外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯--研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化和盈余管理以意大利上市公司為例

1、<p>　　研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化和盈余管理：以意大利上市公司為例</p><p>　　摘 要：研發(fā)費(fèi)用的資本化一直以來都是個(gè)有爭(zhēng)議的會(huì)計(jì)問題，因?yàn)橘Y本化處理極易受到盈余管理動(dòng)因的影響。以選取的意大利上市公司樣本為例，本研究探討企業(yè)研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化的決策是否會(huì)受到盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)的制約。因?yàn)橐獯罄麜?huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則允許將研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化，所以意大利公司的案例提供了根本性的研究方向，使我們可以利用回歸模型來驗(yàn)證所提出的合理假設(shè)。研

2、究表明，企業(yè)確實(shí)傾向于通過費(fèi)用資本化來達(dá)到利益最大化的目的，但以資本化降低違反債務(wù)契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的假設(shè)是不成立的。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：盈余管理，費(fèi)用資本化，研發(fā)會(huì)計(jì)，平穩(wěn)收入，債務(wù)契約，意大利公司</p><p><b>　　1 簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p>　　在當(dāng)前全球化的時(shí)代，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)面臨的一個(gè)重要問題是學(xué)者和從業(yè)人員能否對(duì)研發(fā)費(fèi)用做

3、出適當(dāng)?shù)臅?huì)計(jì)處理。在國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（IASB，2004）第38號(hào)“無形資產(chǎn)”中，討論了研發(fā)費(fèi)用的會(huì)計(jì)處理方法。在第54章標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中規(guī)定，沒有經(jīng)過調(diào)查的無形資產(chǎn)研究費(fèi)用是不能被確認(rèn)為資產(chǎn)的，這類研發(fā)支出應(yīng)在其發(fā)生時(shí)確認(rèn)為費(fèi)用。至于企業(yè)開發(fā)階段的費(fèi)用，在國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第38號(hào)第57段指出，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)企業(yè)可證明以下所有各項(xiàng)時(shí)，開發(fā)活動(dòng)（或內(nèi)部項(xiàng)目開發(fā)階段）產(chǎn)生的無形資產(chǎn)才可予確認(rèn)：（1）無形資產(chǎn)的成功開發(fā)在技術(shù)上是可行的；（2）有意完成該無形資產(chǎn)并使用

4、或銷售它；（3）有能力使用或銷售該無形資產(chǎn)；（4）該無形資產(chǎn)可以產(chǎn)生可能的未來收益；（5）為完成該無形資產(chǎn)的開發(fā)，并使用或銷售該無形資產(chǎn)，有足夠的技術(shù)、資金和其他資源的支持；（6）對(duì)歸集于該無形資產(chǎn)開發(fā)階段的支出，能夠可靠的計(jì)量。雖然國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第38條允許公司將開發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化，但由于研發(fā)過程中所固有的主觀性，管理者有權(quán)決定是否滿足國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第38條的條件。從本質(zhì)上講，國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第38條賦予管理者在開發(fā)費(fèi)用方面有相當(dāng)大的靈活性。&l

5、t;/p><p>　　美國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則對(duì)這一問題有嚴(yán)格的規(guī)定，在財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（FASB，1974）第2號(hào)“研發(fā)費(fèi)用”中要求所有的研發(fā)費(fèi)用在當(dāng)期列為支出。唯一例外的是，會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（FASB，1985）在第86號(hào)規(guī)定，涉及軟件開發(fā)的費(fèi)用可以資本化。在國(guó)際上，某些國(guó)家的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（例如意大利的）規(guī)定，當(dāng)一些條件得到滿足的時(shí)候允許靈活使用研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化。這些都是與國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則所要求相似的文件。</p><p>

6、;　　研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化一直是個(gè)有爭(zhēng)議的會(huì)計(jì)問題。資本化支持者的報(bào)告結(jié)果表明，研發(fā)是一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)期資產(chǎn)未來盈利能力的重要影響因素（例如，Bublitz和Ettredge，1989；Sougiannias，1994；Ballester等，2003）；此外，研發(fā)費(fèi)用金額與企業(yè)市場(chǎng)價(jià)值之間是正相關(guān)的（Hirschey和Weyanandt，1985；Shevlin，1991；Sougiannis，1994）。</p><p>　　

