法學(xué)專業(yè)畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯--法國法律中的違約責(zé)任在安全的期望值和有效性之間

1、<p>　　法國法律中的違約責(zé)任：在安全的期望值和有效性之間</p><p>　　The breach of contract in French law: between safety of expectations and efficiency</p><p>　　學(xué) 院（系）： </p><p>　　專

2、 業(yè)： </p><p>　　學(xué) 生 姓 名： </p><p>　　學(xué) 號： </p><p>　　指 導(dǎo) 教 師： </p><p>　　完 成

3、 日 期： </p><p>　　The breach of contract in French law: between safety of expectations and efficiency</p><p>　　Pierre Garello?</p><p>　　Faculte d’Economie Appliq

4、uée, Universite de Droit, d’Econimie et des Sciences d’ Aix-Marseille,</p><p>　　3 Avenue Robert Schuman, Aix-en-Provence 13628, France</p><p>　　Accepted 20 August 2002</p><p>　

5、　Introduction: which path will lead us to a better understanding of French contract law?</p><p>　　Contracts are marvellous tools to help us to live in a world of uncertainty. They allow us to project ourselv

6、es into an unknowable future, to invest. Lawyers who have inspired the French Civil law and contributed to its evolution, as well as most lawyers in the world, have clearly perceived the necessity to protect that institu

7、tion. “The contract is, as far as the individual is concerned, the best forecasting instrument generating legal security, and the favored path to freedom and responsibilit</p><p>　　Contracts are far from mir

8、aculous tools, however. If they make life easier, they do not necessarily make life easy. As the future unfolds, one or both contracting parties may be tempted, or compelled, to break his or her promise. But, the mere fa

9、ct that the contract is running into difficulties does not force the law to do something!2 It is only when one of the parties does not perform that the law (the court, the legislation), backed with coercive power, has to

10、 give an opinion, to decide the ca</p><p>　　The present study of the French contract law is based on the premise that, from a law and economics point of view, there exists basically two possible ways to addr

11、ess this concern: the first approach requires that whenever a problem arises, an assessment be made of all costs and benefits incurred by the parties. In other words, one must attempt to evaluate in a sufficiently precis

12、e way the consequences of the court decision—or of the rule of law under consideration—for both parties as well as fo</p><p>　　The second possible attitude looks, apparently, pretty much like the first. The

13、guiding principle is again that the law should provide to members of the society the right incentives. But one must immediately add that the judge—or the legislator, or the expert—is not in a position to evaluate and com

14、pare the social costs and benefits of alternative rules of law. He or she just does not know enough. One does not know, for instance, all the effects of a rule that would allow one party to breach a c</p><p>

15、;　　As pointed out, those two attitudes may appear the same, differing just in degree. The first one assumes more knowledge on the part of lawyers and legislators than the second. However, when it comes to practical decis

16、ion-making, differences turn out to be important, because the more knowledgeable you think you are, the stronger will be the incentive to regulate the contract, and the lower will be the respect for tradition and customs

17、 on which daily expectations are based.</p><p>　　The two approaches outlined above are well known to economists. The first one is the so-called “mainstream” (Paretian) approach and underlines most of the exi

18、sting economic analysis of law.3 The second one, stressing the problem of knowledge, is far less developed.4 We will call it the “safety-of-expectations approach,” or the Austrian approach to law and economics, because i

19、t can be found primarily in thework of the Austrian school of economic thought, and especially in Hayek’s studies.</p><p>　　“The rationale,” says Hayek, “of securing to each individual a known range within w

20、hich he can decide on his actions is to enable him to make the fullest use of his knowledge, especially of his concrete and often unique knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. The law tells him what

21、 facts he may count on and thereby extends the range within which he can predict the consequences of his actions. At the same time it tells him what possible consequences of his actions he must tak</p><p>　　

