外文翻譯----個人代理人，企業(yè)和房地產經紀過程

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)設計（論文）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　Individual Agents, Firms, and the Real Estate Brokerage Process</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　This study examines ho

2、w individual agents affect house selling prices and time on the market while controlling for brokerage firm-specific effects as well as supply and demand conditions that vary by neighborhood. The existing theoretical and

3、 empirical research on real estate brokerage tends to blur the distinction between the firm and individual agents within firms. As a consequence, the empirical literature studying the housing market-broker nexus deals pr

4、imarily with identifying firm level ef</p><p>　　This study examines the effects of agents’ unique skills and revealed strategies in the market as reflected in various degrees of agent specialization by funct

5、ion (e.g.,listing, selling, and partnering) or by geographic area. This paper extends the model developed in Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) to study individual agent effects on transaction outcomes. The framework controls f

6、or localized demand and supply conditions surrounding the house being sold, which allows us to separate the effects of lo</p><p>　　Using transaction data covering a 2-year period in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, w

7、e find that firm size effects on selling price disappear once firm specialization and agent characteristics are taken into account. Geographic concentration by firms leads to higher selling prices. Houses listed and sold

8、 by different agents in the same firm sell for less. For individual agents, neither sex nor selling own listings affects price or selling time, but there are significant gains from partnering transactions</p><

9、p>　　The paper is organized as follows. “Agents and the Sales Process” discusses existing empirical evidence as it relates to agents’ roles in the sales process, emphasizing that different agents may have comparative a

10、dvantages in different phases of the transaction sequence and may therefore find it beneficial to specialize their functions to some degree. “The Empirical Model” explains the empirical model, the variables and their int

11、erpretation for firm and agent effects. “Empirical Analysis” descri</p><p>　　Agents and the Sales Process</p><p>　　We can conceptually partition the transaction process into the listing, search

12、and matching, negotiation, and closing phases. Doing so emphasizes that individual agents may have incentives to invest more heavily in certain skills that apply most readily to a subset of phases in the transaction sequ

13、ence, a strategy adopted by a significant number of agents.</p><p>　　The theoretical models that address listing activities typically depict this phase as a matching process, where agents expend effort compe

14、ting with each other to obtainlistings from the pool of potential sellers (Williams 1998; Yinger 1981). Williams (1998) depicts agent effort spent in this type of matching as unproductive competition among homogeneous ag

15、ents. He also notes, however, that agent effort expended to obtain listings may increase market efficiency when agents and sellers are heterog</p><p>　　The theoretical and empirical literatures tend to focus

16、 on the search phase of the transaction process in which sellers are matched with buyers (Williams 1998; Wu and Colwell 1986; Yavas 1992, 1996; Yinger 1981). A popular perspective of agent activity in the academic litera

17、ture envisions a house seller whose agent matches the seller with a buyer from the population of potential buyers for a house, typically by influencing the seller’s asking price (Salant 1991). At the same time, we can al

18、so vi</p><p>　　The negotiation phase of the transaction process is where some of the more subtle aspects of the agent’s efforts in cultivating the seller in the listing phase can affect the outcome. The agen

19、t can influence the seller’s perspective on the likelihood of finding a better offer at this stage. The level of trust established by the listing agent through the entire process to this point can help overcome incipient

20、 seller’s remorse or falling into unrealistic valuations of specific house features to w</p><p>　　There is some recent empirical evidence that individuals’ negotiation skills appear to matter for both sides

21、of the transaction (Harding et al. 2003). And there is evidence that the overall difficulty of the negotiation process can affect prices (Sirmans et al. 1992). While these studies do not examine the role of agents, they

22、imply that agents who can reinforce the bargaining power of their party or generally smooth the negotiation process will likely affect selling prices.</p><p>　　Many real estate scholars view the closing phas

23、e almost as an afterthought. Most transactions that reach the point of an accepted sales contract close without major mishap. Nonetheless, real estate agents have a role and incentive help their seller (or buyer, in the

24、case of buyer’s agents) complete the transaction, whether by coordinating tasks required to fulfill the sales contract or helping to resolve sales contract performance issues. All of these types of inputs by agents lower

25、 sellers’ and</p><p>　　In summary, we argue that agents have more channels through which to influence transaction outcomes than just through their skill in matching willing sellers with willing buyers. Indiv

26、idual agents can vary how they split time among a range of activities and that some may have comparative advantages and therefore specialize more heavily in certain aspects of the transaction process. This observation mo

27、tivates our effort to measure how market outcomes are affected by individual agents’ decisions t</p><p>　　Turning to the roles of firms versus individual agents, the real estate agency relationship is an int

28、erlacing set of principal-agent relationships: between the seller and agent, of course, but also between the brokerage firm and its associated agents as well as between buyers and their agents. This suggests that we need

