在合并的欲望涌動(dòng)并購(gòu)趨勢(shì)與分析外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： Surge inurge to merge: M&A Trends and Analysis </p><p>　　出 處： Journal of Applied Corporate Finance </p><p>　　作 者： Mic

2、hael J.Mauboussin </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Surge in the Urge to Merge: M&A Trends and Analysis </p><p>　　by Michael J. Mauboussin, Legg

3、 Mason Capital Management*</p><p>　　We may be at the front end of another mergers and acquisition (M&A) boom. Historically,upswings in deal activity have coincided with improvements in the economy and th

4、e stock market. Figure 1 shows the relationship between deal volume and the price level of the S&P 500 Index over the past 15 years. Te strong rally in equities of the March 2009 lows, sharply improved credit conditi

5、ons, solid non-fnancial corporate balance sheets, and companies seeking to enhance their strategic positions all poin</p><p>　　Source: Bloomberg, Reuters estimates; data through 2009.</p><p>　　A

6、fter reaching an all-time high in 2007, M&A activity tumbled during the next two years, refecting the financial and economic tumult. While 2008’s deal volume was respectable given the stock market’s sharp decline, th

7、e deals were heavily skewed toward the frst half of the year. Announced activity was weak in 2009, but the fourth quarter was the strongest of the year, refecting the improvement in equity and credit markets. For all of

8、2009, global M&A volume was roughly $2 trillion, about half of </p><p>　　During the deep recession of the past two years, falling earnings and limited access to capital made executives more risk averse.

9、As a result, frms slashed expenses, squeezed their balance sheets, and reined in growth initiatives. Tis has allowed companies to generate healthy free cash fows and to sustain strong fnancial positions. While consumer a

10、nd government debt may be of concern, the balance sheets of many companies are solid. As the recovery gains momentum, companies are again setting thei</p><p>　　M&A activity tends to rise and fall along w

11、ith the stock market, and almost every company is either involved in a deal, or afected by one, at some point. For instance, research suggests that roughly 2-3 percent of public companies are acquired in any given year.

12、Often, a move by one competitor triggers cascading moves by its competitors hoping to sustain their competitive position. Mergers and acquisitions play a large role in shaping competitive landscapes and can have a large

13、impact on corpora</p><p>　　Many companies and investors do not have a frm grasp on how M&A deals create or destroy shareholder value. Companies do deals for a host of reasons, including the pursuit of gr

14、owth, diversifcation of their businesses, or to consolidate an industry. And companies often feel compelled to do a deal simply because other companies in their industry are doing them. Generally, companies, investment b

15、ankers, and investors assume that deals that add to earnings per share are virtuous. But for an acquirer</p><p>　　On this point, however, the evidence is far from reassuring. Research shows that roughly two-

16、thirds of public M&A transactions destroy shareholder value for the acquiring companies. In addition, the market’s initial reaction to a deal is a reasonably unbiased predictor of long-term value creation. Mark Sirow

17、er and Sumit Sahni, consultants versed in M&A economics, looked at the persistence of returns for deals that the market initially deemed favorable or unfavorable. While the initial response w</p><p>　　On

18、e important reason that so many M&A deals fail to create value for buyers is that acquirers tend to overpay for targets. A host of factors might explain this tendency, including an overly optimistic assessment of mar

19、ket potential, overestimation of synergies, poor due diligence, and hubris. But while deals are harmful for the shareholders of acquirers on average, some buyers do create value. Acquirers can increase their chance of su

20、ccess by paying low premiums and executing on operational impr</p><p>　　A recent study by three professors of management showed that companies that do deals early in an acquisition wave generally enjoy share

21、-price rises, while those that buy later tend to sufer stock-price declines. Acquirers at the beginning of a wave see their shares increase more than 4% above what would be expected, based on past performance and market

22、trends, over the three weeks following the M&A announcement Buyers acting roughly two-thirds through the wave see average declines of approximate</p><p>　　Te professors defned an acquisition wave as any