22、The reason why these two approaches are mentioned at the outset is that, when one studies French contract law, it is difficult to reconcile all of it with a single approach. True, the mainstream, neoclassical approach, b

23、ased on the assumption that rules be chosen that maximize social wealth (or, at other times, that lead to a Pareto-efficient outcome), can help us to understand an important part of that body of law. But, as will be show

24、n, certain French doctrines cannot be reconciled with neithe</p><p>　　In the next two sections we will examine the main doctrines and rules of French contract law trying to identify those that are compatible

25、 with both principles and those that are compatible with only one. If none of those sets are empty, it will mean that the French law of contract is not totally coherent; it cannot be brought under a unique unifying princ

26、iple of explanation. The next natural questionwould then be whether French lawismoving towards one principle and away from the other. However, </p><p>　　The paper is organized in two parts. Indeed, for reaso

27、ns briefly mentioned above, it is important to underline in a first part the many things the law does in order to avoid breach of contract: what can be done in order to save a contract when the parties are having difficu

28、lties performing, and what is forbidden? The second part deals directly with the breach of contract. It will be shown that French law differs in some important respects from other contract laws.</p><p>　　Sav

29、ing the contract6</p><p>　　We will study the various attempts to “save” the contract by looking first at the conditions for invalidity (Section 2.1), then at the various possibilities left to the judge to in

30、terpret the terms of the contract (Section 2.2) and end with the study of the cases where the judge is authorized to change the terms of the contract (Section 2.3).</p><p>　　2.1. Invalid contracts</p>

31、<p>　　One way to save the contract is to prove that there was no valid contract in the first place! Formation defenses as defined in the French law are roughly identical to those found in the contract laws of other

32、 countries. The main defenses are: incompetency (incapacité), mistakes (erreur), fraud (dol), duress (violence), absence of cause (reminding us of the doctrine of consideration in the bargaining theory), failure to

33、disclose information, lésion (a defense close to unconscionability),7 or, may</p><p>　　But, what exactly is meant by invalidity in the French law? What are the consequences? The French law distinguishes

34、 between absolute invalidity (nullité absolue) and relative invalidity (nullité relative). The first category includes all the contracts that are against what is called ordre public de direction, that is to say

35、, contracts that violate a public policy judged to be beneficial to the society as a whole and not only to those individuals involved in that particular contract. For such con</p><p>　　In both cases, however

36、, the result is as if the contract had never existed, and retroactivity with restitution is the general principle: one is supposed to go back to the situation that prevailed before the contract was created: the status qu

37、o ante. Parties are relieved of their obligations, and damages can no longer be awarded, but it is still possible to bring a tort law action.9</p><p>　　From an economic point of view, most of the formation d

38、efenses mentioned have already been analyzed in various places, the bottom line being: any contract that is not voluntary must be considered as invalid. One can see however that, from a strictly Paretian point of view, i

39、t is not clear that all involuntary contracts—e.g. contracts relying on a mistake—will always be dominated by the situation prevailing before the contract. If one chooses the Hayekian, safety-of-expectations point of vie

40、w, su</p><p>　　Before leaving the topic of nullity, two interesting facts deserve attention. First, it must be pointed out that exceptions exist to the general principle of retroactivity with restitution. In

41、 particular, if the contract is null due to the deliberate action of one of the parties (e.g. In the case of fraud), the principle is softened; the victim sometimes will not have to return the object, or the payment. The

42、 action for annulment can even be rejected by the judge if this favors the victim. Final</p><p>　　2.2. Interpreting the contract</p><p>　　To save the contract, the judge may have to interpret it

43、s terms or to modify them. When reading legal scholars on the topics, one comes rapidly to the conclusion that there is no unanimity in France about what is the proper role for the judge when performance is problematic.