29、 to include variables in the empirical model to capture both firm level and individual agent level effects on observed transactions. We do so in this study, estimating a series of</p><p>　　Despite the import

30、ance of the topic, published real estate research does not offer much solid evidence about how individual real estate agents affect property markets. Much work has been done on real estate brokerage in general, both theo

31、retical and empirical. The theoretical models, however, often assume no distinction between a firm and its individual agents. Indeed, the terms “firm” and “agent” are sometimes used interchangeably (Turnbull 1996; Yang a

32、nd Yavas 1995). And while there is a growi</p><p>　　The empirical literature that does examine observable performance in terms of price or selling time tends to focus on firms. Sirmans et al. (1991), Turnbul

33、l and Sirmans (1993) find some firm size and co-brokered sales effects on the sales price and marketing time. Jud and Winkler (1994) find higher prices for co-brokered houses. Hughes (1995) finds that houses listed with

34、larger brokerage firms tend to sell for higher prices. It is not clear whether the empirical estimates of firm size effects i</p><p>　　The branch of literature looking at how individual agents affect transac

35、tions outcomes yields few strong empirical conclusions. Yang and Yavas (1995), Zumpano et al. (1996), Jud and Winkler (1994), Jud et al. (1996), and Munneke and Yavas (2001) generally find that the characteristics of ind

36、ividual agents have insignificant effects on selling prices or time on the market. Black and Nourse (1995) similarly find no significant price effect from introducing buyers’ brokers into the residential prop</p>

37、<p>　　It is appropriate at this point to raise a caveat with respect to empirical studies of firm and agent behavior and common inferences about economic efficiency. One common notion is that the primary benefit to

38、using brokers or agents in any market can be measured by the higher return or quicker selling time that sellers obtain. This is not true in general. Observed price effects do not generally reflect the net advantage of br

39、oker-assisted sales in the market because professional agent assistance</p><p>　　The Empirical Model</p><p>　　Sirmans et al. (1991) develop an empirical multi-equation model of the joint housing

40、 and brokerage services markets. Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) modify the framework into a simultaneous model of sales price and marketing time that specifically controls for the effects of competition among nearby houses

41、for sale. We extend the framework to measure separate firm and agent effects on selling price and marketing time.</p><p>　　Source: Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Jonathan Dombrow. 2007. J Real Estate Finan Econ. Spri

42、nger Science, 35:57–76譯文：</p><p>　　個人代理人，企業(yè)和房地產經紀過程</p><p><b>　　簡介：</b></p><p>　　本文探討的是價格和時間如何影響房屋銷售市場上的個人代理問題，而經紀公司所產生的供應和需求狀況的影響，通過相互變化得以控制。現(xiàn)有的理論與實證研究說明房地產經紀模糊了企業(yè)內部的公司

43、經紀和個人代理人的區(qū)別。因此，實證文獻研究的是住房市場和經紀人之間的關系對企業(yè)在房地產方面交易水平的影響，實驗證據還表明個人代理人對銷售特點和戰(zhàn)略眼光的影響。</p><p>　　本文考察了代理的獨特技能的影響，專業(yè)化代理已經不同程度的體現(xiàn)在市場策略（例如，上市，銷售，合作）或地理區(qū)域上。本文擴展了特恩布爾和度布朗（2006）的研究成果：個人代理人的交易效果模型。該框架控制器運用需求和供給條件分析正在出售的房子，

44、這使我們明白專業(yè)化代理人的市場條件對銷售價格的影響。此外，這種銷售價格和銷售時間為一體的搜索/匹配過程，使我們能夠弄清楚公司經紀和個人代理人對房屋銷售價格和銷售時間的的獨立影響。</p><p>　　使用巴吞魯日，路易斯安那州2年的交易數(shù)據，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在企業(yè)規(guī)模效應一度消失和考慮代理公司專業(yè)化特點的情況下，地理集中的企業(yè)的銷售價格相對比較高。同一公司的不同的代理商對于上市出售的房屋的賣多賣少與個人代理人的性別或出

45、售自己的物品價格或銷售時間有關。有些個人代理人專門為他們的銷售商抬高出售價格，而有些卻專門為買家壓低價格。最后，較大規(guī)模的上市和銷售代理活動往往會降低銷售價格或延長上市時間。</p><p>　　本文的結構如下：“代理及銷售流程”討論現(xiàn)有的實證證據，因為它涉及到代理商在銷售過程中的所扮演的角色，強調不同的藥物也許在不同階段的交易過程中有不同的優(yōu)勢，因此可能有利于發(fā)現(xiàn)一些專門的職能度。“經驗模型”解釋了實證模型，解

46、釋公司和代理意義?！皩嵶C分析”描述實證，并討論了實證結果。最后一節(jié)對全文進行總結。</p><p><b>　　代理及銷售流程：</b></p><p>　　我們可以從概念上將交易過程分割成上市，搜索，匹配，談判，結束這幾個階段。這樣做強調，個別代理商可能有動力投資于那些最容易申請到的一個交易。</p><p>　　在交易過程中的談判階段，代理

