法律專業(yè)畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯3

1、<p>　　Law and Fact in Patent Litigation: Form versus Function*</p><p>　　法律和事實(shí)在專利訴訟中是形式還是功能</p><p>　　Thomas G. Field, Jr.</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Recently, t

2、he Supreme Court sent Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp. back to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). It remanded with explicit directions that the lower court consider the extent to which Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(

3、a) governs appellate review of nonobviousness determinations.</p><p><b>　　介紹：</b></p><p>　　最近，最高法院駁回了丹尼森Mfg.訴泛達(dá)公司的案件至聯(lián)邦巡回法院（CAFC）。它的駁回帶有鮮明的特征，即在考慮了《美國聯(lián)邦民法》第52頁中所規(guī)定的審查基層法院上訴的非顯而易見的程度后

4、才發(fā)回重審。</p><p>　　On remand, the CAFC should attempt to relate the issue to the scope of review for other issues that arise in patent appeals. Neither the narrow nor the broad problem has ever received the att

5、ention it deserves — particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental law/fact dichotomy.</p><p>　　在發(fā)回重審時(shí)，聯(lián)邦巡回法院應(yīng)該嘗試在專利上訴時(shí)聯(lián)系它的復(fù)審范圍。但是無論是狹義還是廣義的問題都沒有得到它應(yīng)有的重視——特別是基本的法律/ 事實(shí)二分法上的觀點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　It

6、is by no means certain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate fo

7、r questions of fact under “clearly erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standards. This paper argues that, if the courts are inclined to persist in more intense review of nonobviousness, two other matters need to be cons

8、idered: First,</p><p>　　whether more liberal review should be extended to all questions concerning patent validity, and, second, whether such review should be conducted under a “constitutional fact” doctrine

9、.</p><p>　　這絕不是說專利的非顯而易見性裁定應(yīng)作為法律問題來對待。然而，現(xiàn)在有充分證據(jù)說明法院將更嚴(yán)格地審查這些帶有明顯錯(cuò)誤或者充足證據(jù)這么一個(gè)層次的審判結(jié)果。本文討論的是，如果法院都傾向于對專利的非顯而易見性堅(jiān)持更嚴(yán)格的審查，則另外兩個(gè)問題需要考慮：第一，審查是否應(yīng)當(dāng)擴(kuò)大到所有涉及專利的有效性審查，而且，第二，審查是否應(yīng)根據(jù)“憲制上的事實(shí)”原則來進(jìn)行。</p><p>　　T

10、he former would address apparent inconsistencies in the current law, and the latter would allow appellate courts an expanded role (function) without unduly confusing terminology (form).</p><p>　　前者將解決現(xiàn)行法律明顯不

11、一致，而后者則允許上訴法院的一個(gè)更大的作用（功能），而不會(huì)出現(xiàn)過度混亂的專業(yè)術(shù)語（形式）。</p><p>　　The Law/Fact Dichotomy</p><p><b>　　法律/事實(shí)二分理論</b></p><p>　　The most directly relevant precedent governing appellate

12、 review of patent litigation is cryptic. Quoted in the per curiam decision that remands Dennison, It consists of one sentence from the Court’s decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.: “While the ultimate question of patent

13、validity is one of law, ... the § 103 condition... lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.” </p><p>　　最直接相關(guān)的專利訴訟的先例中的上訴審查是比較模糊的。引述一則依法院決定將Dennison案發(fā)回重審的案例，法院對Graham v. John Deere Co.的決定中的有這么一句話

14、：“雖然專利的有效性問題最終都是法律問題，... 第103項(xiàng)條件...隨后又詢問了幾個(gè)基本的事實(shí)?！?</p><p>　　However, what that sentence means is unclear; Graham indicated neither reasons nor authority for denominating questions of patent validity, in g

15、eneral, or nonobviousness, specifically, as ones of “l(fā)aw” (as contrasted with “fact”). As shown below, without an analysis of those matters, it is very difficult to determine either whether validity issues other than non

