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1、<p>  標(biāo)題:Giving Green to Get Green: Incentives and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology</p><p>  原文:Abstract:</p><p>  Federal, state and local governments use a variety of incent

2、ives to induce consumer adoption of hybrid-electric vehicles. We study the relative efficacy of state sales tax waivers, income tax credits and non-tax incentives and find that the type of tax incentive offered is as im

3、portant as the value of the tax incentive. Conditional on value, we find that sales tax waivers are associated a seven-fold greater increase in hybrid sales than income tax credits. In addition, we estimate the extent

4、</p><p>  Data and Methodology</p><p>  We use quarterly state-level data on sales of each hybrid model to distinguish the impact of three factors which potentially speed consumer adoption of hy

5、brid technology:</p><p>  government incentives, including single occupancy HOV lane access and income or sales tax incentives</p><p>  (2) changes in gasoline prices</p><p>  (3) c

6、hanges in consumer travel intensity or preferences for environmentalism or national security. Our study period runs from Q1 2000 to Q4 2006 during which automakers introduced eleven hybrid models. The date at which dom

7、estic sales first appear in the JD Power data are: Honda Insight (2000Q1), Toyota Prius (2000Q3), Honda Civic (2002Q1), Honda Accord (2004Q4), Ford Escape (2004Q3), Lexus RX400h (2005Q1), Toyota Highlander (2005Q2), Merc

8、ury Mariner (2005Q3), Lexus GS450h (2006Q2), Toyota Cam</p><p>  We purchased our data on hybrid sales from JD Power and Associates. The sales data is based on their proprietary Power Information Network da

9、ta. The Power Information Network (PIN) collects real-time transaction level data from approximately 6,000 dealers. For our analysis, JD Power and Associates aggregated consumer purchases (as opposed to fleet purchases

10、) in the PIN transaction data up to quarterly quantities for each model at the state level. Based on actual purchases, the transaction d</p><p>  We classify models as high fuel-economy hybrids if the EPA-

11、rated fuel economy is 50 percent greater than other vehicles in its class. Using this criterion, we classify the Honda Insight and Civic, Toyota Prius and Camry and the Ford Escape as high fuel-economy vehicles.</p&g

12、t;<p>  Figure 1 graphs quarterly domestic sales of high and low fuel-economy hybrids as well as the average quarterly retail price of gasoline reported by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) from Q1 2000

13、until Q4 2006. Honda and Toyota introduced high-economy hybrids first, beginning with the Insight, Prius and Civic. Due to earlier introduction dates, sales of high-economy hybrid models account for the vast majority

14、of total hybrid sales from Q1 2000 to Q4 2006.Over 2005 and 2006, though, s</p><p>  Our dataset of state and federal incentives programs were collected by contacting regulators in each jurisdiction. Althou

15、gh a large number of incentive programs exist, we focus specifically on incentives related to high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane access and tax incentives. We omit local incentive programs such as parking fee waivers and

16、state vehicle registration incentives since both are likely of insufficient magnitude to affect state-level sales of hybrid vehicles substantially. We constr</p><p>  Finally, we construct proxies capturing

17、 consumer travel behavior and preferences for environmental quality and energy security. As a proxy for travel intensity, we use annual per-capita vehicle-miles traveled in each state. We also use average commuting tim

18、e as an alternative – the choice of proxy for travel intensity does not change our empirical conclusions. We use state-level per-capita Sierra Club membership as a proxy for the proportion of a state’s population with a

19、high preference for e</p><p>  Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the hybrid sales data, gasoline prices, state and federal incentives, and socioeconomic measures. We use the unbalanced panel to ge

20、nerate the summary statistics for hybrid sales and state incentives. For demographics and gasoline prices, we treat each state-quarter as a single observation and report the summary statistics for the balanced panel. C

21、onditional on positive sales, mean model sales in a particular state-quarter are 121.1, with a high of 8</p><p>  In the empirical section, we estimate the effect of government hybrid incentives, retail gaso

22、line prices, and social preferences on hybrid sales. We first estimate and compare the effects of government incentives designed to stimulate purchases and market incentives created by changed gasoline prices. We evalu

23、ate a number of testable hypotheses related to relative sales of high-economy and low-economy hybrids. In particular, we would expect rising gasoline prices to have an especially large e</p><p>  Several so

24、urces of potential bias exist arising from the endogeneity of state incentives and gasoline prices. States may choose which incentive to offer based on the relative efficacy of the different incentives in a particular st

