include debt contracts, dividend covenants, supplying contracts etc. As accounting data are used in external cinontracts,</p><p>　　2.2 Meeting management compensation co

48、ntract requirements</p><p>　　Most management compensation contracts measure the achievement of managers by accounting data such as profit and sales scale, so management compensation contract can drive manag

49、ers to engage in earning management. For example bonus plans, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) stated that managers have incentives to advance the reported earnings from the future to the current accounting period when a bonus

50、 award plan existed. (Healy 1985) provides the evidence that earnings are managed in the direction tha</p><p>　　With stock options incentives being applying in Chinese companies in recent years, stock option

51、 compensation is associated with earnings management. Since earnings and stock prices are positively related, managers can manage earnings down before scheduled stock option awards. The result is to arbitrarily hold down

52、 the stock price before the award, thereby lowering the exercise price and increasing the value of their stock option compensation. On the other hand, managers can also manage earnings </p><p>　　2.3 To avoid

53、 regulatory and minimize political costs</p><p>　　Due to anti-trust considerations, some companies have the incentive to lower earnings in order to minimize political costs associated with being seen as too

54、profitable. In China, anti-trust regulations and industry-specific regulations for earnings are rare. The most important regulatory motivation for Chinese</p><p>　　companies is tax considerations. Especially

55、 for small sized and private ownership companies, earnings management for tax-planning purpose may be prevalent in practice in China.</p><p>　　2.4 Due to capital market considerations</p><p>　　C

56、apital market motivations have been recognized as the most important reason for managers to manage earnings. For Chinese companies, the most important capital market considerations may come from the regulatory framework,

57、 which is a series of guidelines issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).</p><p>　　3 Earnings Management Techniques Used in China</p><p>　　Managers usually use both accountin

58、g methods and non-accounting methods to engage in earnings management in China’s listed companies. Accounting methods mainly include accounting policy choices and changes, accounting estimates and changes etc.;

59、 managers engage in earnings management using non-accounting methods, primarily through structuring transactions to achieve, for example, asset restructuring, debt restructuring and related transactions etc.</p>&

60、lt;p>　　3.1Accounting methods</p><p>　　Chinese GAAP offers some flexibility in preparing the financial statements and gives the financial managers some freedom to select among accounting policies and alter

61、natives. Earnings management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the company so as to achieve a predetermined target set by the management.</p><p>　　Take fixed asset

62、s for example, managers can low earnings in current year by setting aside fixed asset impairment provisions, as asset impairment losses can not be reversed, and the amount of depreciation will be re-adjusted within the r

63、emaining useful life of fixed assets, so the amount of depreciation will decrease and earnings will increase in the next year.</p><p>　　This study concludes that earnings management is pervasive in China’s l

64、isted companies. Earnings management makes earnings less reliable as a measure of company performance, if the true performance of the company is hidden, there is potential for less efficient resource allocation decisions

65、.</p><p>　　中國上市公司盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)和方法</p><p>　　作者：Daniel A.Cohen</p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　選自: 會(huì)計(jì)博覽 VOL.83,NO.3 2008 757-787</p><p><b>　　1簡介&l

66、t;/b></p><p>　　到目前為止，還沒有任何一個(gè)關(guān)于盈余管理的定義已經(jīng)達(dá)成了一致。席佩爾（1989）定義盈余管理為“在外部財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告過程盈余管理目的的干預(yù)，在獲得某種私利的目的（而不是說只是促進(jìn)中性操作過程）?！?Healy和Wahlen （1999）指出，“盈余管理往往出現(xiàn)在交易中的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告結(jié)構(gòu)，通過改變財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，或誤導(dǎo)相關(guān)的一些利益相關(guān)者公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，或影響依靠會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告的數(shù)字來判斷該合同的結(jié)果

