文化，產(chǎn)業(yè)關(guān)系，與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展秘魯?shù)陌咐就馕姆g】

1、<p><b>　　畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　外文題目： CULTURE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PERU </p><p>　　出 處： Industrial & Labor

2、Relations Review，Jul63, Vol. 16 Issue 4, p583-594, 12p </p><p>　　作 者： WILLIAM F. WHYTE. </p><p><b>　　原 文：&l

3、t;/b></p><p>　　CULTURE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PERU ropr_420 839..880</p><p>　　The economists who give their attention to the study of the developing co

4、untries are now generally agreed that culture has an extremely important impact upon economic development and upon the pattern of industrial relations found in a given country. Nevertheless, the governments of these coun

5、tries generally tend to neglect the culture and concentrate their attention upon capital, natural resources, transportation, technical education, and so on—-all of these being factors which appear to be more</p>&

6、lt;p>　　or less concrete.</p><p>　　Why is culture generally neglected in development plans? There are certainly several reasons for this condition, and I shall focus our attention on only one of them. My t

7、heory is that in the planning of the economic policy makers, those factors for which measurements are readily available tend to receive attention, whereas the factors for which measurements are not readily available tend

8、 to be neglected. To the layman, culture appears to be a vague and nebulous notion. It is fashionable these da</p><p>　　measured, then he is unlikely to develop plans consciously designed to change culture.&

9、lt;/p><p>　　For this reason, the development of measuring instruments for cultures may be an essential step in the forward movement of the developing countries.</p><p>　　This is a report on one suc

10、h effort. It grows out of fifteen months of research in Peru on "Human Problems of Industrial Development." The project was planned as a series of field studies in Peruvian industrial plants, to be carried out

11、by four Peruvian research assistants, under my general direction. We did indeed carry out the factory field studies we planned, but in the early stages of the project, I became convinced of the necessity for a broad stud

12、y of culture to provide interpretation for </p><p>　　Nobody who comes to Peru to take even a most casual look at industrial activities in the country can fail to be impressed by the scarcity of firms founded

13、 and developed by Peruvians, whose families had been in the country for several generations. A large part of the industry is in foreign hands.</p><p>　　The railway system was pioneered bya U. S. engineer, He

14、nry Meigs, and is now owned by the Peruvian Corporation, a British concern. The major internal airline, Faucett, was founded by an American.</p><p>　　More than 90 percent of the oil production is in the hand

15、s of foreign firms, the dominant one being International Petroleum Company, an affiliate of Standard Oil of New Jersey. In mining, the dominant firms are Cerro de Pasco Corporation, Southern Peru Mining Corporation, and

16、Marcona Mining Company, all American firms.</p><p>　　The dominant company in shipping is W. R. Grace and Company—which is also prominent in raising and refining sugar, in textiles and in chemicals. More impo

17、rtant in the textile industry is Duncan Fox and Company, Ltd., a British firm. 'I he most important public utility, Empresas Electricas Asociadas, was founded and is still controlled by Swiss, although Peruvians have

18、 invested substantially in the company.</p><p>　　The list could be extended, but perhaps this is enough to show the importance of foreign capital and explain why many Peruvians look with some resentment upon

19、 what they consider the colonial status of their country. Why are foreign concerns so prominent in Peru? One American professor put this question to a group of Peruvian</p><p>　　university students. Their ma

20、in reply was that Peru's governments over the years have catered to foreign interests and given to foreigners advantages and help that they did not give to their own people.</p><p>　　To examine the merit

21、s of this argument would require an historical study which is beyond the scope of this project. Let us simply examine the assumption underlying the argument: the assumption is that industry cannot develop in Peru without

22、 special favors and assistance from the government. Is this true? Let us get down to cases. </p><p>　　More than fifty years ago, the father of Antonio D'Onofrio started in the ice-cream business with a

23、 pushcart. When Antonio D'Onofrio was old enough to work, he went to work with his father. Today, D'Onofrio is the dominant concern in manufacturing chocolates and all kinds of candies, cookies, and ice cream. &l

24、t;/p><p>　　Thirty years ago, Oscar Ferrand, the son of a grocery-store owner, opened a small shop to experiment with the manufacture of glass. Today, Cristal Ferrand is the leading firm in the glass industry an

25、d produces such a fine product that it is able to export approximately 10 percent of its production to other markets, including the United States.</p><p>　　Less than ten years ago, Luis Banchero, a man who h

26、ad worked his way through engineering school pedaling petroleum products on the streets, scraped up enough money to go into partnership with an American and set up a plant to produce fish meal from anchovies that are abu

27、ndant along the coast of Peru. The partner died shortly after this beginning, leaving Banchero to carry on alone. The success of Banchero's first plant set off the phenomenal boom in the fish-meal industry, until tod

28、ay fish meal </p><p>　　None of these men had any assistance from the government in getting their enterprises started or at any crucial stage. But who are these men? D'Onofrio is an Italian immigrant. Fen

29、and is the son of a French immigrant. Banchero is the son of an Italian immigrant. And so it goes. In any gathering of industrialists in Peru today, you will find a large proportion of immigrants and sons of immigrants.