25、ate. For example, California and Virginia may choose to allow hybrid vehicles to access the HOV lanes because travel/traffic costs are significant in each of these markets. More rural locations where travel/traffic cos

26、ts are substantially lower may choose to use tax i</p><p>  In several quarters in 2002 and 2003, production limitations constrained sales of the Toyota Prius and Honda Civic hybrid. If production constrain

27、ts affected all states equally, our use of time*model fixed effects would control for state-invariant scarcity. If automakers allocated a greater proportion of production during periods of scarcity to states with more g

28、enerous incentives, though, we may inappropriately attribute the effect of production constraints to the government incentives. We b</p><p>  Finally, we observe model level sales, but do not observe the ne

29、gotiated price between the dealer and the consumer. Thus, we cannot observe the dealer incentives offered, nor can we observe how the dealer and consumer split the tax incentive. Our fixed effects control for state inv

30、ariant correlation of dealer incentives and state incentives. Although Sallee (2007) finds strong evidence that consumers retain the vast majority of the hybrid tax incentives, if the benefits of state incentives ar<

31、/p><p>  Like government incentives, we expect that changes in gasoline prices induce consumers to purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles. Furthermore, we expect that changes in gasoline price should have a gre

32、ater effect on demand for high-economy hybrids, and the effect on high-economy vehicles should be especially pronounced for high travel intensity states.</p><p>  In our base specification, we estimate that

33、hybrid sales are positively correlated with tax-inclusive gasoline prices. The impact of gasoline prices, though, comes predominately through the purchase of high-economy hybrid vehicles. Separately estimating gasoline

34、 cross-price elasticity for high and low-economy vehicles in specification (5), we estimate that a 10 percent change in gasoline price leads to an 8.6 percent increase in per-capita sales of high-economy hybrid vehicles.

35、 Our point esti</p><p>  出處:Terry A. Taylor. Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects[J]. Management Science .2002.48(8),pp. 992–1007</p><p>  標(biāo)題:通過提供綠色技術(shù)來帶動(dòng)綠色消

36、費(fèi)</p><p><b>  譯文:</b></p><p><b>  摘要</b></p><p>  聯(lián)邦政府和地方政府采用了多種激勵(lì)政策刺激消費(fèi)者對(duì)混合動(dòng)力技術(shù)的汽車消費(fèi)需求。我們研究了相關(guān)的國(guó)家銷售稅放棄,所得稅基建學(xué)分,等非常重要的稅收激勵(lì)和發(fā)現(xiàn)類型的稅收激勵(lì)的功效,發(fā)現(xiàn)與營(yíng)業(yè)稅減免相關(guān)的所得稅抵免中,混合銷

37、售比營(yíng)業(yè)稅抵免的幅度提高了七倍多。此外,我們估計(jì),在一定程度上,消費(fèi)者采用混合動(dòng)力汽車的原因還可以歸咎于各方面,如:美國(guó)政府在2000 年– 2006年采用的一系列激勵(lì)機(jī)制,汽油的價(jià)格的改變,消費(fèi)者注重環(huán)境質(zhì)量保護(hù)和能源安全問題。通過對(duì)模型的特定時(shí)間和趨勢(shì)的控制,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)營(yíng)業(yè)稅收的增長(zhǎng),不斷上揚(yáng)的汽油價(jià)格和能源危機(jī)等都是息息相關(guān)的,在2000 – 2006年,混合經(jīng)濟(jì)性能提高了27%--36%的銷售量。</p><p

38、><b>  數(shù)據(jù)和處理方法</b></p><p>  我們用國(guó)家級(jí)季度銷售數(shù)據(jù)區(qū)分各混合模型的影響消費(fèi)者三個(gè)構(gòu)成潛在速度采用混合動(dòng)力技術(shù)的因素:</p><p>  (1)政府激勵(lì)機(jī)制,包括單親占用專業(yè)巷的制造、銷售。請(qǐng)您訪問收入稅收鼓勵(lì)政策,</p><p>  (2)汽油價(jià)格的變化,</p><p>  (