44、As explains Ghestin: “Hence, always referring to justice, it is possible to forbid to the judge any intervention, or at the opposite, and as is done today, to justify his/her corrective interference, so that he/she can g

45、uara</p><p>　　The role of the judge in appreciating the terms of the contract is a matter of great controversy.</p><p>　　On one hand, you may wish to deprive the judge of any power arguing that

46、he is not a party to the contract; consequently, the judge should never intervene, nor modify such and such elements of the contract. On the other hand, one can admit the intervention of the judge in contractual matters

47、in order to introduce a light wind of fairness in the contract. The law is rather based on the first approach.Indeed, as we have noticed already, the legislator allows himself or herself the right to perfect</p>&

48、lt;p>　　Keeping in mind this controversy, let us see what the French written law says.</p><p>　　A major principle of French law is juridical consensualism (consensualisme juridique). Deeply rooted in Frenc

49、h tradition—it goes back to the 18th century and became prominent in the 15th century14—this principle is closely related to a more recent one: the autonomy of the will.15 In contractual matters this means that the contr

50、act should be interpreted, not literally, but according to good faith. This is also called the subjective method of interpretation and is grounded in art. 1156 to 1164 C.c</p><p>　　On the bright side, whethe

51、r you are Paretian or Austrian, you can argue that this method of interpretation reduces transaction costs since the parties may leave the contract incomplete: if necessary, the judge—or more generally, the law through d

52、efault rules—will interpret the contract as they would have written it, if it was not for the cost of writing done a complete contract. Not only that, but the very possibility to leave gaps in the contract may be desirab

53、le to allow the parties to signal </p><p>　　On the dark side, it may be pointed out that the objective method, chosen in other countries such as Germany, forces the parties to be more explicit on what they e

54、xpect and this, in turn, may reduce future transaction costs. Also it should be recalled that it is not always easy to interpret the will of the parties, and it is good for that reason to give them strong incentives to f

55、ill up as many gaps as possible.</p><p>　　Anyway, the French law will not let the judge interpret the terms of the contract, or fill gaps as it pleases her. The judge will have to follow certain rules. Here

56、are some of them.16</p><p>　　First maxim: better to interpret the contract in such a way that it will survive (art. 1157 C.civ.). Again one can read here an a priori in favour of voluntary exchanges which, a

57、s was pointed out earlier, is economically sound. It is also the desire to avoid that efforts invested in the contractual relationship be wasted.</p><p>　　Second maxim (only for unilateral contracts such as

58、loan contracts): the judge should interpret the contract in the way which is most favorable to the debtor (art. 1162 C.civ.). One can perceive two economic reasons to this rule. Firstly, it increases the probability of p

59、erformance since it is the debtor who is having difficulties. Secondly, the maxim let the creditor bears the risks related to a lack of precision in the terms of the contract. This in average is a good thing since the cr

60、editor i</p><p>　　The third maxim of interpretation is derived from art. 1136 of C.civ.: “Conventions compel the parties to perform not only according to what is written, but also according to the requiremen

61、ts of fairness, customs and existing legislation.” This somehow echoes the famous article 6 of C.civ. It is based on this philosophy that the courts have recently established some new bonds for the parties. Hence, each p

62、arty ought to inform properly the other parties, especially as far as safety is concerned: </p><p>　　Finally let us recall that in French law, if the judge goes beyond the mere interpretation of the contract

63、, the judgment will be broken by the Cour de Cassation. This, surely, is compatible with the safety of expectations.</p><p>　　2.3. Modification of the contract by the judge</p><p>　　“To interpre

64、t the contract is to pay due homage to the autonomy of the will. To modify a</p><p>　　contract is to testify against it.”20</p><p>　　The life of a contract being full of unexpected events, there

65、 is nothing more economically sound as far as Paretian efficiency is concerned as well as for the safety of expectations, to let the parties renegotiate to the extent, of course, that both parties agree to the change. Fr

66、ench contract law understands this and facilitates such commonly agreed upon changes. It can even go further: if the contract includes a revision clause, the courts have the possibility to impose a revision if the negot&

