外文翻譯--促進(jìn)新企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)的早期資本天使投資在歐洲創(chuàng)業(yè)中的作用（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　2000單詞，1.1萬(wàn)英文字符,3580漢字</p><p>　　出處：Dagnino G B, Faraci R, Sorrentino M. Mobilizing Capital for Fostering the Early Growth of Firms: The Role of Business Angels in Nascent European Entrepreneurship

2、[M]//New Frontiers in Entrepreneurship. Springer New York, 2009: 109-124.</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Mobilizing Capital for Fostering the Early Growth of Firms: The Role of Busines

3、s Angels in Nascent European Entrepreneurship</p><p>　　Dagnino G B, Faraci R, Sorrentino M</p><p>　　Despite the important role recognized to outside equity in financing and fostering innovative

4、entrepreneurial firms (i.e., entrepreneurial start-ups), relatively little is known about the key characteristics of the different fund-providers involved either in a temporal perspective (diverse stage of the early fir

5、m’s life) or in an industry perspective(specialized equity investors).While business angels and venture capitalists are relatively common and welcome companions of entrepreneurs, various</p><p>　　The essence

6、 of entrepreneurship is recognizing, seizing and exploiting new and nascent opportunities (Zahra et al. 2006). In order to recognize, seize and exploit opportunities, we point to the fundamental of entrepreneurial capabi

7、lities intended as capabilities for growth and of wealth creation for the firm and thereby for the broad institutional environment.</p><p>　　Based on ideas presented by Venkataraman (1997), Shane (2003) defi

8、nes entrepreneurship as “an activity that involves the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and services, ways of organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials through organi

9、zing efforts that previously had not existed”. As a central premise of his reflection, he contends that “entrepreneurship can be explained by considering the nexus of enterprising individuals and valuable opportuni</p

10、><p>　　Flanking the various long-established external investors for new entrepreneurial ventures, business angels are reported in various countries as an effective source of seed and start up equity capital. Bu

11、siness angels are informal, non-institutional investors making up the informal venture capital market. By means of direct search processes, business angels invest their own financial resources by acquiring equity in high

12、-potential new and young non listed companies in which there is no family con</p><p>　　Informal venture capital market plays a major role in seeding new entrepreneurial ventures in both USA and Europe. Recen

13、t panel data suggest that in the US, angel investments raised approximately US$ 26 billion per year involving 57,120 ventures joined by over 258,000 active business angels (CVR 2009). As Europe is concerned, current appr

14、aisal suggests that the total number of active angel investors participating in networks or acting on independent basis revolves roughly around 75,000 individu</p><p>　　Together with equity, business angels

15、 provide new companies with knowledge and valuable networking relationships, which are often able to significantly increase the success rate of new ventures. Playing a more active role than venture capitalists, the busin

16、ess angels assist the venture-backed firm, occasionally assuming the role of a veritable partner engaged in managing the business. Besides their own personal skills, business angels provide the firm’s with their network

17、of contacts as well as </p><p>　　It is noteworthy that, unlike formal venture capitalists, business angels invest their own finance. The personal derivation of financial resources that business angels use ha

18、s considerable upshot on their investment activity: since they have no obligation to guarantee externally constrained elevated thresholds of return on the capital they invested, business angels are only accountable to th

19、emselves. This state of affairs is uncovered by their greater propensity to invest in risky entrepreneuria</p><p>　　Unlike its regulated formal counterpart, the informal venture capital market operates in qu

20、asi complete darkness. The investments made are neither disclosed in a regulated market nor there is obligation to track the records since there are no institutional regulatory agencies through which the market can be mo

21、nitored. As stated above, the matching between the capital supplied and emerging business opportunities mainly occurs via direct search by the counterparts and deals are essentially based o</p><p>　　On the g

22、round of this analysis, it is important to clarify why business angels can be an effective source of equity capital to new entrepreneurial ventures despite the presence of information asymmetries and high uncertainty pro

23、blems (which were analyzed in the previous sections). Given their inner nature, business angels seem to be able to reduce information asymmetries and the uncertainty of the new venture survival. This occurs in both the e

