追趕，危機(jī)和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)韓國的電子產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)學(xué)習(xí)進(jìn)化方面外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2880字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： Catching-up, crisis and industrial upgrading: </p><p>　　Evolutionary aspects of technological le

2、arning </p><p>　　In Korea’s electronics industry </p><p>　　出 處： Asia Pacific Journal of Management </p><p>　　作 者： Diete

3、r Ernst </p><p>　　A SIMPLIFIED MODEL</p><p>　　A distinguishing feature of the Korean model has been a symbiotic relationship between governments and large business groups (th

4、e chaebols). This has given rise to the following vicious circle of truncated industrial upgrading a heavy reliance on credit and an extremely unbalanced industry structure has led to a narrow knowledge base, and a stick

5、y pattern of specialization. The development of Korea’s electronics industry fits the pattern of large-scale, capital-intensive latecomer industrializat</p><p>　　Once a decision has been made to enter a sect

6、or, the chaebols normally move in on a massive scale and in a highly integrated manner. By channeling funds at concessionary terms to a handful of chaebols, the state has created powerful domestic oligopolies. Korea’s ex

7、tremely unbalanced industry structure has given rise to a peculiar form of competition strategy: firm growth has occurred through octopus-like diversification into many different and unrelated industries rather than thro

8、ugh an accumula</p><p>　　This development model worked well, as long as major export markets kept growing rapidly. As we will see in the following sections, this is no longer the case today. The result is ov

9、er-capacity and price wars, as well as a dramatic increase in the country’s exposure to debt. After three decades of rapid growth, Korea is now facing a major crisis. External factors, caused by the volatility of interna

10、tional financial markets, have acted as a catalyst; their impact however has been magnified by imp</p><p>　　A NARROW DOMESTIC KNOWLEDGE BASE</p><p>　　A narrow domestic knowledge base is another

11、indicator of Korea’s truncated industrial upgrading. Catching-up required a limited set of capabilities: a capacity to absorb and upgrade imported foreign technology and to develop operational capabilities in production,

12、 investment and minor adaptations. This is no longer sufficient today. In 1995, an OECD review of Korea’s NSI concluded: ‘The country can no longer afford simply to import technology - which foreigners are in fact more a

13、nd more reticent</p><p>　　Korea thus needs to create a broad-based and diversified knowledge base, especially with regard to product design, market development, the production of key components and the provi

14、sion of high-end knowledge intensive support services. So far however, Korea’s knowledge base is constrained by three main weaknesses: an insufficient critical mass of R&D; gross inefficiencies of corporate technolog

15、y management; and equally important inefficiencies of its public innovation system.</p><p>　　An insufficient critical mass</p><p>　　Until around the mid-1980s, Korean electronics firms had littl

16、e motivation co- invest in R&D, for the following reasons: First, rapid capacity and market share expansion was much easier, if production was based on imported machines and technology. Second, price competition depe

17、nded primarily on a combination of low labor costs and selective government support and protection: competing for government resources and contracts has been the essence of competition. Third, continuously high rates of

18、in</p><p>　　In the 1980s Korea’s comparative labor cost advantages eroded, product life cycles shortened and competition intensified in the electronics industry. This has forced the Korean electronics indust

19、ry to develop its own R&D capacity (Kim 1997a, chapters 6 and 7). In 1985, for example, there were 5,249 persons engaged in R&D in the electronics industry, and this accounted for 32% of the researchers in the en

20、tire Korean industry. By 1990 this number had risen to 12,865 and accounted for 37% of total </p><p>　　Korea’s R&D spending as a ratio of total sales increased from 0.36% in 1976 to 1.96% in 1990. While

21、this is an impressive achievement, it is still less than half of the current R&D/sales ratios of U.S. and Japanese manufacturing companies. And Korea’s pet capita R&D expenditures of US$176.2 (in 1993) lag well b