67、lt;/p><p>　　Difficulties arise of course whenever one of the parties refuses to negotiate. In such circumstances French contract law takes a path different from the one taken by most other contract laws, and fo

68、rbid any modification of the contract by the judge. Exceptions exist to this reject of the so-called théorie de l’imprévision, but they are few. Hence, it is possible to rescind a contract (this is called resci

69、sion pour lésion) following the realization of an unforeseeable event (art. 1675 C.civ.), bu</p><p>　　This position against a modification of the contract by the judge has a long standing in French law,

70、 going back to the famous 1876 decision of the supreme court of appeal in the Canal de Craponne case. In that case, the heirs of Mr. Adam de Craponne wanted the price for maintenance of a canal to be raised, a price that

71、 was contractually fixed in 1567 by Adam de Craponne. Relying on art. 1134 C.civ., the court replied that: “It is not the business of the courts to take into account time and circu</p><p>　　Two last remarks

72、before leaving that topic. First, let us note that if the position of the French courts has been accepted by the business community, it is because parties always keep the possibility to add some clauses to the contract r

73、egarding unforeseen events and, actually, they have made extensive use of it.26 Finally, if the position of the Civil law is against judiciary revision, administrative law has taken an other path, allowing for the revisi

74、on of the contract,27 and the legislator al</p><p>　　法國法律中的違約責(zé)任：在安全的期望值和有效性之間</p><p>　　Pierre Garello</p><p>　　1論文簡介：哪個(gè)途徑可以讓我們更好地了解法國合同法？</p><p>　　合同是幫助我們在不確定的世界上生活的很好的

75、工具，它們可以使我們計(jì)劃自己不知道的未來和投資。啟發(fā)了法國民法典并促進(jìn)其發(fā)展的法學(xué)家們以及世界上大多數(shù)法學(xué)家們都很清楚地認(rèn)識(shí)到保障合同的機(jī)構(gòu)的必要性。“合同對個(gè)人來說，是引發(fā)法保障性的最好的工具，是為人來社會(huì)繁榮所必要存在的責(zé)任和自由最受青睞的途徑。但是，合同遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不是一個(gè)神奇的工具。如果他們讓生活更輕松，卻不一定讓生活變得簡單。作為未來可以實(shí)現(xiàn)的合同，締約一方或者雙方可以用欺詐、脅迫等方式違約。但是，僅僅因?yàn)楹贤瑫?huì)陷入這樣的困境法律的強(qiáng)

76、制性就會(huì)做出一些事情。只有當(dāng)一方當(dāng)事人不履行法律（法院的立法），在強(qiáng)制力的支持下，給出意見，對案件做出判決。為了這些做出一個(gè)原則或者理論，就必須要達(dá)到對什么是最好的做出一個(gè)判斷。</p><p>　　法國合同法是本研究的前提，從法律和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度來看，基本上存在兩種可能的方法來解決這一問題。第一種方法，每當(dāng)出現(xiàn)問題，一個(gè)評估讓所有費(fèi)用和利益由當(dāng)事人承擔(dān)。換句話說，我們必須試圖得到一個(gè)相當(dāng)精確評價(jià)方法，為法院或法治

77、正在審議對雙方以及第三方（包括未來潛在的承包商）的決定承擔(dān)后果。這是比當(dāng)時(shí)的合同法更準(zhǔn)確的方法，主要目的是，提供正確的機(jī)制激勵(lì)締約方，其中以“正確的激勵(lì)機(jī)制”這種手段鼓勵(lì)這樣的行為，是一個(gè)社會(huì)福利和社會(huì)成本之差最大化的方法。這是法國認(rèn)為低于合同法而采取這種方法</p><p>　　第二個(gè)可能的方法，顯然，幾乎像第一個(gè)。該原則是法律應(yīng)規(guī)定向社會(huì)成員正確的激勵(lì)。但是，我們必須馬上補(bǔ)充說，法官或立法者或?qū)＜?，是不是在?/p>

