在中國和墨西哥的發(fā)展模式和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級【外文翻譯】

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目：Development Models and Industrial Upgrading in China and Mexico </p><p&

2、gt;　　出 處： European Sociological Review </p><p>　　作 者： Gary Gereffi </p><p>　　There are fundamental change

3、s afoot in the globale conomy, and no simple answers for countries that want to improve or even maintain their levels of development. In recent decades, national and regional development models have come under increasing

4、 scrutiny, and countries are trying to determine what kinds of policies and institutions provide the best opportunities for long-term growth and prosperity.</p><p>　　This article will explore these issues th

5、rough a comparative analysis that focuses on how internationaltrade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have shaped the development trajectories of China and Mexico, two of the most dynamic emerging economies in the worl

6、d. The first section of the article provides a broad comparison of the development models in Latin America and China, with an emphasis on how each has changed in recent decades. The second part of the article uses intern

7、ational trade data </p><p>　　Industrial upgrading is defined as ‘the process by which economic actors—nations, firms, and workers—move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in global production

8、networks’. One of the ways that we can assess industrial upgrading for export-oriented economies like China and Mexico is to look at shifts in the technology content of their exports over time. We divide each country’s e

9、xports into five product groupings, which are listed in ascending levels of technological content: pri</p><p>　　Thus, Mexico and China have a number of commonalities in their export trajectories to the US ma

10、rket during the past two decades. Both are diversified economies, with a range of different types of export products. In both cases, manufactured exports are more important than primary product or resource-based exports;

11、 within manufacturing, highand medium-technology exports are displacing low technology goods. While these export data have limitations as indicators of industrial upgrading, both econom</p><p>　　Why has Chin

12、a gained US market share over Mexico so rapidly and decisively? There are several factors. First, China has significantly lower labor costs than Mexico. In 2002, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics calculated China’s avera

13、ge manufacturing compensation at $0.64 an hour,3 compared with Mexico’s US$2.48. It remains to be seen if this gap will widen, shrink, or be maintained in coming years. Persistent labor shortages are now being reported a

14、t hundreds of Chinese factories, a trend that is</p><p>　　Second, China has sought to leverage its huge economies of scale, and it has made major investments in infrastructure and logistics to lower transpor

15、tation costs and to speed time to market for their export products. The growth of China’s ‘supply-chain cities’— led by FDI-driven clusters in Guangdong (including Dongguan and Humen) and single-product clusters in Zheji

16、ang (such as Anji and Datang)—is a perfect illustration of how China’s governments and entrepreneurs are turning scale-driven speci</p><p>　　Third, China has a coherent and multidimensional upgrading strateg

17、y to diversify its industrial mix and to add high-value activities. In their careful study of China’s export performance, Lall and Albaladejo argue that China and its East Asian neighbors are developing high-technology e

18、xports in a regionally integrated fashion, based on complex networks of export production that link leading electronics MNCs and their first-tier suppliers and global contract manufacturers. The export patterns for</p

19、><p>　　Fourth, China is using FDI to promote ‘fast learning’ in new industries and knowledge spillovers in its domestic market. Despite restrictions imposed by the WTO against domestic performance requirements

20、for MNCs, China’s local market is sufficiently attractive for multinational manufacturers that they are willing to comply with the wishes of local, regional, and national government authorities, despite stringent technol

21、ogy transfer requirements.</p><p>　　The concept of ‘supply chain cities’ has been used in media reports and academic literature to highlight the growth of large-scale production in China and the agglomeratio

22、n of multiple stages of the value chain in particular locales within China as a key to its upgrading success. Barboza (2004), for example, lays out the incredible specialization and scale that characterizes China’s diver

23、sified export success in the apparel industry, even before the phase-out of the multifibre arrangement and ap</p><p>　　The term ‘supply-chain cities’ encompasses two distinct, but related, phenomena in China