7、而費(fèi)用化的支持者相對(duì)較少。他們強(qiáng)調(diào)研發(fā)活動(dòng)對(duì)未來經(jīng)濟(jì)利益做出貢獻(xiàn)缺乏可靠的證據(jù)（例如，F(xiàn)ASB，1974；AIMR，1993；Kothari等，2002）；或者指出相較于資本化，費(fèi)用化對(duì)信息一致性和可比性的好處。另外，最保守的費(fèi)用化處理支持者強(qiáng)調(diào)了財(cái)務(wù)信息可靠性和盈余管理政策的要求，特別是費(fèi)用化提高了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的客觀性，消除了因管理人員進(jìn)行費(fèi)用資本化處理而產(chǎn)生的研發(fā)資產(chǎn)減值的可能性（Nelson等，2003；Schilit，2002）。&

8、lt;/p><p>　　參考其他文獻(xiàn)也可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，爭(zhēng)議圍繞何為最有效的研發(fā)費(fèi)用會(huì)計(jì)處理方法，研究則主要權(quán)衡會(huì)計(jì)信息之間在相關(guān)性（即預(yù)測(cè)能力）和可靠性（即真實(shí)性）上的關(guān)系（FASB，1980；AICPA，1994；IASB，2004）。到目前為止，研發(fā)費(fèi)用的實(shí)證研究主要集中在相關(guān)性的權(quán)衡，而甚少提及可靠性方面，這可能使研發(fā)費(fèi)用受到盈余管理的限制。此外，一些研究也表明，研發(fā)支出確實(shí)受到盈余管理的限制，即企業(yè)為了實(shí)現(xiàn)其盈利目

9、標(biāo)而降低他們的研發(fā)投資金額（例如，Perry和Grinaker，1994；Bushee，1998；Mande等，2000）。而且，缺乏關(guān)于允許研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化靈活使用的會(huì)計(jì)處理的研究。測(cè)試企業(yè)是否通過研發(fā)費(fèi)用會(huì)計(jì)處理從事盈余管理，可以顯著促進(jìn)全世界對(duì)這種費(fèi)用的最佳處理方法的辯論。近來提出的這種辯論，在美國(guó)財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則、國(guó)際財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告準(zhǔn)則中逐漸顯現(xiàn)。這說明，操縱盈余作為研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化的動(dòng)機(jī)，將使目前美國(guó)公認(rèn)的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則堅(jiān)持拒絕這類

10、費(fèi)用資本化的立場(chǎng)。相反，也顯示出企業(yè)不使用研發(fā)費(fèi)用的會(huì)計(jì)處理方法進(jìn)行盈余管理，將支持現(xiàn)在的國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則、國(guó)際財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告準(zhǔn)則的規(guī)定，使資本化在一定條件下是允許的。</p><p>　　這項(xiàng)研究有助于為這一論點(diǎn)提供關(guān)于費(fèi)用資本化動(dòng)機(jī)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。我們推測(cè)，政府決定利用研發(fā)支出有兩個(gè)主要?jiǎng)右颍浩椒€(wěn)收入和債務(wù)契約。我們測(cè)試的假設(shè)使用的是在米蘭證券交易所上市公司的抽樣調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)。多種結(jié)果表明：該公司利用把研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化來平穩(wěn)收入

11、，雖然目前還不支持債務(wù)契約假說。這些結(jié)果全面體現(xiàn)了企業(yè)內(nèi)部的各種特征，如企業(yè)規(guī)模，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，增長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)，盈利能力，管理特點(diǎn)，產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)和時(shí)間控制。</p><p>　　文章編排如下。第二部分介紹了意大利的會(huì)計(jì)與研發(fā)核算制度背景。第三部分討論以前的文獻(xiàn)。第四部分提出了假說，然后第五部分是研究方法。第六部分提出結(jié)果，第七部分對(duì)研究進(jìn)行了總結(jié)。</p><p>　　2 意大利的研發(fā)費(fèi)用會(huì)計(jì)處理制度<