30、There are successful industrial entrepreneurs who are Peruvians by birth and by two or more generati</p><p>　　One hears it said that some foreign blood is necessary for industrial leadership, but obviously b

31、lood is not the answer. There can hardly be any biological explanation for the failure of Peruvians to take to and succeed in industry. This is clearly a matter of culture.</p><p>　　For generations, the typi

32、cal Peruvian economic activity has been concentrated on the land—ownership of haciendas, buying and selling of real estate—and commerce, the buying and selling of goods. Manufacturing has not been part of that pattern. T

33、he historical origins of this aspect of the culture pattern are beyond the scope of our study. We are concerned with the impact of the culture on industrial development today, and this has been a major focus of our inqui

34、ry in the questionnaire administere</p><p>　　There are various aspects to culture. For present purposes, I shall concentrate</p><p>　　upon the way people think and feel about the world around th

35、em— particularly the values that they hold in areas that seem to us relevant for economic development. If these aspects of culture exist in the thoughts and feelings of men, it should be possible to measure them with a q

36、uestionnaire.</p><p>　　The questionnaire providing the data to be presented later was based in part upon the Cornell values study, carried out in eleven U. S. universities during the last decade by Rose Gold

37、sen, Morris Rosenberg, Edward A. Suchman, and Robin N. Williams. One member of my research staff in Peru, Gradela Flores, worked with me to translate the parts of the questionnaire we intended to use and to develop a num

38、ber of new items designed to test certain aspects of Peruvian culture. We then developed a colla</p><p>　　representing every social level up to the most elite group. 18.?4 respondents are included in our sam

39、ple, 768 of them being in the public and private schools of Lima.</p><p>　　The study is still in the early stages of analysis, but we already have some preliminary conclusions for Lima, which seem worth some

40、 serious attention. I shall present some of our findings in three areas which seem to us important for economic development and for industrial relations: the status of manual work, the suspicious Peruvian, and the motiva

41、tional drag on development.</p><p>　　THE STATUS OF MANUAL WORK</p><p>　　Peru, like many other of the developing countries, has a surplus of unskilled workers and a great shortage of skilled labo

42、r. Peru urgently needs more and better skilled workers and technicians. At the same time, Peru is apparently suffering from a cultural barrier: the low status of manual work.</p><p>　　In the United States, w

43、e recognize a social distinction in this area, but we express it in a very cumbersome manner when we speak of blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. The Spanish Language provides one word for each concept while we

44、 use three. The blue-collar worker is called obrero, and the white-collar worker is called empleado. This conceptual economy and clarity also seems to suggest a sharper line of social demarcation than we have in the Unit

45、ed States, and our findings indeed in</p><p>　　We asked all our high school students the following question: "If you had to choose between two jobs earning an equal amount in either one, but in one you

46、would be an obrero and the other an empleado, which job would you prefer?" For those who gave the expected answer of empleado, we tried to measure the intensity o[ tJie preference by offering a series of possibiliti

47、es in which the obrero job paid successively from 50 to 300 soles more per week and then the most extreme statement, "Under no cir</p><p>　　To put these figures in perspective. 300 soles is approximatel

48、y .$11.20. The maximum differential we offered, 300 solos per week, is in itself more than the newly established legal minimum salary for empleados in Lima: 750 soles per month.</p><p>　　As we applied this q

49、uestion to boys in the courses of letters, sciences, and commercial studies in the high schools, we found the overwhelming preference for the status of empleado that we had expect. ed. When we applied the question to the

50、 boys in the industrial arts programs, we found a difference—but not enough difference to give much, encouragement to Peru. </p><p>　　Among these boys, supposedly being educated to be skilled workers, only 1

51、3.3 percent chose obrero when offered the same amount of pay they would receive as empleado. On the other hand, 31.1 percent chose obrero only if they received 300 soles more per week, and 35.6 percent chose "Under

