外文翻譯--利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易支撐

1、<p><b>　　1 外文翻譯 </b></p><p><b>　　原文 </b></p><p>　　Propping through related party transactions</p><p>　　Material.Source:Review.of.Accounting.St

2、udies</p><p>　　Author: Ming.Jian ,T.J.Wong</p><p>　　Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1998 through 2002, this paper documents that listed firms prop up earnings by using abnormal re

3、lated sales to their controlling owners. Such related sales propping is more prevalent among state-owned firms and in regions with weaker economic institutions. We also find that these abnormal related sales are not enti

4、rely accrual-based but can be cash-based as well, and they serve as a substitute rather than complement to accruals management for meeting</p><p>　　Using a sample of listed firms in China, we study how insti

5、tutions and firm organizational structures in a transitional economy shape the ways firms use related party transactions to manage earnings. This paper is motivated by recent research on economic institutions and account

6、ing properties. In contrast to prior studies that attempt to draw broad inferences from data across many countries, this paper utilizes the intricate institutional structures of a particular country and the variation of

7、t</p><p>　　China offers a natural setting for a study of the questions for three reasons. First, as in many other emerging markets, the capital, product, and labor markets in China are underdeveloped. As a r

8、esult, firms in these markets organize into groups to form internal markets to lower transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu 2000). Further, the 2 restructuring process before the initial public offering of listed state-own

9、ed enterprises (hereafter SOEs) creates corporate groups with frequent related party</p><p>　　Second, the bright-line rules for share issuance and delisting in China allow us to identify clear evidence of ea

10、rnings management incentives. Chinese securities regulators have set two earnings targets that regulate firm listings. In particular, a firm must report at least 10% return on equity (ROE) to maintain its listing status

11、and 10% (6% after 2001) ROE to issue new shares. These targets create incentives for controlling owners to assist listed firms in managing ROEs. We expect that more in</p><p>　　Third, the weak legal and mark

12、et institutions in China implies a higher frequency of propping (Cheung et al. 2006) and increases the power of our tests. The significant variation in the degree of market development and government intervention in busi

13、ness activities across China’s thirty provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (excluding Hong Kong and Macau SAR) allows us to examine the cross-sectional effects of legal and market institutions on propping. &l

14、t;/p><p>　　We hypothesize that controlling owners inflate Chinese listed firms’ revenues and earnings through related sales to qualify for rights issues or to avoid delisting.4 Chinese firms have ample opportun

15、ities to use related sales for earnings management because related party transactions are very common. One reason for their prevalence is that SOEs rely heavily on internal markets for materials, products, labor, and cap

16、ital. Before China’s economic reforms, these markets were non-existent as the cen</p><p>　　Following Khanna and Yafeh (2005), we use related sales to proxy for propping because they are one of the most frequ

17、ent types of related party transactions in our sample. The high frequency of these transactions allows sellers to inflate earnings simply by shifting next period’s related sales to the current period. Compared with real

18、activities manipulation such as aggressive price discounts to 3 increase sales or deferral of R&D projects discussed in Roychowdhury (2006), accelerating related sa</p><p>　　We note that firms could use

19、other types of related party transactions such as asset injections as an alternative way to achieve propping, but such transactions are much more infrequent and thus more easily detected. According to the CSRCs 1999 regu

20、lations for rights offerings, infrequent items such as gains and losses from investments and sales of fixed assets are no longer allowed to be included in the calculation of ROE, which suggests that government regulators

21、 regard nonrecurring items as p</p><p>　　Chinese listed companies have been required to disclose related party transactions since 1997. This disclosure was incomplete and irregular in the first year (Yuan 19

22、98), but more systematic thereafter. Most companies report in a special footnote to their financial statements the identity of their related parties, the relation with these related parties (for example, percentage of sh

23、ares held), and the types and amounts of related party transactions. Due to the complexity of some Chinese corpora</p><p>　　Based on the financial statement footnotes on related party transactions, we manual

24、ly collect and classify each transaction by the nature of the transaction and the related party involved. Generally, the major related parties are the shareholders (or companies in the shareholder’s group), the subsidiar

