外文翻譯---并購支付方式在歐洲的選擇

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The choice of payment method in European M & A</p><p>　　Global M&A activity h

2、as grown dramatically over the last ten years, bringing with it major changes in the organization and control of economic activity around the world. Yet, there is much about the M&A process that we do not fully under

3、stand, including the choice of payment method. Given the large size of many M&A transactions, the financing decision can have a significant impact on an acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, and subsequ

4、ent financing decisions. The financing decision</p><p>　　In making an M&A currency decision, a bidder is faced with a choice between using cash and stock as deal consideration. Given that most bidders ha

5、ve limited cash and liquid assets, cash offers generally require debt financing. As a consequence, a bidder implicitly faces the choice of debt or equity financing, which can involve a tradeoff between corporate control

6、concerns of issuing equity and rising financial distress costs of issuing debt. Thus, a bidder’s M&A currency decision can be strongly</p><p>　　Under existing theories of capital structure, debt capacity

7、 is a positive function of tangible assets, earnings growth and asset diversification and a negative function of asset volatility. Firms with greater tangible assets can borrow more privately from banks and publicly in t

8、he bond market. Since larger firms are generally more diversified, we expect them to have a lower probability of bankruptcy at a given leverage ratio and thus, greater debt capacity. These financing constraint and bankru

9、p</p><p>　　In assessing potential determinants of an M&A payment method, our focus is on a bidder’s M&A financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the final terms of an M&A de

10、al. However,if a target’s financing choice is unacceptable to the bidder, then the proposed M&A transaction is likely to be aborted or else the bidder can make a hostile offer on its own terms. For a deal to succeed,

11、 the bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal.</p><p>　　Bidder and target considerations:</p><p>　　* Corporate Control </p><p>　　Bidders controlled by a maj

12、or shareholder should be reluctant to use stock financing when this causes the controlling shareholder to risk losing control. Assuming control is valuable, the presence of dominant shareholder positions should be associ

13、ated with more frequent use of cash, especially when the controlling shareholder’s position is threatened. To capture this effect, we use the ultimate voting stake held by the largest controlling shareholder. </p>

14、<p>　　A bidder with diffuse or highly concentrated ownership is less likely to be concerned with corporate control issues. In line with this argument, Martin (1996) documents a significantly negative relationship b

15、etween the likelihood of stock financing and managerial ownership only over the intermediate ownership range. Therefore, we incorporate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the method of payment and the v

16、oting rights of a bidder’s controlling shareholder by estimating both a </p><p>　　Corporate control concerns in M&A activity can manifest themselves in more subtle ways. Concentrated ownership of a targe

17、t means that a stock financed acquisition can create a large blockholder, threatening the corporate governance of the acquirer. If the seller is closely held or is a corporation disposing of a division, then ownership co

18、ncentration tends to be very concentrated. This implies that financing the M&A deal with stock can create a new blockholder in the bidder. While the risk of cr</p><p>　　* Collateral, Financial Leverage a

19、nd Debt Capacity</p><p>　　We use the fraction of tangible assets as our primary measure of a bidder’s ability to pay cash, financed from additional borrowing. COLLATERAL is measured by the ratio of property,

20、 plant and equipment to book value of total assets. Myers (1977) argues that debtholders in firms with fewer tangible assets and more growth opportunities are subject to greater moral hazard risk, which increases the cos

21、t of debt, often making stock more attractive. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman(2001) find that a firm’</p><p>　　We also control for a bidder’s financial condition with its leverage ratio, FIN’L LEVERAGE. Since

22、cash is primarily obtained by issuing new debt, highly levered bidders are constrained in their ability to issue debt and as a consequence use stock financing more frequently. A bidder’s financial leverage is measured by

23、 the sum of the bidder’s face value of debt prior to the M&A announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the book valve of total assets prio</p><p>　　Bidder size

24、 is likely to influence its financing choices. Larger firms are more diversified and thus, have proportionally lower expected bankruptcy costs. They also have lower flotation costs and are likely to have better access to

25、 debt markets, making debt financing more readily available. Thus, cash financing should be more feasible in the case of larger firms. Larger firms are also more apt to choose cash financing in smaller deals due to its e

26、ase of use, provided they have sufficient unused </p><p>　　* Relative Deal Size, Bidder Stock Price Runup and Asymmetric Information</p><p>　　Hansen (1987) predicts that bidders have greater inc

