[雙語翻譯]環(huán)境治理外文翻譯--政府間環(huán)境治理關(guān)系（英文）

1、Contents lists available at ScienceDirectJournal of Environmental Managementjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvmanResearch articleIntergovernmental relations for environmental governance: Cases of solid waste

2、management and climate change in two Malaysian StatesJose A. Puppim de OliveiraFundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), Management School of São Paulo (FGV/EAESP), and Brazilian School of Public and Business Adminis

3、tration (FGV/EBAPE), BrazilA R T I C L E I N F OKeywords:Intergovernmental relationsEnvironmental governanceClimate changeWaste managementDeveloping countryAsiaMalaysiaJohorPenangA B S T R A C TInstitutions for environme

4、ntal governance evolve differently across sectors. They also vary in the same sectorwhen governments at two levels (national and subnational) have different political alignments. As the policyenvironment becomes more com

5、plex, with global problems like climate change, and politics more dividing,better coordination among various levels of government is a tough governance challenge. Scholars and practi-tioners need to realize how best to b

6、uild institutions to bridge the various levels of government in differentpolitical environments and environmental sectors. This research analyzes the influence of intergovernmentalrelations in two environmental sectors i

7、n two localities with contrasting political alignments between two levelsof government. It draws lessons from solid waste management and climate policy in two Malaysian states (Johorand Penang). In an evolving State and

8、new policy arenas, when formal institutions for intergovernmental re-lations may not be effectively in place, politics play an even larger role through the discretionary power offederal and subnational authorities. An op

9、en political process can help with the engagement of different politicalgroups and civil society to bring legitimacy, resources and efficiency to environmental management, if it is donewith robust intergovernmental insti

10、tutions; otherwise, intergovernmental relations can also become a tool forzero-sum games, cronyism and patrimonialism, which can undermine policies, and result in inefficiencies andineffectiveness in environmental manage

11、ment.1. IntroductionThe world population is expected to reach 8.5 billion by 2030. Fivebillion of those will live in cities, increasing the world's already over-exploited resources. The ability to achieve the Sustain

12、able DevelopmentGoals (SDGs) of the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for SustainableDevelopment (UN, 2015) will depend on effective urban environmentalmanagement to deal with issues such as climate change and waste.There

13、has been an unprecedented demand for improving governance incities (in this paper, city is a subnational government having an urbanarea) and other subnational governments to deliver better environ-mental management, part

14、icularly in light of limited resources andunder increasing pressure resulting from rapid changes. Changes ingovernance can enhance environmental management and sustainability(Den Uyl and Driessen, 2015). However, city go

15、vernments have limitedautonomy and capacities to handle a growing set of challenges (Pierre,1999). Intergovernmental relations are indispensable to coordinate ef-forts between national and subnational governments (Agrano

16、ff, 1986;O'Toole and Christensen, 2012). Non-governmental sectors, such ascivil society organizations and the private sector, are also increasinglybeing decisive players in action and knowledge transposition to cover

17、political and capacity gaps to address certain environmental issues atdifferent levels (Andrade and Puppim de Oliveira, 2015; Kadirbeyoglu,2017).The context of urban environmental management in Asia and else-where has al

18、so become more complex. Multiple levels of governance(i.e., global, federal, state and local) affect the way cities impact and areimpacted by local and global environmental issues (Hickmann et al.,2017). This is particul

19、arly important for multi-sectoral environmentalissues that require the participation of various levels and departmentsin the State, such as policies to tackle climate change. For example,decisions about the energy supply

20、 in Malaysian cities, which are key toaddressing climate change, are primarily made by the national gov-ernment, not local or state authorities. Thus, building mechanisms forintergovernmental relations among the differen

21、t organizations in aState is crucial to coordinate environmental management and policy.This paper aims to examine environmental governance at subna-tional level in Malaysia. It analyzes how institutions for building in-t

22、ergovernmental relations in different environmental sectors developand how they vary when governments in the two levels (state/local andfederal) have different political alignments. It is an attempt to under-stand how be

23、st to build governance mechanisms in different politicalhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2018.11.097Received 9 January 2018; Received in revised form 16 November 2018; Accepted 22 November 2018E-mail addresses: jose.pup

24、pim@fgv.br, japo3@yahoo.com.Journal of Environmental Management 233 (2019) 481–488Available online 26 December 20180301-4797/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Tor more levels of government (e.g., federal, st

25、ate, city) can generatedependency and expectations that the other — in general, the higherlevel — will bring the resources and capabilities to implement the po-licies (often in exchange for political loyalty or favors).

26、Thus, institu-tional inertia can set in when the same political group leads acrossvarious governmental levels, by inhibiting innovation and effectiveresource use.On the other hand, political differences in two levels of

27、governmentcan decrease willingness to coordinate efforts or even create a “zero-sum” game. It is not uncommon for players at two government levelsdominated by different political groups to blame each other for a pro-blem

28、 or ineffectiveness in public policies or for invading each other'sjurisdiction (Stratton, 1989). Nevertheless, political rivalry can driveinstitution building to improve services and policies through “healthy”politi

29、cal competition (Fiszbein, 1997). Two political groups at two le-vels of government or in different governmental divisions could agreeto innovate and “do better” in order to achieve political gains and le-gitimacy for ea

30、ch of their constituencies.In light of the above, a key point concerning improvement in en-vironmental governance is the institutions that bridge intergovern-mental relations. Thus, the primary research question in this

31、paper is:How do institutions in diverse environmental sectors emerge to bridgeintergovernmental relations between two government levels underdifferent political alignments?3. Research methodologyThis paper applies the ca