22、ehind those of Japan (USs762.9 in 1992) and the U.S. (US$540.9 ) (Lall 1997, Table 8). In order to reach a ‘critical mass’ for industrial upgrading, R&D investments in Korea will have to g</p><p>　　Ineff

23、iciencies of corporate technology management</p><p>　　What really matters however is the quality of the R&D output, i.e., the efficiency of technology management. Patent figures indicate that Korea has a

24、 problem: while it spends more than twice the amount for R&D compared to Taiwan, the number of patents granted to Koreans by the U.S. in 1992 was only 538 compared to 1252 patents to Taiwanese (Kim Linsu 1997b, p.15)

25、. Korea’s innovation system continues to be dominated by a handful of chaebols: they can recruit the best scientists, engineers and man</p><p>　　One important difference between Korea and Japan is that in Ko

26、rea hierarchical patterns of firm organization are still much more prevalent (Janelli and Ylm Dawnhee 199.3).This has important negative implications for the organization of R&D: Korean engineers and technicians are

27、more inclined to work on their own and are much less willing to contribute to a team than their Japanese counterparts (Oki 1993). A bias in Korea for centralized R&D organizations also has quite negative implications

28、 beyon</p><p>　　Inefficiencies of Korea’s public innovation system</p><p>　　Important inefficiencies also exist in Korea’s public innovation system. While the government’s share of R&D has d

29、eclined to less than 20%, it is still large enough to play an important role. Yet, there is a serious lack of coordination among R&D programs of different ministries which has wasted Korea’s scarce resources. The cur

30、rent mechanism for priority setting is highly imperfect: each ministry sets up its own program and basically feels free to pursue its own goals without much coordination </p><p>　　As long as the goal was cat

31、ching-up, Korea almost exclusively relied on one set of actors: the government research institutes (GRIs). Their main purpose was to compensate for the then still very weak R&D activities of private firms and to assi

32、st and support them in the assimilation and adaptation of imported foreign technologies. This has changed since the mid-1980s, with the result that the private sector is now responsible for more than 80% of Korea’s total

33、 R&D. But this private R&D has a very</p><p>　　A further important weakness of the Korean innovation system, paradoxically enough, relates to the established educational system. Its heavy focus on th

34、e training of mid-level managers, engineers and technicians has been an important prerequisite for success during the catching-up phase. Yet today, as the focus shifts to research, product design and market development,

35、the educational system is poorly equipped to cope with these new requirements. Korea’s educational system is characterized by a </p><p>　　In short, as a result of its earlier success, Korea’s innovation syst

36、em is now faced with new challenges. It is characterized by a number of structural weaknesses, which have been well identified and extensively debated within both the government and management circles. Yet the inertia re

37、sulting from previous success and established power structures appear to cripple Korea’s ability to adapt to the new industrial upgrading requirements. The search for a new policy doctrine and new corporate stra</p>

38、;<p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　追趕，危機(jī)和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)：韓國的電子產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)學(xué)習(xí)進(jìn)化方面</p><p><b>　　簡化模型</b></p><p>　　韓國模型有一個(gè)顯著的特點(diǎn)，那就是政府和大企業(yè)集團(tuán)（即財(cái)閥）的共生關(guān)系。這引起了阻斷產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)的惡性循環(huán)嚴(yán)重依賴于信用和結(jié)構(gòu)的極

39、不平衡，導(dǎo)致了狹隘的國內(nèi)知識(shí)基礎(chǔ)和棘手的專業(yè)化格局。Gerschenkron描繪的韓國電子產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展適合大型的資本密集的后工業(yè)化模式：韓國財(cái)團(tuán)的競爭實(shí)力主要來源是極易獲取的大量病態(tài)債務(wù)資本。這已經(jīng)形成在產(chǎn)品專業(yè)化，生產(chǎn)型，承諾和進(jìn)入策略，垂直整合，競爭的焦點(diǎn)和技術(shù)管理規(guī)模的企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的關(guān)鍵特征。韓國成功的進(jìn)入電子產(chǎn)業(yè)并如同急行軍般發(fā)展出批量生產(chǎn)的能力，可以服務(wù)于高速增長的同類產(chǎn)品出口市場；很少發(fā)生升級(jí)到更高端的、快速增長的差異化的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)

