[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]環(huán)境治理外文翻譯--環(huán)境治理——從公共到私人？（英文）

1、Contents lists available at ScienceDirectEcological Economicsjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecoleconAnalysisEnvironmental Governance – From Public to Private?Arild VatnFaculty of Landscape and Society (Landsam

2、), Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences(NMBU), Noragric/NMBU, P.O. Box 5003, 1432 Aas, NorwayA R T I C L E I N F OKeywords:Environmental Govern

3、ancePrivatizationMarket CreationPublic GoodsMotivationTransaction CostsA B S T R A C TThis paper analyzes the expanded role of private actors and markets in environmental governance. The publicgoods dimension of environm

4、ental services renders privatization and trading challenging. To illustrate the keyissues involved, a series of privatization efforts and market creations are reviewed. Despite the focus on pri-vatization, the empirical

5、material shows that the role of the state is still very pronounced. It defines the com-modities and property rights, and plays a key role in setting up and regulating the markets. In the case ofpayments for ecosystem ser

6、vices, public authorities even appear as the dominant ‘trader’. Privatization andmarkets may reduce costs of delivering the service, while this is not universally true. Moreover, the servicedelivered often is transformed

7、 to make trade possible. Finally, high transaction costs may prohibit the creation ofmarkets. The conflict between public goods delivery and private profit motive makes public control both im-portant and difficult. Final

8、ly, several distributional issues following this neo-liberal development are high-lighted.1. IntroductionEnvironmental governance is moving towards an expanded role forprivate actors and markets. This neo-liberal trend i

9、ncludes e.g., priva-tization of environmental resources, programs like payments of eco-system services as well as carbon markets. Moreover, private rule-making have become increasingly important – e.g., certification.Thi

10、s development represents a change in the institutional basis forthe management of many environmental resources. Originally, en-vironmental policy was dominated by public regulations based on legaland economic instruments

11、. Over time, there seems to be a shift towardsmore ‘private regulation’. It is argued that this will enhance efficiency –e.g., Pagiola and Platais (2007). The development is also thought tolessen the burden on public bud

12、gets. At the same time, privatizationand markets face limitations in a sphere like the environment. The aimof this paper is to study the new trend to see what the institutionallandscape looks like and to what extent expe

13、ctations have been met.The paper is divided in six parts. First, I give a brief overview ofwhat characterizes environmental resources from a socio-political andnatural science perspective. Second, I explain the conceptua

14、l frame-work used in the analysis. The analysis is divided in three parts focusedat a selected set of cases regarding a) changes in property rights towardsincreased private ownership of resources; b) the creation of mark

15、ets inenvironmental services; and c) the development of self-regulation i.e.,the move from state law to private rule making. Finally, I conclude bydiscussing and summarizing the findings and offering explanations forthe

16、patterns observed.2. Characterizing Environmental ResourcesNature is of great economic, social and cultural importance. First,we all live off nature and how access to these resources is distributed iscrucial. For the poo

17、r, it may even influence the capacity to survive.Defining e.g., property rights seems important also to avoid over-exploitation.We do, however, not only live off, but also in and with nature(O'Neill et al., 2008). Th

18、e significance and meaning of nature is com-plex as well as culture specific. Environmental values may pertain tocertain places. Nature is moreover common in the sense that what onedoes to e.g., a forest has implications

19、 for others. It therefore becomes atense political and social issue as to who should have the right to ‘use’these resources, what should be for individual use and what should beunder common decisions.From a biophysical p

20、erspective, ecosystems are complex networksof processes including species transforming and transferring matter andenergy. We talk of bio-geochemical cycles of different spatial andtemporal scales. Variation in life forms

21、 – biodiversity – is crucial for thedynamics of ecosystems and their resilience (Odum and Barrett, 2005).The above observations have several implications for environmentalgovernance. First, we have the issue of rights to

22、 resources and howshifts in such rights influence people's opportunities. Second, environ-mental values may both be quite idiosyncratic as well as highlyhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.010Received 6 Septem

23、ber 2017; Received in revised form 18 December 2017; Accepted 9 January 2018E-mail address: arild.vatn@nmbu.no.Ecological Economics 148 (2018) 170–1770921-8009/ © 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.Tespecially in the UK

24、, US and Canada.Land trusts focus at conservation and ensuring land for public ac-cess. Hodge and Adams (2012) discuss the situation in the UK withreference to the debate on neo-liberalization and privatization. Land for

25、land trusts is mainly acquired from other private owners. Hence, to theextent one can talk of privatization, it regards the conservation re-sponsibilities. The public may still be involved through partnerships.The state

26、may moreover help land trusts by e.g., giving priority tocollective buying of land as recently included in the Scottish Land Re-form Act. Hodge and Adams note that “The policy represents a directstate intervention to pus

27、h back the operation of the private land marketand override the interests of individual owners in order to promotecollective action in support of public policy objectives” (ibid.:476).Hence, “Neo-liberalization is too br

28、oad a category to offer an adequatebasis for the analysis of rural land conservation policies” (p.480).Logan and Wekerle (2008) observe a similar trend in Canada, butsee it much more as neo-liberalism in action where the

29、 state facilitatescreating expansion opportunities for private profit making. It is truethat the development follows a strong reduction in expenditures onconservation by relevant ministries. This seems to be an effect of

30、 neo-liberal ideology. Land trusts ‘fill (some of) the gap’ left – while they stillreceive public funding, and landowners that make contracts with landtrusts for conservation are supported by tax incentives. While a ‘pul

31、l-back’ of the state, it plays at the same time a key role in facilitating theoperation of land trusts. Most notably, it is hard to see this kind of‘privatization’ as pushing the frontiers for private profit making.4.2.