67、。” 根據(jù)這兩個(gè)定義，盈余管理是被認(rèn)為作為外部財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告有目的的和蓄意的干預(yù)。盈余管理技術(shù)，不僅包括會(huì)計(jì)方法，而且也包括非會(huì)計(jì)方法，例如結(jié)構(gòu)化交易等。此外，它沒有明確區(qū)分會(huì)計(jì)處理方法是否違反公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（GAAP），斯科特（1997）定義為從一個(gè)由管理員設(shè)置的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇盈余管理，以最大限度地發(fā)揮自己的效用和該公司的市場價(jià)值。奧爾特加（2003年）認(rèn)為，盈余管理通過使用財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的靈活性來改變公司的財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績。從兩個(gè)定義，我們可以看

68、到，收入只包括會(huì)計(jì)管理技術(shù)方法，另外會(huì)計(jì)盈余管理使用的方法也不能允許違反會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則。</p><p>　　萊維特（1998）定義盈余管理為一個(gè)灰色領(lǐng)域，那是個(gè)正在變化的會(huì)計(jì)盈余管理;其中管理人員偷工減料，并在收益報(bào)告中反映了管理的基本心愿，而不是本公司的真實(shí)的財(cái)務(wù)表現(xiàn)。萊維特認(rèn)為，盈余管理等于盈余操縱。Carlos Noronha 和Yun Zeng（2008）認(rèn)為盈余管理是一項(xiàng)持續(xù)性的有目的的干預(yù)，其存在于外部財(cái)

69、務(wù)報(bào)表處理過程中。從以欺詐違反會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的合法的活動(dòng)考慮，以及從經(jīng)濟(jì)的深層次考慮，盈余管理能誤導(dǎo)一些利益相關(guān)者，因此盈余管理被看作是外部財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告過程中有目的的干預(yù)，以誤導(dǎo)有關(guān)本公司相關(guān)的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)一些利益相關(guān)者的意圖，此外盈余管理的技術(shù)包括非公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的核算方法。</p><p><b>　　2盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)</b></p><p>　　正如Healy和Wahlen （1

70、999）指出，管理者事盈余管理主要有四種激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī)，即外部契約激勵(lì)，管理人員的報(bào)酬契約激勵(lì)，管理角度和資本市場的動(dòng)機(jī)。這四種盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)確實(shí)存在著來避免企業(yè)在實(shí)際中的虧損，外部契約沖突管理人員可以通過改變會(huì)計(jì)盈余管理數(shù)據(jù)符合合同要求。例如債務(wù)合同，會(huì)計(jì)資料債務(wù)合同中的高利息的懲罰。中國銀行可以要求公司保持指定的債務(wù)水平，以公平，利息償付，或營運(yùn)資金。如果這些公約受到侵害時(shí)，中國銀行可以并處如利率上升，或其他借款的限制或要求立即償還處罰。

71、因此，當(dāng)企業(yè)接近債務(wù)契約，并有可能侵犯他們，經(jīng)理有動(dòng)機(jī)使用盈余管理技術(shù)，以增加收入放松或推遲收益為基礎(chǔ)的債務(wù)契約規(guī)定的限制性。而另外一個(gè)方面是，陷入困境的企業(yè)則更有動(dòng)機(jī)來修改企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績重新談判，防止收入的減少。</p><p>　　2.2滿足補(bǔ)償管理層的需要</p><p>　　大多數(shù)管理人員通過薪酬衡量管理者的效率，如利潤和銷售規(guī)模，從而使管理人員薪酬合同的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)成果可以驅(qū)動(dòng)管理人員

72、從事盈余管理。比如獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃， Watts和Zimmerman （1986）指出，管理者有動(dòng)力推進(jìn)從未來的收益報(bào)告在本會(huì)計(jì)期間的獎(jiǎng)金獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)計(jì)劃的存在。希利（1985）提供了進(jìn)行盈利的方向是與最大限度地發(fā)揮管理者的收入為基礎(chǔ)的獎(jiǎng)金獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)一致管理的證據(jù)。當(dāng)盈余將低于要求獲得獎(jiǎng)金的最低水平，通過盈利的盈余管理，從而使其達(dá)到最低的達(dá)標(biāo)水平，從這個(gè)角度來說高管的獎(jiǎng)金是掙來的。反之，當(dāng)收入將高于最大值在哪一級(jí)沒有額外獎(jiǎng)金的支付，那么收入的管理下。額外的收