27、entives to finance with stock when the asymmetric information about target assets is high. This information asymmetry is likely to rise as target assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder. Yet, stock is used in

28、relatively larger deals, it produces more serious dilution of a dominant shareholder’s control position. Finally, as bidder equity capitalization rises, concern about its financing constraint falls, since there is a rela

29、tively s</p><p>　　Both Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hansen (1987) predict that bidders will prefer to finance with stock when they consider their stock overvalued by the market and prefer to finance with cash

30、 when they consider their stock undervalued. As uncertainty about bidder asset value rises, this adverse selection effect is exacerbated. Martin (1996) finds evidence consistent with this adverse selection prediction. Fo

31、r a sample of publicly traded targets, Travlos (1987) finds that stock financed M&A deals e</p><p>　　In addition to bidder considerations, we need to take into account typical target considerations. Thes

32、e preferences are related to risk, liquidity, asymmetric information and home bias.</p><p>　　T1. Unlisted Targets and Subsidiary Targets</p><p>　　We use an indicator variable, UNLISTED TARGET, t

33、o control for listing status where the variable takes a value of one if the target is a stand-alone company, not listed on any stock exchange and is zero for listed targets and unlisted subsidiaries. When an M&A deal

34、 involves an unlisted target, a seller’s consumption/liquidity needs are also likely to be important considerations. These sellers are likely to prefer cash given the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio h

35、oldings and the </p><p>　　T2. Cross-Industry Deals and Asymmetric Information</p><p>　　Seller reluctance to accept bidder stock as payment should rise as the asymmetric information problem worse

36、ns with greater uncertainty about bidder equity value and future earnings. This problem is also likely to be more serious for conglomerate mergers. In contrast, sellers are more apt to accept a continuing equity position

37、 in an intra–industry merger, where they are well acquainted with industry risks and prospects. </p><p>　　T3. Cross-Border Deals, Local Exchange Listing and Home Bias</p><p>　　In cross border de

38、als, selling stock to foreign investors can entail several problems. We are concerned with the possibility that investors have a home country bias in their portfolio decisions as documented in Coval and Moskowitz (1999),

39、 French and Poterba (1991) and Grinblatt and Keloharju(2001), among others. This can reflect a foreign stock’s greater trading costs, lower liquidity, exposure to exchange risk and less timely, more limited access to fir

40、m information. </p><p>　　T4. Bidder Investment Opportunities</p><p>　　High growth bidders can make an attractive equity investment for selling shareholders. MKTTO-BOOK, defined as a market value

41、 of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid, measures a bidder’s investment in growth opportunities.We expect a higher market to book ratio to increase

42、 a bidder stock’s attractiveness as M&A consideration. High market to book is also correlated with high levels of tax deductible R&D expenditures, along wit</p><p>　　Source: Mara Faccio and Ronald W.

43、Masulis, 2005 “The choice of payment in European mergers & acqusitions”.The Journal of Finance, Volume 60 Issue 3, pp. 1345-1388.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　并購支付方式在歐洲的選擇</p&

44、gt;<p>　　在過去的十年，全球并購活動已顯著增長,同時(shí)帶來組織的重大改變和在世界各地的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動的控制。然而,有很多的并購的過程,我們并不完全理解,包括支付方式的選擇。鑒于許多公司并購交易規(guī)模大,融資決策可能對收購股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿率產(chǎn)生重大的影響,以及之后的融資決策。融資決策也會有嚴(yán)重的公司控制，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)能力，稅務(wù)和現(xiàn)金流以及影響買賣公司和股東。</p><p>　　在作出并購貨幣決策時(shí),收購

45、方面臨一個(gè)選擇,是用現(xiàn)金還是股票交易的考慮。鑒于大多數(shù)收購方有有限的資金和流動資產(chǎn)，現(xiàn)金一般需要提供債務(wù)融資。因此,收購方暗中地面臨著舉債或發(fā)行股票融資的選擇,它包含了發(fā)行權(quán)益之間以及越來越多地發(fā)行債務(wù)的企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)困境成本控制問題的權(quán)衡。因此,收購方的并購貨幣決定,可以強(qiáng)烈地影響其債務(wù)能力和現(xiàn)有的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿的作用。它也可以強(qiáng)烈地影響管理層的愿望，以維持現(xiàn)有的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。與此相反,賣方可能面對股票之間的稅收優(yōu)惠和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最小化的流動性和現(xiàn)金代價(jià)