78、正立場來評價(jià)和比較的社會(huì)成本和其他法律規(guī)則的好處。他或她并不夠了解。例如，所有的影響的規(guī)則將允許一方未經(jīng)對方同意違反合同。事實(shí)上，即使違反行為的受害者是一個(gè)公平的賠償承諾，使這一規(guī)則可能對全球的機(jī)構(gòu)的根本目的，是要降低不確定性的負(fù)面影響。因此，法律應(yīng)采取目標(biāo)小于社會(huì)福利最大化的野心。這一目標(biāo)可以是“保護(hù)合同”，或在其他方面，創(chuàng)造了獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)措施，引導(dǎo)個(gè)人感到自信，這樣的設(shè)置使他們的合理期望將會(huì)實(shí)現(xiàn)。 正如指出的那樣，這兩種方法，可能會(huì)

79、出現(xiàn)相同的效果，只是程度不同。該第一個(gè)假設(shè)的學(xué)著比第二個(gè)擁有更多的理論。然而，當(dāng)涉及到實(shí)際的決策，分歧變成很重要，因?yàn)樵绞强粗兄R(shí)，好的是鼓勵(lì)規(guī)范的合同，降低的將是對傳統(tǒng)和習(xí)俗的尊重。</p><p>　　上述兩個(gè)辦法是眾所周知的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家提出的。第一個(gè)是所謂的“主流”（帕累托）方法，并強(qiáng)調(diào)現(xiàn)行法律的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析。第二類，強(qiáng)調(diào)知識(shí)的問題，是參考奧地利法律和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，主要是因?yàn)樗梢栽趭W地利學(xué)派IMF在發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)思想，特別是

80、在哈耶克的研究。</p><p>　　哈耶克說，“這個(gè)道理就是確保每一個(gè)人在一個(gè)已知的范圍內(nèi)，他可以決定他的行動(dòng)的理由”這是為了使他能夠使他的知識(shí)充分利用，特別是在實(shí)際情況中，出現(xiàn)獨(dú)特具體的時(shí)間、地點(diǎn)等具體情況。這項(xiàng)法律告訴他，他可以指望什么事實(shí)從而擴(kuò)大了行為的范圍，他可以預(yù)測其行為的后果。同時(shí)它告訴他，他的什么行為可能產(chǎn)生什么樣的后果，他必須考慮到什么，會(huì)承擔(dān)什么責(zé)任?！?lt;/p><p>

81、;　　這兩種方法是在開始時(shí)提到的原因是，當(dāng)單一研究法國合同法，它是難以調(diào)和的單一方案的這一切。誠然，主流觀點(diǎn)在新古典主義的方法的基礎(chǔ)上，假設(shè)規(guī)則，選擇在其他時(shí)間，最大限度地創(chuàng)造社會(huì)財(cái)富的（或者，這導(dǎo)致帕累托效率的結(jié)果），可以幫助我們理解是這一法律體系的重要組成部分。但是，正如將顯示，某些法國的學(xué)說不能協(xié)調(diào)的既不是帕累托辦法，也不是財(cái)富最大化的辦法。在某些情況下，法律似乎更符合人們的安全期望。</p><p>　　

82、在接下來的兩節(jié)我們將研究合同法的主要理論和法國合同規(guī)則法，試圖找出那些與原則及那些規(guī)則相兼容的內(nèi)容，兼容的話原則只能有一個(gè)。如果這些規(guī)定沒有一個(gè)是空的，這將意味著法國關(guān)于合同的法律是不完全一致的，它不能在一個(gè)個(gè)獨(dú)特的解釋中歸納出統(tǒng)一的原則。下一個(gè)問題自然是，是否會(huì)再對法國法律梳理一個(gè)有別于其他的原則。但是，這篇文章將不解決這個(gè)問題。</p><p>　　該文章是由兩部分組成。事實(shí)上，上述簡單的理由，重要的是要在第