16、obviousness should be treated as ones of “l(fā)aw” or, in any case, what sort of treatment should be afforded. It is hoped that, following t</p><p>　　不過，這句話的意思是什么不清楚，Graham表示命名這些專利權(quán)的有效性問題既沒有原因也沒有權(quán)威，在一般情況下，非顯而易性具

17、體而言是作為“法律”（作為對比的“事實(shí)”）的。如下所示，沒有對這些事項(xiàng)的分析，它是很難確定專利是否有效的問題比專利的非顯而易見性的問題更應(yīng)被視為“法律”或在任何情況下應(yīng)該提供的什么樣的待遇。人們希望，隨著Dennison案件的發(fā)回重申，能夠取得一些進(jìn)展，解決這些重要問題。</p><p>　　While much has been written on the law/fact dichotomy, a brie

18、f overview is in order. The terms, “l(fā)aw” and “fact” are used several ways, and it is necessary to define them in the present context. Approached that way, the term, “fact,” is more precisely called “adjudicative fact,” a

19、nd the most accurate definition is operational. In short, a question of adjudicative fact is one of the kind traditionally regarded as appropriate for juries. Conversely, a question of “l(fā)aw” is anything that remains — i&

20、lt;/p><p>　　盡管很多案例已經(jīng)被寫進(jìn)了法律/事實(shí)二分法，下面就來一個(gè)簡單的介紹。法律術(shù)語“法律”和“事實(shí)”被用于若干方面，在目前的情況下，我們有必要去給這個(gè)兩個(gè)術(shù)語下定義。專業(yè)術(shù)語“事實(shí)”，更精確地應(yīng)該被稱為“裁決的事實(shí)”，而這個(gè)最準(zhǔn)確的定義具有可操作性。總之，事實(shí)問題的裁決歷來是陪審團(tuán)認(rèn)為比較合適的裁判種類之一。相反， “法律”問題則是被遺留的問題——包括“立法”事實(shí)問題，它甚至被法院使用并與價(jià)值相結(jié)合后

21、，演變成一般規(guī)則。</p><p>　　The closest one can come to avoiding circularity is to look at whether a fact is critical only to the outcome of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the c

22、lasses of which the parties are merely members. See generally, e.g., B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 213-16 (2d Ed. 1984).</p><p>　　最接近的一次可以用來避免循環(huán)是看事實(shí)是否只對具體糾紛的結(jié)果，或只是去建立階級(jí)中少數(shù)成員的權(quán)利和義務(wù)。一般見，例如，B. Schwartz行政法，16

23、卷213頁（1984年第二版）。</p><p>　　Unfortunately, the water is muddied when courts occasionally resolve fact issues as a“matter of law.” Yet, even then, the operational definition stands: If a matter is sufficiently

24、well established in the record that reasonable minds could not differ, it is within the ultimate control of judges, not a jury. Hence, in sorting out “l(fā)aw” and “fact” issues, roles of judge and jury are paramount. </p

25、><p>　　不幸的是，在法院偶然的一次將事實(shí)問題當(dāng)做判例法來解決后水還是被攪渾了。然而，即使如此，在操作上它就定義為：如果一個(gè)事件被充分地記錄了但是合理的分析又不能將它辨別，那么只有法官有最終控制權(quán)，而不是陪審團(tuán)。因此，在對“法律”和“事實(shí)”問題進(jìn)行分類時(shí)，法官和陪審團(tuán)的角色是至關(guān)重要的。</p><p>　　Indeed, this is inherent in rights to jur

26、y trials; without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. While appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact properly entrusted t

27、o juries are entitled to exceptional deference under the “substantial evidence” standard. </p><p>　　事實(shí)上，這是陪審團(tuán)的固有權(quán)利；沒有這些區(qū)別，陪審團(tuán)的這一權(quán)利就是被架空的，上訴法官和審判法官也一樣。雖然上訴法院可能是法律問題的最終仲裁者，但是為了表示特殊的敬意，法院通常會(huì)在有大量充足的證據(jù)情況下的將事實(shí)案件妥善