24、. The first usage refers to giant, vertically integrated firm factories. Appelbaum (2005), as well as a variety of textile journals and large textile/apparel companies like Luen Thai (2004), use ‘supply chain city’ to in

25、dicate a new breed of ‘super-factory’ that firms are constructing in China and in other parts of Asia. These factories are company-specific, and are designed to bring together multiple parts o</p><p>　　A sec

26、ond usage of this term refers to so-called cluster cities. Barboza (2004) and others use ‘supply-chain cities’ when discussing the growing number of singleproduct industrial clusters that have sprung up in China’s coasta

27、l regions. These areas have dramatically increased production of one specific product, and are churning out massive volume, but are not limited simply to manufacturing firms. As these clusters have grown, they have attra

28、cted related and supporting businesses, including yarn </p><p>　　What forces drive the formation of China’s supply chain cities? In addressing this question, bottom–up versus top–down metaphors offer a misle

29、ading dichotomy for China, simply because both characterizations are oversimplified. ‘Top–down’ implies that development patterns are directed closely by the central government, while ‘bottom–up’ implies that development

30、 patterns are determined purely by market forces. The reality in China lies somewhere in the middle.</p><p>　　‘Supply-chain city’ super-factories appear to be more bottom–up than top–down, since they result

31、from individual sourcing decisions by private firms and are not directed by central government policy. The location of many of these factories is tied to existing manufacturing activities and the low cost of factor input

32、s (land, electricity, and labor), though local and provincial government has played a key role in providing a beneficial policy environment (tax incentives, streamlining bureaucratic </p><p>　　As for the for

33、mation of clusters, this story is more complicated, and involves regional, technological, and industry factors. There is a growing body of scholarship—mostly in Chinese—on this topic, addressing the economic, policy, cul

34、tural, and historical reasons behind cluster formation. At the risk of over generalizing China’s current situation, the major analytical divide in these clusters seems to be between clusters whose formation was driven in

35、itially by foreign capital, and those whose fo</p><p>　　The foreign-led clusters were founded first in the 1970s and 1980s as export-oriented production platforms, mainly in South China (Guangdong, Fujian).

36、These began in low-cost manufacturing industries, including textiles and apparel, and have now expanded to include newer industries like electronics. Foreign investment was particularly important, with large investments

37、coming from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao; thus the central government’s role in determining FDI policy was important. These clust</p><p>　　The Chinese-led clusters are mainly in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province

38、s, and began to grow more rapidly in the 1990s. These clusters are based on so-called town and village enterprises (TVEs) that were a major part of the government’s push for economic development in the 1980s and 1990s, a

39、nd are often in traditionally rural areas. In Zhejiang, many of these clusters were founded by chance—with a confluence of historical knowledge, individual entrepreneurship, networking, and pure luck—but continue</p&g

40、t;<p>　　An additional question is whether these clusters are seeking to upgrade and move up the value chain.Again, it is helpful to separate our clusters into two groups.South China: The foreign-led cluster cities

41、 in Guangdong and Fujian seem to be further along in terms of fostering new, higher tech industries, building firms with international brands, and feature a broader export mix in traditional industries. The growth of the

42、 electronics industry is a good example.East China: These cities lie at an </p><p>　　In the past several decades, China and Latin America have pursued very different economic trajectories. China’s developmen

43、t model appears to have served it well, delivering steady levels of growth since 1978 and facilitating China’s rise to economic prominence on the world stage. Latin America, in contrast, has displayed a far more uneven p

44、attern of growth, and political observers have noted the shift to more radical leaders and leftist rhetoric. In both cases, however, international trade and F</p><p>　　Yet, these two regions have much to lea

45、rn from each other. Both China and Mexico currently face a host of new social and economic problems—corruption,</p><p>　　environmental degradation, and income inequality— and are actively questioning the mer

46、its of a neoliberal, export-led growth model (Nolan, 2005). Each region faces criticism that previous paradigms of development have left parts of the economy vulnerable to foreign control or foreign pressure. In each cas