12、;/p><p>　　意大利會(huì)計(jì)制度一直允許企業(yè)靈活運(yùn)用研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化，這與國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則類似。無形資產(chǎn)的會(huì)計(jì)處理由會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第24號(hào)規(guī)定，將研發(fā)費(fèi)用區(qū)分為如下三種不同類型：</p><p>　　1）“基礎(chǔ)研究”，其中包括研究，調(diào)查和試驗(yàn)，不涉及具體項(xiàng)目。這種類型的研發(fā)費(fèi)用通常是一個(gè)公司的一般效用探索（例如，市場(chǎng)研究，服務(wù)更新等）；</p><p>　　2）“應(yīng)用研究”，其中

13、包括研究，調(diào)查和實(shí)驗(yàn)，是指具體項(xiàng)目；</p><p>　　3）“發(fā)展”，其中包括將研究成果應(yīng)用到特定的材料、工具、產(chǎn)品和生產(chǎn)工藝上。基礎(chǔ)研究費(fèi)用應(yīng)在損益表中扣除。然而，如果滿足以下條件，有關(guān)研發(fā)費(fèi)用可以資本化：（a）費(fèi)用明確為產(chǎn)品或工藝的實(shí)現(xiàn)所耗費(fèi)的；（b）費(fèi)用是可以識(shí)別和衡量的；（c）該項(xiàng)目的費(fèi)用是應(yīng)用在技術(shù)上的；（d）公司擁有必要的資源來完成和利用該項(xiàng)目；（e）通過開發(fā)該項(xiàng)目產(chǎn)生的收益，可以補(bǔ)償費(fèi)用的損耗。&

14、lt;/p><p>　　很明顯，由意大利會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則規(guī)定的開發(fā)成本條件與國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的規(guī)定類似。事實(shí)上，意大利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)下“應(yīng)用研究”中的定義，也符合國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第38條提供的開發(fā)費(fèi)用的定義。意大利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不同于國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則之處在于，當(dāng)發(fā)生上述情況時(shí)，公司也可以不使用靈活性來進(jìn)行研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化。但是，這種差異相當(dāng)正常。從對(duì)一些條件評(píng)估的主觀性來看，即使在國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則下，當(dāng)上述條件得到滿足時(shí)，公司偏好費(fèi)用化的這種做法也是很明顯的。&

15、lt;/p><p>　　有關(guān)研發(fā)費(fèi)用分?jǐn)偅獯罄臅?huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則要求進(jìn)行攤銷的時(shí)間為從開始使用最長(zhǎng)不超過五年。意大利法典（第2426條）中collegio sindacale（審計(jì)條例）提出研發(fā)費(fèi)用的資本化應(yīng)被審核而且它不能用于支付股息，直到有足夠的盈利來掩蓋研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化的賬面價(jià)值。這一規(guī)定限制了利用研發(fā)費(fèi)用增加所支付股息的目的。民商法也要求在“企業(yè)管理討論和分析”部分對(duì)研發(fā)活動(dòng)進(jìn)行討論。最后，民商法規(guī)定，研發(fā)費(fèi)用的攤銷

16、時(shí)間表等方面的信息應(yīng)在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表附注中提供。</p><p>　　3 盈余管理與具體的預(yù)提費(fèi)用</p><p>　　盈余管理的定義是“對(duì)外部財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告過程有目的的干預(yù)，以獲得某種私利的意圖”（Schipper，1989，第92頁）。在普遍接受的條款中，盈余管理出現(xiàn)在“當(dāng)管理人員在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中使用判斷和修改交易結(jié)構(gòu)來改變財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，向某些利益相關(guān)者描述虛假的公司經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，或依靠會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表中的數(shù)字來影響

17、合同的結(jié)果”（Healy，Wahlen，1999，第368頁）。</p><p>　　迄今為止大量的研究已經(jīng)表明，管理人員行使酌情權(quán)并且通過各種方式進(jìn)行盈余管理，從而在權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制下進(jìn)行特別交易（即所謂真實(shí)的盈余管理）。進(jìn)行盈余管理的主要誘因包括一些債務(wù)契約、獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃和平穩(wěn)收入。債務(wù)契約假說認(rèn)為，管理層進(jìn)行盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)是為了避免違反債務(wù)合同的約定，這是在會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字或比例方面很典型的說法。獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃假說認(rèn)為，管理層進(jìn)行

