外文翻譯---服務業(yè)fdi的開放性一個國際比較分析

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An International Comparative Analysis</p><p>　　Stephen S. Golub</

2、p><p>　　National policies towards FDI typically feature measures aimed at both attracting and discouraging in ?ows. Policies to attract FDI such as tax breaks, favourable regulatory treatment and subsidies of v

3、arious sorts are usually focused on manufacturing. Policies towards services are far more ambivalent. Laws and regulatory practices frequently discriminate against foreign investors in services such as public utilities (

4、electricity distribution and telecommunications in particular), transport (not</p><p>　　The ambiguous attitudes towards FDI in services are amply illustrated in recent policy actions and debates. The Committ

5、ee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency group that screens foreign direct investment for national security concerns, has recently been in the limelight with several high-profile cases, nota

6、bly one involving the acquisition of a US port by investors in Dubai. A recent ‘open skies’ aviation agreement between the United States and the European Union w</p><p>　　?nancial services industry to foreig

7、n investors. Likewise, India is also gradually opening wholesale and distribution services to large foreign ?rms such as Wal-Mart despite strong local opposition. Venezuela and other Latin American countries with left-wi

8、ng governments, on the other hand, have recently increased restrictions on foreign investment in telecommunications. Thailand has also recently moved to reduce control by foreign investors in its telecommunications indus

9、try.</p><p>　　As in the case of manufacturing, countries bene?t from FDI in services through employment creation, capital accumulation, transfer of technology, improved service and increased competition. Mor

10、eover, liberalisation of FDI in services can contribute to manufacturing productivity by increasing availability of quality of production-related services (Arnold et al., 2006, 2007; Golub et al.,2007). Critics argue tha

11、t FDI can also impose economic costs such as displacement of local ?rms and reduced com</p><p>　　The cross-border provision of services, unlike goods, often can only be delivered through ‘commercial presence

12、’, i.e. setting up of foreign operations, rather than international trade in the item itself. It is therefore to be expected that FDI plays a prominent role in the globalisation of the service sector, fostered in part by

13、 partial opening of service industries to FDI.</p><p>　　Formal international agreements on FDI and on trade in services have been far less extensive than on international trade in goods, although various glo

14、bal negotiations and regional free-trade agreements often cover some aspects of international investment in services, notably the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provisions on commercial presence. To the ex

15、tent that it has occurred, opening to FDI in services has primarily been unilateral.</p><p>　　FDI in services has been increasing rapidly, raising the stakes in the debates about policies. In 2005, services

16、constituted the majority of inward FDI stocks, at almost two-thirds for developed countries, and about 50 per cent for developing countries, up considerably from 1990 (Table 1). Within services, ?nance, trade and busines

17、s services are the three largest categories, but transport, communications and electricity have also been increasing rapidly. It should be noted, however, that the sha</p><p>　　Despite the increasing promine

18、nce and controversies surrounding FDI in services, very little systematic information is available on policies towards FDI in services. Unlike international trade where international comparisons of tariff and non-tariff

19、barriers are widely available, there have been few previous efforts to quantify and systematically compare national policies towards FDI. Yet, indicators of the policy stance towards FDI are just as important as measure

20、s of trade barriers, given the</p><p>　　Case studies of the environment for FDI in various economies have been conducted through investors surveys and country reports (e.g. Economist Intelligence</p>

21、<p>　　Unit reports and Country Commercial Guides), but these cover a wide variety of issues and are not easily compared.</p><p>　　Given the dif?culties in classifying and ranking the various restriction

22、s, some studies (e.g. Hoekman, 1995) are limited to counting the number of restrictions. Kobrin (2005) used an annual UNCTAD report on national policy changes to show that liberalisation measures greatly outnumber increa

23、sed restrictions in the 1992–2001 period. However, UNCTAD’s database provides no information about the level of restrictions, only the number and nature of changes that are observed in different years.</p><p&g

24、t;　　A number of studies of restrictions on FDI (Hoekman, 1995; Paci?c Economic</p><p>　　Cooperation Council, 1995) use the WTO’s GATS commitments related to mode 3 (commercial presence) as their primary data

25、 source. GATS commitments are made in the form of ‘positive’ lists, i.e. they represent of?cial commitments to open markets. This is in contrast to ‘negative’ lists of exceptions to liberalisation. A problem with the GAT