24、x ante assessment of investment proposals and in the</p><p>　　Despite its importance and adequacy to fund high risk new entrepreneurial ventures, the informal venture capital market in both US and UK is far

25、from be fully efficient. Various studies suggest that this market has notable undeveloped potential as most business angels do have funds available to invest (Coveney and Moore 1998) but are unable to invest as frequentl

26、y or as much they would like to (Mason and Harrison 2002; Paul et al. 2003). As a result, substantial capital remains largely uncommitt</p><p>　　We identified a couple of main factors that contribute to thes

27、e informal venture capital market inefficiencies. First, market inefficiencies reflect the existence of market failure in the supply of early stage venture capital. The assumptions of efficient capital markets with perfe

28、ct information between the buyers and sellers and low transaction costs do not apply to new entrepreneurial ventures. In fact, information regularly flows pretty inefficiently especially in the early stage of the equit&l

29、t;/p><p>　　These inefficiencies in turn influence shortage of “small sized” early stage equity capital especially from venture capital funds. The “capital gap” is a primary source of market inefficiency since m

30、any promising high growth entrepreneurial ventures do not receive early stage capital. In the previous section, we showed that business angels try to fill this gap. However, while they provide capital to entrepreneurs be

31、yond their ability to raise funds from their own connections (including family an</p><p>　　Due to their characteristics, business angels fuel new business projects with money, managerial resources, network c

32、apabilities and additional services that normally both venture capital and private equity firms neglect to bring into backed ventures. Even when they are able to perceive viable opportunities, considerable effort and mon

33、ey are necessary to new entrepreneurs to exploit and execute them properly and, not seldom, also to integrate them within their own complex mind frames. Still, a ke</p><p>　　For the reasons reported above, i

34、t is expected that the role of business angels and business angels supporting networks will increase over the next years in potentially the entire world’s regions. A related explanation is connected to the current global

35、 economic downturn that, starting in the second semester of the year 2008, has generally shown the weaknesses of the formal financial ties among venture capital firms (or, alternatively, private equity firms) and the oth

36、er people’s money provided </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　促進(jìn)新企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)的早期資本：天使投資在歐洲創(chuàng)業(yè)中的作用</p><p>　　盡管股權(quán)融資在促進(jìn)創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)（即企業(yè)初創(chuàng)期）中扮演了重要的角色，但無(wú)論是從時(shí)間（新企業(yè)的不同生命周期）或者行業(yè)角度（專業(yè)股票投資人）都對(duì)其資金提供者知之

37、甚少。天使投資者和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家都是比較常見(jiàn)的可合作伙伴，他們樂(lè)于和新企業(yè)共同協(xié)調(diào)和處理各種所需要的情況，以建立和發(fā)展真正有利于各方的關(guān)系。本章旨在討論創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)為其創(chuàng)業(yè)項(xiàng)目尋求早期階段融資和天使投資提供股權(quán)投資之間各個(gè)方面的關(guān)系。特別是，我們強(qiáng)調(diào)天使投業(yè)務(wù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)出現(xiàn)的原因，是為了優(yōu)化尋求資金成本和形成良好資金供求關(guān)系。天使投資網(wǎng)絡(luò)已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了許多歐洲國(guó)家，順便說(shuō)一句，在美國(guó)的天使投資組織（或自發(fā)的投資者協(xié)會(huì)）發(fā)達(dá)得多。我們?cè)谝粋€(gè)歐洲天使投資網(wǎng)絡(luò)

38、（埃班）中提取5年的模板數(shù)據(jù)，深入探討關(guān)于天使投資網(wǎng)絡(luò)的在歐洲業(yè)務(wù)低效率的復(fù)雜性，并簡(jiǎn)要的和盎格魯-撒克遜經(jīng)驗(yàn)作比較。</p><p>　　企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)的本質(zhì)是明確、抓住和利用新的和剛產(chǎn)生的機(jī)會(huì)（薩拉等人，2006）。為了明確，把握和利用機(jī)遇，我們認(rèn)為為公司創(chuàng)造財(cái)富和由此拓寬體制環(huán)境是企業(yè)的創(chuàng)業(yè)能力的根本。</p><p>　　根據(jù)卡塔拉曼提出意見(jiàn)（1997），肖恩（2003）將創(chuàng)業(yè)定義為“創(chuàng)