46、利益的權(quán)衡。例如,賣方可能愿意接受股票，如果他們在一個(gè)目標(biāo)股價(jià)低稅率基礎(chǔ)上,能推遲他們的稅務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)通過接受收購方的股票作為支付手段。另一方面,賣家可能更偏愛于現(xiàn)金考慮，以避開成為一個(gè)小股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在集中所有人的收購方，從而避免了相關(guān)的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。不幸的是,由于數(shù)據(jù)的限制,賣方權(quán)益不容易衡量。</p><p>　　在現(xiàn)行資本結(jié)構(gòu)的理論下,償債能力是有形資產(chǎn)、收益增長和資產(chǎn)多樣化的積極作用和資產(chǎn)的波動性的負(fù)面作用

47、。公司擁有更大的有形資產(chǎn)可以從銀行或公開的債券市場私底下里借到更多。由于大公司一般來說更多元化,我們期望在給定的杠桿率的基礎(chǔ)上它們會有一個(gè)較低的破產(chǎn)概率,還有更大的負(fù)債能力。這些融資約束和破產(chǎn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素也可以減少借款人愿意資助一個(gè)收購方的現(xiàn)金收購,尤其是在相對較大的交易中。</p><p>　　在評估并購支付方式的潛在因素時(shí),我們的重點(diǎn)是收購方的并購融資選擇,認(rèn)識到目標(biāo)也能影響到一個(gè)并購交易的最終條款。然而,如果

48、一個(gè)目標(biāo)的融資是不能被收購方接受的,那么所提出的并購交易可能會被中止,否則該收購方能夠用自己的方式進(jìn)行敵意收購。為了達(dá)成交易的成功,該收購方必須對該次交易的資本結(jié)構(gòu)滿意。</p><p>　　收購方和目標(biāo)要考慮的問題:</p><p><b>　　*公司的控制權(quán)</b></p><p>　　被大股東所控制的收購方不情愿使用股票融資，這將導(dǎo)致持有

49、控股權(quán)的股東有失去控制的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。假設(shè)控制是有價(jià)值的,那么具有支配權(quán)的股東將更頻繁地使用現(xiàn)金,尤其是當(dāng)控股股東的位置已經(jīng)受到威脅的時(shí)候。為了達(dá)到這個(gè)結(jié)果,我們使用最終投票的股份，股份由最大的控股股東持有。</p><p>　　有廣泛或高度集中所有權(quán)的收購方是不太可能對公司控制問題表示關(guān)注的。按照這種觀點(diǎn),馬丁(1996)評述了只能通過一系列的中間所有權(quán)之間的股權(quán)融資和管理所有權(quán)之間可能的顯著地負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。因此,我們提

50、供可能的非線性關(guān)系的支付方式和收購方的控股股東的投票權(quán)，通過線性和立體來預(yù)測該收購方的最大股東的最終投票控制百分比。在我們的穩(wěn)定分析中,我們也估計(jì)了這個(gè)變量樣條函數(shù)。</p><p>　　公司控制權(quán)的并購活動可能會以更加微妙的方式顯示他們。一個(gè)目標(biāo)所有權(quán)的集中意味著股票融資收購可以創(chuàng)造一個(gè)大股東來威脅收購方的公司治理。如果賣方持有公司的一個(gè)部門,那么股權(quán)集中度往往是非常集中的。這意味著并購融資與股票收購可以創(chuàng)建一

51、個(gè)新的大股東的收購方。當(dāng)目標(biāo)企業(yè)有一個(gè)集中的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)時(shí)，盡管建立一個(gè)新的收購方與大股東股權(quán)融資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高，但是當(dāng)相對規(guī)模較大時(shí)這是特別真實(shí)的。為了獲得通過股票融資來購買企業(yè)的大股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，我們使用失去控制，在目標(biāo)的控制區(qū)和交易的相關(guān)大小的產(chǎn)品。相對交易規(guī)模計(jì)算為發(fā)行規(guī)模比率（不包括承擔(dān)的負(fù)債）向收購方的權(quán)益預(yù)先提供資本，加上發(fā)行規(guī)模的總和。假設(shè)目標(biāo)的控股大股東有非上市子公司100％的所有權(quán)。</p><p>　