28、地交給陪審團(tuán)。由于某些不同的原因，事實(shí)的裁決范圍要被擴(kuò)大，就像在Dennison案件中法官的審判，有“明顯錯(cuò)誤”的審查適用。</p><p>　　For somewhat different reasons, deference to fact finding is also extended, as in Dennison, to bench trials. There “clearly erroneous”

29、review applies. That standard is less deferential, but the Supreme Court demonstrated in Dennison, and more so in Inwood Laboratories more than token deference is required. </p><p>　　該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是不那么恭敬，但最高法院在Dennison

30、案件表現(xiàn)出來的，以及在Inwood實(shí)驗(yàn)室案件中說明超過象征性的尊重是必需的。</p><p>　　Until 1985, the depth of review sometimes varied depending on whether cases turned on demeanor or documentary evidence. The latter had sometimes been accorded

31、less deference.直到1985年，審查的深度有時(shí)視乎案件的行為或書面證據(jù)而不等。后者有時(shí)不被給予尊重。</p><p>　　The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings... based solely on documentary evidence is that th

32、e rationale of Rule but, in explaining the change made that year, the Advisory Committee said: These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by re

33、cognizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more act</p><p>　　主要論點(diǎn)有利于推進(jìn)搜索上訴審查結(jié)果...純粹證據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)是，規(guī)則的理由，但是，在解釋改變這一年，咨詢委員會(huì)說：這些考

34、慮公眾輿論的和司法經(jīng)濟(jì)會(huì)被審判法庭，而不是上訴法庭要允許上訴法院……。更加積極地分享實(shí)況調(diào)查功能往往會(huì)破壞在當(dāng)事人的心目中的區(qū)法院的合法性，一些事實(shí)問題的上訴重審案件將會(huì)速度增加，司法權(quán)威將會(huì)不必要的重新分配。</p><p>　　“Constitutional Facts”</p><p><b>　　“憲法事實(shí)”</b></p><p>　

35、　Despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give above-average scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at stake.Indeed, the Supreme

36、 Court held exactly that in Bose Corp v. Consumers Union U.S. While the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not patents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. </p&

37、gt;<p>　　盡管如此，也不管是否事實(shí)發(fā)生在審判前，在危急時(shí)刻憲法關(guān)注的一項(xiàng)爭議可以使法院給予高于平均水平的審查。事實(shí)上，最高法院認(rèn)為正是在Bose公司訴美國消費(fèi)者聯(lián)盟案件，雖然決定有關(guān)于言論自由和詆毀產(chǎn)品，而不是專利，適度延伸審查范圍會(huì)對后者產(chǎn)生重大影響。</p><p>　　In Bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to

38、 exercise independent judgment in determining when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the other’s products. One commentator has argued t

39、hat the Court’s reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. He also urges that deep review of constitutional facts is compelling when they have been found by administrative agencies. <

40、/p><p>　　在Bose案件中，有人認(rèn)為，上訴法院有責(zé)任決定當(dāng)一方應(yīng)該對另外乙方的非事實(shí)描述信任的時(shí)候獨(dú)立裁判（在此種情況下，與“意見”相反的東西）。一位評(píng)論家認(rèn)為，法院的自由裁量難以限制的第一修正案。他還對當(dāng)一項(xiàng)憲法事實(shí)被行政機(jī)關(guān)發(fā)現(xiàn)時(shí)它的審查深度時(shí)候可信度表示懷疑。</p><p>　　Consider whether findings that deal with patent va

41、lidity do not fit in either instance. At least when no new art is introduced in the litigation, a challenge to validity involves not only issues of constitutional interest (Art. I § 8 cl. 8) but also a collateral ch