39、業(yè)是一個(gè)包括發(fā)現(xiàn)，評(píng)價(jià)和開(kāi)發(fā)利用機(jī)會(huì)的活動(dòng)，引進(jìn)新的商品或新的服務(wù)，通過(guò)協(xié)調(diào)市場(chǎng)、工藝、原材料，努力組織起以前不存在的方式”。其反映的主要意思，他解釋說(shuō)，“創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)可以解釋為通過(guò)考慮其自身進(jìn)取的抓住寶貴機(jī)會(huì)之間的關(guān)系，并利用該關(guān)系了解發(fā)現(xiàn)和利用機(jī)會(huì)的過(guò)程、資源的收購(gòu)、企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略和企業(yè)組織的過(guò)程”。從創(chuàng)業(yè)家的角度來(lái)看，這種起源于奧地利的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)為其有興趣關(guān)注的新問(wèn)題提出了一些有趣的特征，這是大多數(shù)悠久的管理理論所缺少得。同時(shí)指出，創(chuàng)業(yè)研究是因

40、沒(méi)有考慮創(chuàng)業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)或新想法的特征，是不全面的（戴維森，2003），我們找出這個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)課題對(duì)于發(fā)現(xiàn)和感知機(jī)會(huì)所需要的基本原理（戴爾等人，2003）。</p><p>　　各種和新的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)建立了長(zhǎng)期合作關(guān)系的外來(lái)投資者，天使投資者們宣布在各國(guó)成立一種有效資本來(lái)啟動(dòng)種子或早期股權(quán)資本。天使投資是非正式的，非機(jī)構(gòu)的投資者組成的非正式風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資市場(chǎng)。通過(guò)直接找尋的手段，天使投資將其自由的財(cái)務(wù)資源投資于高潛力或新的非上市公司股

41、權(quán)，其中時(shí)沒(méi)有家庭關(guān)系連接的（梅森和哈里森，1994）。像任何金融股東，天使投資者的目標(biāo)是從他們實(shí)行股權(quán)分離時(shí)獲取投資收益。它已被廣泛認(rèn)可，天使投資者是富有的，有作為企業(yè)家、經(jīng)理或顧問(wèn)的背景，以及在絕大多數(shù)情況下，是40至65歲的男性。</p><p>　　非正式風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)在美國(guó)和歐洲播種新的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)中都扮演了主要角色。最新的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在美國(guó)，天使投資每年集資約260億美元，涉及57120家企業(yè)，其中有超過(guò)25

42、8,000家活躍的天使投資（對(duì)比2009年）。對(duì)于歐洲而言，目前的評(píng)估表明，基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)或獨(dú)立的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行投資活動(dòng)的活躍天使投資總數(shù)大約為75,000人，投資額大約為每年30億歐元（埃班2008:2）。至于英國(guó)的天使投資，梅森和哈里森（2000）提供了大概的數(shù)字，他們對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的投資是許多可見(jiàn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金的八倍。</p><p>　　和資金一起，天使投資還為創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)提供豐富的情報(bào)和寶貴的人脈資源，這往往能夠極大地提

43、高新企業(yè)的創(chuàng)業(yè)成功率。作為比風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金更活躍的角色，天使投資更好的幫助其投資的公司，他們偶爾假設(shè)是企業(yè)的一員來(lái)幫助管理企業(yè)。除了自己的個(gè)人技能，天使投資也為創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)提供他們自己和其他本地的新合資公司在商業(yè)上和金融上的人脈關(guān)系。</p><p>　　值得注意的是，不像正規(guī)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資，天使投資能夠靈活的運(yùn)用自己的資金。天使投資只使用他們個(gè)人推導(dǎo)的財(cái)務(wù)資源去獲取相當(dāng)?shù)耐顿Y回報(bào)：因?yàn)樗麄儧](méi)有義務(wù)，也不用考慮外部條件的約