26、S positive lists is that the absence of a positive commitment in some sector does not necessarily imply a restriction. A country may simply have chosen not to li</p><p>　　The Australian Productivity Commissi

27、on and af?liated researchers carried out a number of sectoral studies of impediments to trade in services: telecommunications (Warren, 2001), banking (McGuire and Schuele, 2001), maritime transport (McGuire et al., 2001)

28、, distribution (Kalirajan, 2000) and professional services (Nguyen-Hong, 2000). These studies focus on all modes of service delivery rather than FDI per se, however, and many of them rely primarily on the GATS, with the

29、related limitations note</p><p>　　The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) rates the openness</p><p>　　of countries to FDI on a scale of 1 to 5. The IEF methodology is not clearly

30、 articulated on their website and covers broader aspects of the climate for FDI, such as foreign exchange convertibility and access to arbitration that differ from the narrower focus here on discrimination between foreig

31、n and domestic investors. The World Competitiveness Report also ranks countries on their openness to FDI. These reports, however, are not based on a transparent and veri?able method and openness to FDI is</p><

32、p>　　Hardin and Holmes (1997, 2002) provide a comprehensive approach to barriers</p><p>　　to inward FDI but cover only a limited number of countries. Golub (2003), Koyama and Golub (2006) and UNCTAD (2006)

33、 adopt a variant of Hardin and Holmes’s approach in a study of restrictions on inward FDI for various samples of developed and developing countries. This article extends and synthesises the results from these three studi

34、es.</p><p>　　There are a number of limitations of the present study. First, policies towards</p><p>　　FDI are diverse and complex, and therefore not easily quanti?ed even when they are known. Se

35、cond, descriptions of these policies are not readily available and must be sought in a variety of sources, which sometimes provide con?icting or incomplete information. Third, policies are not static; on the contrary, go

36、vernments have frequently altered policies. Fourth, the focus here is on policies that discriminate between foreign and domestic investors, i.e. deviations from‘national treatment’. Regula</p><p>　　The remai

37、nder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the method of computing FDI restrictions, Section 3 presents the results for all countries, Section 4 examines the correlations of FDI restrictions with FDI p

38、atterns, and Section 5 concludes.</p><p>　　This section explains how measures of policies discriminating between foreign and domestic investors are computed. There are several issues involved in computing th

39、e restriction scores. A classi?cation of various types of restrictions, a choice of industries and a system of weighting are needed.</p><p>　　外文題目： Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An In

40、ternational Comparative Analysis </p><p>　　出 處： The World Economy (2009) </p><p>　　doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2009.01201.x

41、 </p><p>　　作 者： Stephen S. Golub </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　服務業(yè)FDI的開

42、放性：一個國際比較分析</p><p>　　國家政策對于外商直接投資的典型特征措施旨在吸引和阻止資本流入。吸引外國直接投資的政策，如稅收減免，有利的監(jiān)督管理和各類補貼通常是以制造業(yè)為重點。對于服務的政策，更是矛盾。法律和監(jiān)管措施對服務的外國投資者的經(jīng)常歧視，如公用事業(yè)（尤其是電力分配和電信），運輸（尤其是空中和海上運輸），金融服務，甚至是建筑和批發(fā)/零售分銷行業(yè)。</p><p>　　最近

43、的政策行動和辯論充分說明了對外國直接在服務業(yè)投資的不明確態(tài)度。美國對外國投資委員會（CFIUS），一個的機構(gòu)間小組篩查的最近引起人們注意的幾個典型外國直接在國家安全問題上投資的案例，特別是其中的涉及美國港口被迪拜投資者收購的案例。最近的一個美國和歐盟的“開放天空”的航空協(xié)議在某種程度上失敗是因為美國拒絕放寬所有美國的航空公司必須至少擁有75%的美國公民的限制。日本拒絕了位于英國的以兒童投資基金為基礎(chǔ)的能源公司J-Powerd的收購要約。

44、中國在受到來自美國的壓力下逐漸對外國投資者開放金融服務業(yè)。同樣，印度也逐漸對國外大公司如沃爾瑪開放批發(fā)及分銷服務，盡管本地的反對意見很強烈。委內(nèi)瑞拉和其他拉美國家的左翼政府，另一方面，最近增加了對外資在電信投資的限制。泰國最近也提出，以減少外國投資者在電信行業(yè)的控制。</p><p>　　由于在制造的情況下，國家通過外國在服務業(yè)直接投資中創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)機會，資本積累，技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移，改進服務和增加競爭受益。此外，外國直接在