25、ies and the associated companies of the listed companies. Some other related parties include the subsidiary’s minority shareholders and the listed companies’ ex-shareholders. We classify related pa</p><p>　　

26、Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics on related sales with various types of related parties in the three general categories of firm ownership. Specifically, 57 and 48% of the central and local government firms,

27、respectively, have related sales, while only 37% of the nonstate firms report such dealings. The majority of these intra-group trades involve the largest shareholder, with 48% of central government firms and 40% of local

28、 government firms. Related sales with the second-largest sha</p><p>　　This study uses a sample of firms listed in China from 1998 through 2002 to provide evidence of propping through related party transactio

29、ns. China offers a natural setting for studying the shifting of resources between controlling owners and listed firms due to its underdeveloped capital, product, and labor markets; bright-line rules for share issuance an

30、d delisting; and weak legal and market institutions. </p><p>　　Our evidence shows that controlling owners of Chinese listed firms engage in propping through related sales. The increase in related sales is as

31、sociated with higher operating profits, and related sales are used to damp negative industry earnings shocks when listed firms have incentives to manage earnings. By using such inter-company trades to meet securities reg

32、ulators’ earnings targets, the controlling owners help the listed firms maintain their listing status or qualify for rights issues. </p><p>　　Propping through related sales can be effected through cash-based

33、, rather than entirely accrual-based, transactions. Related sales and discretionary accruals are found to be substitutes for earnings management. When firms generally have sales transactions with their related parties or

34、 they have positive abnormal related sales, they have a weaker tendency to use discretionary accruals to meet earnings targets. However, we find that firms have a stronger tendency to use discretionary accruals to i</

35、p><p><b>　　譯文 </b></p><p><b>　　利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易支撐</b></p><p>　　資料來源: 會計研究述評 作者: Ming.Jian ,T.J.Wong</p><p>　　以 1998 至 2002 的中國上市公司為研究樣板，本文研究了上市公司利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易

36、操縱利潤問題。 這種不正常的關(guān)聯(lián)交易在國有企業(yè)和一些經(jīng)濟(jì)體制薄弱的地區(qū)非常常見。我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)這些不正常的關(guān)聯(lián)交易并不完全基于獲利多少，還可以根據(jù)現(xiàn)金的流動，并且他們起了 一個替補(bǔ)作用， 而非為了達(dá)到盈利目標(biāo)。由于這些異常相關(guān)的銷售可以是以現(xiàn)金為基礎(chǔ)， 通過有關(guān)的借貸款有大量現(xiàn)金從上市公司調(diào)回后，用以支撐控制業(yè)主。然而，通過相關(guān)借貸沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金調(diào)動同增值收入管理聯(lián)系在一起。</p><p>　　利用中國的上市公司為樣

37、本，我們研究機(jī)構(gòu)和企業(yè)組織結(jié)構(gòu)如何在在轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)中利用公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易來操縱盈余管理。本文是出于對經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)和會計性能的研究而進(jìn)展的。與試圖吸引來自全世界各地的許多國家廣泛的推論和以前的研究數(shù)據(jù)不同，本文利用了某一特定國家的體制結(jié)構(gòu)和在該國境內(nèi)跨省變化的復(fù)雜機(jī)構(gòu)。此外， 通過分析主要作為盈余管理形式的關(guān)聯(lián)交易， 如 Leuz 等人先前的研究， 發(fā)現(xiàn)他們側(cè)重于研究應(yīng)計項目與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　研究該問

38、題，中國提供了一個很好的天然環(huán)境。首先，正如許多其他新興市場一樣，在中國，資本，產(chǎn)品，以及勞動力市場并不發(fā)達(dá)。因此，在這些市場內(nèi)的企業(yè)們會自發(fā)地組織起來，形成內(nèi)部市場，降低交易成本。此外，在首次公開招股的上市國有企業(yè)(以下簡稱國有企業(yè))，以所有者身份，在公開發(fā)行之前，與其子公司和母公司頻繁地創(chuàng)建企業(yè)集團(tuán)間的關(guān)聯(lián)方交易。</p><p>　　其次，對股票發(fā)行與中國退市的具體規(guī)則允許我們尋找盈余管理的激勵機(jī)制的證據(jù)。