47、e, reformers are calling for new social welfare programs to address their concerns, and they confront those who argue that only a fuller implementation of neoliberalism can address the problems </p><p>　　In

48、addition, China’s growing economic links with Mexico and Latin America make this study a valuable one. Latin America has become an important source of raw material exports to China in the last decade, and a foreign polic

49、y priority as well, marked by major visits to the region by President Hu Jintao and Vice President Zeng Qinghong in recent years. In addition, Mexico and China are competing for US markets in a widening array of product

50、lines, ranging from textiles apparel and furniture, to au</p><p>　　To understand China’s development model and industrial upgrading experience, one must situate China within emerging intra-regional trade and

51、 production networks in East Asia, as well as to examine China’s broader role in the global economy. Foreign direct investment has facilitated China’s export diversification, but China is also pioneering new forms of dom

52、estic industrial organization in the form of supply-chain cities. The Chinese model is predicated on a clear value-chain strategy of giving </p><p>　　Both China and Mexico are trying to move beyond a simple

53、cost-based approach to competitiveness . Increasingly, the stakes are defined not as a race to the bottom, but as a quest to push the upgrading model beyond comparative advantages in raw materials, cheap labor, and manuf

54、acturing production to high value niches in a broad range of global industries. China’s current edge is its huge domestic market and its voracious appetite for raw materials and intermediate inputs from abroad to feed it

55、s s</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　在中國和墨西哥的發(fā)展模式和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級</p><p>　　全球經(jīng)濟發(fā)生了根本性的變化，對那些想提高甚至維持發(fā)展水平的國家來說也沒有簡單的答案。近幾十年來，國家和地區(qū)的發(fā)展模式受到了越來越多的審視，同時各個國家正在試圖確定什么樣的政策和機構(gòu)能夠為長期的發(fā)展和繁榮提供最好的

56、機會。</p><p>　　本文將通過比較分析兩個世界上最具活力的新興經(jīng)濟體—中國和墨西哥的國際貿(mào)易、外商直接投資的發(fā)展軌跡來探索這些問題。文章的第一部分對拉丁美洲和中國的發(fā)展模式提供了一個廣泛比較,并強調(diào)近幾十年來發(fā)生的變化。這篇文章的第二部分采用國際貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)來檢查墨西哥和中國的產(chǎn)業(yè)升級模式,并重點強調(diào)他們在美國的競爭利基市場以及中國領(lǐng)先多個不同行業(yè)的原因。文章的第三和最后部分更深入地分析了中國作為供應(yīng)鏈城市的

57、產(chǎn)業(yè)升級模式的新特性。中國獨特的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展模式就其本身而言很迷人,但是中國作為一個供應(yīng)商,一個市場越來越重要,最近作為一個對外直接投資的來源使世界許多國家和地區(qū)高度依賴于中國未來的經(jīng)濟效益。</p><p>　　產(chǎn)業(yè)升級的定義是,“在全球生產(chǎn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中通過經(jīng)濟主體-國家、企業(yè)、工人，產(chǎn)品從低值易耗品到相對高價值的過程”。我們的其中一種用來評估外向型經(jīng)濟體-例如中國和墨西哥的產(chǎn)業(yè)升級的方式是，著眼于最后他們出口品技術(shù)含量

58、的變化。我們把每個國家的出口品分為五個產(chǎn)品群組，是按它們所獲得的技術(shù)含量水平而羅列的，分別是:初級產(chǎn)品、資源基礎(chǔ)型制成品、低科技含量制成品、中科技含量制成品、高科技含量制成品。</p><p>　　因此,墨西哥和中國在過去的二十年對美國市場的出口軌跡中有許多共同點。 兩者都是多元化經(jīng)濟體,擁有一系列不同類型的出口產(chǎn)品。在這兩個國家,制成品出口比初級產(chǎn)品和資源基礎(chǔ)型出口顯得更重要；在制成品中，高級技術(shù)產(chǎn)品和中級技術(shù)