18、盈余管理是為了最大限度的獲取收益。Healy（1985）認(rèn)為，如果管理層的收入高于或低于獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃的范圍，他們往往會(huì)降低企業(yè)收益。相反，當(dāng)他們的收入在兩者之間，談們往往會(huì)增加企業(yè)收入。最后，收入平滑假說認(rèn)為，企業(yè)追求利潤(rùn)以減少盈余波動(dòng)。</p><p>　　盈余管理實(shí)證研究的發(fā)現(xiàn)支持了在各種環(huán)境中的上述動(dòng)機(jī)。許多研究驗(yàn)證了預(yù)提費(fèi)用與盈余管理激勵(lì)機(jī)制之間的關(guān)系。（例如，Healy，1985；DeAngelo，1986

19、；Jones，1991；Dechow等，1995）。作為替代方法，其他的研究集中于單一的項(xiàng)目，這表明具體的預(yù)提費(fèi)用與系統(tǒng)的盈余管理激勵(lì)機(jī)制有關(guān)。對(duì)后者的研究，McNichols和Wilson（1998）認(rèn)為公司管理其壞賬準(zhǔn)備是根據(jù)獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃假說的。Zucca和Campbell（1992）通過審查可供出售的資產(chǎn)減值現(xiàn)象，表明企業(yè)使用這些預(yù)提費(fèi)用是為了加強(qiáng)戰(zhàn)略或盈余平穩(wěn)。Francis，Hanna和Vincent（1996）認(rèn)為盈余管理激勵(lì)機(jī)

20、制在解釋商譽(yù)注銷和重組費(fèi)用中發(fā)揮重要作用。其他的研究集中在遞延稅款津貼（例如，Miller和Skinner，1998；Vincent和Wong，2003），它們提供了各自不同的結(jié)果。最后，Dowdell和Press（2004）分析了研發(fā)支出減值的過程，但他們沒有找到證據(jù)支持他們的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)計(jì)劃假設(shè)。</p><p>　　關(guān)于盈余管理和具體的預(yù)提費(fèi)用的結(jié)論，與上述研究是一致的。這項(xiàng)研究的目的，是測(cè)試當(dāng)存在靈活性時(shí)，研發(fā)費(fèi)

21、用資本化還是費(fèi)用化是否受盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)的影響。</p><p><b>　　4 理論假設(shè)</b></p><p>　　以下研究探討的是盈余管理的三種主要誘因：盈余平穩(wěn)、債務(wù)契約和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)計(jì)劃。在這項(xiàng)研究中，我們側(cè)重于前兩個(gè)，因?yàn)樵谝獯罄粳F(xiàn)存數(shù)據(jù)中，有關(guān)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)計(jì)劃的信息披露是有限的。</p><p>　　平穩(wěn)收入假說認(rèn)為，管理人員的會(huì)計(jì)自由裁量權(quán)，是

22、由他們的欲望驅(qū)使減少收入來源導(dǎo)致的（Fudenberg and Tirole，1995）。平穩(wěn)收入的過程是把中期到期末之間的收入波動(dòng)從高峰轉(zhuǎn)入到不太成功的時(shí)期，降低了高峰期收益，使收益波動(dòng)較?。–opeland，1968）。</p><p>　　平穩(wěn)收入一直被看作是一個(gè)積極的策略，它促使管理者向投資者傳遞內(nèi)部信息（例如，Gordon，1964；Beidleman，1973；Romen和Sadan，1981；Tuc

23、ker和Zarowin，2006）并通過投機(jī)目的來推動(dòng)實(shí)踐操作（Gordon，1964；Imhoff，1977；Kamin和Ronen，1978）。在這項(xiàng)研究中，我們不打算對(duì)這兩種觀點(diǎn)中的任何一種進(jìn)行討論。因?yàn)椋覀儨y(cè)試的目的是研究研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化是否用于平穩(wěn)收入。</p><p>　　Capitalization of R&D Costs and Earnings Management：Evidence

24、from Italian Listed Companies</p><p>　　ABSTRACT: The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motiv

25、ated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this study examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings-management motivations.