39、3)旅游消費(fèi)強(qiáng)度的變化或環(huán)?;驀?guó)家安全的喜好。本研究期在2000年第一季度到2006年第四季度期間,汽車制造商推出了十一種混合模型。在該日期內(nèi)國(guó)內(nèi)銷量第一的JD Power的數(shù)據(jù)顯示為:本田Insight(2000Q1),豐田普瑞斯(2000Q3),本田思域(2002Q1),本田雅閣(2004Q4),福特Escape(2004Q3),雷克薩斯RX400h(2005Q1)豐田漢蘭達(dá)(2005Q2),水星Mariner(2005Q3),雷克

40、薩斯GS450h(2006Q2),豐田佳美(2006Q2)和土星Vue(2006Q4)。為了讓每一個(gè)模型都有它自己的時(shí)代潮流,對(duì)每個(gè)國(guó)家的人具有不同的吸引力,其包括了國(guó)家模型和時(shí)間固定效應(yīng)模型,并估算模型中使用的銷售動(dòng)向狀態(tài)模型的變化。</p><p>  我們購(gòu)買了JD Power and Associates公司的混合銷售數(shù)據(jù)。銷售數(shù)據(jù)是基于其專有的電力信息網(wǎng)絡(luò)數(shù)據(jù)。在電力信息網(wǎng)絡(luò)(PIN)中約有6000名經(jīng)

41、銷商收集實(shí)時(shí)事務(wù)級(jí)的數(shù)據(jù)。對(duì)于我們的分析,匯總公司JD Power and Associates公司的交易數(shù)據(jù)中的PIN消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買(而不是購(gòu)買車隊(duì))到國(guó)家為每個(gè)季度的數(shù)量級(jí)模型。根據(jù)實(shí)際購(gòu)買,交易數(shù)據(jù)提供了更準(zhǔn)確的時(shí)間比車輛登記數(shù)據(jù)信息。對(duì)于我們的分析,JD Power的限制了消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買樣品。這不包括私人和政府,最好的采購(gòu)車隊(duì)最好是與消費(fèi)者的喜好相關(guān),最壞的是與國(guó)家政府的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)相關(guān)。這些銷售排斥確保我們不會(huì)用政府采購(gòu)說明消費(fèi)者的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。&l

42、t;/p><p>  我們總結(jié)的模型為高燃油經(jīng)濟(jì)雜交模式,如果EPA額定燃油經(jīng)濟(jì)性比其百分之五十類其他車輛更大。那么使用這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn),能被稱為高燃油經(jīng)濟(jì)性車輛有本田和思域,豐田普瑞斯和凱美瑞和福特。</p><p>  2006年。消費(fèi)者可能選擇去延遲2005年第四季度混合采購(gòu)記錄期盼已久的更慷慨的聯(lián)邦稅收學(xué)分。</p><p>  圖1中各季度的低油耗,高經(jīng)濟(jì)雜交,以及汽

43、油的平均零售價(jià)格每季國(guó)內(nèi)銷售報(bào)告的能源情報(bào)署(EIA)從2000年到2006年第四季度第一季度。本田和豐田推出高經(jīng)濟(jì)雜交第一。由于引進(jìn)的日期早,高經(jīng)濟(jì)的混合動(dòng)力車型為一體的混合銷售總額從2000年第一季度到第四季度的絕大多數(shù)2006年比2005年高。不過,相比2006年的帳戶,低效率的車型的銷量大幅增加,混合銷售在2005占182,000的百分之28,在2006年占了235,000的百分之25的混合銷售市場(chǎng)。雖然只是道聽途說,2006可

44、能是聯(lián)邦稅收優(yōu)惠的最后1個(gè)月。消費(fèi)者可能選擇延遲了較為寬松的聯(lián)邦稅收抵免預(yù)期在2005年第四季度購(gòu)買混合動(dòng)力車。</p><p>  我們的國(guó)家和聯(lián)邦刺激方案,由每個(gè)國(guó)家或地區(qū)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)收集數(shù)據(jù)。雖然大量的激勵(lì)方案存在,我們特別著重于與高占用車輛(HOV車道)里獲取的稅收優(yōu)惠鼓勵(lì)措施。如果停車費(fèi)減免,這兩個(gè)國(guó)家的車輛登記獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的激勵(lì)方案在當(dāng)?shù)厥且?guī)模不足的,會(huì)影響混合動(dòng)力汽車的國(guó)家級(jí)銷售大幅下降。我們構(gòu)造的按季平均每個(gè)