59、產(chǎn)品正逐漸替代低級技術(shù)產(chǎn)品。 雖然這些出口數(shù)據(jù)作為產(chǎn)業(yè)升級的指示器可能有所限制，兩國的經(jīng)濟似乎增加了他們的出口結(jié)構(gòu)的復(fù)雜性。</p><p>　　為什么中國戰(zhàn)勝墨西哥如此快速果斷地獲得美國市場的份額? 這其中有幾個因素。首先,中國擁有顯著低于墨西哥的勞動力成本。在2002年,美國勞動統(tǒng)計局的計算出中國普通制造補償為一個小時0.64美元,而墨西哥是2.48億美元，整整超過中國3倍之多。在未來幾年，這種差距是否會加大

60、、縮小或者維持，都有待觀察。成千上萬的中國工廠正在發(fā)生持續(xù)的勞動力短缺危機,這一趨勢正在迫使工資升高，同時使得許多制造商考慮將他們的工廠轉(zhuǎn)移到低成本的國家,例如越南。</p><p>　　其次,中國一直在尋求利用其巨大的經(jīng)濟規(guī)模,在后勤及基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施方面投入了大量的投資，降低了運輸成本,并縮短出口產(chǎn)品進入市場的時間了。 中國作為供應(yīng)鏈城市的經(jīng)濟增長，是被廣東(包括東莞、虎門)的外商直接投資和浙江(如安吉,大唐)的單個

61、產(chǎn)品集群所驅(qū)使的，這是中國的政府和企業(yè)家將規(guī)模經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)化為一個國家可持續(xù)的比較優(yōu)勢的完美例證。</p><p>　　再次,中國有一個清晰且多維的的升級策略使得產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)多樣化，從而增加高價值的活動。在仔細研究中國的出口表現(xiàn)后，勞爾和阿布拉戴尤認為中國和東亞的鄰居正在整合的區(qū)域中發(fā)展高科技的產(chǎn)品出口,基于聯(lián)系領(lǐng)先的電子產(chǎn)品跨國企業(yè)、一線供應(yīng)商和提供專業(yè)技術(shù)支持的全球制造廠商的復(fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)。高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口模式展示了中國同其

62、成熟的東亞合作伙伴(日本、韓國、臺灣、新加坡)之間的互補而非對抗。中國作為這個區(qū)域汽車的出口增長點,卻能改變自身的價值鏈并接管目前亞洲友鄰所實施的活動。羅德里克表明,中國已經(jīng)出口了廣泛的高度復(fù)雜的產(chǎn)品,他計算出,中國的出口束已經(jīng)同高于中國目前的人均收入水平三倍的國家相似了。</p><p>　　緊接著,中國在國內(nèi)市場正在利用外國直接投資來促進新興產(chǎn)業(yè)的快速學(xué)習(xí)以及知識溢出。盡管在世貿(mào)組織對跨國公司國內(nèi)表現(xiàn)要求的限

63、制下,中國本土市場對跨國制造商仍然具有足夠的吸引力,盡管嚴(yán)格的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓的要求，他們愿意遵從地方、區(qū)域和國家當(dāng)局的意愿。</p><p>　　供應(yīng)鏈城市的概念市已經(jīng)應(yīng)用于各種媒體報告和學(xué)術(shù)文獻,以突出在中國大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)的增長和在特定地點的價值鏈的多級集聚，它是升級成功的關(guān)鍵。巴布杰勾畫出在中國服裝產(chǎn)業(yè)中最令人難以置信的專業(yè)化和規(guī)模出口多樣化的成功, 甚至在多纖維安排和WTO在2005年一月一日分配的服裝配額撤銷之前。