45、服務投資的開放能夠促進生產(chǎn)效率的提高，通過增加與生產(chǎn)相關(guān)的服務的可用性(Arnold et al., 2006, 2007; Golub et al., 2007)。批評者認為外國直接投資也可以征收經(jīng)濟損失比如當?shù)仄髽I(yè)的置換和減少競爭。嬰兒‘企業(yè)家精神'論點可以被引證為對外國投資者的歧視的支持。服務部門通常也受到經(jīng)濟或?qū)徤鞅O(jiān)管，因為對自然壟斷或其他市場失靈的傾向，雖然這種市場失靈本身并不能為本地和外國投資者直接的歧視提供明確的理

46、由。限制在非經(jīng)濟領(lǐng)域的外資服務所有權(quán)的主要原因在于國家安全和經(jīng)濟民主主義。行業(yè)如電信，銀行，交通和電力供應往往是被東道國國家視為“戰(zhàn)略”或“敏感”。因此，服務業(yè)普遍受到比制造業(yè)甚至自然資源更為嚴格的限制（Hoekman，1995）。</p><p>　　該服務的跨境提供，不像商品，往往只能通過“商業(yè)存在”交付，即設(shè)立海外業(yè)務，而不是項目本身的國際貿(mào)易。因此，可以預期，外國直接投資在全球化的服務部門中有著很重要的地

47、位，在某種程度上推動了服務業(yè)的外國直接投資的部分開放。</p><p>　　利用外商直接投資的正式的國際協(xié)議和服務貿(mào)易范圍比在國際貿(mào)易的貨物少得多，雖然不同的全球貿(mào)易談判和區(qū)域自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定經(jīng)常會涉及國際投資服務的一些方面，特別是在服務貿(mào)易總協(xié)定（GATS）對商業(yè)存在的規(guī)定。在某種程度上外國直接投資在服務業(yè)的開放已單向的初步發(fā)生。</p><p>　　服務業(yè)外國直接投資迅速增加，提高有關(guān)政策

48、的辯論中的利害關(guān)系。2005年，服務構(gòu)成了大部分的外來直接投資股票，與1990年比較發(fā)達國家?guī)缀跤腥种拇蠓壬仙?，發(fā)展國家大約有百分之五十(表 1)。在服務業(yè)，金融，貿(mào)易和商業(yè)服務構(gòu)成三大類別，但交通，通訊和電力也迅速增加。應當指出，在外國直接投資總額中服務所占的份額仍然低于世界GDP的服務份額，部分反映了外國直接投資在服務業(yè)仍然相對有限的事實。如下證據(jù)表明限制條件減少了外國直接投資。</p><p>　　

49、盡管圍繞服務業(yè)外商直接投資的爭論日益突出，很少有系統(tǒng)的資料可用于服務業(yè)外國直接投資政策。不像國際貿(mào)易的關(guān)稅和非關(guān)稅貿(mào)易壁壘在國際上比較廣泛的使用，很少有過量化和比較系統(tǒng)地研究對外國直接投資的國家政策。然而，對外國直接投資的政策指標的立場是與貿(mào)易壁壘措施一樣重要的，考慮到圍繞外國直接投資在世界經(jīng)濟和外國直接投資政策的突出辯論。政策制定者和研究者都從這里展示的指標受益。有關(guān)外國直接投資在任何國際談判的第一步是改進對外國直接投資的政策信息。頗

50、具影響力的外國直接投資的知識資本的模型表明，外國直接投資的限制條件是經(jīng)驗性分析中需列入的一個重要變量。外商直接投資的計量測試中，研究人員有時會采取對投資者的民意調(diào)查，而不是客觀的測量對外國直接投資的開放性，但是這些主觀測試的可靠性值得商榷。</p><p>　　通過投資者和國家報告（如經(jīng)濟學家情報組的報告和我國商業(yè)指南），對各經(jīng)濟體的外國直接投資環(huán)境案例研究進行了調(diào)查，但這些涵蓋了各種各樣的問題，不容易比較。&l