83、一部分強(qiáng)調(diào)，重要的是要強(qiáng)調(diào)在第一部分的很多事情沒有法律，以避免違約：省略合同的時(shí)候什么可以做，當(dāng)事人有困難的處境，什么是被禁止？第二部分直接涉及違約責(zé)任。這表明，法國法與其他合同法規(guī)在一些重要方面有多不同。</p><p><b>　　2 儲(chǔ)蓄合同</b></p><p>　　我們研究會(huì)嘗試各種“拯救”，通過查看病殘條件（第2.1），進(jìn)而向法官來解釋合同（2.2節(jié)），

84、并在研究先合同結(jié)束時(shí)的各種可能性的條款，以及法官授權(quán)改變合同（第2.3節(jié)）的條款的情況。</p><p>　　2.1 無效合同 一種方法保存合同證明，沒有在第一時(shí)間的有效合同！抗辯權(quán)，其他國家的合同法與法國法律規(guī)定大致相同。主要的抗辯理由是：不稱職（incapacité），失誤（erreur），詐騙（勞工部），強(qiáng)迫（暴力），沒有原因缺席（我們考慮在談判理論學(xué)說），未披露的信息，病變（國防接近不合

85、情理），或可能更具體的法國法律，私人之間的協(xié)議和公共秩序，即公共政策，或“法律與秩序”（見藝術(shù)的沖突.6和法國民法典1134，從此C.civ。）。在這些情況下所訂立的合同無效，法官是唯一有權(quán)判令這些合同無效。</p><p>　　但是，究竟是由法國法律無效意味著什么？有什么后果？法國法律區(qū)分絕對無效（nullité蘭蔻）和相對無效（nullité相對）。第一類包括所有的合同，對所謂的公共秩序方

86、向，這就是說，合同違反公共政策的判斷，有利于整體社會(huì)而言，不只是在合同所涉及的特定的個(gè)人。對于沒有什么可以做這樣的合同無效，并不能完全避免。第二類是違反了合同去保護(hù)公共秩序，即合同一方不尊重公眾的政策旨在保護(hù)較弱的當(dāng)事人。在這些情況下，誰是法律要保護(hù)的受害者，可以選擇合同的立場后，修改該合同。</p><p>　　在這兩種情況下，好像從來沒有存在的合同，并與歸還溯及既往的一般原則是：一個(gè)是應(yīng)該返回的情況普遍存在合

87、同之前已創(chuàng)建：原狀。締約方免除其義務(wù)，損害賠償可以不再頒發(fā)，但仍然有可能帶來侵權(quán)法的行為。</p><p>　　從經(jīng)濟(jì)角度來看，上述抗辯的形成大部分已在各地進(jìn)行了分析，底線是：必須考慮沒有任何合同被視為無效志愿。不過，人們可以看到，從嚴(yán)格帕累托的觀點(diǎn)來看，目前尚不清楚，所有非自愿的合同，如合同依靠一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤，將永遠(yuǎn)是合同之前由當(dāng)時(shí)的情況為主。如果一個(gè)人選擇從海耶克安全預(yù)期的角度來看，這種困境是不太可能發(fā)生的程度，人

88、們期望的交易是自愿的。因此，任何非自愿的交易違反了一些“合理期望?！?lt;/p><p>　　在離開了無效的話題，兩個(gè)有趣的事實(shí)值得關(guān)注。首先，它必須需要指出的是例外情況存在溯及既往的一般原則與恢復(fù)原狀。特別是，如果合同無效，因當(dāng)事方的欺詐案（如蓄意行動(dòng)），該原則是軟化;受害人有時(shí)不會(huì)返回對象或者付款。對于廢止的行動(dòng)，如果這有利于受害者法官甚至可以拒絕。最后，由于一些欺詐案件提請法院，立法者旨在加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管的合約的過程。