45、州含稅汽油零售價(jià)的基礎(chǔ)上,每月汽油從能源情報(bào)署的價(jià)格數(shù)據(jù)。我們還包括從當(dāng)前人口調(diào)查國(guó)家級(jí)的人口控制。我們使用一個(gè)高中或四年制大學(xué)文憑的人均收入,居民百分?jǐn)?shù),平均年齡和女性比例。</p><p>  最后,我們構(gòu)造捕捉消費(fèi)者旅游行為和環(huán)境質(zhì)量和能源安全的喜好。作為一個(gè)旅游強(qiáng)代理,我們利用在每個(gè)國(guó)家年度人均車輛行駛里程。我們也使用作為替代的平均通勤時(shí)間-強(qiáng)度的旅行代理的選擇并沒有改變我們的實(shí)證結(jié)論。我們使用國(guó)家級(jí)人均

46、塞拉俱樂部會(huì)員資格作為一個(gè)國(guó)家的人口與環(huán)境的積極性高的偏好比例代理。至于全球變暖和反戰(zhàn)情緒突出的代理,我們使用季度偏離了100年的平均溫度,人均參加武裝部隊(duì),以及在伊拉克和阿富汗的人均傷亡。</p><p>  表2列出了混合銷售數(shù)據(jù),汽油價(jià)格,州和聯(lián)邦獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),以及社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)措施的摘要統(tǒng)計(jì)信息。我們使用的非平衡面板產(chǎn)生的混合銷售和國(guó)家獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的摘要統(tǒng)計(jì)信息。對(duì)于人口和汽油的價(jià)格,我們則把它看作一個(gè)單一的觀察每個(gè)國(guó)家的季度

47、報(bào)告和平衡面板的摘要統(tǒng)計(jì)信息。良好的銷售條件,意味著在某一國(guó)家的季度銷售121.1模型與加州的普銳斯在2006年第三季度的銷售額的提高高。大約94年的研究期間為混合銷售市場(chǎng)一個(gè)有一○七三美元平均值聯(lián)邦稅收優(yōu)惠政策的資格。混合銷售額的百分之十二是為任何一個(gè)州所得稅或銷售稅獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的資格,與平均值的二〇一一美元和一〇三七美元美元相區(qū)別。在樣本期間,平均的含稅零售汽油是$一點(diǎn)八零加侖與一0.994美元一加侖(格魯吉亞,第四季- 2001)低點(diǎn),比

48、每加侖高3.10美元(夏威夷,第3季- 2006)。</p><p>  在實(shí)證部分,我們估計(jì)政府混合激勵(lì),零售汽油價(jià)格,銷售和社會(huì)偏好的混合效果。我們首先估計(jì)和比較,旨在刺激購(gòu)買和市場(chǎng)激勵(lì)措施改變政府的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)汽油價(jià)格造成的影響。我們?cè)u(píng)估了有關(guān)的高經(jīng)濟(jì)和低經(jīng)濟(jì)雜交相對(duì)銷售數(shù)量可檢驗(yàn)的假設(shè)。特別是,我們希望汽油價(jià)格上漲有一個(gè)高效率的混合模型,其中模型的銷售相對(duì)較同類車的燃油經(jīng)濟(jì)性的改善的影響是巨大的。此外,我們預(yù)計(jì)燃

49、油效率更高的效率和低排放車型與一個(gè)對(duì)環(huán)境和能源安全,具有較高的旅游強(qiáng)個(gè)人強(qiáng)烈的偏好個(gè)人將特別有吸引力。然后我們研究如何將激勵(lì)效果涉及到稅收激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)的提供中。我們比較了減免營(yíng)業(yè)稅和所得稅抵免的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn),隨著對(duì)稅收的顯著減少,銷售稅減免所得稅的優(yōu)惠比著更大的銷售相關(guān)一致。最后,我們測(cè)試環(huán)境的偏好是否對(duì)能源安全的喜好代理是具有高經(jīng)濟(jì)雜交,為此,環(huán)境和能源安全利益是與最大銷售相關(guān)的。</p><p>  潛在的偏見存在

50、來源于一些消息所產(chǎn)生的國(guó)家獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)和汽油價(jià)格的內(nèi)生性。各國(guó)可以選擇哪些獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)提供,關(guān)鍵在于在一個(gè)特定國(guó)家的不同的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)相對(duì)有效性的基礎(chǔ)。例如,加利福尼亞州和弗吉尼亞州可以選擇允許混合動(dòng)力車訪問高乘載車道,因?yàn)槁眯?交通費(fèi)用在這些市場(chǎng)每個(gè)重要。更多的農(nóng)村地區(qū)在旅游/交通費(fèi)用大幅降低可能會(huì)選擇使用稅優(yōu)惠代替。本表格內(nèi)生性使我們的點(diǎn)估計(jì)要在政府的鼓勵(lì)措施效果上限。國(guó)家汽油價(jià)格上漲,另一方面,都振振有詞地外生的混合銷售。在研究期間,雖然經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)質(zhì)上更多的