39、中國證券監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)設(shè)立了要規(guī)范上市的兩個公司的盈利目標(biāo)。特別是，公司必須報告至少 10%的權(quán)益回報(凈資產(chǎn)收益率) 用來維持其上市地 6位以及 10%(2001 年后 6%) 的凈資產(chǎn)收益率才能發(fā)行新股。這些目標(biāo)創(chuàng)造的盈余，使得所有者支持上市公司凈資產(chǎn)收益率的管理激勵機(jī)制。我們期望更多的收入和報告的凈資產(chǎn)收益率與高于盈利目標(biāo)只有輕微有關(guān)。 </p><p>　　我們推測，所有者通過夸大中國上市公司的銷售收入和盈

40、利水平來通過有關(guān)資格權(quán)利問題， 避免被停止上市。中國企業(yè)有充分的機(jī)會利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易，因為關(guān)聯(lián)方交易是一種很常見的現(xiàn)象。其原因之一是國有企業(yè)普遍依賴于材料，產(chǎn)品，勞動力和資本的市場現(xiàn)象嚴(yán)重。在中國的改革開放以前，作為中央政府，它指導(dǎo)國有企業(yè)的所有方面的運作，這些市場現(xiàn)象并不存在。另一個原因就是，近 80%的中國上市公司是被從他們的父母，即以前的國有企業(yè)中分離，變成了上市公司的所有者并控制其附屬公司。剝離出來并首次公開上市后，上市附屬公司繼續(xù)

41、經(jīng)常從事與父母國有企業(yè)有關(guān)的關(guān)聯(lián)方交易。 </p><p>　　以 Khanna 和 Yafeh 為例， 我們使用相關(guān)的關(guān)聯(lián)交易代理為支撐，因為他們是我們的樣本中關(guān)聯(lián)方交易最頻繁的類型之一。這些高頻率的交易，可以簡單方便的通過把今后一個時期的相關(guān)銷售收益移動到當(dāng)期收益。與操縱手法比較真實的活動相比，如利用積極的價格折扣， 來增加銷售或延遲 Roychowdhury討論研發(fā)項目，加快關(guān)聯(lián)交易的進(jìn)行可以使操縱公司的成

42、本更低。</p><p>　　我們猜測，當(dāng)企業(yè)想盡量達(dá)到盈利目標(biāo)時，關(guān)聯(lián)交易的水平會異常的高。我們注意到，企業(yè)可以使用其他類型的關(guān)聯(lián)交易，如以另一種替代方式來實現(xiàn)資產(chǎn)注入，以達(dá)到支撐關(guān)聯(lián)方的目的， 但這樣的交易非常頻繁，因此更容易被發(fā)現(xiàn)。 根據(jù) CSRCs1999 年的配股規(guī)定， 一些罕見項目，如投資收益和出售固定資產(chǎn)不再被允許計入凈資產(chǎn)收益率，這表明政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)將視潛在收益的非經(jīng)常性項目作為管理工具。在診斷檢查

43、報告的第二節(jié)，我們研究其他的操作系統(tǒng)，如相關(guān)的采購項目以及非經(jīng)營性項目 ，如資產(chǎn)或現(xiàn)金的注入。研究表明結(jié)果不支持企業(yè)在周圍的股份發(fā)行和被除名的時間里，利用這些項目 來支撐這一概念。 </p><p>　　中國上市公司自 1997 年開始被要求披露關(guān)聯(lián)方交易。這種披露在第一年，即1998 年是不完整也不規(guī)則的，但此后便變得更加系統(tǒng)。多數(shù)公司在報告中標(biāo)有一個特殊的腳注， 表明其財務(wù)報表中的有關(guān)各方的身份，以及與這些關(guān)