89、這是個(gè)案例如，在8月1日，1905年關(guān)于欺詐（現(xiàn)在的消費(fèi)者法律的一部分的法律，法德報(bào)Consommation，第L. 213-1），或12月27日的法律，1973年公告（今日三Consommation甲屬124-1）的立法有時(shí)旨在保護(hù)潛在受害者的欺詐行為。這種干預(yù)的類型可以很容易地在合理的帕累托或財(cái)富最大化框架，因?yàn)樗鼫p少了一些交易成本。最好是法律，而不是發(fā)出明確的信號，以端正潛在違法者一旦發(fā)生的錯(cuò)事。從海耶克的角度來看，這種干預(yù)的好處

90、是不那么明顯，因?yàn)槟惚仨毧紤]到這一事實(shí)的潛在受害者可能，因此，不那么認(rèn)真，而表現(xiàn)出負(fù)責(zé)任的方式較少。在任何情況下，應(yīng)該牢記，法院認(rèn)為無效時(shí)特例。要盡可能地限制對無效案件數(shù)目似乎適應(yīng)當(dāng)代的需要，使更多的業(yè)務(wù)安全。</p><p><b>　　2.2解讀合同</b></p><p>　　為了保存合同，法官可能要解釋其條款或修改它們。當(dāng)讀議題的法律學(xué)者，迅速得到的結(jié)論是，在

91、法國有沒有什么原則是在法官應(yīng)用時(shí)的表現(xiàn)是一致的。蓋斯坦解釋：“因此，指的就是正義，就可以禁止向法官任何干預(yù)，或相反，正如我們今天，為了證明他/她糾正干擾，讓他/她可以保證至少有一個(gè)相對平衡的承諾可以交換”德樂貝爾也發(fā)現(xiàn)：</p><p>　　法官在解讀合同條款的作用是一個(gè)非常有爭議的問題。一方面，你可能想剝奪任何權(quán)力，法官辯稱，他并非該合同的一方，因此，法官不應(yīng)干預(yù)，也沒有權(quán)修改這些合同的內(nèi)容。另一方面，人們可以

92、承認(rèn)法官進(jìn)行干預(yù)合同事項(xiàng)，以引進(jìn)合同的公平微風(fēng)。法律是比較基礎(chǔ)上，第一種方法。事實(shí)上，正如我們已經(jīng)看到的，立法者允許自己活著自己的權(quán)利，完善和規(guī)范了一些合同。這決定了法官也有權(quán)介入合同，法官們可放心干預(yù)。</p><p>　　牢記這場爭論，讓我們看看法國成文法說。</p><p>　　法國法律的一個(gè)主要原則是法人共同同意（consensualisme juridique）。深深植根于法國的

93、傳統(tǒng)，它可以追溯到18世紀(jì)，在15世紀(jì)有一個(gè)與人身關(guān)系非常突出的原則——自主權(quán)。這意味著，解釋合同的時(shí)候，不是做字面解釋，而是根據(jù)當(dāng)事人的主觀。這也是所謂的解釋是主觀的方法和藝術(shù)基礎(chǔ)。1156年至1164年C.civ.,：“就公約而言，一要尋找的，而不是對這些詞語的字面意思看締約各方的共同意愿”（第1156 C.civ。）現(xiàn)在，如果解釋是試圖重新發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)事人真正想要什么，那么這種方法從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度來說，是作為客觀的方法改變了嗎？</p

94、><p>　　從好的一面說，不管你是帕累托或奧地利，你可以說這一解釋方法降低交易成本，因?yàn)殡p方當(dāng)事人可離開不完整的合同：如果有必要，法官，或更普遍的人是通過默認(rèn)規(guī)則-用法律解釋有關(guān)合約，他們會(huì)寫它，如果它沒有費(fèi)用完成一個(gè)完整的書面合同。不僅如此，但很可能在合同中留下空白，可能是可取的，讓各方取得高度信任的信號，承諾可以執(zhí)行。換句話說，差距可能是有用的戰(zhàn)略工具。</p><p>　　從不好的一面