26、Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalizati</p><p>　　KEY WORDS: Earnings management, Cost capitalization, R&D accounting,

27、Earnings smoothing, Debt covenants, Italian companies</p><p>　　1 Introduction</p><p>　　In the current era of globalization, a highly relevant issue facing regulators, academics, and practitioner

28、s is the determination of an appropriate accounting treatment for research and development (R&D) costs. International Accounting Standards discuss accounting for R&D costs in IAS No. 38 “Intangible Assets” (IASB,

29、 2004; IASB, 2004). Paragraph 54 of this standard states that no intangible asset arising from research (or from the research phase of an internal project) shall be recognized as an</p><p>　　US GAAP tak

30、es a stricter approach to the issue. SFAS No. 2—Accounting for Research and Development Costs (FASB, 1974)—requires that all R&D expenditures be expensed in the current period. The only exception to the full expensin

31、g rule is stated in SFAS No. 86. The exception relates to the capitalization of software development costs (FASB, 1985). At the international level, certain national accounting standards (e.g., those of Italy) allow flex

32、ibility for the capitalization of R&D costs when some</p><p>　　The capitalization of R&D costs has always been a controversial accounting issue. Supporters of capitalization report results suggesting

33、 that R&D is a long-lived asset that influences future profitability (e.g., Bublitz and Ettredge, 1989, January; Sougiannis, 1994, January; Ballester et al., 2003). Also, R&D costs are positively related to marke

34、t value (Hirschey and Weygandt, 1985, Spring; Shevlin, 1991, January; Sougiannis, 1994, January) and yield value-relevant information to investors (e.g.</p><p>　　Supporters of expensing are fewer. They

35、stress the lack of reliable evidence of future economic benefits (e.g., FASB, 1974; Association for Investment Management and Research, 1993; Kothari et al., 2002) or refer to the benefits of consistency and compara

36、bility, pointing out that such benefits trump the costs identified by the supporters of capitalization. Additionally, reliability and the risk of earnings-management policies are underscored by supporters of the most con

37、servative accounting trea</p><p>　　The debate surrounding the most effective accounting method for R&D costs supplements other literature that examines the trade-off between relevance (i.e., the predicti

38、ve ability) and reliability (i.e., the representative faithfulness) of accounting information (FASB, 1980; AICPA, 1994; IASB, 2004; IASB, 2004). Thus far, empirical research on R&D costs has focused mainly on the rel

39、evance side of the trade-off, while little has been written about the reliability side that is, the possibility that</p><p>　　However, a few studies have indeed shown that R&D expenditures are subject to

40、 real earnings management. In short, this means that companies cut their R&D investments in order to achieve their earnings goals (e.g., Perry and Grinaker, 1994; Bushee, 1998; Mande et al., 2000). But there is still

41、 a paucity of research that explores the motives behind the accounting treatment of R&D costs within a setting where flexibility is allowed. Testing whether companies engage in earnings management through R&</

42、p><p>　　This study contributes to this debate by providing empirical evidence on the motivations for R&D cost capitalization. We hypothesize that the decision to capitalize R&D expenditures is related t

43、o two primary motivations: income smoothing and debt contracting. We test our hypotheses using a sample of firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. Multivariate results indicate that firms use capitalization of R&D

44、costs to smooth earnings, while there is no support for the debt-covenant hypothesis. Thes</p><p>　　The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces accounting in Italy and the institutional background re

45、lating to R&D accounting. Section 3 discusses the previous literature. Section 4 presents the hypotheses and is followed by the research methods in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes th

46、e study. </p><p>　　2 R&D accounting in Italy</p><p>　　Italian accounting regulation has always allowed for some flexibility in the capitalization of R&D costs. This allowance is similar

47、to that of IAS. Accounting for intangibles, including R&D costs, is regulated by Principio Contabilen. 24 (Accounting Standard No. 24). This standard distinguishes three different types of R&D costs as follows: &

48、lt;/p><p>　　1) “Basic research,” which consists of studies, surveys, and experiments that do not refer to a specific project; this type of R&D cost is normally carried out for the general utility of a compa

49、ny (e.g., market research, updating, etc.);</p><p>　　2) “Applied research,” which consists of studies, surveys, and experiments that refer to specific projects; </p><p>　　3) “Development,” which

50、 consists of the application of research results to specific materials, tools, products, and processes preceding production.</p><p>　　The costs for basic research are to be expensed in the income statement.

