外文翻譯--政府績效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)

1、中文 中文 4350 4350 字外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯 外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯原文：Government Performance: Lesson and ChallengesThis article concentrates on attempts by OECD countries to introduce performance-based or results-based budgeting and management. The need to

2、enhance public sector performance has become more urgent as governments face mounting demands on public expenditure, calls for higher quality services and, in some countries, a public increasingly unwilling to pay higher

3、 taxes. Performance budgeting and performance management seek to move the focus of budgeting, management and accountability away from inputs towards results, i.e. better value for money. Drawing on data from the OECD/Wor

4、ld Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database, the article explores the trends and country approaches (different phases, various objectives), discusses accountability to the public (including external performance audi

5、ting), and recognises the importance of context and a whole-of-government approach, in particular for changing the behaviour of key actors and motivating politicians to use performance information. The limitations and te

6、nsions of performance budgeting and performance management are also discussed, as well as problems of measurement and the efficient use of performance information.A great deal of rhetoric has surrounded the introduction

7、of performance management and budgeting. Supporters claim that it has the capacity to transform governments. However, it is important that this reform should not be seen as a panacea and that governments have realistic e

8、xpectations about what it can achieve and the time needed to reach these objectives.Even countries that have been using this approach for over 15 years continue to struggle with issues of measurement; this is especially

9、the case for outcomes. A key challenge for all countries is obtaining good quality information which is valid, reliable, and timely. Numerous challenges can be encountered including setting clear are set at too high or t

10、oo low a level.Too many targets: There is also an issue about how many targets to have. Too many targets create information overload and make it difficult to select priorities; too few targets create distortion effects.

11、Again it takes time to get a realistic balance. Several countries have started out with a large number of targets and subsequently reduced them. For example, in the United Kingdom when performance agreements for departme

12、nts were first introduced as part of the comprehensive spending review in 1998, there were in total 600 targets across government. By the time of the revised spending review in 2002, that number had been reduced to 130 t

13、argets (H.M. Treasury, 2004).Avoiding distorting behaviour: This is a challenge for all governments. Possible perverse effects include goal distortion – that is, organisations and managers focusing on a few specific indi

14、cators and targets, usually the most achievable or “saleable”, at the expense of the overall objectives or programme. In extreme cases of goal distortion, agencies or staff, under pressure to meet targets, may deliberate

15、ly present misleading information. In many OECD countries, the objective of introducing performance into the budget process is to improve budgetary decision making and to act as an incentive for agencies to improve perfo

16、rmance. Most countries, however, continue to struggle with this approach. As discussed above, one of the key issues is obtaining good quality and reliable performance data. Briefly, other challenges include establishing

17、some link between financial information and performance information. This is particularly challenging for outcome measures. In many countries there are also problems with the structure of the budget and accounting issues

18、. Budgets tend to be structured in accordance with institutional and functional boundaries and not according to results categories. Also if there is no system of cost recording, it is difficult to relate true costs to re

19、sults.Getting the right mix of incentives: This is particularly important when countries use performance information in resource allocation. A fundamental question is whether financial rewards should be given for good pe