52、　*抵押,財(cái)務(wù)杠桿和債務(wù)能力</p><p>　　我們用有形資產(chǎn)的一部分作為衡量一個(gè)收購方支付現(xiàn)金，額外的資金借貸的主要方式。抵押品用其財(cái)產(chǎn)，廠房和設(shè)備總資產(chǎn)的賬面價(jià)值來衡量。邁爾斯(1977)指出持債者用更少的有形資產(chǎn)和更多的發(fā)展機(jī)會的方式會受到更大的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，增加負(fù)債的成本，容易導(dǎo)致股票更有吸引力。Hovakimian,Opler和Titman(2001)發(fā)現(xiàn)公司有形資產(chǎn)的比例對其債務(wù)水平有很強(qiáng)的正面影響。&

53、lt;/p><p>　　我們還用其杠桿比率控制了收購方的財(cái)務(wù)狀況。由于獲得的現(xiàn)金主要是通過發(fā)行新債，高杠桿收購方被他們的能力所限制，因此發(fā)行債券和股票融資越來越頻繁。收購方的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿被用來衡量收購方在并購宣布之前的債務(wù)的票面價(jià)值的總和，加交易的總價(jià)值(包括承擔(dān)的負(fù)債)除以并購宣布之前的總資產(chǎn)的賬面價(jià)值，加上交易價(jià)值(包括承擔(dān)的債務(wù))。如果交易是債務(wù)融資那么就抓住了收購方交易之后的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿率。這個(gè)方式不同于馬丁(199

54、6)，使用交易前收購方的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿率來調(diào)整，且報(bào)告具有無關(guān)緊要的作用。</p><p>　　收購方大小可能會影響其融資的選擇。大企業(yè)的形式更加多樣化,因此，有較低的預(yù)期破產(chǎn)成本比例。同時(shí)，他們也有較低的浮選成本，且有可能有更好的途徑進(jìn)入債務(wù)市場，使債務(wù)融資更加容易。因此，現(xiàn)金融資在大公司更可行。大公司也由于現(xiàn)金的易用性而更傾向于選擇規(guī)模較小的交易，只要有足夠的未使用的債務(wù)能力或流動資產(chǎn)。此外允許使用現(xiàn)金，收購方避免

55、重大的成本，獲得批準(zhǔn)股東權(quán)利豁免和授權(quán)先發(fā)制人,較高的調(diào)節(jié)性花費(fèi)的股票報(bào)價(jià)。我們衡量收購方由合并前的美元資產(chǎn)的賬面值記錄資產(chǎn)規(guī)模(總資產(chǎn))。除了收購方控制和融資的考慮，我們需要考慮一些其他收購方的特點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　*相對交易規(guī)模,收購方股票價(jià)格猛漲與信息的不對稱性</p><p>　　漢森(1987)預(yù)測,當(dāng)關(guān)于目標(biāo)資產(chǎn)的信息的不對稱很高時(shí)，收購方有更大的誘因去進(jìn)行股票融資。相對

56、于收購方，這個(gè)信息不對稱有可能會上升為目標(biāo)資產(chǎn)價(jià)值的上升。然而，股票在相對較大的交易中，它產(chǎn)生更嚴(yán)重的稀釋主要股東控制的位置。最后，作為收購方股權(quán)資本上漲，關(guān)注它的融資約束的降低，因?yàn)樗鼘φw財(cái)務(wù)狀況影響相對較小。我們代理與相對大小的效果，這是作為交易發(fā)行規(guī)模(不包括承擔(dān)的債務(wù))除以交易發(fā)行規(guī)模的總和，加上收購方的預(yù)報(bào)價(jià)市值在去年年底前的投標(biāo)來計(jì)算的。</p><p>　　邁爾斯(1984)和麥吉羅夫(1987)

57、都預(yù)測，在收購方高估股票市場值時(shí)會傾向于選擇股票融資支付，而在低估時(shí)將會傾向于現(xiàn)金支付。隨著對收購方的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值上升的不確定性，這種逆向選擇會加劇影響。馬丁(1996)發(fā)現(xiàn)的證據(jù)與此逆向選擇的預(yù)測是一致的。對以一個(gè)上市企業(yè)為目標(biāo)樣本，Travlos(1987)發(fā)現(xiàn)股票融資并購交易比現(xiàn)金融資交易有更大的負(fù)面公告效應(yīng)。他總結(jié)，這是與一個(gè)逆向選擇效果的實(shí)證效度是一致的。我們以一個(gè)收購方的高估(或低估)，代理收購方的購買和持有的累積市場收益率在并