95、說，它可能指出，客觀的方法，選擇了在其他國家，如德國迫使各方更期待些什么，而這反過來又可以降低未來的交易成本。還應(yīng)該指出，這并不總是容易理解當(dāng)事人的意愿，正是出于這個(gè)原因，使他們強(qiáng)大的動(dòng)力，填補(bǔ)了盡可能多的差距。</p><p>　　無論如何，法國的法律是不會(huì)讓法官解釋合同的條款或者填補(bǔ)空白，不能任意解釋。法官必須遵守一些規(guī)則。下面是其中的一些： </p>

96、<p>　　第一格言：更好地解釋這種方式的合同，它才能生存下來（第1157 C.civ）。同樣可以看到在這里有一個(gè)應(yīng)驗(yàn)的，正如前面指出，在經(jīng)濟(jì)上是自愿的交流有利于健全合同。這也是希望避免在合同關(guān)系方便做出的努力白費(fèi)。</p><p>　　第二格言（只適用于如貸款合同的單方合同）：法官應(yīng)解釋的方式是最有利于債務(wù)人（第1162 C.civ合同。）。人們可以看到這一規(guī)則的兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)原因。首先，它增加了表現(xiàn)的可能

97、性，看雙方當(dāng)事人誰有錯(cuò)誤。其次，格言讓債權(quán)人承擔(dān)相關(guān)的精密在合同條款缺乏的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這是一件好事，因?yàn)閭鶛?quán)人通常是一個(gè)誰擁有對本合同條款的選擇影響最大，并在一個(gè)位置，避免風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因此成本最低。同樣的邏輯可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)法國法律規(guī)定，在合同的附著力，誰寫了應(yīng)承擔(dān)的合同與合同條款含糊不清帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因此，合同應(yīng)該對他或她的解釋。它始終是最好的一對效率的角度，以及來自安全預(yù)期的觀點(diǎn)，統(tǒng)一的知識(shí)和決策。</p><p>　　第三箴

98、言的解釋是來自藝術(shù)。1136的C.civ。：“公約迫使當(dāng)事人履行，不僅是根據(jù)什么寫的，而且根據(jù)以公平的要求，海關(guān)和現(xiàn)有法例?！斑@也呼應(yīng)了著名的第6條的C.civ。正是基于此，法院最近設(shè)立了一些新的債券各方哲學(xué)。所以，每一方應(yīng)通知適當(dāng)?shù)钠渌鞣?，特別是就安全而言：一個(gè)外科醫(yī)生必須告知維和行動(dòng)的客戶端，生產(chǎn)者必須告知產(chǎn)品結(jié)構(gòu)的客戶端，必須轉(zhuǎn)運(yùn)安全地履行他/她的工作。在每種情況下，如果不履行義務(wù)，沒有透露資料的提供方將被追究責(zé)任。現(xiàn)在，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)

99、家對這些問題的角度是什么？對于一個(gè)帕累托，人們可以爭辯說，這格言允許降低交易成本。但它也可以被看作是一個(gè)愿望，保護(hù)合法的期望。每個(gè)人，包括第三者，希望別人的行為按照慣例，國家的設(shè)置最先進(jìn)的法律。因此，這種期望不應(yīng)失望。一個(gè)可以添加的限制性條款的意見：如果一個(gè)人認(rèn)為，雙方可能在某些情況下是由一名法官所作的解釋感到驚訝，以為根據(jù)海關(guān)，國家的最先進(jìn)和立法它應(yīng)該是可以增加。只要法律過于復(fù)雜，要遵循這個(gè)思路是合理的，基本上不會(huì)將工作對安全的期望。