44、聯(lián)方的關(guān)系(例如，持有股份的百分比)、 種類和關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的金額。由于一些中國企業(yè)集團(tuán)的復(fù)雜性，這些關(guān)聯(lián)交易附注披露可以非常復(fù)雜。例如，上海龍公司報道，在 2002 年，其公司與超過 100 家關(guān)聯(lián)方發(fā)生超過140起的關(guān)聯(lián)交易。</p><p>　　在關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的財務(wù)報表附注的基礎(chǔ)上，我們手動收集和分類所有交易的性質(zhì)以及有關(guān)當(dāng)事人的每筆交易。一般來說，主要的關(guān)聯(lián)方有股東(或股東的集團(tuán)公司)，附屬公司及上市公司的聯(lián)營

45、公司。其他一些相關(guān)方包括附屬公司少數(shù)股東和上市公司的前股東。我們將其分為 17 種不同類型的關(guān)聯(lián)方交易。樣本7中一些公司當(dāng)年的交易頻率和每個交易的平均價值如下: 銷售(47.29%， 人民幣 3.03 億美元)， 購買商品或產(chǎn)品(44.50%， 人民幣 550 億元)， 應(yīng)收賬款和應(yīng)付賬款(37.07%，人民幣 1億美元)， 其他應(yīng)收應(yīng)付款項(51.32%，為 18 億元人民幣)， 服務(wù)收入(12.53%，人民幣 7800 萬) 和費

46、用(22.08%，人民幣 6600萬)，利息收入(14.57%的貸款，人民幣 11 萬元 ) 和支 出(3.6%，1800 萬元)，資產(chǎn)購買(10.44%，人民幣 1.36 億元) 和銷售(5.69%，人民幣 7500 萬 ) ，股票購買(7.95%，人民幣 68 億元) 和銷售(5.56 %，人民幣 5100 萬)，租金收入(11.90%，人民幣 10萬元) 及費用(28.63%，人民幣</p><p>　　通

47、過調(diào)查關(guān)聯(lián)方的各類所有制企業(yè)的銷售統(tǒng)計摘要，發(fā)現(xiàn)有 57%和 48%的中央和地方政府的公司有相關(guān)的銷售，但是卻只有 37%的非國有企業(yè)報告有關(guān)交易。參與這些集團(tuán)內(nèi)部交易的第一大股東有 48%的中央企業(yè)和 40%的地方政府。與第二大股東相關(guān)產(chǎn)品的交易更是頻繁，從 2%的當(dāng)?shù)卣墓镜?5%的中央政府到的公司。</p><p>　　本研究采用了從 1998 年到 2002 年的中國上市公司，來尋求他們利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易

48、來支撐企業(yè)的證據(jù)。基于中國欠發(fā)達(dá)的資本，產(chǎn)品和勞動力市場背景，對股票的發(fā)行規(guī)則，以及法律和市場制度的薄弱，中國提供了一個學(xué)習(xí)上市公司和所有者之間的資源轉(zhuǎn)移的絕佳環(huán)境。</p><p>　　我們的證據(jù)表明中國上市公司所有者有涉及到相關(guān)關(guān)聯(lián)交易。相關(guān)關(guān)聯(lián)交易伴隨較高的經(jīng)營利潤，并且當(dāng)潮濕行業(yè)的盈利面臨負(fù)面沖擊時，關(guān)聯(lián)交易便成為上市公司制造盈余管理的方式。通過使用這種公司間的內(nèi)部交易，以滿足證券監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的盈利目標(biāo)，控股

49、上市公司所有者幫助維持其上市的地位、資格或權(quán)利問題。</p><p>　　關(guān)聯(lián)交易的實現(xiàn)可以是以現(xiàn)金的流動為基礎(chǔ)的，而不完全是以獲利經(jīng)營為基礎(chǔ)。關(guān)聯(lián)交易和應(yīng)計項目也被當(dāng)成是盈余管理的替代品。當(dāng)企業(yè)頻繁得與他們的關(guān)聯(lián)方進(jìn)行關(guān)聯(lián)交易或者是有異常相關(guān)的交易時，他們稍微會有操縱應(yīng)計利潤的傾向，以滿足盈利目標(biāo)。但是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)企業(yè)沒有相關(guān)的關(guān)聯(lián)方或沒有進(jìn)行關(guān)聯(lián)交易時，企業(yè)就有較強(qiáng)的夸大使用裁決性應(yīng)計利潤的傾向。此外，以現(xiàn)金