23、six-year period where the peak year of acquisition activity was twice as high as the base year, and where there was a subsequent decline of greater than 50%. Te sample included over 3,000 companies in a wide range of ind

24、ustries from 1984 through 2004. All returns were adjusted for market factors.</p><p>　　There are several benefts to acting early in a cycle, including choosing from a greater pool of potential targets and th

25、e ability to buy assets cheaply. Naturally, the larger the number of potential acquisition candidates, the more likely it is that a buyer can fnd a suitable target. Further, companies that move early can generally do dea

26、ls at cheaper prices—usually against a background of economic growth—than companies that act late in the cycle. Finally, benefits to moving early are most prono</p><p>　　Underperformance for late movers is g

27、enerally the result of taking strategic action based on the previous action of other firms. While early movers can scan the landscape for the besttargets, late movers act less rationally and with greater haste,often lead

28、ing them to acquire suboptimal targets at elevated prices. Bandwagon pressures motivate the late movers to focus on social cues. As a result, they assume other companies have superior information and plunge into deals wi

29、thout fully considering</p><p>　　Bandwagon pressures also help explain why returns improve late in the wave. Te pressures subside as the M&A boom simmers out, allowing frms to complete more rational asse

30、ssments of acquisition targets and their values. Even so, the latest movers still generate shareholder returns that lag those made by early movers. Finally, the form of financing plays a role in determining shareholder r

31、eturns for acquirers later in the cycle. Companies that finance their deals primarily with cash see smaller de</p><p>　　Setting the Stage</p><p>　　There are two basic types of acquirers: strateg

32、ic and financial. Strategic buyers are companies that use M&A as a tool to implement corporate objectives. The most common rationales for doing deals include industry capacity reduction, product or market line extens

33、ion, geographic rollup, indus-try convergence, and M&A as research and development.Strategic buyers generally assume that they can realize significant operational synergies, which justifes the premium they pay for th

34、eir targets. </p><p>　　Financial buyers are typically private equity frms that acquire companies, business units, or assets and seek to improve their operating performance. Te substantial use of debt—private

35、 equity frms typically use $3-4 dollars of debt for every $1 of equity they contribute—allows them to enhance their cash-on-cash returns. Further, there is a perception that private equity frms, because less susceptible

36、to pressure from the public markets, can make more optimal capital allocation decisions. (While </p><p>　　Companies generally pursue strategic deals to expand their core strengths. This may involve plans t

37、o extend their product or geographic scope. Recent instances of this horizontal expansion include Kraft and Cadbury, Stanley Works and Black & Decker, and Disney and Marvel.</p><p>　　While horizontal exp

38、ansion may be the most popular rationale for doing a deal, there has been a notable increase in deals based on vertical integration. A vertically integrated company controls a product or service throughout the value chai

39、n, from raw materials to the end product. In recent decades the trend has been toward greater specialization,as companies have increasingly focused on one part of the value chain. In the last two years—perhaps spurred by

40、 the economic downturn—some prominent co</p><p>　　One factor slowing the pace of deals is that banks have been hesitant to fund them. In the U.S., bank loans for M&A fell sharply in 2009 to approximately

41、 $100 billion, about one-third of 2008’s volume and only one-sixth of the volume of 2007.After a brutal period in 2008 and early 2009, there are encouraging signs in the credit markets. Deal financing is picking up, inte

42、rest rates are falling, credit spreads are narrowing, and bond issuance is at record highs.</p><p>　　Along with the falling cost of debt, we have also seen a major increase in bond issuance. U.S. corporate b

43、ond issuancehit an annual record of $1.2 trillion in 2009, just ahead of the issuance in 2007 and up nearly 34% compared to 2008.Much of this increase has been the result of latent demand that built up during the credit

44、freeze in 2008. Government initiatives and low interest rates also helped. </p><p>　　Improvement in the credit markets is encouraging, but banks are not likely to return to pre-crisis mode any time soon. Eve

45、n if the volume of loans recovers, lenders are likely to be more conservative on the terms in the future than they were in the past. Tis might include, for example, insisting on a lower ratio of debt to the company opera