32、se study method for the two Malaysianstates in two sectors. The case study approach is particularly re-commended for research where quantitative data alone cannot explaina phenomenon (Ragin and Becker, 1992). This resear

33、ch explores pat-terns of intergovernmental relations as they affect urban environmentalmanagement and policies in cases in Malaysia to better understandinstitution building in the waste management sector and climatechang

34、e under different political alignments. The justification forchoosing Penang and Johor as cases are that they had historically quitedifferent political relations with the national government. Until the2018 elections, Pen

35、ang was controlled by the opposition in recent timesand Johor was politically aligned to the federal government, though thefederal government and each state were able to work together in severalinitiatives. Also, policie

36、s in the two selected sectors, waste managementand climate change, need to have different kinds of coordination amonggovernment levels to be properly implemented.The field research included visits and more than 42 semi-s

37、tructuredinterviews with policy-makers in government, academia, civil societygroups, private service providers and citizens in Johor (where the au-thor lived for four months), Putrajaya/Kuala Lumpur (three field visits)a

38、nd Penang (three field visits) between September 2015 and May 2018.The author interviewed individuals from several organizations, in-cluding: SWCorp national headquarters in Putrajaya, SWCorp's statebranch in Johor,

39、Municipal Council of Penang Island (MBPP: MajlisBandaraya Pulau Pinang, in Malay), Johor Bahru Tengah MunicipalCouncil (MPJBT: Majlis Perbandaran Johor Bahru Tengah, in Malay),Federal Ministry of Housing and Local Govern

40、ment, Town and CountryPlanning Department, Think City, The Penang Institute, Penang GreenCouncil (PGC), Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA),Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), UTM School of Build Environment,Univ

41、ersity of Malaya and various members from civil society groups,particularly those working in urban environmental issues, such as TzuChi Education and Recycle Centers and Consumers Association ofPenang (CAP). The intervie

42、ws lasted between 20 and 60 min, andsometimes were followed by field visits in the projects or localities theorganization or individuals worked.The author carried out extensive data collection related to thetrends of the

43、 different environmental sectors in Penang, Johor and morebroadly about Malaysia, but concentrated the questions in wastemanagement and climate change during the interviews, some of whichwere transcribed and others recor

44、ded. In order to understand dynamicsat the local level, one local authority in the capital of each state wherethe author had access to informants were selected for more in-depthanalysis: MBPP in Penang and MPJBT in Johor

45、. However, the analyseswere broader for the states, as local authorities are under the state'spolitical control. From the interviews, the author collected informationon the various factors that shaped the relations b

46、etween organizationsin different levels of government, and how those relations helped tobuild or hinder institutions in addressing urban environmental issues(e.g., waste management) and in combating climate change. The i

47、n-terviews provided data that was analyzed to examine how differentinitiatives in waste management and climate policy emerged and de-veloped, how organizational and institutional capacity was built andhow the stakeholder

48、s were able to overcome various political, resourceand institutional obstacles to improve waste management and fulfillMalaysia's climate change agenda.4. A diagnosis of governance in MalaysiaMalaysia has a multi-ethn

49、ic population of more than 31 million, ofprimarily ethnic Malays, Chinese and Indians. The Chinese tends todominate the economy in urban centers, whereas Malays control publicadministration and politics (Harding and Chin

50、, 2014). The Malaysianeconomy grew rapidly after its independence, although its growthslowed after the economic recessions in 1997 and 2008. From a post-colonial poverty-stricken country in the 1960s, with a large part o

51、f thepopulation illiterate and without basic services, it has become a middle-high income country aiming to be a “fully developed” country by the2020s, according to the 11th Malaysia Plan 2016–2020 (Government ofMalaysia

52、, 2015).The country is a federal constitutional monarchy and consists ofthree federal territories and 13 states, nine of which have hereditaryrulers. It has a prime minister as government head (selected among themajority

53、 political group in the national parliament) and a king (or Yangdi-Pertuan Agong) as a head of State, chosen among the nine ‘hereditary’rulers. The Federal Constitution and laws divide the responsibilitiesamong the diffe

54、rent entities in the federation. The constitution desig-nates exclusive responsibilities of the states and the federal govern-ment, as well as their shared responsibilities (Malaysia, 1957). Thefederal government control

55、s a large part of the responsibilities andresources, but states control some important resources such as land,forests and water within their territories. The country also has a thirdtier of government: the municipalities

56、 or local authorities (LAs). How-ever, Malaysia abolished municipal elections in 1969 for political rea-sons (i.e., after waves of ethnic and political unrest). Thus the statescontrol municipal governments, appointing th

57、e heads of the local au-thorities (LAs) and councilors. Therefore, LAs function more as ad-ministrative bodies and the mayors are often career public servants.Malaysia has several political parties divided along ethnic,

58、religiousand ideological lines. The same political group (called Barisan Nasionalor BN, a coalition of mainly ethnic parties) had dominated nationalpolitics since the creation of Malaysia as a country, though BN lostelec

59、tions in 2018 to a splitter group that aligned to the traditionalopposition.Unlike other countries in the region, such as Indonesia, which is aunitary state but has pursued decentralization (Lewis, 2015), Malaysiahas bec

60、ome more centralized in recent decades (Hutchinson, 2014).The New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971, and its follow-up plans, re-quired tight control of the state bureaucracy and economy (Harding andChin, 2014). In this tren

61、d of centralization, one of the latest responsi-bilities to be centralized was waste management. Previously in thehands of the local authorities, waste management was federalized bythe Solid Waste and Public Cleansing Ma

62、nagement Act of 2007(SWPCM Act, 2007). The main alleged reason for this centralization isthat many local authorities could not afford and lacked the technicalJ.A. Puppim de Oliveira Journal of Environmental Management 23