44、束去保證他們的資本投資升值，取得高回報(bào)，天使投資者只對(duì)自己負(fù)責(zé)。這種狀況發(fā)生于他們更多的傾向于投資高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)，因此具有高變異性和不確定性，正式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家往往會(huì)避免這種情況。因此，天使投資一般傾向于投資種子和初創(chuàng)型基金，或資助一些具有高成長(zhǎng)潛力和高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司（杰拉德和馬古利斯，2001；哈蒙，2000）。與此同時(shí)，出于個(gè)人觀點(diǎn)并由于在一個(gè)單一交易中投入有限的資金導(dǎo)致商業(yè)天使把重點(diǎn)放在小型或微型的投資上，這些也不是正式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

45、投資者的目標(biāo)。根據(jù)來(lái)自歐洲和美國(guó)的證據(jù)表明，天使投資的主體部分，相當(dāng)于在100,000—250,000歐元的范圍內(nèi)。因此，天使投資習(xí)慣的供應(yīng)低于該閾值的財(cái)政資源是不能盈利的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家的投資，因?yàn)樵谠u(píng)估涉及的費(fèi)用固定不變的性質(zhì)，監(jiān)測(cè)和提供后的投資支持創(chuàng)業(yè)支持企業(yè)（梅森和哈里森，1999；梅森和哈里森，2000）。從這個(gè)角度來(lái)看，天使投資試圖填補(bǔ)為小型和初創(chuàng)期企業(yè)進(jìn)入金融市場(chǎng)承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的空白。</p><p>　　不同

46、與正式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資，對(duì)非正式風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作的監(jiān)管并不是全面的。既不能對(duì)其投資市場(chǎng)做出監(jiān)管披露，也有跟蹤其責(zé)任記錄，因?yàn)闆](méi)有監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)能夠通過(guò)其市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行監(jiān)管。如上所述，兩者所提供的資金供應(yīng)和新興商業(yè)機(jī)遇主要發(fā)生于直接找尋對(duì)應(yīng)的企業(yè)和源于個(gè)人信任交易。天使投資者們是低調(diào)的，不愿進(jìn)一步表明他們對(duì)初創(chuàng)期企業(yè)投資的身份（韋特澤爾，1981；本杰明和馬古利斯，1996）。天使投資的市場(chǎng)缺乏正規(guī)性和透明度，影響了他們投資的地理范圍：大量來(lái)自美國(guó)和英國(guó)的

47、證據(jù)表明，多數(shù)尋求投資機(jī)會(huì)的天使投資者往往只在當(dāng)?shù)剡M(jìn)行投資（通常在他們基地150—200公里的范圍內(nèi)）。</p><p>　　表面上的分析,為什么說(shuō)商業(yè)天使能夠成為一種有效的資源新股份資本創(chuàng)業(yè)行為是很重要的，盡管存在信息的不對(duì)稱性和高度不確定性問(wèn)題?？紤]到他們的內(nèi)在本質(zhì)的時(shí)候,商業(yè)天使似乎可以降低新企業(yè)生存信息的不對(duì)稱和不確定性。這種情況在事先評(píng)估的投資建議和后融資兩個(gè)階段發(fā)生。關(guān)于“事后”的投資評(píng)估階段,我們必

48、須記得,商業(yè)天使專業(yè)投資者特殊的技能經(jīng)常會(huì)出現(xiàn)在評(píng)估投資建議中。因此,為了減少正式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的不確定性，天使投資者有更好的條件來(lái)進(jìn)行有效的盡職調(diào)查,以減少信息評(píng)估風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等級(jí)。作為后融資問(wèn)題,商業(yè)天使減少不確定性，因?yàn)樗麄兘?jīng)常要參與到公司的管理中去。負(fù)責(zé)公司的管理手段發(fā)揮某種形式的直接控制擁有向被投資的企業(yè)家。其他的事情都是平等的,這有助于降低道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題和降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此,專業(yè)性的天使投資者們?cè)试S他們有效地解決高度不確定性潛在的新企業(yè)家