46、ting cash flow or as a percentage of total capitalization. Banks remain fearful that another market downturn will leave them with vulnerable debt instruments.</p><p>　　Some of the largest institutional inves

47、tors have already begun to cut back on their investments in private equity. For example, California Public Employees Retirement System, the biggest pension plan in the U.S., has reduced its allocation to private equity b

48、y more than 60%. In addition, over 40% of the largest university endowments are currently above their target allocations to private equity, suggesting they are also likely to reduce their investments in the future.</p

49、><p>　　These factors have led to the virtual disappearance of large private equity deals. Based on trends through the frst half of 2009, we estimate private equity M&A to be about $70 billion in 2009, or 3-

50、4% of total deals, much lower than the 15% average over the past decade .</p><p>　　For the foreseeable future, private equity deals will likely be smaller, and will include more upfront cash. Lower amounts o

51、f leverage may reduce returns, as the use of leverage has accounted for between one-quarter and one-third of returns. Transaction fees of about 1 to 2 percent will come under pressure as well, as fees this high are hard

52、to justify in an environment of lower expected returns.</p><p>　　Implications for Investors</p><p>　　Resurgent M&A activity is by no means inevitable, but the now</p><p>　　evide

53、nce strongly points toward a reversal of the 2008-2009 decline. Should deal volume pick up, investors need to be prepared to assess these transactions properly. Investors should ask three question when companies announce

54、 a deal:</p><p>　　1. Does the deal have material economic consequences for Share</p><p>　　Holders of the buying and selling companies?</p><p>　　2. Is the buyer sending signals by ch

55、oosing to pay for the deal with stock instead of cash?</p><p>　　3. What is the stock market’s likely reaction?</p><p>　　譯文： 在合并的欲望涌動(dòng)：并購(gòu)趨勢(shì)與分析</p><p>　　我們可能站在兼并與收購(gòu)（M＆A）熱潮的另一前端。從歷史上看

56、，并購(gòu)活動(dòng)高漲也恰逢在經(jīng)濟(jì)和股票市場(chǎng)改善時(shí)。下圖顯示了過(guò)去15年里交易量與S＆P500的價(jià)格指數(shù)水平的關(guān)系。2009年3月低點(diǎn)股市強(qiáng)勁反彈，信貸條件大幅度改善，公司通過(guò)尋求更多的交易加強(qiáng)其戰(zhàn)略據(jù)點(diǎn)。值得注意的是，根據(jù)研究顯示，一些在年初制定收購(gòu)周期并斷言這個(gè)收購(gòu)周期的最終發(fā)展情況的公司，給股東帶來(lái)了更高的回報(bào)。</p><p>　　全球并購(gòu)數(shù)量和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)</p><p>　　數(shù)目

57、（萬(wàn)億美元）標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)</p><p>　　資料來(lái)源：彭博資訊，路透社對(duì)2009年的數(shù)據(jù)估計(jì)。</p><p>　　并購(gòu)活動(dòng)在2007年達(dá)到了空前的高度，而在其后兩年內(nèi)暴跌，這正反映了金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)的動(dòng)蕩。就2008年的交易量而言，僅是07年的一半，使得股市大幅下跌。而2009年則是最弱的，但第四季度卻是那年最強(qiáng)的，這也反射出股票和信貸市場(chǎng)的改善。對(duì)于2009年來(lái)說(shuō)，全球并購(gòu)量是2萬(wàn)億

58、美元，約為過(guò)去五年的平均水平的一半以上。</p><p>　　在過(guò)去經(jīng)濟(jì)嚴(yán)重衰退的兩年里，收入的下降和資金的有限使得管理人員更不愿承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此，財(cái)政資源管理處削減開支、壓縮他們的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表、并勒住增長(zhǎng)計(jì)劃，這些使得公司有現(xiàn)金能夠自由流動(dòng)和維持健康強(qiáng)勁的金融立場(chǎng)。雖然消費(fèi)者和政府債務(wù)的可能會(huì)被關(guān)注，但許多公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表顯然才是最重要的。當(dāng)恢復(fù)增長(zhǎng)勢(shì)頭時(shí)，公司會(huì)再次將注意力放在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)上。</p>