32、Water ServicesWater services include domestic water delivery, wastewater treat-ment, irrigation, as well as ‘services’ for ecosystems. I will here focus onthe first of these. Privatization of domestic water services come

33、s indifferent forms. There are systems where infrastructure and manage-ment responsibilities are transferred from a public body to a privatecompany, and there are systems where infrastructure is still publiclyowned while

34、 a private company is responsible for (some of) the op-erative parts. Therefore, what is owned and what is under operationcontracts varies.The system with private ownership of water infrastructure is calledthe UK system

35、and refers to the way public water agencies for Englandand Wales were transferred to private companies by the Thatchergovernment. The system with operation contracts dominates, however,globally and includes various forms

36、 of public-private partnerships – seeBakker (2010), Jacobs and Howe (2005), McDonalds and Ruiters(2005), de Gouvello and Scott (2012). Shift in ownership of water itselfis usually not part of the privatization of domesti

37、c water services.1 Thisillustrates some of the challenges involved when privatizing waterservices. Water covers a basic need for humans as well as other species.Hence, there is the argument that access should be ensured

38、for all, andif taken seriously, it reduces opportunities for trade (Bakker, 2007).Privatization of domestic water services is not new. Morgan (2005)shows, as an example, how the US and UK involved the private sectorexten

39、sively in the 19th century, while turning to public solutions formost of the 20th. What is special about the recent privatization is therole of transnational firms. The sector is quite monopolized with RWE-Thames, Suez a

40、nd Vivendi as dominant actors (Jacobs and Howe, 2005;Morgan, 2005). According to Morgan (2005), these firms were re-sponsible for about 15% of the world's water supply at the time.Water privatization is justified by

41、expected increased efficiency andby fiscal arguments – see e.g., Dore et al. (2004), Araral (2009). Havethese ‘promises’ been fulfilled? The literature shows that performance isvery context-dependent. The overall picture

42、 is, however, that cost ofdelivery does not differ systematically between private and public do-mestic water services. This is the conclusion of four meta-studies ana-lyzing the effect of water privatization – Dore et al

43、. (2004), Bel andWarner (2008), Araral (2009), de Gouvello and Scott (2012) – andaccording to Araral (2009) this is the consensus view. I note that thecosts of public regulation are not included in these assessments. Whi

44、lepublic water bodies also need to be controlled, this cost is expected tobe higher under the privatization regime as they have to organizebidding and undertake contracting, price controls, and ensure that ‘non-economic’

45、 uses are taken care of – including water to ecosystems(Swyngedouw, 2005).Generally, it is only the bidding that is competitive – and less so dueto monopolization in the sector. Delivery is a natural monopoly and thepote

46、ntial positive effect of competition is weakened. In the end, it is stillthe public that is responsible for delivery and acceptable prices – e.g.,the UK price regulation from 1999 (Dore et al., 2004). Bel and Warner(2008

47、) emphasize that due to asset specificity – for example, the qualityof infrastructures – there is also substantial information asymmetry thatresults in high rates of renegotiation of contracts.Regarding the issue of fisc

48、al balance, Hall and Lobina (2006) showthat privatization has not relieved the public of the burden of invest-ments where the problem is largest – in developing countries. Watercompanies have concentrated their efforts m

49、ore in medium to high-income countries where the possibilities for earning money is greatest.The problem of generating resources for investments in domestic waterservices in the South therefore largely prevails. While th

50、ere have beensubstantial levels of protest against privatization due to price increasesand people being cut off if unable to pay – e.g., McDonalds and Ruiters(2005), Bakker (2007, 2010) – dysfunctionalities of the public

51、 systemtypically continue. This is so not least because of lack of finances.Sometimes payments for water services are even used to support othersectors of an underfinanced state – see e.g., Hellum et al. (2015).5. Creati

52、ng Markets in Environmental GovernanceWhile there has been reference to trade above, the issue of estab-lishing markets in environmental governance warrants more in-depthtreatment. According to Coase (1960), if transacti

53、on costs are zero/lowand rights clearly defined, it would be better to rely on markets thanstate regulation. While many saw Coase's paper as a theoretical ex-ercise, it has become part of neo-liberal practice. To ill

54、ustrate keyvariations across the field, I will briefly cover four areas – the creationof markets for individual fishing quotas, the establishment of paymentsfor ecosystem services, carbon markets and finally biodiversity

55、 offsets.5.1. Tradable Fish QuotasEstablishing markets for an environmental resource, demands alsoestablishment of rights to the resource. This is well illustrated by thetopic of tradable fish quotas. The first step is t

56、o define total allowablecatches (TACs) – an important strategy in regulating harvests in fish-eries. States create property rights in these catches by splitting up TACsinto individual quotas (IQs). Some countries have ne

57、xt made thesetradable (ITQs). Fish may travel large distances and transgress nationalborders. International agreements have therefore been key in the de-velopment of TAC/I(T)Q systems (e.g., Stokke, 2012). According toAr

58、nason (2012), harvests under ITQs cover up to 25% of global marineharvests.Economists largely support ITQs on the grounds that it reduces perunit costs of catches (e.g., Grafton, 1996; Hannesson, 2004; Arnason,2012) comp

59、ared to non-tradable IQs – a claim that is empirically sup-ported. Including transaction costs into the equation seems not tochange that conclusion. In 2008, eighteen countries used ITQs “tomanage several hundred stocks

60、of at least 249 species” (Chu,1 The conflict in Cochabamba over payments for collecting rainwater is a much com-mented case to the contrary. International Waters were contracted for water delivery andclaimed the right to

61、 rainwater by including it into their paid permit system. Regarding theUK system, I note that water companies need a license from the Environment Agency toaccess water sources and have to pay for the water (see Environme