52、no circumstances would I be an obrero." In other words, two-thirds of these boys flatly rejected the possibility of being an obrero or else imposed conditions that are extremely difficult if not impossible to rea<

53、;/p><p>　　I have already presented one explanation for this finding: the category of obrero seems to occupy very low social status in Peru, and apparently the notion of being a skilled obrero has not yet affect

54、ed this social reputation very much.</p><p>　　There is also another explanation which becomes apparent as we look at the educational pyramid in Peru. Of every one thousand children who enter the first year o

55、f school, only 51 graduate from high school. Of these 51, how many make application to continue their education in a university? 51--or 52. (The possible excess is accounted for by the fact that, on the one hand, nearly

56、everyone who finishes high school applies to be admitted to a university, and many of those who are turned down one yea</p><p>　　Thus, in a country where over 50 percent of the population is illiterate and t

57、hose who finish high school represent a very small proportion of those who began schooling, it is natural and inevitable for those boys in; their last year of high school to think of themselves as members of an elite gro

58、up. Why then should a member of elite lower himself to do manual labor? </p><p>　　In this way the shape of the educational pyramid tends to reinforce the cultural barrier against manual work.</p><

59、p>　　THE MOTIVATIONAL DRAG ON INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT</p><p>　　Who in Peru wants to work in a factory?</p><p>　　We put the question in this way:</p><p>　　"Assuming equal econo

60、mic opportunities, in which of the following types of organizations would you prefer to work?" We offered the following choices: realestate business, factory, government service, banking, hacienda (or large farm), a

61、 large store, buying and selling of food stuffs, or a shop (taller) such as machine shop, electrical repair shop, etc.</p><p>　　We found 50 percent of our industrial arts students picking the workshop, indic

62、ating an interest in being small business men in the industrial field, whereas 25 percent chose the factory, and the remaining votes were scattered. For the boys in the other course programs of the public schools (commer

63、cial, letters, and sciences) the factory lags far behind the more traditional spheres of government service and the banking, and the shop hardly figures at all.</p><p>　　If we divide our private school boys

64、into three prestige levels, according to the social standing of the schools, we find that the lowest level of students in letters and sciences have the same pattern of choice observed in the public schools.</p>&l

65、t;p>　　It is only as we get to the top social level, to the three schools for children of the social elite, that we find the factory exerting a strong appeal, being practically tied for first place with the hacienda or

66、 large farm. This faithfully reflects the current situation of the generation preceding these boys. The hacienda has for generations been the primary field of economic activity for the social dlite, and in recent years m

67、embers of this elite have been branching out into industrial activiti</p><p>　　We find then that the children of the social ^lite are much more oriented toward industrial careers than are the public school b

68、oys—^with the exception of the industrial arts students who can hardly be expected to become important industrial leaders. In terms of their own inclinations and in terms of their family and other social connections, we

69、can confidently predict that, barring a revolution, many of these boys from the elite schools will be among the industrial leaders of the Peru of tomorr</p><p>　　Do these boys show the psychological qualitie

70、s required to push Peru ahead more rapidly along the path of industrial development? Are they willing to do their own work and show some degree of independence, or do they prefer to rely on personal connections for reach

71、ing their goals? For measurements in this area, we used more than twenty items, most of them newly devised for our questionnaire. Nearly all of them showed systematic differences according to social status. Let me presen

72、t several items</p><p>　　In our private school population, the percentage was 76.3. 'Ilie recommendation from the prestigeful stranger has been a well-known and popularly used device in the past. Managem

73、ent people today tell us that it is receiving less and less attention as far as they are concerned, but apparently the private school boys still feel that "pull" is of great importance in getting a job. The pub

74、lic school boys do not think so—- or perhaps we should say that they have no hope of getting the support of a hi</p><p>　　The line of cleavage is clearly between the public schools and the private schools as

75、 a group. In all of the questions I shall now present, we do not find the same similarity of responses within the private school group. Generally the boys of the lowest prestige private schools have much the same respons

76、es as the public school boys. On most items the middle level school boys also are not far away from the public school responses. We find, as we might expect from our knowledge of Peruvian society</p><p>　　Ou

77、r next question deals with cheating in the classroom. We found the pattern of "mutual assistance" quite common in some classrooms, and indeed some of the students define the system in this way, telling us that

78、it really is not right to refuse to heljj a friend, even though the rules of the classrof)m supposedly prohibit this behavior. </p><p>　　While this can be regarded as a moral question, we prefer to look at i