51、t;/p><p>　　鑒于分類和排序各種限制的困難，一些研究（如Hoekman，1995）受限于計數(shù)數(shù)量的限制。Kobrin (2005) 使用年度的聯(lián)合國貿(mào)易和發(fā)展會議報告的國家政策變化顯示，自由化措施，極大地超過在1992-2001年期間增加的限制。但是，貿(mào)發(fā)會議的數(shù)據(jù)庫沒有提供有關(guān)的限制級別的信息，只有不同年份的數(shù)量和性質(zhì)的變化。</p><p>　　對外國直接投資的限制（Hoekman

52、，1995;太平洋經(jīng)濟合作理事會，1995年）的研究報告,利用世貿(mào)組織的服務貿(mào)易總協(xié)定的承諾，將源模式3（商業(yè)存在）作為其原始數(shù)據(jù)，服務貿(mào)易總協(xié)定作出的承諾是“積極的”清單的形式，也就是說，它們代表官方承諾開放市場。這是相對于“負面的”例外的自由化清單。服務貿(mào)易總協(xié)定列出積極的清單的問題是一些部門的積極承諾，并不一定意味著沒有限制。一個國家可能干脆選擇不列出時間表，保留本部門政策的靈活性。或者，如果該部門限制，服務貿(mào)易總協(xié)定可能會對該限

53、制的性質(zhì)保持沉默。此外，目前2000年左右的服務貿(mào)易總協(xié)定的時間表，可能無法充分反映國家最近的變化。此外，澳大利亞生產(chǎn)力委員會及其所屬的研究人員開展了一系列阻礙服務貿(mào)易的部門研究，電信業(yè)(Warren, 2001)，銀行業(yè)(McGuire and Schuele, 2001)，海運(McGuire et al., 2001)，配送(Kalirajan, 2000)和專業(yè)服務(Nguyen-Hong, 2000)。這些研究側(cè)重于所有提供服

54、務的模式，而不是外國直接投資本身，然而，其中許多主要依賴于服務貿(mào)易總協(xié)定與上面提到的</p><p>　　美國傳統(tǒng)基金會經(jīng)濟自由度指數(shù)（國際盛事基金）將國家的外國直接投資的開放性的規(guī)模評為1至5。國際盛事基金的方法在他們的網(wǎng)站沒有明確闡述，涵蓋了外國直接投資更廣的面，如外匯兌換和存取的仲裁的不同較窄的集中在國內(nèi)外投資者之間的歧視這里。世界競爭力報告還對他們國家的外國直接投資的開放性排名。但是這些報告并非基于一個透

55、明和可核查的方法，對外國直接投資開放性沒有明確的界定。</p><p>　　Hardin和Holmes (1997, 2002) 提供全面的方法來解除外國直接投資流入的障礙，但只涉及有限的幾個國家。Golub (2003)，Koyama 和Golub (2006)采用Hardin和Holmes對外商直接投資流入發(fā)達國家和發(fā)展中國家的各種樣品的限制的研究的一種做法。本文從這三個研究結(jié)果進行擴展和綜合處理。</

56、p><p>　　當前的研究有許多限制。首先，對外國直接投資的政策是多樣和復雜的，因此不容易量化，即使它們是已知的。其次，這些政策信息是不容易獲得，必須尋求各種各樣的來源，有時提供相互矛盾的或不完全的信息。第三，政策不是一成不變的，相反，政府經(jīng)常改變政策。第四，這里的重點是在外國和國內(nèi)投資者的政策，即偏離“國民待遇'”。勞動力和產(chǎn)品市場和其他政策條例同樣適用于外國和國內(nèi)投資者在這里不予考慮，除了政府壟斷者以外。

57、例如，國內(nèi)含量要求，價格上限，審慎監(jiān)管和其他進入障礙得不到解決。第五，本研究僅限于公開限制的外國直接投資，幾乎忽略任何非正式的私人或政府努力傾斜外國公司競爭環(huán)境使有利于國內(nèi)市場。第六，執(zhí)法的廣度和程度可能并不總是很容易從法律的說明推斷出來。第七，這個研究并沒有考慮對外國投資者正面的歧視，諸如減稅。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分組織如下。第2節(jié)說明了外國直接投資的限制的計算方法，第3節(jié)顯示了所有國家的結(jié)果，第