64、</p><p>　　供應(yīng)鏈城市這個術(shù)語包括中國兩種截然不同的,但又相關(guān)的現(xiàn)象。 第一個用法是指巨大,垂直整合的工廠企業(yè)。 艾比利鮑爾，曾說各種紡織期刊和例如聯(lián)泰控股這樣的大型服裝紡織公司,使用“供應(yīng)鏈城市”表示一種新型的超級工廠，這種工廠正在中國和亞洲其它地方建設(shè)中。這些工廠通常是特定的公司設(shè)計用來將企業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈設(shè)計者,供應(yīng)商和制造商等多個不同的部分結(jié)合起來，為了最大限度地降低交易成本,利用規(guī)模經(jīng)濟,培育更具有彈

65、性的供應(yīng)鏈管理。聯(lián)泰控股在廣東省(在東莞、清遠、和番禺)的工廠是這種方法的體現(xiàn)，建立這些大型工廠的企業(yè)一般來自香港和臺灣。</p><p>　　這個術(shù)語的第二種用法指的是所謂的集聚城市。鮑勃拉和其他一些人在討論沿海地區(qū)涌現(xiàn)的單一產(chǎn)品產(chǎn)業(yè)集聚的增長數(shù)量時，使用了供應(yīng)鏈城市這個術(shù)語。這些地區(qū)某一特定產(chǎn)品的產(chǎn)量明顯增加,甚至是巨量的,但是不僅僅被制造公司所限制。當(dāng)這些集群擴大,他們吸引了相關(guān)和支持的商業(yè)公司,包括紗線經(jīng)

66、銷商、裁縫師、壓制、包裝和貨運代理。這些集群也有獨特的大型縱橫交錯的工廠,附帶有給工人的廠房、宿舍、有限的便利設(shè)施,但是這里的焦點是綜合集群公司，范例包括大唐和嵊州。</p><p>　　什么因素驅(qū)使中國供應(yīng)鏈城市的形成呢? 為解決這個問題,“自下而上”和“自上而下”的比喻為中國提供一種誤導(dǎo)的二分法,僅僅都是因為兩種特征都過于簡單?！白陨隙隆币馕吨l(fā)展模式是由中央政府直接引導(dǎo)的,而“自下而上”意味著發(fā)展模式是由

67、純粹的市場力量決定的。然而我國的實際情況是處于這兩種情況中間的某一位置。</p><p>　　供應(yīng)鏈城市的超級市場顯得比自上而下更具自下而上的特性,因為他們的決定是來自于個人私營公司且不直接由中央政府的政策引導(dǎo)。許多這類工廠的位置與現(xiàn)有工廠生產(chǎn)活動以及低成本的要素投入(如土地、電力、勞動)等有關(guān),盡管當(dāng)?shù)睾褪〖壵谔峁┮环N有益的政策環(huán)境(稅收優(yōu)惠、官方條例等)扮演了重要角色。</p><p&

68、gt;　　為盡快形成集群,這個故事是更復(fù)雜的,牽涉到區(qū)域、技術(shù)和產(chǎn)業(yè)的因素。 在這個話題上越來越多的中國人因此獲得了獎學(xué)金,著眼于集群形成背后的經(jīng)濟、政策、文化和歷史原因。在中國當(dāng)前的國情情況下,這些集群的主要分析似乎處于由于外資驅(qū)使形成的集群和由于國內(nèi)企業(yè)驅(qū)使形成的集群之間。</p><p>　　外資驅(qū)使的集群首先是作為外向型生產(chǎn)平臺在20世紀(jì)70年代和80年代建立的,主要集中在中國南(廣東、福建)。這些開始于