51、However, costs related to applied R&D can be capitalized if the following conditions are met: a) the costs refer to a project for the realization of a clearly defined product or process; b) the costs are identifiable

52、 and measurable; c) the project to which the costs refer is technically feasible; d) the company owns the necessary resources to complete and exploit the project; and e) the costs are recoverable through the rev</p>

53、;<p>　　It is evident that the conditions stated by the Italian accounting standards are similar to those stated by IAS for development costs. In fact, the definition of applied research under Italian standards als

54、o fits into the definition of development costs provided by IAS 38. The Italian standards differ from IAS in that they do not require R&D capitalization when the abovementioned conditions occur, leaving flexibility i

55、n the hands of the companies. However, this difference is more formal than sub</p><p>　　Concerning the amortization of R&D costs, the Italian accounting standards require that the amortization be carried

56、 out over a period of no longer than five years beginning from the moment the outcome (product or process) is ready to be used. The Italian Civil Code (art. 2426) states that the capitalization of R&D costs shall be

57、authorized by the collegio sindacale (statutory auditors) and that it is not possible to pay dividends until there are enough retained earnings to cover the carrying amo</p><p>　　3 Earnings management and sp

58、ecific accruals</p><p>　　Earnings management is defined as a “purposeful intervention in the external financial-reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain” (Schipper, 1989, p. 92). In

59、generally accepted terms, earnings management occurs “when managers use judgment in financial-reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying

60、economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported a</p><p>　　The large amount of research carried out thus far indicates that managers exercise discretion and m

61、anage earnings using a wide variety of methods, ranging from carrying out special transactions (so-called real earnings management) to the manipulation of accruals. Several of the main incentives for earnings management

62、include debt covenants, bonus plans, and income smoothing. The debt-covenant hypothesis suggests that managers have an incentive to manage earnings in order to avoid violating coven</p><p>　　Empirical earnin

63、gs-management studies find support for the abovementioned motives in a variety of contexts. Many of these studies test the relationship between aggregate accruals and incentives for earnings management (e.g., Healy, 1985

64、; DeAngelo, 1986; Dechowet al., 1995). As an alternative approach, other studies focus on single items, suggesting that income from specific accruals is related in a systematic way to earnings-management incentives.

65、 Among these latter studies, McNichols and Wilson</p><p>　　In line with the aforementioned studies on earnings management and specific accruals, this study aims at testing whether the decision to capitalize

66、or to expense R&D costs (when flexibility exists) is affected by earnings-management motives.</p><p>　　4 Hypotheses development</p><p>　　Previous research investigates three main incentives

67、for earnings management: earnings smoothing, debt covenant, and bonus-plan incentives. In this study, we focus on the first two since disclosure of data on the existence and structure of bonus plans by Italian companies

68、is limited. </p><p>　　The income-smoothing hypothesis suggests that a manager's accounting discretion is driven by his or her desire to reduce income-stream variability (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). The

69、process of smoothing serves to moderate year-to-year fluctuations in income by shifting earnings from peak years to less successful periods. This process lowers the peaks and makes earnings fluctuations less volatile (Co

70、peland, 1968).</p><p>　　Income smoothing has been viewed both as a positive strategy, whereby managers transmit private information to investors (e.g., Gordon, 1964, April; Beidleman, 1973; Ronen and Sadan,

71、1981; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006), and as a manipulative practice driven by opportunistic aims ( Gordon, 1964, April; Imhoff, 1977, Spring ;Kamin and Ronen, 1978). In this study, we do not intend to argue for either o