42、allenge to findings of the Patent and Trademark Office. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the implications of this. Yet, it may well have had Bose (perhaps unconsciously) in mind when it rema

43、nded Dennison. </p><p>　　考慮專利的有效性不適合其他任何實(shí)例的結(jié)果是否成立。至少在沒有新的發(fā)現(xiàn)在訴訟中出現(xiàn)，對涉及的有效性提出挑戰(zhàn)，不僅憲法利益的問題（第一條第8款第8項(xiàng)），也是一個(gè)對于專利和商標(biāo)是局的調(diào)查結(jié)果的變相挑戰(zhàn)。這是令人懷疑的是，最高法院有機(jī)會(huì)考慮有關(guān)的影響。然而，在考慮Dennison 案件是很可能有Bose公司（也許不自覺地）在潛意識(shí)里。如果美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院，或者最高法院認(rèn)

44、為，在專利案件事實(shí)的特殊審查是非常必要的，應(yīng)考慮 “憲制上的事實(shí)”學(xué)說是否可能是有益的延長。專利代理人喜歡專利制度的憲法基礎(chǔ)這一理論。然而，很少有案件會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)移到這方面來，任何最高法院所作出的有效性裁決都是值得懷疑的。</p><p>　　Even an 1850 case often regarded as the genesis of the nonobviousness requirement was not

45、based on the Constitution. On the contrary, notwithstanding a dissent claiming otherwise, Justice Nelson did not admit to adding a new requirement — much less one mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, he insisted that me

46、re novelty, even coupled with market success, had long been inadequate to support patent validity. </p><p>　　即使是1850年的情況通常認(rèn)為非顯而易見性的要求不是以憲法為依據(jù)的。相反，盡管聲稱異議，法官納爾遜不承認(rèn)加入了新的要求——更不用說一個(gè)由憲法規(guī)定的。事實(shí)上，他堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，單純的新穎性，即使加上市場的

47、成功，早已不足以支持專利的有效性。</p><p>　　The first Supreme Court allusion to constitutional interests being involved in standards of patentability does not seem to have occurred until the 1950 — almost exactly a century l

48、ater. Moreover, it arose in the context of the Court’s addressing the scope of appellate review in patent cases. While it had a rule against re-examining findings consistently made by two lower courts, the Court neverthe

49、less found the patent invalid. The majority maintained, however, that it was reversing because the w</p><p>　　第一最高法院針對憲法的利益被參與到專利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的事實(shí)似乎并未有發(fā)生，直到1950年 - 幾乎整整一個(gè)世紀(jì)之后。此外，在它的背景下出現(xiàn)了法院在處理在專利案件上訴時(shí)規(guī)定了審查范圍。雖然它必須有兩個(gè)下級(jí)法

50、院進(jìn)行結(jié)果檢查規(guī)定，但法院從來沒有判定專利無效。然而大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為，這是因?yàn)殄e(cuò)誤的法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的應(yīng)用。</p><p>　　The most noteworthy aspect of that case, for present purposes, is a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. There, it was argued that the majority wou

51、ld have been justified in reversing, notwithstanding the two-court rule. He reasoned that validity is a question of law because “The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard; and the question of validity is

52、 a question of law.” For authority he cited Mahn v.Harwood, an 1884 case in which the Court reviewed a decision of the Patent Commi</p><p>　　在那種情況下對于當(dāng)前的目的最值得注意的方面，就是讓大法官Douglas贊成這個(gè)意見。在那里，有人認(rèn)為，多數(shù)是可以扭轉(zhuǎn)，盡管有兩法庭規(guī)

53、則。他的理由是有效性是法律的問題，因?yàn)樗f：“專利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是憲法標(biāo)準(zhǔn);以及有效性問題是一個(gè)法律問題?！睂τ跈?quán)威，他引用Mahn v.Harwood在1884年審判的一個(gè)案件中，法院審查了專利專員的決定。然而，Mahn 只指出，雖然可能專利專員過度尊重事實(shí)問題，但是法院不必在這個(gè)法律問題上推遲——因?yàn)檫@根本就不是什么驚天動(dòng)地的問題。</p><p>　　Had Graham cited Justice Douglas’