40、的細(xì)分市場。</p><p>　　一旦已決定進(jìn)入一個(gè)部門，財(cái)閥們通常以大規(guī)模和高度集成的方式移動(dòng)。通過以優(yōu)惠條件引導(dǎo)資金的少數(shù)財(cái)閥，國家已建立強(qiáng)大的國內(nèi)寡頭壟斷。韓國的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)極不平衡，造成了一個(gè)特殊形式的競爭戰(zhàn)略：企業(yè)是通過章魚般的多樣化而進(jìn)入許多不同的和無關(guān)的行業(yè)來完成，而不是通過產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)的知識(shí)積累。這樣的結(jié)果就是產(chǎn)生了一個(gè)狹隘的國內(nèi)知識(shí)基礎(chǔ)，而反過來又使人們難以去移動(dòng)專業(yè)化方向。</p>&l

41、t;p>　　只要主要出口市場一直保持快速增長，這種發(fā)展模式就會(huì)行之有效。正如我們將要在下面的部分看到的，如今的情況已經(jīng)不再是那樣的了。這種發(fā)展模式的結(jié)果是生產(chǎn)能力過剩和價(jià)格戰(zhàn)，以及該國所面臨的債務(wù)急劇增加。經(jīng)過三十年的快速增長，韓國正面臨一個(gè)重大的危機(jī)。受國際金融市場的波動(dòng)引起的外部因素猶如催化劑：他們的影響被國內(nèi)的主要因素所放大。升級(jí)的失敗是韓國在金融和貨幣市場上如此脆弱的重要原因：它減少了韓國企業(yè)生產(chǎn)足夠多的外匯去支付巨額債務(wù)

42、的能力。</p><p><b>　　狹隘的國內(nèi)知識(shí)基礎(chǔ)</b></p><p>　　狹隘的國內(nèi)知識(shí)基礎(chǔ)是阻礙韓國產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)的一個(gè)指標(biāo)。追趕需要一個(gè)有限的功能：一種引進(jìn)和升級(jí)國外技術(shù)和發(fā)展生產(chǎn)、投資和細(xì)微調(diào)整經(jīng)營能力的功能。這種功能現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)不足夠了。1995年經(jīng)合組織對(duì)韓國國家創(chuàng)新系統(tǒng)的審核結(jié)論是：“這個(gè)國家再也不能輕易地引進(jìn)技術(shù) – 實(shí)際上是因?yàn)橥鈬嗽絹碓捷p視引進(jìn)的

43、優(yōu)惠條件 - 而且將不得不提高它所生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品的附加值和技術(shù)水平?！?OECD 1995b, p.5)如今，又有了一個(gè)更重要的理由去轉(zhuǎn)變韓國的發(fā)展模式：國家已經(jīng)沒有足夠的外匯去購買國外技術(shù)。</p><p>　　因此，韓國需要去建立一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)廣泛的，多元化的知識(shí)基礎(chǔ)，尤其是在產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)，市場開發(fā)，關(guān)鍵部件生產(chǎn)和高端知識(shí)密集的支援服務(wù)。然而到目前為止，韓國的知識(shí)基礎(chǔ)受制于三個(gè)主要缺點(diǎn)：R＆D的臨界值不足；企業(yè)技術(shù)管理嚴(yán)重

44、的低效率；公共創(chuàng)新體系的效率低下。</p><p><b>　　臨界值不足</b></p><p>　　直到大約80年代中期，韓國電子企業(yè)都缺乏共同投資研發(fā)的動(dòng)機(jī)，原因如下: 第一，如果以進(jìn)口生產(chǎn)設(shè)備和技術(shù)作為基礎(chǔ)，市場份額的快速擴(kuò)張要容易得多；第二，價(jià)格競爭主要取決于一種低勞動(dòng)力成本和政府選擇性支持和保護(hù)功能的組合：政府資源和合同的競爭一直是競爭的本質(zhì)；第三，不斷持