47、人在上市階段培養(yǎng)賣方的一些細微方面的努力都能影響銷售結果。代理人能影響賣方對在該階段尋求一個更好的工作機會的可能性的觀點。對于這一點，上市階段通過整個進程建立的信任程度能幫助克服初期賣方的自責以及防止掉入賣方一直賦予特定功能的房子的不切實際的估價。當然，我們期望代理人以一種能促成自身利益的方式將信息傳遞給賣方。買方與他們代理人之間的關系容易發(fā)生類似的委托代理問題。</p><p>　　最近有一些經驗證據表明，個人

48、的談判技巧似乎影響著交易雙方談判進程的總體難度。也有證據表明談判進程的總體難度會影響價格。雖然這些研究沒有審查代理人的角色，但是他們申明那些能強化他們組織的議價能力或能使談判進程大體上順利的代理人將可能影響賣出的價格。</p><p>　　許多房地產學者將結束階段幾乎當作一個事后來看待。大部分符合公認交易合同要求的交易的促成都沒有重大意外的發(fā)生。盡管如此，房地產經紀人的一個功能是幫助他們的賣方（或是買方，在買房代

49、理人的情況下）完成交易，無論是通過協(xié)調任務來完成銷售合同或是幫助解決合同績效問題。所有這些類型的投入全部包含在代理商賣方和買方的總交易成本之中，從而可能影響價格及流動性。</p><p>　　總之，我們認為代理人可以通過很多方式去影響交易結果而不僅僅通過他們的技能使買賣方相互配合來影響交易結果。個體代理人可以改變他們在一系列活動中時間的分配，有些可能具有比較優(yōu)勢和專長，因此在交易進程的某些方面表現(xiàn)的更為強烈。這個

50、觀察促使我們努力去衡量當個體代理人決定從事上市或以銷售為導向的活動或是集中他們在市場信息方面的投資將重點放在特定地區(qū)或市場，市場結果是如何被影響的。</p><p>　　談到個人代理公司的角色，真正的地產代理關系是委托代理關系不僅在賣方和代理人之間的隔行掃描設置，當然，還有經紀公司和相關人員，以及買賣雙方之間的代理人。這表明，我們需要收錄在實證模型中的變量去獲取企業(yè)層面和個體代理人水平上觀察到的交易影響。在這項研

51、究中我們確實這樣做了，同時也估算了一系列機構的影響，包括公司的影響以及公司和個體代理人的影響。</p><p>　　撇開該專題的重要性，已發(fā)表的房地產研究并沒有提供更多關于個別房地產代理如何影響房地產市場的確鑿證據。一般地，房地產經紀業(yè)務無論是理論還是實證方面已經做了許多工作。然而，該理論模型往往主張公司和它的個體代理人之間的無差異。事實上，術語“公司”和“代理人”有時是可以互換使用的。雖然有越來越多的實證文獻關

52、注著個別地產代理公司，但是其中大部分集中于代理收入而不是他們在市場上的角色及功能。</p><p>　　根據實證研究表明，在價格、銷售時間上觀察的表現(xiàn)往往側重于公司。包括錫爾曼斯等（1991年），特恩布爾和錫爾曼斯（1993）發(fā)現(xiàn)一些企業(yè)規(guī)模和合作對促成的銷售價格和市場銷售時間的影響。士和溫克勒（1994）找到共同促成的住宅價格較高。休斯（1995年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，較大的房屋經紀公司往往賣更高的價格。目前還不清楚在這些所

53、研究公司的規(guī)模效應的實證能夠反映規(guī)模從成立時，是否是名稱或從更廣闊的市場存在的品牌知名度的優(yōu)勢還是企業(yè)規(guī)?；蚴袌鰻I銷相關的其他經濟體的先天優(yōu)勢。 理論分支研究出個人代理交易結果是如何產生一些影響較強的經驗性結論。楊和亞瓦斯（1995），祖帕諾（1996年），士和溫克勒（1994），喬德（1996年）和木內科和亞瓦斯（2001）發(fā)現(xiàn)，通常個別代理人的特點，在市場上出售的價格或時間有著顯著效果。黑與諾斯（1995）同樣沒有找到引入住

54、宅物業(yè)市場買家經紀人顯著的價格效應。這些研究，不涉及是否按列表不大于銷售功能專業(yè)化細分市場或改善劑的性能。審查的問題就在于此。 這一點就是提出的企業(yè)和代理行為，對經濟效率的共同推論實證研究具有適當?shù)母嬲]作用。這是一個常見的概念主要好處在于使</p><p><b>　　經驗模型</b></p><p>　　錫爾曼斯等人 （1991年）制定了一個聯(lián)合住房和經紀服