49、精神。</p><p>　　盡管它對(duì)資助新的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的具有重要性和充分性，但是非正規(guī)的資本投資市場(chǎng)在美國(guó)和英國(guó)都還遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有得到充分的利用。各種研究表明，這個(gè)市場(chǎng)具有顯著的發(fā)展?jié)摿?，因?yàn)榇蟛糠值奶焓雇顿Y是有資金提供給投資（科夫尼和摩爾，1998），但不能進(jìn)行頻繁或過(guò)多的超出他們意愿的投資（梅森和哈里森，2002；保羅等人，2003）。其結(jié)果是，大量的資本在很大程度上仍然不能被提供。潛在的投資者，也就是說(shuō)，那些

50、希望成為天使投資者，但是從來(lái)沒(méi)有進(jìn)行投資的人，據(jù)估計(jì)在歐洲有85萬(wàn)人，在美國(guó)有1.75億人（圣何塞等人，2005）。</p><p>　　我們確定了幾個(gè)影響這些非正式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)的效率低下的主要因素。首先，市場(chǎng)無(wú)效反映了市場(chǎng)失靈存在在早期風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的供應(yīng)中。資本市場(chǎng)效率的假設(shè)條件在買家和賣家之間的信息的完善和降低交易費(fèi)用不適用于新企業(yè)家精神。實(shí)際上，信息定期流動(dòng)效率低特別是在早期股市階段。我們?cè)谙惹案嬖V他，種子投

51、資的特點(diǎn)是在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資金提供者和創(chuàng)立期的企業(yè)家之間有關(guān)信息的不對(duì)稱。缺乏記錄一家新公司和充分保障增加產(chǎn)品開(kāi)發(fā)信息不對(duì)稱，創(chuàng)造更高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)認(rèn)知種子，啟動(dòng)和發(fā)展早期的企業(yè)。</p><p>　　尤其是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本基金，使這些低效率又“小規(guī)模的”早期權(quán)益資本受到短缺的影響。這種“資金缺口”是資本市場(chǎng)低效率的主要來(lái)源，因?yàn)樵S多有前途的高增長(zhǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)沒(méi)有得到早期資本。在上一節(jié)中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，天使投資試圖填補(bǔ)這一空白。然而，雖然他們向創(chuàng)

52、業(yè)企業(yè)提供資金，從他們的人脈資源（包括家人和朋友）提高資金供給能力，以取得創(chuàng)業(yè)資本基金的最小資金（梅森和哈里森，1994），但是天使投資并沒(méi)有充分滿足創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的資金需求。此外，市場(chǎng)的低效率在通過(guò)美國(guó)和歐洲的正規(guī)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資實(shí)踐有所改善，特別是在過(guò)去的十年里，他們往往注重后期的投資，因?yàn)樗麄儾粩嗵岣咄顿Y的平均規(guī)模（索爾，2003 ）。鑒于天使投資沒(méi)有增加其平均投資規(guī)模，意外出現(xiàn)了新的“第二個(gè)資金缺口”，在美國(guó)的第二個(gè)缺口粗略估計(jì)將在200萬(wàn)美

53、元至500萬(wàn)美元之間（索爾，2003；梅森，2006）。</p><p>　　由于其特點(diǎn)，天使投資為企業(yè)新的業(yè)務(wù)項(xiàng)目，管理資源，網(wǎng)絡(luò)功能和附加服務(wù)提供助力，這些通常都是被風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本公司和私人股本投資公司忽視的。即使他們能夠意識(shí)到可行的機(jī)會(huì)，相當(dāng)大的努力和金錢是新的企業(yè)家利用和妥善執(zhí)行的必要的，而不是很少，也融入了他們自己的復(fù)雜的計(jì)劃中。盡管如此，獲得非正規(guī)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的支持的主要優(yōu)點(diǎn)是擴(kuò)大了對(duì)組織新穎性和戰(zhàn)略性的各種途