45、續(xù)的高通貨膨脹率和高投資率一直是阻礙R&D支出的強(qiáng)大因素：他們推動(dòng)著資金進(jìn)入房地產(chǎn)投資而不是高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的R&D；第四，產(chǎn)業(yè)振興政策偏重量化指標(biāo)而忽視了產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)：…根據(jù)其出口量…不論在乎資本和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率，增值和技術(shù)的成就(Sun G. Kim 1995, p.103)。</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)80年代韓國的勞動(dòng)力成本比較優(yōu)勢(shì)削弱，產(chǎn)品生命周期縮短，在電子行業(yè)競爭加劇。這迫使韓國電子產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展自己的

46、研發(fā)能力(Kim 1997a, chapters 6 and 7)。舉個(gè)例子，1985年在電子行業(yè)從事研發(fā)的有5249人，而這個(gè)數(shù)量占整個(gè)朝鮮產(chǎn)業(yè)研發(fā)人員的32％。到1990年這個(gè)數(shù)字已上升到12,865，而占了韓國產(chǎn)業(yè)總研發(fā)人員的37％。</p><p>　　1976年到1990年，韓國的R＆D開銷占總銷售額的比例從0.36%上升到了1.96%。雖然這已經(jīng)是一個(gè)了不起的成就，但仍比目前美國和日本制造業(yè)企業(yè)的研發(fā)

47、/銷售比少了一半。而韓國的人均研發(fā)支出US$176.2（1990年）遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于日本（USs762.9 in 1992)和美國(US$540.9 ) (Lall 1997, Table 8)。為了達(dá)到產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)的臨界值，在韓國的R＆D投資將進(jìn)一步大幅增長。最生動(dòng)的例證是，相對(duì)于通用汽車公司的研發(fā)預(yù)算，韓國的研發(fā)總支出的金額只有它的54％(Kim L. 1997b)。</p><p>　　企業(yè)技術(shù)管理的低效率</

48、p><p>　　然而真正的問題是在R＆D產(chǎn)出，即技術(shù)管理質(zhì)量和效益。專利的數(shù)字顯示了韓國存在一個(gè)問題：雖然他的R&D研發(fā)費(fèi)用的金額是臺(tái)灣的兩倍，但相比較下1992年美國授予韓國的專利數(shù)量是538個(gè)，臺(tái)灣卻有1252個(gè)(Kim Linsu 1997b, p.15)。韓國的創(chuàng)新體制仍然由少數(shù)的財(cái)閥們主導(dǎo)：他們可以招募最優(yōu)秀的科學(xué)家，工程師和管理人員，他們的戰(zhàn)略決定該國的研究議程（見不平衡產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)部分）。財(cái)閥的創(chuàng)新

49、管理的有效性方面已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)存在嚴(yán)重的問題(Bloom 1992; Kim S. G. 1995;Kim I. Y. and Chung 1991; Kim I. Y and Kim C. Y. 1991; Kim L. 1992, 1993; and Kim S. R. 1996)。雖然外部技術(shù)采購戰(zhàn)略已經(jīng)高度成熟，但是這些企業(yè)內(nèi)部創(chuàng)新組織依然相當(dāng)無效而且有巨大潛力的重組和生產(chǎn)力的提高。組織的保守主義依舊占上風(fēng)。如果發(fā)生改變，他們會(huì)遵守一