51、燃料混合比同類非混合動(dòng)力汽車高,但是高效的混合動(dòng)力車市場(chǎng)的普及率相當(dāng)?shù)?。因此,混合?dòng)力汽車占了總汽油消費(fèi)量的一小部分,不太可能影響到國(guó)家的汽油價(jià)格。</p><p>  在2002年和2003年幾個(gè)季度,生產(chǎn)的局限限制了豐田的Prius和本田思域混合動(dòng)力車的銷售。如果影響生產(chǎn)的制約因素在所有國(guó)家一樣,我們的時(shí)間*固定效應(yīng)模型的使用將控制狀態(tài)不變的稀缺性性。與豐田我們的對(duì)話顯示,公司分配稀缺的生產(chǎn),以平衡在不同的市

52、場(chǎng)的延誤。我們認(rèn)為,這種擔(dān)心并沒有實(shí)質(zhì)性的偏見我們的結(jié)果。在某種程度上,在此期間的混合動(dòng)力汽車銷量成正比現(xiàn)有需求,固定效應(yīng)模型*時(shí)間將捕獲的生產(chǎn)限制因素的影響。我們經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量測(cè)試確認(rèn)這是我們估計(jì)到的周期中,生產(chǎn)量超過了生產(chǎn)模式的限制排斥的魯棒性。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)這些宿舍的排除并不會(huì)實(shí)質(zhì)性改變我們的實(shí)證結(jié)論</p><p>  最后,我們觀察到模型層次銷售,但不遵守之間的經(jīng)銷商和消費(fèi)者議價(jià)。因此,我們可以不遵守經(jīng)銷商提供誘因

53、,也不能觀察的經(jīng)銷商和消費(fèi)者的分裂稅收激勵(lì)政策。我們的固定效應(yīng)控制國(guó)家獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)和國(guó)家獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)經(jīng)銷商不變的關(guān)系。雖然薩利(2007)發(fā)現(xiàn)有力的證據(jù),消費(fèi)者保留了混合絕大多數(shù)稅收優(yōu)惠,如果對(duì)國(guó)家鼓勵(lì)的好處被部分交易商無論是從俘虜談判或通過本國(guó)經(jīng)銷商激勵(lì)措施,我們將再次對(duì)我們的保守估計(jì)偏差福利國(guó)家級(jí)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。</p><p>  像政府獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),我們預(yù)計(jì),汽油價(jià)格的變化誘導(dǎo)消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買更省油的汽車。此外,我們預(yù)計(jì),在汽油價(jià)格變動(dòng)應(yīng)該有一

54、個(gè)高經(jīng)濟(jì)雜交需求較大的影響,以及對(duì)高車輛效果應(yīng)該是經(jīng)濟(jì),尤其是高強(qiáng)度的旅游國(guó)家明顯。</p><p>  在我們的基本規(guī)范中估計(jì),混合銷售正與含稅汽油價(jià)格密切相關(guān)。而汽油價(jià)格的影響,以通過高經(jīng)濟(jì)混合動(dòng)力汽車的購(gòu)買為主,。另外估計(jì)汽油交叉價(jià)格高和低經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)范車輛彈性(5),我們估計(jì),在汽油價(jià)格上漲10百分比變化會(huì)導(dǎo)致在高經(jīng)濟(jì)混合動(dòng)力汽車的人均銷售額增加百分之8.6。我們對(duì)低經(jīng)濟(jì)雜交交叉價(jià)格彈性點(diǎn)估計(jì)是接近零(0.02

55、7)和不顯著。此外,當(dāng)我們每年人均車輛行駛里程與汽油變量相互作用,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),汽油價(jià)格和高經(jīng)濟(jì)的混合銷售關(guān)系在高虛擬制造技術(shù)的國(guó)家更明顯,與我們的預(yù)測(cè)一致,即高里程個(gè)人有最大的鼓勵(lì)采取應(yīng)對(duì)汽油價(jià)格的上漲。</p><p>  出處:Terry A. Taylor. Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects[J]

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