[雙語翻譯]企業(yè)管理外文翻譯—管理層持股和公司績效波羅的海上市公司的證據(jù)（原文）

1、POLISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES Ber?e-Berga A., Dovladbekova I., ābula M. 2017 Vol.15 No.2 273 MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN THE BALTICS Ber?e-Berga A., Dovladbekova I.,

2、ābula M.? Abstract: This paper focuses on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, which appears to be an important issue in corporate governance literature. We conduct regression analysis em

3、ploying a sample of listed companies in the stock exchanges of the Baltic States. We test whether increased managerial ownership has effect on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). The resu

4、lts reveal that there is positive relationship between managerial ownership and internal performance measure (ROA) while it does not significantly affect the market performance measure (Tobin’s Q). We conclude that ma

5、nagement mainly focuses on firm fundamental factors and ratios like profitability, sales growth, investment – they have positive relation with managerial ownership. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference in mark

6、et-related factors for companies with or without managerial ownership, as these factors in the Baltics are more influenced by other considerations like economics, politics and high liquidity premium. Keywords: manage

7、rial ownership, firm performance, Tobin’s Q, ROA, Baltic States DOI: 10.17512/pjms.2017.15.2.25 Article’s history: Received January 5, 2017; Revised March 3, 2017; Accepted June 9, 2017 Introduction and Literature Revie

8、w Relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has received much attention in corporate governance literature since the mid-70-ties, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explored

9、 the principal-agent theory, ownership structure, managerial behaviour and agency costs. The idea of managerial ownership was present since the Baltics regained their independence (early 90-ties). During the privatiza

10、tion process in early nineties, thanks to favourable legislative framework, many ex-ante state-owned companies offered shares to their management or all employees on beneficial conditions. In last decades, there is a

11、trend for international companies operating in the Baltic market to implement their global human resource policy measures. Many of them have employee share ownership plans either broad- or narrow- (i.e., management onl

12、y) based. Legislative framework and taxation according to employee share ownership in the Baltics has not been supportive. The institutional framework under which companies operate in Baltic States is quite similar,

13、 with some exceptions. In Latvia and Estonia there are no special ? Dr. oec., doc. An?elika Ber?e-Berga, Dr. oec., prof. Inna Dovladbekova, Dr.iur., doc. Marta ābula, Riga Stradi?? university, Faculty of European Studi

14、es ?? Corresponding author: anzelika.berke-berga@rsu.lv ? inna.dovladbekova@rsu.lv; marta.abula@rsu.lv POLISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES Ber?e-Berga A., Dovladbekova I., ābula M. 2017 Vol.15 No.2 275 et al., 2012; P

15、eni, 2014; Wahba, 2013), return on equity (Gosh, 2006; Short and Keasey, 1999), sales to assets ratio (Singh and Davidson, 2003) and other. Many authors, including the above mentioned for firm performance evaluation us

16、e a combination of several different ratios of both types – market value based (like Tobin’s Q) and firm based (like profit measures and profitability ratios). Turning back to the very often used Tobin’s Q ratio – a

17、number of empirical studies reveal non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, as this link is impacted by two opposite effects: the manager’s incentive as shareholder and entrenchment effec

18、t. Usually, at high managerial ownership levels, the latter effect overpowers the former. Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) were the first ones that found the so-called “hump-shaped” or “inverted-U” relation between

19、the mentioned variables. Other studies have also found the “hump-shaped” relationship. The findings regarding the most optimal level of managerial ownership differ across studies. Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) find

20、 that the maximum point of the hump-shaped relationship between Tobin’s Q and CEO ownership is 20.0%. Maximum level discovered by Benson and Davidson (2009) where the ownership-performance relation turns from positive

21、 to negative 28.24%. The evidence of Florackis, Kostakis and Ozkan (2009) research reveals strong and positive link between managerial ownership and firm performance at rather low levels of managerial ownership – lower

22、 than 15%. Khan, Mather and Balachandran (2014) researched Australian companies and found that at 20%-30% of ownership level there is a relation consistent with incentive alignment. Mueller and Spitz-Oener (Mueller an

23、d Spitz-Oener, 2006) find positive managerial ownership – firm performance relation in German SMEs up to 40% of managerial shares. However, due to non-listed status of surveyed companies, the performance measure they

24、use is slightly different from others – net number of times the reported quarter profit has increased. Other researchers create exponential models and raising the managerial ownership to several degrees (up to quantic

25、). They have found double and more hump-shaped curves of managerial ownership and firm performance relation with different turning points. Double-humped curves were found by Morck et al. (1988) at 5% and 25% level; Sh

26、ort and Keasey (1999) at 13% and 42% level; Faccio and Lasfer (1999) at 19.7% and 54.1% level, and others. Florackis et al. (2009) in their model with quantic level of managerial ownership find four turning points at 1

27、3%, 25%, 49% and 72% levels. These results are rather close to what Davies et al. (2005) have found – 7%, 26%, 51% and 76%. Our paper adds to existing literature by providing empirical evidence of managerial ownershi

28、p on firm performance in the Baltic States. This paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes data and methodology, Section 3 presents the results of empirical tests, and Section 4 is for discussion and conc