69、低成本制造產(chǎn)業(yè),包括紡織品和服裝,而今已擴展到包括電子產(chǎn)品的新產(chǎn)業(yè)。外國投資和來自香港、臺灣、澳門地區(qū)的大量投資尤為重要；因此中央政府在外國直接投資政策的決定中起重要作用。這些集群在中國南部建立是由于其低廉的勞動力及其靠近投資者和主要交通中心。廣東(靠近香港)和福建(臺灣的對岸)是這種類型集群的先鋒,將來長江三角洲的大城市（紹興、杭州）也會有發(fā)展。</p><p>　　中國的主要集群位于浙江和江蘇兩省,并在20世

70、紀(jì)90年代開始快速增長。這些集群是基于所謂的城鎮(zhèn)和鄉(xiāng)村企業(yè),是20世紀(jì)80年代和90年代經(jīng)濟發(fā)展推動力的一大部分，并且常常位于傳統(tǒng)農(nóng)村地區(qū)。在浙江,這些集群大部分是由歷史知識、個人企業(yè)、網(wǎng)絡(luò)、純粹的地方保護政策融合而成的。因此,私營企業(yè)是至關(guān)重要的,但政府有一個重要的促進作用。</p><p>　　額外的問題在于,這些集群是否在尋求升級和價值鏈的上移。另外,這對于把我們集群分成兩個群組是有幫助的。中國南部：在廣東

71、、福建的外資驅(qū)使集群似乎會更深入,建立新興的高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)、有國際品牌的建筑公司，同時為傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)業(yè)更寬的出口起作用。電子產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展就是一個很好的例子。中國東部:這些城市都處在發(fā)展初期,中國作者例如王建民曾評論這些地區(qū)仍在低端技術(shù)價值鏈的末端上生產(chǎn)。即便是在這里,企業(yè)和政府官員越來越意識到他們需要新的競爭優(yōu)勢,尤其是在面臨升高的勞動力成本和來自其他地方日益增長的經(jīng)濟競爭的情況下。</p><p>　　此外,中國與墨西哥和

72、拉丁美洲日益增長的經(jīng)濟聯(lián)系使這個研究具有價值。在過去十年中，拉丁美洲已成為出口到中國的原始材料的一個重要來源,同時也擁有外國政策優(yōu)先權(quán)，是最近幾年胡錦濤主席和曾慶紅副主席的主要出訪地。此外,墨西哥和中國正在為一系列擴大的產(chǎn)品下的美國市場做競爭,范圍從紡織品服裝、家具、汽車直到電子產(chǎn)品等。</p><p>　　為了了解中國的發(fā)展模式和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級經(jīng)驗,我們必須定位在東亞區(qū)域內(nèi)貿(mào)易和生產(chǎn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)里中國的位置,并檢查在全球經(jīng)濟

73、中中國更大的作用。外國直接投資促進了中國的出口多樣化,但是中國在供應(yīng)鏈城市的形式下正在開拓一種國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織的新形式。中國模式是基于一個清晰的盡量給予高價值活動的價值鏈策略，同時研發(fā)、設(shè)計、科技和工程教育及獨立的產(chǎn)品品牌越來越得到重視。</p><p>　　中國和墨西哥正試圖超越簡單的以成本為基礎(chǔ)的方法來提升競爭力。逐漸地，這個代價并不是競相殺價,而是作為一個在原材料、廉價勞動力擁有比較優(yōu)勢,在全球產(chǎn)業(yè)的制造品中擁

74、有高價值的產(chǎn)業(yè)升級模式的推動力。 中國目前的優(yōu)勢是其龐大的國內(nèi)市場,以及為了工業(yè)快速增長而由外國投入的大量原材料和中間產(chǎn)品。然而,大量農(nóng)民工涌入城市,惡劣的工作條件，勞動力短缺,環(huán)境的惡化正在威脅中國模式，昭示著這些問題沒有得到改善。近幾十年來，中國和墨西哥的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展令人矚目,但他們所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)也和經(jīng)濟增長速度一樣成正比。</p><p>　　由于對國際競爭力基礎(chǔ)更強的關(guān)注,對于一些產(chǎn)業(yè)來說所提出的政策和方法變得