79、t from the standpoint of motivation. Is the individual willing to rely upon his own effort and. ability as he seeks the rewards of good marks, or does he rely upon the help of friends and associates? We asked four questi

80、ons on this topic. </p><p>　　Since they all gave the same result, I shall illustrate with one: "How many of your classmates are accustomed to cheat in class?" When we combined together the first tw

81、o categories, "All of them" and "The majority," we find 24.8 percent of the public school boys checking these responses. As we move up the social scale, this percentage rises slightly, but then for ou

82、r three elite schools, it jumps to 62.1 percent.</p><p>　　CONCLUSIONS</p><p>　　This is a preliminary report upon a project the analysis of which will continue for many months. Therefore, instead

83、 of concluding with general statements, I prefer to pose some of the questions that are suggested by our findings.</p><p>　　The questions are of both a theoretical and practical interest. Why does manual lab

84、or—even skilled labor—enjoy such a low prestige position in Peru? What is being done and what can be done to change this condition?</p><p>　　Why do Peruvians distrust each other?</p><p>　　Would

85、it be desirable to have a higher level of trust in people? How could this be achieved?</p><p>　　My aim is simply to indicate that research of this type is capable of posing some of the crucial questions for

86、economic growth in the developing countries. In Peru we have already held a number of discussion meetings to feed back our findings, and we have sought to create the conditions to make it possible for Peruvian social sci

87、entists to continue to provide cultural measurements to fit the development needs of the country. Of course, we should not assume that the problem of culture change is s</p><p>　　The study reported here then

88、 is by no means the end in a process of relating social research to the problems of culture and culture change. We can only claim that measurements of culture can help to provide a people and its leaders with a better se

89、nse of where they are and a better prospect for making intelligent decisions about where they want to go.</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　文化，產(chǎn)業(yè)關(guān)系，與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展：秘魯?shù)陌咐?lt;/p><p>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)

90、學(xué)家把注意力放在發(fā)展中國(guó)家的研究中，文化是一個(gè)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展有巨大作用的因素，發(fā)現(xiàn)在一個(gè)特定國(guó)家的產(chǎn)業(yè)關(guān)系模式對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展有著極其重要的影響。然而，這些國(guó)家的政府普遍忽視的文化，注意力集中在資金，資源，交通，技術(shù)教育等。</p><p>　　為什么文化一般是在發(fā)展計(jì)劃中被忽視的？這種情況是有一定幾個(gè)原因的，我將我們的注意集中在其中的一個(gè)。我的理論是，在經(jīng)濟(jì)政策制定者的規(guī)劃中，這些因素的測(cè)量是現(xiàn)成的，而往往會(huì)文化因素的測(cè)

91、量不容易獲得重視，往往被忽視。對(duì)于外行，文化似乎是一種模糊的概念。但必須承認(rèn)，文化是重要的，但如果政府計(jì)劃者認(rèn)為在理解它有什么困難，也沒(méi)有多少了很多方面可能被測(cè)量的想法，那么他不可能自覺(jué)地制訂計(jì)劃旨在改變文化。</p><p>　　由于這個(gè)原因，測(cè)量?jī)x器的發(fā)展文化可能是在發(fā)展中國(guó)家向前運(yùn)動(dòng)的一個(gè)重要步驟。</p><p>　　這是對(duì)一個(gè)這樣的努力的報(bào)告。它生長(zhǎng)在秘魯?shù)难芯恳皇鍌€(gè)月在“人性

92、的工業(yè)發(fā)展問(wèn)題?！痹擁?xiàng)目原計(jì)劃作為一個(gè)研究領(lǐng)域在秘魯工業(yè)廠房系列，以進(jìn)行研究助理四個(gè)秘魯根據(jù)我的一般方向。我們確實(shí)進(jìn)行工廠實(shí)地考察，我們的計(jì)劃，但在項(xiàng)目的早期階段，我堅(jiān)信有必要成為一個(gè)廣泛的文化研究，為我們的行為是在觀察一些植物的解釋。</p><p>　　誰(shuí)沒(méi)來(lái)秘魯采取甚至是一個(gè)在該國(guó)的工業(yè)活動(dòng)最隨便看看能不能由成立的公司，由秘魯人，他們已在該國(guó)已經(jīng)開(kāi)發(fā)了幾代家庭缺乏深刻的印象。一個(gè)行業(yè)的很大一部分是掌握在外國(guó)

