[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]外文翻譯--中國(guó)企業(yè)債務(wù)的選擇國(guó)有制的作用（節(jié)選）

1、3700 英文單詞， 英文單詞，2 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 6350 字文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：Pessarossi P, Weill L. Choice of corporate debt in China: The role of state ownership[J]. China Economic Review, 2013, 26(9):1-16.Choice of corporate debt in China: Th

2、e role of state ownershipPierre PESSAROSSI , Laurent WEILLAbstract We analyze the factors affecting the decisions of Chinese firms to take on debt in the form of either bonds or syndicated loans over the period of 2006–2

3、010. The study reveals the extent to which corporate debt choices are politically or economically driven. We test if central government ownership, flotation costs, asymmetries of information, and renegotiation and liquid

4、ation costs influence the choice of debt. We find evidence in favor of the influence of central government ownership on the financing choices of firms because Central State owned firms are more likely to issue bonds and

5、to borrow uniquely on the bond market, rather than tapping both debt markets. Overall, our findings show that financial factors play a much more minor role in corporate debt choices compared to other countries, whereas c

6、entral government ownership is a key determinant of preference for the bond market.Keywords: Corporate bonds; Syndicated loans; Debt choice; China; State ownership1. IntroductionThe Chinese financial system is characteri

7、zed by a weak, albeit fast-growing, corporate bond market and an over-dominant banking industry.1 As Chinese banks have proven to be poorly efficient (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009) – mainly because of a lack of experi

8、ence in risk management and severe political influence in lending decisions (Yeung, 2009) – capital allocation remains biased towards inefficient state-owned companies in China. In the long run, this misallocation of cap

9、ital threatens the development of the country.A competitive corporate bond market should alleviate such concerns by providing benchmarks in risk pricing and putting pressure on banks to attract other types of borrowers,

10、such as small and medium enterprises, which are currently rationed on the credit market (Herring & Chatusripitak, 2006).To determine whether this capital allocation problem can be solved through the corporate bond ma

11、rket development, one needs to understand whether the banking system and the corporate bond market truly compete in China. This paper provides evidence on this issue by analyzing the determinants affecting firms' cho

12、ice of debt market. Thus, our aim is to investigate the determinants of the choice for a Chinese firm to issue a bond, rather than borrowing from banks.The Chinese Communist Party has recognized the usefulness of capital

13、 markets and the importance of developing the corporate bond market in its Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets in 2004. The Governor of the P

14、eople's Bank of China (PBOC) stated that “China's underdeveloped corporate bond market has distorted the financing structure in the economy which poses a threat to financial stability, as well as to social and ec

15、onomic development” (Zhou, 2005).However, since the market turmoil in the early 1990s, during which an important proportion of issued bonds ended up in default, China's corporate bond market development has been impe

16、ded by tight regulation on bond issuance approval. The regulator notoriously favored large state-owned enterprises to avoid financial instability in the corporate bond market. The situation (2001) perform this analysis o

17、n a sample of debt financings in Asian countries, which are widely dominated by financings of Japanese companies. China is included in the sample, but only for 6 syndicated loans, whereas no Chinese bonds are considered.

18、 Esho et al. (2001) test the influence of several financial variables to investigate the relevance of the three theories. These researchers find empirical support for the three theories, notably with bond issuances relat

19、ed positively to firm size and negatively to the probability of financial distress of the issuer. Altunbas, Kara, and Marques-Ibanez (2010) focus on determinants of financing choices between corporate bond and syndicated

20、 loan markets in European countries. These authors also find support for the three theories of corporate financing choices. In particular, larger firms with more financial leverage, higher fixed assets to total assets, b

21、ut fewer growth opportunities are more likely to borrow from the syndicated loan market, rather than the corporate bond market.The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the large de

22、bt markets in China. Section 3 reviews the determinants of financing choices. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Section 5 develops the results. Section 6 concludes.2. Overview of large debt financing markets

23、in China2.1. The corporate bond marketThe bond market still remains notably small, although its annual growth was sustained at 26.9%, on average, during the period of 1995–2005 (OECD, 2010). The total outstanding bonds r

24、eaches 45% of GDP by mid-2009, a comparable figure to that of other emerging countries, but the corporate segment accounts only for one tenth of the total. The lack of current development of the corporate bond market is

25、a direct consequence of the tight regulation over issuance approvals. During the 1980s and 1990s, a large number of bond issuances ended up in default. The central government had to intervene to bail out companies. This

26、episode mostly explains why the government has remained cautious in pushing bond market development: according to the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) officials, a repetition of the financial instability cre

27、ated by the bond market in the 1990s would have caused political grief for the NDRC (Reuters News, 2006). In 1998, the NDRC4 tightly modified the approval process for corporate bond issuance, de facto allowing almost exc

28、lusively large Central State owned firms to enter the market. Issuances were subject to an annual quota system, which required a one-hundred-percent guarantee from a bank and were at the discretion of the regulatory body

29、. Consequently, the market nearly collapsed. In the early 1990s, issuances amounted to RMB 68 billion, whereas in the early 2000s, issuances had fallen to only RMB 8.3 billion (The Banker, 2004).Informal evidence suggest

30、s that the state agency played a key role in favoring the access of state enterprises to the bond market. The Financial Times wrote in 2007 that “[c]orporate bonds are virtually non-existent in China, mostly because they

31、 are regulated by the state's conservative central planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission. The commission allows only a handful of giant state-owned enterprises to issue bonds through an extr

32、emely opaque quota system.” (Financial Times, 2007). Apart from the fear of a new episode of corporate debt defaults, favoritism was also a consequence of the government objective to employ the corporate bond market as a

33、 tool to finance pillar SOEs and infrastructure projects, such as the “Three Gorges Dam” (Business Weekly, 2002).As a consequence, even the rare, approved privately owned firms had difficulties in issuing bonds because o