50、種過時(shí)的集中式研發(fā)模式，而于如今日本、美國和歐洲公司典型的研究逐步下放的模式相反。</p><p>　　韓國和日本之間的一個(gè)重要區(qū)別是，韓國企業(yè)組織等級(jí)模式仍然盛行(Janelli and Ylm Dawnhee 199.3)。這對(duì)研發(fā)組織有著嚴(yán)重的負(fù)面影響：韓國工程師和技術(shù)人員更傾向于做屬于自己的工作，相較于日本同行更不愿意為團(tuán)隊(duì)付出(Oki 1993)。韓國集中研發(fā)機(jī)構(gòu)偏置的不利的影響已經(jīng)超越了企業(yè)的邊界。這

51、可能是在技術(shù)的產(chǎn)生和擴(kuò)散過程中涉及的不同行動(dòng)者國內(nèi)呈現(xiàn)極微弱的聯(lián)系狀態(tài)的主要原因。這尤其適用于大型電子制造企業(yè)和零部件供應(yīng)商之間的聯(lián)系。大多數(shù)聯(lián)系是與國外公司或者被領(lǐng)先的財(cái)閥內(nèi)化(Bloom 1992)。</p><p>　　韓國公共創(chuàng)新體制的低效率</p><p>　　韓國的公共創(chuàng)新體系也存在嚴(yán)重的低效率。雖然政府的研發(fā)比例已經(jīng)下降到不足20％，但依舊足夠大，足夠去發(fā)揮了重要作用。然而，

52、不同部委之間的研發(fā)嚴(yán)重缺乏協(xié)調(diào)已經(jīng)浪費(fèi)了韓國的稀缺資源?，F(xiàn)有的制定優(yōu)先次序的機(jī)制非常的不完善：每個(gè)部委設(shè)立了自己的方案，基本上都是自由的提出自己的方案目標(biāo)而缺乏不同程序之間足夠的協(xié)調(diào)。</p><p>　　只要長期目標(biāo)是趕超性的，韓國幾乎完全依賴于一個(gè)角色：政府研究機(jī)構(gòu)(GRIs)。他們的主要目的是為了彌補(bǔ)當(dāng)時(shí)還很薄弱的私營公司的R＆D活動(dòng)，并協(xié)助和支持他們?nèi)ノ蘸瓦m應(yīng)引進(jìn)的外國技術(shù)。自80年代中期開始發(fā)生了改變

53、，改變的結(jié)果是目前私營部門負(fù)責(zé)的部分超過韓國總研發(fā)的80％。但是這類的研發(fā)企業(yè)存在一個(gè)狹隘的焦點(diǎn)：其中大部分是面向發(fā)展，而不是研究，特別是流程重整和產(chǎn)品定制。這導(dǎo)致了阻斷產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)研發(fā)所需的一個(gè)浪費(fèi)的惡性循環(huán)：財(cái)閥已經(jīng)擁有研究經(jīng)費(fèi)，卻忽視了它，而寧愿去把重點(diǎn)放在了發(fā)展活動(dòng)上。</p><p>　　韓國創(chuàng)新體系的另一個(gè)重要弱點(diǎn)，反常的，涉及到了既定的教育體系。重點(diǎn)關(guān)注對(duì)中層管理人員，工程員和技術(shù)人員的的培訓(xùn)是趕超階段

54、成功的重要前提。然而今天，重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到了研究，產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)和市場開發(fā)，現(xiàn)有的教育系統(tǒng)是不足以去應(yīng)付新的要求的。韓國的教育體系的特點(diǎn)是嚴(yán)重依賴于正規(guī)教育：在每個(gè)領(lǐng)域，更多是集中在傳統(tǒng)材料，而不是最新的論點(diǎn)。太多的注意力集中在整合和記憶，缺乏創(chuàng)意。高等教育一直是韓國技術(shù)學(xué)習(xí)上的明顯瓶頸。</p><p>　　總之，由于其早期的成功，韓國的創(chuàng)新體系正面臨著新的挑戰(zhàn)。它表現(xiàn)出大量的結(jié)構(gòu)性弱點(diǎn)，這些已經(jīng)得到了政府和管理層很好的識(shí)