93、手中。</p><p>　　鐵路系統(tǒng)率先bya美國(guó)工程師，亨利梅格斯，現(xiàn)由秘魯公司，英國(guó)關(guān)注擁有。內(nèi)部的主要航空公司，福西特，是由一個(gè)美國(guó)人。</p><p>　　超過(guò)九成的石油產(chǎn)量的百分之是外國(guó)公司，一個(gè)是占主導(dǎo)地位的國(guó)際石油公司，一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的新澤西石油下屬的手中。在采礦，占主導(dǎo)地位的公司是塞羅代帕斯科公司，南秘魯?shù)V業(yè)公司，并馬爾科納礦業(yè)公司，所有的美國(guó)公司。</p>&l

94、t;p>　　在航運(yùn)優(yōu)勢(shì)是格雷斯公司和公司也是在提高和完善糖，紡織品和化學(xué)品，突出。更重要的是紡織業(yè)和鄧肯福克斯有限公司，一家英國(guó)公司。我他最重要的公用事業(yè)，仍然成立，由瑞士的控制，雖然秘魯已投資于本公司大增。</p><p>　　這個(gè)名單可以延長(zhǎng)，但也許這足以證明了外國(guó)資本的重要性，并解釋為什么許多秘魯人一些對(duì)他們認(rèn)為他們國(guó)家的殖民地地位的不滿看看。為什么有這么一些外國(guó)在秘魯?shù)年P(guān)注？一位美國(guó)教授提出這個(gè)問(wèn)題

95、到秘魯大學(xué)的學(xué)生。他們的主要答復(fù)是，秘魯政府多年來(lái)都迎合外國(guó)利益和給予外國(guó)人的優(yōu)勢(shì)和幫助，他們沒(méi)有給自己的人民。</p><p>　　為了檢驗(yàn)這一論點(diǎn)的優(yōu)劣，需要一個(gè)歷史的研究，超出了這個(gè)項(xiàng)目的范圍。讓我們簡(jiǎn)單的假設(shè)基礎(chǔ)研究的說(shuō)法：假設(shè)是，行業(yè)不能在秘魯發(fā)展離不開(kāi)特殊照顧，并從政府的援助。這是真的嗎？讓我們來(lái)認(rèn)真的案件。</p><p>　　比起五十年前多了，父親安東尼德Onofrio開(kāi)始

96、在冰淇淋業(yè)務(wù)上手推車。當(dāng)安東尼奧德Onofrio還小的工作，他去上班，他的父親。今天，德國(guó)的Onofrio是制造巧克力的主要關(guān)注和糖果，餅干各類和冰淇淋。</p><p>　　三十年前，奧斯卡費(fèi)朗，一個(gè)雜貨店，店老板的兒子，開(kāi)了一家小商店進(jìn)行實(shí)驗(yàn)用玻璃制造。今天，克里斯塔爾費(fèi)朗是在玻璃行業(yè)的領(lǐng)先企業(yè)，并產(chǎn)生如此優(yōu)秀的產(chǎn)品，它能夠出口其生產(chǎn)約百分之10至其他市場(chǎng)，包括美國(guó)。</p><p>

97、　　不到十年前，路易斯Banchero，誰(shuí)曾通過(guò)一個(gè)工科學(xué)校的路上的人在街上蹬石油產(chǎn)品，刮了足夠的錢去與美國(guó)建立伙伴關(guān)系，并成立一家工廠，生產(chǎn)鳳尾魚是魚粉豐富沿秘魯海岸。合作伙伴去世后不久開(kāi)始時(shí)，留下Banchero單獨(dú)進(jìn)行。該Banchero的第一家工廠的成功掀起了魚粉魚粉行業(yè)，直到今天的繁榮現(xiàn)象，（肥料和牲畜飼料中使用）已成為后，銅和棉花，秘魯外匯的主要來(lái)源。在捕魚和魚粉業(yè)和行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)在市場(chǎng)三十一個(gè)年齡在寫這篇文章的產(chǎn)品，最高的人物之

98、一，高級(jí)Banchero現(xiàn)在分支到其他工業(yè)企業(yè)。</p><p>　　這些人沒(méi)有一個(gè)是從政府在讓他們的企業(yè)開(kāi)始或在任何關(guān)鍵階段的任何援助。但是，誰(shuí)是這些人？德Onofrio是意大利移民。 Fenand是法國(guó)移民的兒子。 Banchero是一個(gè)意大利移民的兒子。如此這般。在任何今天在秘魯工業(yè)場(chǎng)合時(shí)，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)移民和移民的兒子大的比例。有成功的誰(shuí)是出生在該國(guó)兩個(gè)或更多代秘魯人工業(yè)企業(yè)家，但他們很少，足，以吸引注意，