59、<p>　　并購(gòu)活動(dòng)與股市一起趨于上升或下降，每家公司要么幾乎是參與了交易，要么就是在某一點(diǎn)上被其他影響。研究表明，大約有2%-3%的上市公司在一些特定年度會(huì)被收購(gòu)。通常，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者的一個(gè)舉動(dòng)將觸發(fā)其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的一系列操作，希望借此來(lái)維持其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)地位。而兼并和收購(gòu)可以在形成的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)格局中發(fā)揮重要的作用，并能對(duì)公司價(jià)值產(chǎn)生很大的影響。</p><p>　　許多公司和投資者對(duì)通過(guò)并購(gòu)創(chuàng)造或摧毀股東價(jià)值沒(méi)有強(qiáng)有力的把握

60、。公司做交易的原因有很多，其中包括追求成長(zhǎng)，使其業(yè)務(wù)多元化，或鞏固一個(gè)行業(yè)。他們常常覺(jué)得有必要做一些簡(jiǎn)單的處理，因?yàn)槠渌疽苍谒麄兊男袠I(yè)里。一般來(lái)說(shuō)，公司、投資銀行、交易商和投資者認(rèn)為，添加每股的盈利是良性的。但對(duì)于收購(gòu)方來(lái)說(shuō)，最終只有一個(gè)測(cè)試交易的優(yōu)點(diǎn)：即它是否創(chuàng)造股東價(jià)值。因?yàn)橥顿Y者有強(qiáng)烈的動(dòng)機(jī)去正確評(píng)價(jià)一個(gè)交易的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值，而股票價(jià)格的變動(dòng)公告常常是一個(gè)優(yōu)秀的交易晴雨表的可取之處。</p><p>　　然而

61、，事實(shí)卻遠(yuǎn)不能讓人放心。研究表明，大約有三分之二的收購(gòu)公司在上市并購(gòu)交易中摧毀了股東價(jià)值。此外，市場(chǎng)對(duì)于處理的最初反應(yīng)是一個(gè)合理的長(zhǎng)期的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的無(wú)偏預(yù)測(cè)，而一些并購(gòu)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)顧問(wèn)認(rèn)為持久的回報(bào)才是市場(chǎng)最初認(rèn)為有利或不利的。雖然最初的反應(yīng)并不總是等于最后的結(jié)果，大約有一半的交易在一年后與積極的初步反應(yīng)一樣有利，同時(shí)，約有三分之二的初始交易仍然不利的消極反應(yīng)。</p><p>　　許多并購(gòu)交易使買家失去創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，其中的

62、一個(gè)重要原因是往往以多付為收購(gòu)的目標(biāo)。許多因素可以解釋這一趨勢(shì)，包括對(duì)市場(chǎng)潛力過(guò)于樂(lè)觀的評(píng)估、高估的協(xié)同作用、缺乏盡職的調(diào)查，以及傲慢。不過(guò)，雖然交易對(duì)股東有害，有些卻能為購(gòu)買者創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。收購(gòu)方可以通過(guò)支付低保費(fèi)和執(zhí)行相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)增加他們成功的機(jī)會(huì)。有關(guān)的研究還指出收購(gòu)成功得另一個(gè)原因，即好時(shí)機(jī)。</p><p>　　最近一個(gè)由三個(gè)管理學(xué)教授所作的研究表明，如果一公司在收購(gòu)交易早期普遍股價(jià)上漲，那么在購(gòu)買后股票價(jià)格往

63、往下跌。在開始收購(gòu)前，基于過(guò)去的表現(xiàn)以及并購(gòu)一宣布后市場(chǎng)在三個(gè)星期內(nèi)的趨勢(shì)，可以預(yù)期看到他們的股份增加超過(guò)4％以上。三分之二的買方行事大約可以引起約3％的平均跌幅。到后期雖然有些改善，但還是大大低于早期。</p><p>　　一些教授認(rèn)為收購(gòu)潮應(yīng)是在連續(xù)的六年期間收購(gòu)活動(dòng)高于基準(zhǔn)年的兩倍，且在隨后有一次大于50％的跌幅。研究的對(duì)象包括從1984到2004年各個(gè)行業(yè)的3000個(gè)公司，所有市場(chǎng)回饋的因素也進(jìn)行了調(diào)整。