54、 opinion in A&P, it would have been helpful in understanding what was meant by calling validity a question of law. Nevertheless, the explicit constitutional origins of the patent system, perhaps coupled with the fact

55、 that validity may involve collateral review of administrative action, could serve as a basis for de novo review of questions of fact. Whether the constitutional fact doctrine or anything else should be used to that end,

56、 however, is another question. </p><p>　　如果Graham引述司法部Douglas在A＆P公司的觀點(diǎn)，這將對理解什么是調(diào)用法律效力問題是有幫助的。然而，憲法明確了專利制度的起源，也許事實(shí)有效性可能涉及抵押品的行政行為的審查，可以作為一個(gè)從頭對事實(shí)問題審查的基礎(chǔ)上加上。但是，無論在憲法或其他任何學(xué)說應(yīng)當(dāng)用于這一目的，就轉(zhuǎn)變成了另外一個(gè)問題。在致力于這個(gè)事實(shí)之前，對非顯而易見

57、性更仔細(xì)的考察可能是有用的。</p><p>　　Is Nonobviousness a Special Case?</p><p>　　非顯而易見性是一個(gè)特殊的情形嗎？</p><p>　　Whatever the CAFC decides about the appropriate standard of review for</p><p&

58、gt;　　nonobviousness, it ought also to address why that standard should differ from that applied to other validity requirements. While nonobviousness was the primary concern in Graham and companion cases, that decision ca

59、lls validity a question of law. If the CAFC chooses to single out nonobviousness for special treatment, it should justify it’s approach.</p><p>　　無論聯(lián)邦巡回法院決定為非顯而易見性決定適當(dāng)?shù)膶彶闃?biāo)準(zhǔn)，它應(yīng)該也能解釋為何該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)有所區(qū)別于應(yīng)用到其他的有效性要求。雖然非顯

60、而易見性是在Graham案件和同樣的案件中的主要關(guān)注點(diǎn)，該決定被稱為一個(gè)法律問題的有效性。如果聯(lián)邦巡回法院選擇對非顯而易見性進(jìn)行特殊待遇，應(yīng)該證明它的做法。</p><p>　　It might do so based on the origins of the nonobviousness requirement. Yet, even if nonobviousness had been found in Ho

61、tchkiss to be constitutionally mandated, an implicit requirement would hardly be more important than the utility requirement, which is about as explicit as the Constitution gets. Thus, even if the “constitutional fact” d

62、octrine were used to justify more appellate review, nonobviousness would not stand out.</p><p>　　也許這樣做是基于非顯而易見性要求的起源。然而，然而,盡管非顯而易見性已經(jīng)被發(fā)現(xiàn)在Hotchkiss是具有憲法，一個(gè)隱含要求將很難超過與憲法同樣明晰的實(shí)用要求。因此，即使是“憲法事實(shí)”學(xué)說被用于辯護(hù)更多的上訴評(píng)審，非顯而易

63、見性也不會(huì)脫穎而出。</p><p>　　The CAFC might also attempt to distinguish nonobviousness on the basis of its technical difficulty and the tendency of fact finders to see inventions as obvious through hindsight. Still,

64、neither that nor the tendency to Monday-morning quarterback should any more justify extraordinary appellate review than it would justify withholding nonobviousness (or, for that matter, medical malpractice) from the jury

65、 altogether.</p><p>　　美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院也可能試圖在技術(shù)難度和事實(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)者在看到事后明顯的虛構(gòu)物時(shí)的傾向基礎(chǔ)上，分辨非顯而易見性。不過，既不是那樣，也不是有放馬后炮傾向的人可能再替特別上訴評(píng)審辯護(hù)會(huì)而不是替來自陪審團(tuán)隱瞞的非顯而易見性辯護(hù)（或與此有關(guān)的醫(yī)療事故）。</p><p>　　The Bottom Line</p><p><b&g