58、購公告前的一個(gè)月。</p><p>　　除了收購方的考慮,我們需要考慮典型目標(biāo)的考慮。這些都與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、流動性、信息不對稱和本土偏好有關(guān)。</p><p>　　T1、未上市的目標(biāo)及附屬的目標(biāo)</p><p>　　我們使用一個(gè)指標(biāo)變量，非上市的目標(biāo)公司，在變量需要一個(gè)值時(shí)去控制上市的狀態(tài)，如果目標(biāo)公司是獨(dú)立的子公司，也不在任何證券交易所上市的和成為上市公司和子公司概率為零

59、的。當(dāng)并購交易涉及一個(gè)非上市的目標(biāo)企業(yè)時(shí)，賣方的消費(fèi)/流動性需求也可能是重要的考慮因素。這些賣方可能更傾向于現(xiàn)金流動性差的，集中了投資組合性質(zhì)的控股和即將被退休的股票經(jīng)理所控制。同樣，公司出售子公司的動機(jī)總是處于財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)關(guān)系或想要重組，發(fā)展他們的核心競爭力。在這兩種情況下，有一種強(qiáng)烈的偏愛現(xiàn)金考慮去認(rèn)識到這些財(cái)務(wù)或資產(chǎn)重組目標(biāo)。一個(gè)可能的結(jié)果是在這種交易中使用更多的現(xiàn)金，因?yàn)槭召彿浇?jīng)常主動放棄子公司，以資助新的收購或減少其債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)。如前

60、所述，這兩個(gè)目標(biāo)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)在考慮集中所有權(quán)問題時(shí)也可能引起公司控制權(quán)的關(guān)系。因此，收購方可能更喜歡現(xiàn)金融資的交易，特別是當(dāng)他們變的相對比較大的時(shí)候。</p><p>　　T2、跨行業(yè)的交易與信息的不對稱性</p><p>　　賣方不愿接受收購方用股票作為支付方式時(shí)會使信息不對稱問題惡化的發(fā)生，帶有貴于收購方公平價(jià)值和未來收益的更大的不確定性。這個(gè)問題也可能是更為嚴(yán)重的企業(yè)集團(tuán)兼并。相反，賣

61、方更傾向于接受在產(chǎn)業(yè)內(nèi)合并的持續(xù)的產(chǎn)權(quán)位置，他們熟悉產(chǎn)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和前景。</p><p>　　T3、跨境交易,本地交換上市和本土偏好</p><p>　　在跨境的交易中，向外國投資者出售股票必須承擔(dān)一些問題。我們所關(guān)心的可能是投資者可能有本土偏好的投資組合，在Coval和Moskowitz(1999), French和Poterba(1991)，Grinblatt和Keloharju(200

62、1)等等的文章中。這也可以反映了一個(gè)外國股票的更大的交易成本，較低的流動性，承受匯兌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和不及時(shí)，更多有限的途徑去獲取公司的信息。</p><p>　　T4、收購方的投資機(jī)會</p><p>　　高速增長的收購方可以使一個(gè)股東出售有吸引力的股權(quán)投資。MKTTO-BOOK，定義為市價(jià)加上債券賬面價(jià)值超過股權(quán)賬面價(jià)值的總和，加上投標(biāo)前的債券賬面價(jià)值，測量一個(gè)收購方的投資增長的機(jī)會。出于并購的考

63、慮，我們期望有更高的市價(jià)與賬面值的比率來增大收購方股票的吸引力。高的市價(jià)與賬面值的比率也與申請扣減稅項(xiàng)研發(fā)支出的高水平有關(guān)，隨著當(dāng)前的低收益和現(xiàn)金股息。這些公司屬性降低了收購方的額外的債務(wù)稅盾的需求，使現(xiàn)金融資缺乏吸引力。這些屬性也出于稅收利益而吸引了高收入層賣方。Jung,Kim和Stulz(1996)證明了一個(gè)較高的股權(quán)融資發(fā)生率對于更高的賬面價(jià)值買家。</p><p>　　出處：Mara faccio,Ro