64、</p><p>　　在這個(gè)周期的早期有幾個(gè)好處，包括選擇一個(gè)更大的潛在目標(biāo)和獲得購(gòu)買廉價(jià)資產(chǎn)的能力。當(dāng)然，潛在的收購(gòu)對(duì)象越多，買家越有可能找到一個(gè)合適的目標(biāo)。此外，公司運(yùn)作的越早，一般在交易中可以得到越便宜的價(jià)格，通常對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)要晚于公司的行為。最后，較突出的是早運(yùn)作的行業(yè)的增長(zhǎng)和穩(wěn)定。</p><p>　　采取逾期操作的戰(zhàn)略行動(dòng)所導(dǎo)致的一般結(jié)果是以以前的其他行動(dòng)為基礎(chǔ)。而先行者可以看

65、到更好的前景，逾期不理智的行為和推動(dòng)者的操作，常常能使他們?cè)诟邷貎r(jià)格時(shí)獲得最理想的目標(biāo)，而從眾的壓力則會(huì)促使逾期操作者更加關(guān)注社會(huì)信息。因此，他們會(huì)認(rèn)為其他公司的優(yōu)越信息并沒(méi)有完全投身在交易中。</p><p>　　從眾的壓力也有助于解釋為什么在收購(gòu)潮中收益的提高會(huì)如此滯后。壓力消退的并購(gòu)蘊(yùn)積了繁榮，使財(cái)政資源管理處能更合理的評(píng)估收購(gòu)目標(biāo)和收購(gòu)價(jià)值。即便如此，逾期操作者產(chǎn)生的股東回報(bào)也是由先行者制成的。最后，融資

66、的形式在確定股東回報(bào)周期里起著決定性的作用。公司融資主要是看他們的股票跌幅而不是使用公司自己的現(xiàn)金。</p><p><b>　　步驟設(shè)置</b></p><p>　　收購(gòu)有兩個(gè)基本類型：戰(zhàn)略與融資。戰(zhàn)略的買方是以并購(gòu)作為手段來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)目標(biāo)的公司。最常見的交易理由包括產(chǎn)業(yè)能力縮減、產(chǎn)品或生產(chǎn)線的延伸、地理匯總、產(chǎn)業(yè)集群，以及并購(gòu)的研究和發(fā)展。戰(zhàn)略的買方普遍認(rèn)為他們能夠

67、實(shí)現(xiàn)該重大業(yè)務(wù)的協(xié)同效應(yīng)，其中溢價(jià)收購(gòu)是他們自己的目標(biāo)。</p><p>　　金融買家通常是一些私人股本的收購(gòu)公司、業(yè)務(wù)部門、或資產(chǎn)，并尋求提高經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的產(chǎn)品。大量使用債務(wù)的私人股本公司通常每使用3-4美元的債務(wù)就有1美元的股本有助于光大他們，提高他們現(xiàn)金到現(xiàn)金的回報(bào)。此外，有一種看法認(rèn)為，私人股本公司，因?yàn)椴蝗菀资芄_市場(chǎng)的壓力，可以行使更多的優(yōu)化資金分配的決策。（雖然我承認(rèn)這個(gè)看法，但我強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)上市公司被阻止

68、是股東作出的最好的長(zhǎng)期資本分配的決定。）</p><p>　　公司普遍追求的戰(zhàn)略是以擴(kuò)大他們的優(yōu)勢(shì)為核心，這可能涉及延長(zhǎng)他們的產(chǎn)品或地域范圍計(jì)劃。最近這一次橫向擴(kuò)張的實(shí)例包括卡夫和吉百利、史丹利和百得、迪斯尼和奇跡。</p><p>　　而橫向擴(kuò)張，可能是做交易最流行的理由，在以垂直整合為基礎(chǔ)的交易中起著的重要的作用。垂直整合公司控制了整個(gè)產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)從原材料到最終產(chǎn)品的價(jià)值鏈。隨著企業(yè)越來(lái)