73、入，不會(huì)產(chǎn)生額外獎(jiǎng)金當(dāng)期保存這將用于在今后一個(gè)時(shí)期賺取獎(jiǎng)金。當(dāng)盈余之間的最低和最高水平，那么收入的管理，以增加向上的獎(jiǎng)金當(dāng)期收入。</p><p>　　隨著股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)近幾年成為了在中國的各個(gè)企業(yè)的首選，股票期權(quán)報(bào)酬是與盈余管理緊密聯(lián)系的一種激勵(lì)，由于營業(yè)收入和股票價(jià)格正相關(guān)，管理人員可以通過管理收入，使得下降之前獲得股票期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)計(jì)劃。其結(jié)果是按住前任意裁決的股票價(jià)格，從而降低價(jià)格和增加行使他們的股票期權(quán)補(bǔ)償值。

74、另一方面，管理者也可以管理收入，從而使得其異常大于以往的，從而便于行使股票期權(quán)。變化的收益提前可以提高股權(quán)的現(xiàn)金支付金額，這是由于股權(quán)變動(dòng)很少發(fā)生于在中國公司，論股票期權(quán)薪酬與盈余管理關(guān)系的一些研究主要關(guān)注的股票期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。于（2009年）提供的證據(jù)表明，經(jīng)理來管理使得收入酌情下降，而通過股票期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)計(jì)劃之前，這些虛假的增加只是相反的一面。</p><p>　　2.3為避免監(jiān)管和政治成本最小化</p>

75、<p>　　由于反壟斷的考慮，一些公司已經(jīng)降低收益的激勵(lì)，以盡量減少與被視為太有利可圖看到相關(guān)的政治代價(jià)。在中國，反托拉斯法規(guī)和對(duì)盈利行業(yè)具體規(guī)定是罕見的。最重要的監(jiān)管動(dòng)機(jī)中公司是稅收方面的考慮。特別是對(duì)小型企業(yè)和私人所有權(quán)，收益為稅務(wù)管理規(guī)劃的目的，可能會(huì)在中國實(shí)踐中十分普遍。</p><p>　　2.4由于資本市場的考慮</p><p>　　資本市場的動(dòng)機(jī)已被公認(rèn)的最重要原

76、因，經(jīng)理管理的收益。對(duì)于中國企業(yè)來說，最重要的資本市場的考慮可能會(huì)規(guī)管架構(gòu)，這是一個(gè)由一系列準(zhǔn)則發(fā)出的中國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)（證監(jiān)會(huì)）。</p><p>　　3中國盈余管理技術(shù)的應(yīng)用</p><p>　　管理者通常使用兩種核算方法和非會(huì)計(jì)方法進(jìn)行盈余管理在中國的上市公司。主要包括會(huì)計(jì)核算方法的選擇和改變政策，會(huì)計(jì)估計(jì)和變化等;經(jīng)理從事盈利使用非會(huì)計(jì)方法的管理主要是通過結(jié)構(gòu)來實(shí)現(xiàn)，例如交易，

77、資產(chǎn)重組，債務(wù)重組和關(guān)聯(lián)交易等。</p><p><b>　　3.1會(huì)計(jì)處理方法</b></p><p>　　中國會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則提供了一些在編制財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的靈活性，賦予一些管理者財(cái)政之間自由選擇會(huì)計(jì)政策和辦法。盈余管理使用中的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的靈活性，以改變?cè)摴镜呢?cái)務(wù)業(yè)績，以達(dá)到預(yù)定的目標(biāo)由管理設(shè)置。</p><p>　　就拿固定資產(chǎn)來說，管理人員可以在本年