66、t;　　例外情況</b></p><p>　　The CAFC has full control of issues of patent law, subject only to legislative and Supreme Court oversight. When reviewing infringement litigation, whether there is a jury or not,

67、 it has the capacity, for example, to correct for the application of erroneous legal standards, to expand the application of principles, or to carve out exceptions to rules.</p><p>　　根據(jù)最高人民法院的立法和監(jiān)督，美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院有

68、專利法的完全控制權(quán)。在審查侵權(quán)訴訟時(shí)，無論有沒有陪審團(tuán)，它有能力改正錯(cuò)誤法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的應(yīng)用，擴(kuò)大原則的應(yīng)用，或開拓出規(guī)則的例外。</p><p>　　It can also correct clear errors of fact. Its power is even greater where no jury is involved. Yet, regardless of the standard of revie

69、w, it cannot second-guess the resolution of disputes that turn on the relative credibility of witnesses. If a case turns on credibility, it is difficult to justify reversal. That would leave trial courts and the bar gues

70、sing.</p><p>　　它也可以糾正事實(shí)的清楚錯(cuò)誤。如果沒有陪審團(tuán)參與，它就有更大的權(quán)利。然而，忽略審查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，它不能依賴證人相對可靠性來猜測糾紛的解決。如果一個(gè)案件轉(zhuǎn)向可靠，這就難以解釋逆轉(zhuǎn)。這將猜想留給了審判法庭和法庭欄桿了。</p><p>　　If closer review of certain issues of fact seems justified notwiths

71、tanding, e.g., problems with demeanor evidence, perhaps on the basis of (often correct) judicial intuition, it behooves the CAFC to confront the issue squarely. It could turn out, on closer inspection, that such review i

72、s unwarranted or, if warranted, falls within a recognized exception. It is possible, too, that a new theory may need to be evolved to explain a new exception. The worst that could happen would be to fail to deal w</p&

73、gt;<p>　　如果事實(shí)的必然爭論點(diǎn)的近一步評(píng)審似乎審查得很有道理，例如，風(fēng)范證據(jù)的問題，可能在司法直覺（通常是正確的）的基礎(chǔ)上，理當(dāng)由美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院直接面對問題。仔細(xì)觀察后，可能發(fā)現(xiàn)這種審查是毫無根據(jù)的，或者落在了一個(gè)公認(rèn)的例外范圍。這也是可能的，同樣，一個(gè)新的理論可能需要發(fā)展才能解釋一個(gè)新例外。最壞的情況也將無法處理這個(gè)問題。這將猜測留給了審判法庭和酒吧.這也似乎在過度鼓勵(lì)無效練習(xí)將不會(huì)被第一時(shí)間處理。</p

74、><p>　　Should review more intensive than permitted under Rule 52(a) be somehow justified for fact disputes underlying one or more validity requirements, calling them issues of “l(fā)aw” changes nothing and merely c

75、onfuses matters. Hence, the “constitutional fact” doctrine deserves close attention. It would highlight the need for intense appellate review without concealing the essential nature of the issue; in short, it would serve

76、 the needs of both form and function. </p><p>　　應(yīng)該更深入的檢討而不是允許在第52（a）條法令下事實(shí)質(zhì)疑隱含一個(gè)或多個(gè)有效要求合法化，稱他們的問題“法律”沒有什么變化，只是混淆問題。因此，“憲法事實(shí)”原則值得密切注意。這將強(qiáng)調(diào)強(qiáng)烈上訴審判的需要沒有隱藏問題的本質(zhì),簡言之,這將滿足形式和功能的雙重需要。 </p><p>　　Regardle

77、ss of the outcome, everyone should appreciate an honest attempt to grapple with an issue in limbo far too long. In Dennison, the CAFC has an opportunity to shape the very foundations of patent litigation. It is to be hop