69、越注重價(jià)值鏈中的某一個(gè)部分，使得最近幾十年來(lái)的趨勢(shì)走向了更細(xì)的專業(yè)化。在過(guò)去的兩年，也許是受到經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的刺激，一些著名的公司做了交易變得更加垂直整合。其中包括甲骨文和太陽(yáng)微系統(tǒng)公司、百事可樂(lè)公司和百事裝瓶集團(tuán)及民族生活和特瑪。</p><p>　　交易速度減緩的一個(gè)因素是銀行一直遲遲未給他們投資。在美國(guó)，銀行給予并購(gòu)公司的貸款在2009年急劇下降至約1000億美元，約是2008年三分之一，只有2007年的六分之一

70、。在經(jīng)歷了殘酷的2008年和2009年初期后，信貸市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)了令人鼓舞的跡象。交易融資正在復(fù)蘇，利率下降，信貸息差縮小，債券發(fā)行量達(dá)到歷史新高。</p><p>　　隨著債務(wù)成本的下降，我們也看到債券發(fā)行大幅增加。美國(guó)發(fā)行的公司債券在2009年達(dá)到了1.2萬(wàn)億美元的年度紀(jì)錄，領(lǐng)先于2007年的發(fā)行量，比2008年上漲了近34％，這一增長(zhǎng)中的大部分建立在2008年信貸凍結(jié)期間的潛在需求。當(dāng)然政府的推動(dòng)和低利率也起了作

71、用。</p><p>　　信貸市場(chǎng)的改善是令人鼓舞的，但銀行不可能用很快的時(shí)間回到危機(jī)前的模式。即使是貸款的回收量，貸款人在未來(lái)也可能比過(guò)去有了更為保守的計(jì)算。這些可能包括堅(jiān)持較低的債務(wù)比率對(duì)公司的營(yíng)運(yùn)現(xiàn)金阜或作為總市值的百分比。銀行仍然擔(dān)心另一個(gè)市場(chǎng)低迷會(huì)使他們的債務(wù)工具變得脆弱。此外，銀行在運(yùn)作中對(duì)資本的要求更嚴(yán)格，限制其擴(kuò)大并購(gòu)的融資數(shù)量。</p><p>　　一些大型機(jī)構(gòu)的投資者已

72、經(jīng)開始削減其私人股本的投資。例如，加州公共雇員退休系統(tǒng)作為美國(guó)最大的養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃準(zhǔn)備減少其分配超過(guò)60％的私人股本。此外，超過(guò)40％的大學(xué)捐贈(zèng)基金目前已超過(guò)其分配的私人股權(quán)，這表明他們也可能減少未來(lái)的投資，這些因素導(dǎo)致一些了大型民營(yíng)交易的虛擬資產(chǎn)的失蹤。根據(jù)2009年上半年的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)，我們估計(jì)2009年的私人股權(quán)并購(gòu)約700億美元或3-4％的交易總額，比過(guò)去十年的平均值低15％。</p><p>　　在可預(yù)見的將來(lái)

73、，私人股本交易可能將會(huì)更小，也會(huì)包括更多的預(yù)付現(xiàn)金。杠桿較低的數(shù)額可能會(huì)減少回報(bào)，而杠桿的使用，已經(jīng)在回報(bào)中占四分之一到三分之一。約1%-2%的交易費(fèi)也將會(huì)比較有壓力，因?yàn)檫@種高收費(fèi)很難證明在一個(gè)較低的預(yù)期環(huán)境中有所回報(bào)。</p><p><b>　　對(duì)投資者的啟示</b></p><p>　　復(fù)活的并購(gòu)活動(dòng)絕不是必然的，但證據(jù)強(qiáng)烈指向2008-2009年的反轉(zhuǎn)下跌。